Hegel's Logic

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http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029069833
HEGEL'S LOGIC
BOOKS BY
HEGEL'S LOGIC
AN ESSAY
IN INTERPRETATION
BY
JOHN GEIER HIBBEN,
Ph.D.
STUAKT PROFESSOR OF LOGIC IN PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
NEW YORK
CHAELES SCRIBNEK'S SONS
1902
COPYRIGHT,
1902,
BY
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

PUBLTSHED NOVEMBER,
1902.
J. S.
CuBhing & Co. Berwick & Smith Norwood Masa. U.S.A.
Co
J.
D. H.
Drei Schwestem, Giite, Heiterkeit, Verstand, Du hast zu Deinen Parzen sie erkoren
;
Sie sind's, die
weben Deines Lebens Band.
Hkqel.
PREFACE
In
his Logic
Hegel has endeavored to incor-
porate the essential principles of philosophy
which in the development of the world's thought have forced themselves upon men's convictions, and have been attested by a general consensus
of opinion.
An
insight into the Hegelian sys-
tem means,
therefore, a comprehensive
and ap-
preciative grasp of the history of philosophy in
the salient features of
its
progress.
The Logic
serves also as an excellent introduction to the
more
specific
study of German philosophy which
has been most profoundlj- affected by the writings of Hegel, both in the philosophical schools
whose doctrines have been grounded confessedly upoii Hegelian principles, and also among those which represent a radical reaction against Hegel. Moreover, the system of philosophy as outlined in the Logic is not merely a speculative system of abstract thought, but is at the same time an interpretation of life in all the fulness
of its concrete significance.
Upon
these con-
siderations,
therefore,
of the
it
is
evident
that
knowledge
Hegelian system must prove
viii
PREFACE
of inestimable value to the student of philoso-
phy.
of
Unfortunately the proverbial obscurity

It is
Hegel has deterred many from undertaking
a systematic study of his works. viction that the text of the Logic
my
con-
is self -illumi-
nating.
It has
been
my
endeavor, therefore,
to simplify all technical
terms and explain their
significance in the light of the definitions as
given by Hegel himself, and as indicated in the context where such terms severally occur. There has been throughout an attempt to render
intelligible the
fundamental Hegelian doctrines
by means of simple statement and illustration. The method of interpretation has grown out of the belief that the best commentary upon Hegel is Hegel himself. The basis of this exposition
has been the Logic of the Encyhlopddie der philosophischen Wissensohaften, Hegel's WerJce,
volume received valuable suggestions from my

of this
During the preparation
VI. have
friend,
Professor Creighton of Cornell University, to whom I gladly express my indebtedness.

J. G.
H.
Princeton University,
October
6,
1902.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
CriAPTEE
I. Pi,5
[.
II.
The Logic as \ Systeji of Philosophy The Vaeiois Attitudes op Thought towards THE Objective World. The
.
METArUYSICAL SVSTE.MS
III.
.23
.
IV.
V.
VI.
The Empirical School The Critical Philosophy The Theory of Intuitive Knowledge A General Survey of the Logic
.
38
.
45
61
68
PAET
VIL
VIII.
THE DOCTRIXE OF BEING

Quality
Quantity
....
PART
II
...
.85
.
.
105 119
IX.
Measure
THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE

X.
The Doctrine of Essence

Features
in its
General
135
.
XI.
XII.
Essence as the Ground of Existence

Actuality, or the Real
148
1I>7
Appearance, or the Phenomenal World
XIII.
World
183
CONTENTS
PART
CHAPTER
III
THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION

PAGE
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
The General Nature oe the Notion The Subjective Notion The Objective Notion
. . . . . . .
205
.
215 249
The Idea or the Eternal Reason 269 The Relation of the Logic to the Philosophy OF Nature and the Philosophy OF Mind 288
...
...
APPENDIX
A
Glossary of the more important Philosophical Terms in Hegel's Logic
295
309
INDEX
INTRODUCTION
Vo7i der Grosse
und Macht des
Geistes
kann der
Mensch
Wesen
loelche
niclit
gross genug denJcen.
Das
verscJdossene
in
sich,
des
Universums hat keine Kraft

llutJie des
dem
es
Erkenncns Wldersiand
ilim
leisten
konnte,
nmss
sich vor
ojifthim
und seinen
Beichthum und seine Tiefen ihm vor Augen legen
und zum Genusse bringen.
Hegel.
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER
I
THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OP PHILOSOPHY
HEGEL'S
is
Logic
is
not a logic in the formal

in
and restricted sense

of reasoning.
which that term
usually understood, as the science or the art

It has a far larger scope, embrac-
ing as
it
does a complete system of philosophy
in itself.
Philosophy, according to Hegel,

;
is
science of things in a setting of thoughts
it is
the science of the universe as
it is
interpreted
by thought, and as it has significance for the mind which observes the wealth of its varied manifestation. The intelligence which contemplates the universe finds therein a like intelli-
gence revealing
in a glass.
izes the
is
itself, as
face answereth to face

character-
That intelligence which

is
observing mind and the world which
the object of the observation
one and the
same.
In order to understand the essential

it
features of the Hegelian system,
is
neces-
sary to appreciate at the beginning the funda3
INTKODUCTION
mental characteristics of the intelligence which constitutes its centre and core. With Hegel thought, whether manifested in
the activity of
mind or revealed
in the order
and harmony
tive features.
It
is
of the universe, has four distinc-
essentially
active
and never
passive.
The mind is not to be regarded as a plastic medium upon which impressions are produced
by the varied stimulation of the several senses. The mind is not a photographic plate to hold
and then to give back upon demand whatever it may have received. Thought is the rather to be conceived as a force, a dynamic centre. Its function is conwhatever may be printed upon
it
structive.
The
creative
is
of the universe
a thought force
and sustaining source and the

;
thought activity which

ercising partakes of the
we
are conscious of ex-
same nature.
The second function of thought is to transmute the crude material given by the senses into a systematic body of knowledge. Out of a chaos of sensations, perceptions, feelings, and the like, thought builds up an orderly cosmos.
To extend
interprets
the figure already employed, thought the world in a series

of
portraits
rather than photographs.
And
as an interpre-
THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 5

tation
by means
of a portrait always involves

of
an ideal element, so in the interpretation

the world of thought there
is
always an ideal
element.
But
the introduction of an ideal eleinterpretation unreal.
ment does not render the
On
the contrary, whenever a superficial view of
the world gives place to a deeper insight,
when
which
to the
thought like the great creative Spirit broods

over
is
it,
we
are persuaded that the change
wrought by thought brings us nearer heart and truth of things themselves.

It is of the nature of
thought in the third
place to seek the universal significance of every

particular experience by
which it is confronted. The animal lives and moves and has its being in the midst of particular experiences, and it does not possess the capacity of reflecting upon
them, or possesses
Reflection,
it
is
in a very restricted
manner.
which
the characteristic
mode
of
thought,
may
as
be defined as the reference of a

its
particular experience to
sal.
appropriate univer-
Man
this
the reflective animal alone posof

It
sesses
power
seeing things
is
in
their
universal aspect.
differs
often said that
man
from the animal in that he is endowed with a conceptual capacity, that is, the capacity Thus when one says. to form universal ideas.
6
" This
is
INTRODUCTION
a man, a dog, a horse," etc., he
is
sim-
ply referring the particular object of perception
which occupies the centre of the

for the
field of vision
moment
is
to the appropriate class or

it
group
or kind to
class idea
which
belongs.
Such a group or
.univer-
a concept
and has always a
sal significance,
and
all of
our assertions contain
some such reference

language
itself as
to a universal.
Moreover,
is
the vehicle of thought
system of symbols which represent universal

ideas,
and which thought employs for the pur-
pose of a complete characterization of particular

experiences wliich must remain without meaning
until they are properly interpreted in the light
of their universal relations.
In the fourth place, every thought reference

carries
with
it
a consciousness of the Ego, or
makes the reference. Every conscious thought process, however simple, and however relatively unimportant, is in
the
itself
personality which
the
declaration
there
is
of
free
personality.
is personaccording to Hegel's fundamental dictum. Therefore the intelligence which is so variously
Wherever
thought,
there
ality,
manifested in the world about us bespeaks an all-embracing Ego, which is the great universal
and to which
all
separate
Egos
are to be referred
THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

as
individuals
to
their
corresponding genus.
centre, gives
Such an Ego, as a cosmic
unity
to the activities of all personalities throughout
the universe, comprehending
all in
one system,
is
which
terized
in every part,
however minute,
charac-
by
intelligence.
Such being the nature

sonal force,
of thought in general,
a dynamic, constructive, interpretative,
and per-
we
will
now examine
as
it
its
functions
more in
detail.
Occupying
does the cenit is
tral place in the
Hegelian system,
necessary
at the outset to understand fully Hegel's con-
ception of thought activity.
It
is
obvious that
thought manifests
its
activity in
numerous ways.
an incalculable
In the reference of the individual experience to

its
appropriate universal there
is
number
of universals, as various as the manifold
possibilities of
the world of experience

is
itself.
In this connection there

naturally suggests
of
itself,
question which
is
and which
of
also one
the fundamental
problems
philosophy,
"Are there not in thought a certain definite number of comprehensive universals to which all others may be referred, and which will serve to mark off well-defined areas of knowledge or modes of thought, so that when we speak of the world of knowledge these divisions may be re-
INTEODUOTION
as
garded
constituting the great continents of
thought?"
called
Such large divisions of our knowledge are Benkhestimmungen). (^die categories

original
The
the
meaning
are the
of
category
is
found in
is,
the Greek verb KarT^yopelv, to predicate, that

categories
possible
predicate various attributes of
ways one can any subject, so
that together they form a natural classification of
the most comprehensive themes of our think-
They indicate the different ways in which the mind can view the world of experience. They are to be regarded as the typical modes of
ing.
thought.
As an
is
illustration,
we may
by
take the table of

Aristotle,
the categories, as outlined

as follows
1.
:
which
Substance.
2. 3.
Quantity.
Quality.
Relation.
4.
5. 6. 7.
8.
Action.
Passion
(i.e.
(i.e.
the object of action).

space).
Where
When
(i.e.
time).
9.
Posture.
10. Habit.
When we
substance,
have described anything
as regards its
how
large
it is,
what
its
nature
is, its
relations to other things,
how
it acts,
how
it is
acted upon,
posture and
its
space and time conditions,
its
its habit,
then
we have
well-nigh
exhausted the
possibilities of description.
Hegel's system of philosophy as contained in

his logic
may
be appropriately styled a natural
history of the categories, being essentially an
exposition of their nature, their relations, and
the
mode
of their development.
The main
:
doc-
trines
of the
logic concerning
the categories
may
rate
be summarized briefly as follows
The
categories are not to be regarded as sepaisolated points of view.
and
They
sustain
such reciprocal relations that together they form

a single and harmonious system.
This system,
series, in
moreover, partakes of the nature of a
which the several terms may be grouped in the

order of their progressive complexity, the
first
term being the simplest, and the succeeding

terms more and more complex.
contains two kinds of elements,
Every term
explicit
is
also
the
it,
and
the implicit.
Explicitly every term
the result
of all the terms

it is
which precede
and implicitly
and
the potential of all which are to follow.

is
It
the nature both of thought
itself,
INTRODUCTION
,lso
of things
as
interpreted by thought, that
yhen we start at the lowest category where mowledge is reduced to a minimun, i.e. the east that can be possibly predicated of anyhing, there
is
a natural constraint of the
mind
pass on to a higher category, a higher level of bought, in order to complete the defects and to
emove the
limitations of the lower
and so on
is
md
on,
until the
will
highest possible category
comprehend and explain eached which This movement of thought he others.

)Ccasioned by the circumstance that the
all
is
mind
evolving about
iategory
is
itself in
the sphere of a single
always confronted by two disquietIt is
ng
considerations.
is
never satisfied with a

it
esult that
partial,
and
will not tolerate a
iontradiction
or
inconsistency.
Hence
is,
arises
bis inner constraint to transcend the limits of

;he
single category in question, that
a partial
defects
joint of view, in order to
overcome
its
md
)f
contradictions.
is
This progressive movement
thought
called the dialectic,
and
is
the disin the
inctive feature of the Hegelian
method
ionstruction of his system of philosophy.
The term
Seno, and
it
" dialectic " originates in the ancient
jreek philosophy, probably with the old Eleatic

has been
made
familiar in the teach-

ings of Socrates and the dialogues of Plato.
latter recall to
11
The
mind a
picture of two disputants,
the one
maintaining a proposition, the other

it,
opposing
while out of the discussion there
emerges a more exact and adequate statement of

truth.
This
:
is,
in substance,
the
method
of
Hegel
the examination of a positive statement

is
or thesis, which
confronted by an opposed
statement or antithesis, and out of the opposition

there results a synthesis, wliich
is
a resolution of
the existing contradiction upon a higher plane

of thought.
Upon
the same level or from the
same point of view contradictory statements
must ever remain

as half truths
obstinately irresoluble
it is
only in a higher sense that they can be regarded
combining to form truth
entire.
Such a
synthesis, therefore, always represents a
progress in thought, an advance to a higher
point of view, a more comprehensive survey, a
deeper insight, a wider prospect.
In order to understand the dialectic method,

the following observations must be carefully
considered
The
first stage,
that of the so-called thesis,
is
designated by Hegel as the stage of the abstract
understanding
is
the second, the antithesis, which
a representation of the incompleteness of the
12
first
INTRODUCTION
by showing
its
obverse side,
;
is
known
as that
of the negative reason

is
the third, the synthesis,

that of
known
as the speculative stage, or
positive reason.
The terms which

abstract
are
here employed
the
the
understanding,
positive reason
negative
reason,
and the
are
is
used in a sense
a fundamental
peculiar to
distinction
crete,
Hegel.
There
drawn
between abstract
runs
and conthe
a distinction which
through
entire philosophical
system of Hegel.
Abstract
or is used always in the sense of a one-sided Concrete, on the other partial view of things.
hand,
is
used to indicate a comprehensive view
of things
which includes
all possible
consideraitself, its
;
tions as to the nature of

origin,
is
the thing
it
and the relations which

first of
sustains
it
the thing plus its setting.
The
the three stages
is
referred to also
as the product of the

stancT), the
understanding Qder VerVernunff) respec-
second and third, as that of the nega(^die
tive
and
positive reason
tively.
There
is
evidently a distinction
the
drawn
reason.
between the
sion,
understanding and
Hegel does not intend to leave the impreshowever, that there

is
a certain definite
call the
faculty of the
mind which we
under-
THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OP PHILOSOPHY

standing, and
still
13
another quite distinct which
Such a view fails wholly Hegel maintains that the mind works as it were upon two levels, a lower and a higher, and yet one and the same mind withal. Upon the lower certain
call the reason.
we
to grasp his meaning.
considerations
characteristic
are
overlooked which are

essential
the the
and
features
of
higher.
Upon
the lower level, that of the underof its functions
standing, the
mind employs one

the
to the exclusion of the rest;
namely, that of
discrimination,
differences,
seeing of things in their

as distinct, separate,
and therefore
and
isolated,
out
may
of relation to other things
and them
to
all.
the
unitary system which
embraces
of the
While, therefore, the function
understanding
be regarded as a process
is
[of differentiation, that of the reason

tially a process of
essenis
integration.
Reason
It is
the
synthetical
power of thought.
takes note,
in the
is
the put-
ting of things together in their natural relations.
The reason
it is
true, of the
differences
which are
world of experience,
It
and yet nevertheless
capable of apprehending
the unity which underlies these differences.

sees things not as apart and cohering in systems, and the
separate, but as
distinct systems
14
INTRODUCTION
all-comprehending
understand-
themselves as forming one

system, the universe
itself.
It is evident, therefore, that the
ing and the reason are not necessarily antithetical terms.
The work
of the understanding
is
preliminary to that of the reason.
Where they
appear, as they often do in the Logic, as antago-
the false view of the understanding which is the object of the Hegelian scorn namely, that view which regards the offices of the understanding as complete in themselves, and needing
nistic, it is
;
no higher operation of the mind to supplement

or correct them.
It is the office of the negative reason to
make
manifest the limitations of the understanding
and the contradictions which every one-sided and partial view of things necessarily involves.
The
office of
is
the positive reason, on the other the defects which the
hand,
to
make good
In this connection Hegel employs two technical terms which appear frequently in the development of his system. They are negation and absolute negation.
negative reason reveals.
By
negation
is
to be understood this process of
negative reason which results in the denial of the primary thesis. By absolute negation is
meant the overcoming
in turn of this first con-

tradiction
15
by an assertion which denies which involves a higher point of view.

has the force always of an affirmation.
negatio affirmat.
it
and
This
is
equivalent to a negation of a negation, whicli
Duplex
The
three steps of the dialectic,
therefore, are affirmation, negation, then a nega-
tion of this negation which

tion.
is itself
an affirma-
It is to
be observed, moreover, that the

is
term " dialectic "

sense
used in two senses in Hegel, In the former

process
of
a general and a special sense.

it
designates
the
threefold
thought as a whole, which has just been outlined.
In
its
special use
it is
applied merely
to the second -of
the limiting
its
negative stage of the process,
of the original statement through
contradiction.
The
antithesis, moreover,
is
which opposes
in
thought the primary thesis

pens to oppose
not a chance con-
fronting of a statement by another which hapit.
The
contradiction
is
is
never
external, artificial, or arbitrary, but
one which
grows out of the very nature of the original thought itself. Every thought which is onesided,
thereby of necessity involves
its
own
it
is
contradiction.
finite
From
the very fact that

it
and therefore incomplete,
point or
must at some inadequate, and therefore other prove
16
fall of its
I2SrTE0DXJCT10ISr
own
weight.
It
cannot support
itself,
nor can
it
justify itself.
Thus, to use an
that
illus-
tration of Hegel,
we say
man
is
mortal,
and seem
to think that the
ground
of this
mor-
tality lies in the external
circumstances which
constantly surround and menace him; but the true view of the matter is that life in its very
nature as
so the
at
life
involves the
germ
its
of death,
and
life of
a finite creature being essentially

itself
war with
works
This dialectic
erb
may be seen in summum jus, summa injuria ;

its
own dissolution. the common provthat

is
is,
to
push
an abstract right to
extreme
to pass in-
sensibly to its contradictory,

reality
and to cause in
So
also
injustice rather
than justice.
Hegel draws attention to the fact that in the

sphere of politics extreme anarchy passes over
into its opposite
extreme despotism; and that in
the sphere of ethics the following proverbs attest the same general principle,
fore a fall "
" Pride
itself,
goeth beitself."
and " Too much wit outwits

finds
The
the
dialectic
further
illustration
in
history of philosophy
wherein the
several systems of thought are confronted each
by
opposed system, while out of the controversies which ensue there emerges a more comits
plete
system which combines the truth and
17
discards the errors, which each of the conflicting
systems contained.
Such a process
is
repeated
again and again in the gradual development

of the fulness of of truth
which only centuries
controversy and of experience are able to
reveal.
We have referred thus far to the method by which Hegel proposes to construct the world of knowledge, and to show how part is related to part throughout, and all parts to the whole in a
progressive development wherein every advance
marks a growing completeness
of
knowledge.
system
;
But
this
is
but one-half of
as one
his
for
Hegel maintains,
are at the
of the
cardinal doc-
trines of his philosophy, that the laws of thought
same time the laws
of things,
and that
the categories of thought correspond precisely
with the determining characteristics of things.
The
rational
system of thought
is
with him
all being.
equivalent to the true philosophy of
Thus with him epistemology and ontology one the secret of the mind is the secret of
;
are
the
universe.
Man
as a rational being
is
veritably
a microcosm. "
Know thyself
is
and
all is
known."
This is all dictum, " The real

tional
is
summarily expressed
This
is
in the Hegelian
the rational, and the rain accord with the
the real."
18
doctrine
of
INTEODtJCTION
Spinoza,
who
affirms
that " the
is the same as and concatenation of things." ^ Hegel the order regards the cosmos and the cosmic processes as
order and concatenation of ideas
the manifestation of reason.
Moreover,
it is
of
the essence of reason to manifest itself in the objective world.
Reason has two
sides,
a thought
Reason
is
side
and a
force side, a rational
and a dynamic
to
essence,
and these two are one.
be regarded, therefore, as underlying all thoughts
and all things. In the physical world the laws of phenomena finding expression in mathematical formulae represent the thought side of reason
;
the
phenomena themselves are but the

of the reason im-
particular manifestations of these laws, the concrete
and dynamic realization

them.
Every individual thing in the universe must be regarded as having some universal law or principle of reason as- the very root and substance of its being, attributes .and activiplicit in
ties.
This universal principle of reason
is
the
creative
It is
and constructive force of the universe.

is
seen in the architectonic principle which
the soul of the plant, in the creative and sustain-
ing power in the animal and in man, in the formation of character, in the building of insti1
Spinoza, Ethics,
II, p. 7.

tutions, in the
state,
19
development of church and of and of the arts and sciences.

of
This principle
Begriff.
reason
its full
Hegel
calls
the
To convey
significance I have
adopted the usual translation of this term

namely, the notion. It will be necessary, however,
to enlarge our usual connotation of the term
" notion," so that as an equivalent for Begriff

it
will signify this universal principle of reason
which is active in all thought and in all things. Let us examine a few passages of the Logic in order that at the beginning we may form a correct idea of Hegel's
own
is
interpretation of the
life
;
term.
it
is
"
The
Begriff
the principle of all
at the
is,
1
same time the absolutely concrete,
that
finding complete manifestation in re-
ality."
"
of things, constituting-
The Begriff is found in the innermost heart them what they in reality
are."^
"The forms
of the Begriff are the living

is
spirit of reality,
and whatever
are."^
real
is
such
only because these forces are active in them,
making them what they

It is
obvious that the Hegelian system
is
one
of idealism.
The cosmic
1
force
is
to be regarded
Hegel, WerTce, VI, 160.

8
VI,
166.
VI, 162.
20
as
JNTIiODUCTlON
the
manifestation
in
its
various phases of
all
the all-embracing reason,
and
histoiy as an
evolution of this reason in the progressive unfolding of

its
inner activity.
This idealism
;
is,
moreover, an absolute idealism

derlying reason, v^hich
taining principle of
all
is
that
is,
the unsus-
the creative
is
and
things,
in the
midst
of all its variety of manifestation absolutely
one
and the same, from which nothing can be taken,

and
to
which nothing can be added.

Absolute,
that
It is
comIt
is,
pletely unconditioned
therefore, the
and independent.
is,
God.
The
highest manifestation of this principle of reason
Hegel
cate
calls the
Idea (die
Idee'), desiring to indi-
by a single word that the supreme power

mechanical and material,
of the universe is not
but essentially rational and spiritual.
The
Idea,
the Absolute, God, are to be regarded as strictly
synonymous terms used by Hegel interchangeably, and with no shade of distinction in their
meaning.
In the exposition of Hegel's system he endeavors to show that the world of knowledge unfolds by the inner constraint of its own dialectic
from the simplest beginnings through more and more complex stages until it reaches
<;'implete fulfilment in
the all-embracing Abso-
THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF THILOSOPHY

lute.
ill
But though the
Aleolut*?
ivs
is tlie
consum-
mation of the process

the Absolute, as the
a whole, nevertheless
creative
and sustaining
principle of reason itself,
ginning of the process,

fore every
must be both the beand must undexlie every

Thereof
this
it
succeeding stage of the process as well.

cn>ss-section.
;\s
were,
process of evolution reveals some ph;\se of the

Al\5olute. incomplete
if
it is
true, and, therefore,

it
taken by
itself
misleading, but so far forth
remains an unmistakable manifestation of the

divine reason which
tion.
is its
ground and
justifica-
Thus Hegel
defines the Absolute as the
essence of all Iving in general; as cause, and as
law
in the physical universe
as couseiousness,
purpose, beneficence, justice,

of mind.
etc.. in
the realm
sys-
From
this point of
view Hegel's
tem may
be characterized as the
progressive
revelation of God.
Kegels method
of exposition in general
may
be summarized, therefore, as an attempt to show

the various stages of development in the manifestation of the principle of re^tson as a growii.g
revelation of the Absolute in such a
every stag^ by
involves
its
itself
is
jwrtial,
;
manner that and therefore
own
contradiction
bat that these
contradictions
contain,
nevertheless,
common
22
IKTEODUCTION
elements by which, from a higher point of view, Such a they may be reconciled and combined.
point of advantage being gained in the progress
of thought, there will be disclosed,
however, a
new
contradiction,
again
to
be
resolved by
earnest
consideration and penetrating insight
and so on and on through every stage of the process to the end where alone there may be found an abiding place in the Absolute, wherein there is found no contrain a higher synthesis,
diction
one, the underlying
and no incompleteness. The process is ground is one, and any elewhole

then and then
ment
only
in the process receives its full significance

;
solely in the light of the

is its
truth revealed.
Truth with Hegel
means always that knowledge which embraces its object upon all possible sides and in all of its possible relations as the complete expression of the eter-
nal reason which underlies
it.
This
is
a thought
Hebrew poet and philosopher who said, " In thy light shall we see light," and that of the later Hebrew who so constantly insisted that everything is known only as it is
akin to that of the old
viewed suh
specie aeternitatis.
CHAPTER
II
THE VAKIOUS ATTITUDES OF THOUGHT TOWARDS THE OBJECTIVE WOKLD. THE METAPHYSICAL
SYSTEMS
THE fundamental conception of the Hegelian

system, of philosophy
is
that of universal
all things.
reason dominating
It
is
all
thoughts and
necessary, therefore, at the very beginning
to
appreciate
the
inherent
relation
between
specifi-
thoughts and things in general, or more

cally
between the thinking mind and the objecIn order to understand fully the
tive world.
Hegelian attitude of thought to the objective

world, the world which furnishes us the materials
of knowledge,
and
but a part,
it
will
which we ourselves are be worth our while to examine

of
this subject in the light
somewhat
in detail the doctrines of other philo-
sophical systems
upon
Their divergence of Hegel's criticism of them. from the Hegelian system will serve by contrast to mark the characteristic features of that system
itself.
There are four typical views

23
as to the
24
INTKODUCTION
relation of the thinking subject to the objective
world.
1. 2.
3.
4.
They are as follows The metaphysical systems. The empirical schools. The critical philosophy. The theory of intuitive
:
or
immediate
knowledge.
The
first
of these attitudes of
thought
re-
gards the external world as perfectly pictured

in thought.
The question
is
not raised as to
the difficulty of passing from the object which

is
perceived to the thinking subject which perit.
ceives
free.
is
The way
as a
is
regarded as open and
The
objective reality of the outer world
assumed
matter of
is
fact.
The testimony
It
of
is
the senses
taken as unquestionable.
the standpoint of nai've realism, which rests
upon the assumption that all things are in their essence what they seem to be in our perception
of them.
A natural result of this point of view

method
of interpreting the
and
of this
world
of
experience was that abstract and empty phrases,

refined metaphysical distinctions, in short, the
terminology of the schools came to be used

experience.
sterile
in-
stead of living words in the description of living
No wonder
as dust
that philosophy
became
and dry
when
the truth of the
THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS
25
world of reality was expressed in the desiccated

formulae of metaphysical speculation.
In other
words, the actual world of living experience
was forced in a purely artificial and arbitrary manner into metaphysical molds. For these molds were cast with no consideration whatsoever of the patterns which the
real
world
might have furnished.

the
They were fashioned
according to the caprice of speculation, and
demands
this,
of certain postulates of thought

basis
which had no
all
in reality.
is
In respect to
that a genuine
Hegel's contention
of the external
knowledge
jects of
world must come

to char-
through a process in which the particular ob-
knowledge are allowed actually
acterize themselves; in other words,
we must
must not
interrogate the facts of experience and allow
them
to
tell
their
own
story.
We
take for granted certain characteristics and certain relations as necessarily obtaining because
our speculations seem to demand them.
We
dare not apply to concrete objects of thought

predicates which have been derived elsewhere
and without any consideration of the nature

the objects themselves.
of
We
should not anticiinterpret

object
of
it.
pate
experience,
but
faithfully
Take
for example the supreme
all
26
thought,
INTEODUCTION
God
Himself.
It is
but a poor and

results a series of predi-
inadequate conception of
God which
merely from ascribing to

cates
Him
which have been deduced from certain
metaphysical necessities.
predicates
However many such

fail utterly to
may
be,
they together
exhaust His infinite nature.

appreciated this
The
Orientals
when
in the Hindoo philosophy
God
is
declared to be the many-named, or the
many-sided, and this without limit of any kind

or degree, so that
if
the resulting
names should
be formed together to constitute a series, the

result
would
of necessity be
an
infinite series.
Moreover, Hegel
insists that the various
meta-
physical schools all adopted a
wrong
criterion
in that they are content to derive their defini-
tions
from popular conceptions.
Any
popular
conception of God, of the world, or of the soul

is
necessarily inadequate
and therefore
false,
for it
of the age, or of
must be colored necessarily by the nature the race whence it emerges,

it is
and
so far forth
particular, local,
and mis-
leading.
Any definition
may
of
God which embodies
a popular conception of
that
conception
be,
Him, however complete fails to sound the

It
is
depths of His being and nature.
Hegel's
most vehement contention that the only true

method
is
27
of building
up the world
of
of
knowledge
to allow the objects
thought freely and
spontaneously to expound their

tics.
Thus God's being
is
own characterisknown only as re-
vealed in the continuous unfolding of Himself

in the cosmic processes, in nature, in history, in
man.
animal
And
;
so
we may
define
man
of
as a rational
but at best
this is only a
vague groping
in the dark, for our
knowledge
man
cannot
be compressed into a single judgment.
That
was the snare

belief
of the metaphysical schools, the
that all objects of knowledge could be

of
expressed completely within the scope
formal
definition
is,
or
stereotyped formula.
What man
opment
as
in all the possibilities of his devel-
artisan, mechanic, scholar, soldier,
citizen, statesman,
martyr, or reformer, and so
on without
tional," as
limit, that the
complete history of
humanity alone can
reveal.
The term
"ra-
used in the traditional definition of man, conceals a vast territory of knowledge which
lies
behind it.
We appreciate the limitless extent

when we even
superficially mediof
is
of this region
tate
upon the many-sided manifestations which the idea of rationality is capable. It

only in the free activity of the
principle
constructive
working within an object of knowl-
28
INTEODTJCTION
its
edge that
vealed.
essential
characteristics
are re-
Moreover, the old metaphysic was dogmatic Although the results of such in the extreme. speculation were partial and one-sided, they were
nevertheless stoutly maintained as absolute and
final.
This insistence upon the ultimate nature
of partially conceived truth indicates the characteristic spirit of the school.
Content with the

understanding
re-
half truth
and the twilight
of the
they never attained the full knowledge as

vealed in the light of reason.
In addition to the
general point of view and method of the metaphysical
systems, their
treatment
of
several
special problems is not only a matter of interest in itself, but has an indirect bearing upon some important points of the Hegelian system. These problems are four in number.
1.
As
As As
to the nature of being in general,
ontology.
2.
to the nature of
the
soul,
rational
cos-
psychology or pneumatology.
3.
to
the
nature of
the
world,
mology.
4.
As
to the being
and nature
of
God,
natural or rational theology.
The
doctrine of being, or ontology, resulted
29
from the attempt to answer the question as to how being in general might be adequately characterized.
The
distinctions raised
by the meta-
physical schools were largely verbal.

certain absolute terms were found
to involve no
Whenever
generally
which seemed
the
contradiction
to
received conceptions of the day, then the meta-
physician was completely satisfied that he had
given expression to the truth in
its
fulness.
He
did not pause to inquire as to the concrete
significance of the terms
which he used or as
to their illustration in actual experience.
Such
terms, for example, as existence, finitude, simplicity,
complexity, and the like, were used as
the current coin of expression by the metaphysical school,
their
and with but little thought as precise meaning and the definite scope
Hegel's
criticism,
to of
their application.
point,
is
at
this
quite characteristic and illustrative of
his general
method.
He
in
insists that
every term
which we
employ
philosophical
is,
thinking
should represent a notion, that
an idea of
universal and necessary significance, and that
such a notion cannot have a one-sided, abstract,
and rigid meaning, but must have a wealth of Every notion, moreover, meaning in itself. must be regarded as a small world within itself,
30
INTRODUCTION
having manifold characteristics connected and
an indefinite variety of vâys. The term which represents such an idea can therefore never be employed in a stereotyped
interrelated in
manner
cians.
as
was the custom

fact that
of
the metaphysi-
The very
itself
it
such an idea embodies

or
relations
within
renders
arise
inner
connections
necessary that contradictions must
them
edge.
which can be resolved only by viewing in the light of the whole body of knowl-
To
cut such an idea off as a finished

of
product, incapable
further modification
it
or
development,
is
to
deal with
in a
manner
extremely
artificial
Ideas are living

ucts.
and unphilosophical as well. processes and not dead prod-
" Let us avoid, therefore,"
say, " the use of terms to partial
task of
Hegel would which we have attached and poor meanings. Let the supreme thought be to overcome the superficial
abstract."
and the
The second question

pneumatology
it
discussed
by the meta-
physicians was that of rational psychology, or

;
had
special reference to the
nature of the soul.

physic regarded the
The pre-Kantian metasoul

as
thing, an
in-
dependent entity.
conception at once suggested the question, which proved to be an
This

utterly futile
31
seat of the soul;

to
and misleading inquirj'-, as to the and the further question as

soul,
whether the
inasmuch as
it is
a thing,
It
should be regarded as simple or composite.
was thought that upon the fact of its simplicitydepended the truth of the doctrine of immortality, inasmuch as whatever is not composed of
parts can suffer no dissolution.
Hegel
insists
at this point that the inner life of the
mind
or
soul cannot be regarded as a finished thing, a
product once for
all
complete, without possibil-
ity of development.
Such a conception renders
impossible also any processes of action and reaction between the several elements which con-
and varied and leaves unexplained the external phenomena of the mind which are so incalculably complex in all the variety of their manyThe mind must be sided manifestations.
stitute the essence of the soul's life
activity,
regarded, according
reality
It is
to
Hegel, as a concrete
its
which
is
evidenced by
manifestations.
not a " thing," as the metaphysicians use
the term "thing," but rather an inward constructive force determining the various phases
of its external
phenomena
in an unlimited, pro-
gressive development.
The
third branch of the traditional metaphysic
32
INTKODUCTION
was that of cosmology. The topics which it embraced were the world, its contingency or
necessity,
its
eternity or
its
necessary limita-
and space, the formal laws of its changes, the freedom of man, and the origin of evil. The general standpoint of the metaphytion in time
Kant was that thought presents to us a number of alternative judgments, one of which must be wholly true and
sician before the time of
its
opposite wholly false.
Therefore, in refer-
ence to the particular questions which arose in

the sphere
of
cosmology, the metaphysicians

is
held that one

choose
of
necessity
constrained to
is
between the theory that the world

it
is
created or that
eternal; that
man
is
the
is
product of the law of necessity or that he

free.
They
held, moreover, that the
evil in the
world are
good and natural opposites, and can

Hegel characteristically
never be reconciled.
opposes this one-sided view of things by maintaining that the world contains on all sides an
indefinite
of opposites, and that it is the peculiar function of the reason to reconcile
number
and harmonize them completely.

is
His system
of all the contradictions and inconsistencies of existence in the all-embracing synthesis of the reason.
essentially a universal resolution

Thus the
necessity,
33
idea of freedom which involves no
and the
no
idea of
are
necessity
alike
which
the
involves
partial
freedom,
merely
abstractions of the understanding.
In
live,
the actual world, the world in which
we
and move, and have our being, freedom and

necessity are not divorced.
P'or there
can be
freedom only in that community wherein liberty

is
guaranteed by law.
And
as regards
the
necessity
which
nature
everywhere
imposes
free
upon
us, it
must be remembered that the

is
activity of the individual
possible only to the
extent to which he can depend implicitly upon

the uniformity of nature's laws
;
for
were nature
result of
without law, and

the caprice or
its
phenomena the
whim
be
of ruling deities as in the
old mythological conception, the free purpose

of
man would
The
constantly
thwarted
and
annulled.
fourth branch of metaphysics

It is
is
that of
natural or rational theology.
concerned
with the fundamental conception of God, His attributes, and the proof of His existence.
The
is
radical
error
of
the
metaphysical logic
revealed in their attempt to discover some
objective
ground
for
the being of God.
The
resulting idea of
God
thus formed, creates the
34
INTRODUCTION
from something
impression of being derived

external to
God Himself.
But God must be

as
conceived as tbe sole ground of all things visible
and
invisible,
and therefore
independent
of
anything in the nature of a foundation or
For if support of His being and existence. from the God is regarded as a being, derived
world,
then the very finitude of
the
world
processes would cling to the idea of a God thus As Hegel suggests, the metaphysiconceived. cian is confronted with the following dilemma
:
either
God
is
the
actual
substance
of
of
the
world,
including the
mind
man, which
endeavoring to come to a knowledge of Him,

of
is
which
is
pantheism
dualism.
or
God
is
an object distinct
subject,
from the apprehending mind, the
which
his
is
Hegel in the development

consciousness in such a
system endeavors to effect a synthesis of the
divine and
as to
human
;
way
avoid the two extremes of dualism and of

it is
pantheism
system
is
only, however,
unfolded before us
when the entire that we have any

this stage of the
basis for
judging whether he has succeeded in
this difficult undertaking.
At
discussion
it
is
sufficient
merely to mark his
general purpose in this regard as a radical point

of departure from the metaphysical view.

There
in
is
35
a phrase
which
is
often employed
speculations concerning the being of
It is this, " Consider nature,
God. and nature will

this connection this
lead you to God."

enters
Hegel in
vigorous protest, inasmuch as
phrase seems to imply that
God
the
is
the consum-
mation merely of
whereas the truth
while
as the
the great
lies
cosmic process,
in
thought
that
God may
final
be regarded in a certain sense
consummation of all things, yet nevertheless He must be regarded also as the absolute ground of the initial stage and every
subsequent stage of the cosmic development.
God
is
the beginning as
It
well as the end of

is
the world's evolution.
only in a very
we are justified in saying that nature leads man to God, for in another and deeper sense we are constrained to believe that it is God Himself who makes
partial sense, therefore, that
nature possible.
Nature leads backward as

God, they were con-
well as forward to God.
As
to the attributes of
ceived by the metaphysicians in so indefinite
and vague a manner as to be utterly devoid These schools of of any genuine significance.
thought seemed to possess a natural dread of
signing to
as-
God any
attributes whatsoever
which
36
INTRODUCTION
distinctively
were
bling
human upon
the
ground
that to think of God's nature as at all resem-
human
nature would be to degrade and
dishonor
Him.
Fearing that they might bethey

lapsed
into
come
anthropomorphic,
vague indefiniteness which was without any Yet they seemed significant content whatever. oblivious of this evident defect, and satisfied
with a
summary
following,
of
the divine
attributes
in
some
as
all
such vague and unmeaning expression

"
the
God
is
the
most real of
beings."
But Hegel
in criticising such a
statement as this insists that the most real of

all
beings of
whom, however, nothing

is
is
af-
firmed definitely,
of
after all the very opposite
what
it
purports to be, and what the under-
standing
supposes
it
to
be.
all
Instead
of
being ample and above

is
measure, the idea

it is
so narrowly
conceived
that
on the
It
is
contrary
poor
and altogether empty.
with reason that the heart craves an answer

to its question as to the nature of will
is
mean something.
When
the idea of
God which God
reduced to an indefinite
and meaningless
then removed to a sphere so foreign to our thought and life as to be reduced

formula,
is
God
to an absolute zero.
Without
a content pos-

sessing any positive significance our thought
37
is
shorn of
puts
it
all
meaning whatsoever.
^
As Hegel
is
in striking
epigram, " Mere light
mere darkness."
radical
Notwithstanding
in general
Hegel's
difference
point of view,
however, and his
critical attitude
toward the
of per-
metaphysical schools, nevertheless he frankly
acknowledges that there
is
something
manent value
teachings,
in one feature at least of their in

their insistence
namely,
all
upon
he
the fundamental truth that thought constitutes the essence of

that
is.
And
this truth
has incorporated in his
own
philosophical sys-
tem
ever,
as its cardinal doctrine.
Thought, howrevealed in
life.
with Hegel does not consist in abstract
definitions
and formulae, but
is
its
fulness only in the concrete realities of

1
Werke, VI,
36,
Zusatz.
CHAPTER
III
THE EMPIRICAL SCHOOL
IN
the course of the

it
sophical thought
development of philowas natural that there
should follow a reaction against the abstract,

Yague, and indefinite results which had been
the outcome of the metaphysical speculations.
This reaction found expression in the teachings

of the
empirical
school
of
philosophy.
The
empiricists insisted that

all
the starting-point of
thought must be something definitely fixed
and secure, some concrete reality such as can be found only in actual experience. The
metaphysical procedure started with
universals,
abstract
and the difficulty which it could not overcome lay in the fact that there was no way of passing from vague generalities to the
abundant variety of particular manifestations
which correspond
world of
reality.
to
It
is
such universals in
the
the function of thought
to interpret experience
and not
38
to anticipate
it.
Therefore the empiricists urged that the logical

and natural beginning of
all
39
inquiry after truth
should be the particular instances which nature

presents in such prodigal profusion.
sisted,
They
in-
moreover, that the true and only source

is
of all experience tions
to be
found
in our sensathis
and perceptions.
According to
view
the foundations of knowledge rest solely upon the direct testimony of the senses
;
here,
and
here alone, can consciousness be certain of
itself
and the
ever
results of its
own
operations.
is
What-
may
be doubted, here at least
certitude,
a firm footing, and the assurance of substantial

progress.
And
of
so
we
is
find
the
fundamental
in in
doctrine
empiricism
formulated
the
words,
" Whatever
true
must be
the
actual world and present to sensation."
This
basis
would seem
to be indeed a
common-sense
for all serious investigation
and for the construction of a sound practical philosophy; and

there
is,
indeed,
much
to
recommend and
calls
to to
justify
its
claims.
Hegel
attention
to
the
very
valuable
contribution
thought
which
school,
scribes,
has come directly from the empirical
and to which
he himself
it is
fully
sub-
namely, that
necessary for every

feel that
man
to see for himself
and to
he
is
present in those primary facts of knowledge
40
INTRODUCTION
feels constrained
which he
is
to accept.
If
one
as
really to
are.
know
This
is
things, he
must
see
them
they
certainly in complete accord

scientific spirit of
all
with the modern
inductive
inquiry which grounds
investigation
upon
first
a study of actual sources, and that, too, at
hand.
The weakness of empiricism, however, as Hegel points out most conclusively, consists in
the fact that any sensation, or combination of
sensations which according to the empiricist
is
the ultimate ground of appeal,

ticular
sible
is
always a par-
to
and individual experience. It is impospass from such experiences to the

idea or
universal
law which
they illustrate
without introducing some

that
conceptions which
transcend the purely empirical presupposition

particular phenomena and immediate connections and relations. Hume had long since drawn attention to the
we know only
their
fact that
when we
interpret the
phenomena
of
experience as manifesting universal principles
and
as related
by necessary causal connections,
we
are thereby reading into the
phenomena what
they themselves do not contain, but that with which they have been invested by our thought.
Granted that necessity and universality are found
41
everywhere in our consciousness, what reason

have we,
Hume would
If
say, to assert that these
characteristics are also the attributes of things
themselves.
sensation
is
to
maintain
its
claim to be the sole basis of
all that
men hold
and
but
as truth, then these ideas of
universality
necessity
must be regarded
as
merely convenit is
ient fictions of the mind, clever
true,
by no means trustworthy.
accepted this conclusion
;
Hume
very frankly
thoroughgoing empiricist.
and so must every Hegel insists, howfundamental

its
ever, that the reason joins to these
processes of sensation and perception
pecul-
iar function of interpreting in the light of their
universal and necessary significance that which
they present as particular experiences.

relation
This
between the reason on the one hand
and the elementary data of the senses on the other, follows logically from the basal postulate of the Hegelian system that whatever is found
to be an ultimate characteristic of reason
also apply in like
must
manner to reality Again, the method of empiricism is
itself.
essentially
one of analysis,
that
is,
the subjecting of our
experiences to a kind of dissecting process which

separates
them
into their constituent elements.
The
defect of such a
method
is
that
it
makes
42
INTBODUCTION
no provision whatsoever for any corresponding

synthesis.
plete, it
is
After the work of analysis
is
com-
necessary to have some unifying and
constructive function of the
mind
It
is
as its natural
and necessary complement.

which enables us
exclusive process
to pass
such a function
from phenomena to the

Dissection as an
laws which underlie them.

is
suggestive only of death,
and can never reproduce the living organism. Moreover, if thought is active in systematizing
the crude material which
is
given by the senses,
something more than that which the crude sensation of

it
then
must bring
to the process
itself is able to give.
As
ment
to the questions
which are of special mo-
for the philosophical thinker, concerning
God, the soul, and the world, the empirical school took the position that the mind of man is so
it can deal only with finite Finding truth only in the outer world as mediated by the senses, they insisted that even
constituted that
material.
if
the
existence of a
supersensible world be
granted, any knowledge of that world

impossible.
would be
it
From
this point of
view
follows
that there
is
no place in such a system either for
a theory of morals or a philosophy of religion. Both ethics and religion thus lose all objective

character,
validity.
43
and
at the
same time
their universal
The
is
logical outcome, therefore, of this

its
doctrine
materialism, which in
is
general
methods and results

Hegelianism.
philosophers
ples of
diametrically opposed to
There have been, however, some
who have
They
styled themselves disci-
Hegel and yet have been pronounced

are the so-called Hegelians
left;
materialists.
of the
they are such
writers
as Feuer-
baeh and Strauss.
This peculiar development of
the Hegelian school must be regarded as a perversion of Hegel's teaching rather than the logical
outcome of
terialism
is
his system.
Hegel's criticism of maas to give
so clear
and emphatic
no
uncertain sound.
He
draws attention to the

after all the of
fact that materialists in general regard matter

in the light of
an abstraction
it is
unknown somewhat behind phenomena,

they are merely the manifestation.
which
And when
the materialists come to explain what matter

itself
is,
its
fundamental nature and essential
characteristics, they are constrained to
employ
and and the like, which are essentially metaphysical concepts for which materialism pure
certain concepts as force, causation, action
reaction,
and simple can give no warrant whatsoever. Moreover, the world of sense-perception, as
44
INTRODUCTION
it,
materialism conceives
of isolated
can give only a series
and separate phenomena. To think of them as forming component parts of an interrelated system, and as sustaining necessary
relations to each other
and
to the whole,
would
of
be equivalent to the rationalizing of the material

universe,
and
this
means the introduction
some non-materialistic factors. This procedure, of course, would contradict the fundamental postulate of materialism, that all knowledge is
confined to the material data furnished by the
senses.
Materialism
is
here confronted by a
its
practical dilemma.
To defend
as
position, it
;
must use the weapons
of metaphysics
but the
he
moment one appears

ceases immediately to
a metaphysician
be a materialist.
The
to
materialistic creed, therefore,
must
suffer either
from inadequacy or inconsistency.
And
it is
overcome these limitations that Hegel seeks a

solution in the creed of absolute idealism.
CHAPTER
IV
THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY
THE
critical
critical
philosophy takes
its
name from
the fundamental Kantian point of view that
thought must
itself investigate
a capacity of knowledge, and in this

of
itself.
how far it has way become
Inasmuch
as the sensation
regarded as a pure sensation can never give

in
and of
itself
the idea of necessity and univer-
sality,
and yet we are conscious that our whole body of knowledge depends upon this very idea for its primary features of order and uniformity,
therefore, the source of this idea, according to
Kant, must
itself.
lie
in the very nature of thought

insists that this
Moreover, he
source
is
not to be sought for in the thought of any

individual, regarded
merely in his individual
capacity, but in the thought
which
is
the com-
mon possession of all individuals
alike,
that
is,
in the very nature of thought
itself
as pure
thought irrespective of the peculiar modes, or

habits of thought incident to the peculiarities of
45
46
INTEODUCTION
These any particular individual whatsoever. fundamental ideas which seem to be the common property of all rational creatures, and
which, together with their relations and connections, form the determining factors in reducing the crude material of sensation to a system of knowledge characterized by order and law,
are the so-called categories,
of necessity, cause
such as the ideas

itself
and
effect, unity, plurality,
and the
like.
The
critical
philosophy sets
the task of
testing the value of these categories in reference

to their application to the sciences, to the sphere of metaphysics,
processes.
cise
It
and to our ordinary conceptual also seeks to determine the pre-
nature and function of these categories so
as to distinguish in our
knowledge between that which is subjective and that which is objective. These terms " subjective " and " objective " play suchan importantrSle in philosophical discussions generally, and especially in the systems both of
Kant and
of Hegel, that
it
will repay us at this
stage of our investigation to inquire

in detail as to the
somewhat
of these
meaning and usage
Hegel draws attention to three distinct senses in which the term " objective " is used In the first place, objective is used in a loose
terms.
:

and rather popular manner
the subjective comes
to
47
to designate what-
ever subsists externally, in contrast to which
be regarded as that
which
dreams.
exists
only in
our
fancy,
hopes,
or
In the second place, the Kantian use of objective consists in
an application of the term to the
elements in thought which are universal and

necessary,
that
is,
what all men are constrained
to think, in contrast to the subjective character
attached to individual experiences which give
them a
ing.
certain particular
and occasional
color-
In the third place, the Hegelian use of the
term objective has regard to the universal and

necessary elements of thought in general after
the
manner
of Kant, but in addition
Hegel con-
siders these universal of
and necessary elements
thought as representing at the same time

This latter distinction marks the point of
the real essence of existing things.
departure of Hegel from Kant.

maintains,
if
For, as Hegel
the necessary and essential factors
in the building
up
of our world of
knowledge
belong only to the processes of thought, then

all
thought must be forever separated from the

itself as the object of
thing
our thought which
48
perceives
it, it.
INTRODUCTION
and as
it
exists apart
it is
from our pertrue that the
ception of
categories
And
although
as causality, necessity,
universality
and
the like lie strictly within the province of

it
thought,
does not necessarily follow that they
must be ours merely in a subjective sense and not at the same time also the essential characteristics of things
themselves.
Hegel, moreover,
will not allow that the convenient
tion of the thing-in-itself (^das
Kantian ficDing an sicK) can

present in
possibly express the real nature of the object
when we have eliminated

consciousness relative to
of feeling
it
all
that
all
is
it,
the deliverances
and
its
all specific
judgments concerning
but an utter abstrac-
as
to
evident attributes and qualities.
What
is left,
Hegel
asks,
?
tion, a total
emptiness
When
objective
the balance between subjective

is
is
and
of
struck by Kant, the
totality
knowledge
found to be on the side of the subjective, while nothing at all remains to the credit of the objective. For when Kant speaks
of the unity of consciousness as transcendental,
he means by
this phrase that our body of knowledge regarded as constituting a system possessing order and unity throughout has validity
only for our thoughts, and not for objects apart

from our knowledge.
selves
49
What
they are in them-
must remain,
therefore,
quantity,
the
an
unknown
insoluble x of the equation of
knowledge.
It
is
characteristic, moreover, of the
Hegelian
method that the

to the
significance
is
which he attaches
term objective
in reality a synthesis
of the
first
two other views mentioned above.

the second
The
holds that objectivity refers to the exterthat objectivity refers

;
nal thing;
to the necessary
and universal thought
while
Hegel
insists that the objective is the
combina-
tion of the two, being the true thought concern-
ing the real thing.

therefore, that
The
subjective
would signify,
which
for the time being has a
place in our thoughts but has no reference to

reality,
and which others under similar circum-
stances might not be constrained necessarily to

entertain.
Kant's position
idealism, are
is
that
known
as one of subjective
is,
the things which
we know
and we possess no certitude as to the truth of what they are in Hegel's position, on the other themselves.
appearances
merely,
is
hand,
one of absolute idealism, as has been
already mentioned,
that
is, it is
conceded that
the objects of our knowledge are phenomena.
50
INTRODUCTION
but nevertheless must be regarded by us as the true representation of the things themselves.
The warrant
late that
for such a belief lies in the postu-
what thought discovers in phenomena is a manifestation of the divine and universal reason, of which the very thought itself is a
kindred
manifestation.
so,
To show how
this
must be
is
and
to indicate its significance as
the corner-stone of the entire Hegelian system,

the purpose of the Logic
its
itself,
and can be
appreciated in
fulness only after a mastery
of the detailed exposition

tains.
which the Logic con-
As
to the special
problems of the soul, the
world, and of God, Kant's position

lined as follows
:
may
be out-
As
to their teaching concerning the nature of
the soul, Kant and Hegel are at one in their

criticism of the old metaphysical
definition of
the soul as substantial, simple, selfsame, and
maintaining
its
independence in
its
intercourse
with the material world.
Such a
definition they
both hold to be eminently unsatisfactory.

quite
different.
The
meta-
reasons assigned for this opinion, however, are
Kant
is
affirms
that the
physical definition
unsatisfactory because the
reason has no more of a warrant in
making the

transition
51
it
from the soul as we think

is
to be,
to the soul as it really
in itself, than in the
procedure from the appearances of things as

perceived by thought to the things as they are
in themselves.
Hegel, however, repudiates the
metaphysical definition on the ground that these

attributes
enumerated
as the
elementary charinadequate to
acteristics of the soul are totally
express the concrete wealth of content which
our idea of the soul should embrace.
As
to the
problem of the world, Kant draws
attention to the fact that the thought in en-
deavoring to
comprehend the
unconditioned
nature of the world stumbles upon certain contradictions

is
which are called antinomies,
for it
frequently found necessary to maintain two
contradictory propositions about one
and the
itself
same object in such a way that each one of the

mutually destructive propositions seems of
to
have the stamp of necessity and of universal
validity.
The Kantian antinomies are four in number and are as follows 1. The world is limited as to space and time. The world is not limited as to space and
:
time.
2.
IMatter
is
indefinitely divisible.
Matter
is
not indefinitely divisible.
52
3.
INTEODTJCTION
4.
The will must be free. The will must be determined. The world is caused. The world is uncaused, eternal.
is
Kant's explanation of these seemingly contradictory statements
that the difficulty
is
not
inherent in the
objects themselves
which are
under contemplation, but attaches only to the
comprehend them in their true significance. At this point Hegel takes exception to Kant's explanation, and insists that
reason which
fails to
there are not merely four antinomies, but that there

tions
is
an indefinite number of such contradic-
arising
itself.
from the essential nature of
all
being
The
difficulty, therefore, lies
not
it is
in the defects of reason.
On
the contrary,
the peculiar office of reason to
show that
these
contradictions attach to the things themselves
and that they are necessary in order to assume a progressive development whose very essence consists in overcoming contradictions and in
establishing a higher unity in the midst of all
differences. It
is
only the
is
absolute
reason,
according to Hegel, which

structing such a unity,
capable of confar forth as the
and so
reason of
is
man
partakes of the divine reason

it.
he capable of comprehending
Here, again,

we
53
obtain a characteristic glimpse of the fun-
tion as to the
damental Hegelian conception, and a suggesworking of his dialectic method.
As
it
to the final problem, the theistic question, to
would be well
examine
briefly the
Kantian
criticism of the proofs concerning the being of
God.
These proofs may be divided into two
kinds according to one or the other of two
methods of procedure
We may
analysis
of
begin, on the one hand, with an
being and
through that process
reach the idea of God.

Or, on the other hand,
we may begin with
an analysis of the idea of God, and through

that process reach the ground of His being.
The former
of these
methods of procedure
God.
will give either the cosmological or the physico-
theological proof of the being of
The
of the
cosmological proof reasons from the variously

related
and interconnected phenomena

first
universe to a
cause as necessary to account
for their origin
and their sustained existence.
This proof turns upon the concept of causation.
The
physico-theological proof reasons from evi-
dences of design manifested in phenomena to

the existence of
of
One who
is
the great architect
them
all,
and
this proof turns
upon the con-
54
INTEODUCTION
Kant's criticism of these
cept of final cause.

proofs
is
based upon the fact that in the transi-
tion from the world

is
which
is finite
to
God who
more
if
infinite,
is
there
is
in the conclusion far
than
contained in the premises, and therefore

is
the inference
an unwarranted one.
For
we may not
rial of
logically pass
from the crude matepass from the
the sensations to the ideas of universality
and
necessity, neither
may we
same beginnings
to the idea of
God.
the
Hegel
first is
contributes two thoughts of special significance

to the general conclusions of
Kant
concerned with a question of form, the second with the question of matter or of content.
As
to the
first,
that of the formal process

if
involved in our reasoning;

transition
we regard
the
from the
finite to the infinite as rep-
resented by a syllogistic process, the startingpoint must involve some theory of the world
which makes
gent
facts,
it
an aggregate either of continof
or
relations
implying design.
But the world as thus conceived is no longer a world of mere sensations. It is a world of
sensations
as
they have been transmuted by
thought, and as they contain the elements of necessity and universality; for we have seen
that
it is
the fundamental nature of thought to
55
exercise this function of transmuting sensations into these higher forms of the mind.
But
in
such a process the crude sensation

as a sensation.
is
destroyed
calls the
This
is
what Hegel
element of negation in the process of transition
from the world
to
God.
The world regarded
as an aggregate of sensations has disappeared.
Out
of its ashes rises the
new world
as inter-
preted by the categories of thought, and such a
world with
necessity
is
its
implications of universality and
an adequate starting-point for the
proof of the being of God.
Hegel's second contribution to this general

discussion relates to the matter or body of truths
to
which the transition from the world
to
God
at first leads,
such truths as concern the nature
of the world's substance, its necessary essence,
and the cause which regulates and

according to design.
directs it
These ideas express but a
very partial and inadequate knowledge of God,
and yet they are necessary to a complete conception of Him.
Hegel
insists that while
they
should not be overlooked, they must
nevertheless
be supplemented by higher truths, and that while
inanimate nature gives us intimations of God,

there
start
is
a higher revelation of
Him when we
with living organisms.
Thence we reach
66
the idea of
INTRODUCTION
God
as the source
is
of
life.
In a
similar way, there
still
a higher level which
may be
level
is
taken as our starting-point.

that of
This higher
mind
itself
it is
through mind
alone that
we reach
the highest possible con-
His nature, therefore, can be adequately defined only when we regard Him as
ception of God.
the absolute mind.
The second general method

inverse process of the
first.
of proof
is
the
It starts with the
idea of
clusion.
God and
reaches His being as the conso-called ontological argu-
It is the
ment
for the being of
God.
Beginning with
con-
the idea of
God
as the
most perfect being

that
ceivable, it proceeds to the belief in the actual
being of God.
Kant's criticism
is
not reason from the thought in the
we may mind to the
actual existence of the object of that thought
and he illustrates this point by showing that a hundred thalers as conceived

outside of the mind,
in the
mind does not put
hundred
thalers in
one's purse.
Hegel's criticism of Kant, how-
ever, puts the matter in a very different light.
He
insists
that no such analogy as

discredit the
drawn by
are
con-
Kant can
ontological argument,
because the idea of

strained to entertain
God which we
is
wholly unique.
The
THE CKITICAL PHILOSOPHY

very nature of any
finite
57
expressed
being in
thing
is
by saying of
of
it
as
is
Kant does that
its
time and space

it.
very different from our notion
But
of the idea of
God
it
must be
said,
and of
Him
alone can
it
be said, that
He
can be
infinite
thought of only as existing.
He, the
One, occupies in our thoughts a position, therefore,
accorded to nothing that

in
is finite.
In
God
His
and
God
alone
is
the idea of
Him and
is
being one and the same.
Here
is
the supreme
illustration that the rational real

is
the real and the
rational.
In the Critique of the Practical Reason Kant

iadicates his position in reference to the moral
life.
The
free
control
of
its
own
activity
which Kant denied to the pure reason, he has

vindicated for the practical reason which manifests itself in the various
phases of
human
conwill
duct.
By
practical reason he
itself
means the
that determines
laws,
according to universal
and these universal laws he claims pos-
sess objective validity,
that
is,
they are recog-
nized by the
all times,
human
intellect
everywhere and at
upon
all
and they impose a common obligation mankind. Kant's special contribution

thought consists in
his protest against
to ethical
the prevailing ethical theory of his day,
that
58
of
INTKODtrCTION
eudsemonism, the
philosophy which finds
man's chief end in some form of happiness, and
fundamentally happiness as interpreted in the
and desires which are dictated by the pleasures and pains Hegel's criticism of Kant is that his of life.
gratification of the selfish appetites
theory gives the form of morality in a universal
law of conduct, but that the formal expression of the law of conduct to do that which is right
by no means determines the content of that law, and thereby does not definitely inform us
as to It
what
is
is
the right in concrete cases.
thoroughly characteristic of the Hegelian
method that it always criticises a one-sided view of things, and then seeks to correct it by showing the other and complementary side. So here, Hegel agrees with Kant completely, only he
adds that the Kantian system is inadequate and needs to be rounded out in some way that will
provide, not merely for
ethic,
the basis of a formal
but for a material ethic as well, so that the two may be regarded as mutually related
elements which
whole.
together
form the complete
The
In the third division of Kant's great wort, Critique of the Judgment, the reflective
of
power
judgment
is
declared to be equiva-
THE CEITICAL PHILOSOPHY

lent to
59
the
function of the intuitive under-
standing.
In this
position
Kant, in a
dim
way
at least, approaches the Hegelian concep-
tion of
reason as the basis of
all
things, in
affirming that everything

its
which
exists manifests
if
nature according to
its
inner idea,
we may
art,
here use an Hegelian phrase.

tuitive
Thus
in the in-
judgment judgment
of
beauty in nature or in
is
in the
of
an ideal end which
being
realized in all the living organisms throughout
the vast range of nature,

to the height of
in
all this
man
rises
comprehending in some measure
that the
in
mere phenomena of the universe reveal themselves an ideal and a purpose. The
is
universe
thus to be regarded as the incarna-
tion of reason.
Hegel's system marks a point of departure in

that he holds that this ideal, this incarnate reason,
is
not merely revealed to the artistic instinct of

or of the poet, but
the genius
may
be
made
manifest to humbler minds through the simple

operations of pure thought alone.
Kant went
so far towards the Hegelian posi-
tion as to assert that the natural purposiveness
seen in nature was not an external principle of
but was immanent within each organism, wherein the final cause is active as a moldfinality,
60
INTKODUCTION
ing principle, forming a constructive dynamic

centre.
He
fails,
however, to attain to the

its
Hegelian doctrine in
he
completeness, because
says that, at the last analysis, the idea of

finality
an
immanent
of
can be affirmed with positive
assurance only of our thought of things and not

the
things
themselves.
Whereas
Hegel
and
the
insists that there is
an objective
finality as well
as a subjective, or rather that the subjective
the objective
finality is
teristic of
are here one
and the same
both in our thoughts and also characthings as well.

critical
it
In the summary of his review of the

philosophy of Kant, Hegel assigns to
points of merit, in that, positively,
it
two
emphasizes
it
the independence of reason, and, negatively,

insists
that the categories of the understandfinite.
ing are
Kant's weakness, on the other
hand,
lies in
affirming that
is
what
is
false or inadlimi-
equate in knowledge
due solely to the

Hecrel
tations of our mental faculties.
insists,
on the contrary, that the defects of knowledge
must be ascribed
objects
of
to the finite nature of the thought themselves and not to the categories by which they are constructed into
a system of knowledge.
CHAPTER V
THE THEORY OF INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
THE
of
chief
representative of
the
doctrine
is
immediate or intuitive knowledge
Jacobi,
who
insists that all
knowledge obtained
is
through the categories of the understanding

derivative
and therefore finite and conditioned, and because finite and conditioned, therefore unsatisfactory. Moreover, through any process
of reasoning whatsoever,
it is
impossible to rise
to the high level of apprehending the true, the

infinite,
the unconditioned, that
is,
God
Himself.
But by an immediate revelation of the reason we may know God intuitively. The being of
God cannot
recognized.
be proved, but
it
can be immediately
"faith,"
The words "knowledge,"

deliverance
of
"intuition," are the terms used to indicate this
immediate
as follows
the
consciousness.
Hegel's criticism of this position

:
is somewhat Although the knowledge of God may
be regarded as an immediate intuition, nevertheless, it is
an intuition which must be conis,
sidered as an intellectual product, that

61
it
62
INTEODUCTION
rise
must
above the things of sense.
It
must
deal with facts
which have
special reference to
our thinking mind, with facts of inherentlyPure and simple intuiuniversal significance.
tion,
therefore,
is
nothing more or
less
than
The distinction and simple thought. intuition is merely a verbetween thought and The fundamental difficulty with the bal one.
pure
position of Jacobi
is
this,
that while he claims
the intuition to be immediate, he overlooks the

possibility that
what may seem
to be complete
it
in itself
is
nevertheless a product, though
be
a finished product, and as a product, therefore

the result of some process which has produced
it.
Hegel's position
is
that in all immediate
knowledge the elements which are immediate have behind them somewhere a process, and by
that process they are mediated.
a seed
is
For
instance,
an immediate existence as regards the
flower and fruit which
may
spring from
it.
As
hesi-
we hold
in itself.
the seed in our hand,

it
we have no
tancy in calling
a finished and complete thing
The flower and fruit, however, are mediated by the processes which are started by
the vital
force latent
in
the seed.
And
yet
from a similar point of view, the seed itself may be regarded as a product resulting from a
THE THBOET OV INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE

process by which
it it is
63
has been mediated, and

in
its
comes to be what
seemingly complete
further illus-
and independent
trate the
state.
We may
Hegelian idea of mediation by the
knowledge which we may have of a book whose title, author, and general point of view we know
only by
common
report,
but
we
ourselves have
never read the book
itself.
Such knowledge
Hegel would
abstract
call
immediate in a general and
and that kind of immediate knowledge would have no special significance

sense,
However, after reading the book and marking the relation of step to step in the grador value. ual unfolding of the author's conception, the bearing of
and
it
each part to the whole as

complete expression,
finally reaches its
we
find
that our
knowledge has grown in definiteness and consequent value through this process which is one of mediation. And then also the book as a whole will be found to leave upon our
mind a
of
its
certain final
total
call
impression as a
significance,
which
in
;
summary turn we
would
immediate knowledge
for in the
course of time the various steps of the process

of mediation
of the process itself,
become merged in the very result and we come to retain in

only the finished product as a
consciousness
64
whole.
INTEODUCTION
Such immediate knowledge, however,
is
which
the result of a mediating process,
is
vastly different from the vague and indefinite knowledge which goes before and is indepen-
dent of
all
mediation whatsoever.
a deep insight into
This distincthe Hegelian
tion gives
method and general point of view. So also religion and morals contain, of course, as their most marked characteristics, the elements of faith, or immediate knowledge, and
yet fiom another point of view they
must be
regarded as conditioned on every side by the
mediating processes of development, education,
and the formation of character.

diate,
that everything from one point of view
Hegel holds is immeis
but from another point of view
to be
regarded as mediated.
The
is
relation between
mediation and immediacy

to a
one of the keys
thorough understanding of the Hegelian system. It need be only referred to here in

passing by
relation
is
way
of anticipation,
inasmuch as
this
developed at length in the second
part of the Logic.
His doctrine of essential

is
being as there expressed
made
to rest
upon
the unity which underlies the seeming antithesis

of mediation
and immediacy.
criticises the
Hegel further
theory of immedi-
THE THEORY OF INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE

ate of
65
knowledge on the ground that the criterion truth is found not in the character of that
true, but in the bare fact
in
it
which purports to be
that
has
found a place
consciousness.
This makes subjective knowledge the sole basis

of truth.
Whatever
is
discovered as a fact in
is
the individual consciousness

to be a fact evidenced
all,
thereby declared
of
by the consciousness
and
to be
regarded even as the very essence

This, however, does not neces-
of
thought
itself.
;
sarily follow
for as a result of
and if granted, it proves too much, such an argument there may
be found as valid a warrant for the superstitions

of
savage peoples as for the doctrines of the
Christian religion.
As Hegel
remarks, " It
is
because he simply believes in them and not
from any process of reasoning or argument that

the Indian finds
God
in the cow, the

^
monkey,
the Brahmin, or the Lama."

It
must also be acknowledged that the immediate knowledge of God merely tells us that
He
is.
Thus
is
religion
God as an object of narrowed down to an indefinite,

the idea of
vague, supersensible
tive attributes.
being devoid of
this point of
all posi-
From
view He
must ever remain the Unknown God.

1
Such
Hegel's Wer/ce, VI, 72.
66
INTEODUCTION
an idea of
God
is
upon the same
level as Her-
bert Spencer's characterization of
God
as " the
Unknowable."
Moreover, the abstract thought of the metaphysician and the abstract intuition are one and
the same thing.
From
either point of view,
God
is
conceived as a being vaguely indefinite
and undetermined.
say that
To call God a spirit and to we know Him as a spirit immediately,

only an empty phrase
;
Hegel
insists, is
for the
consciousness, or better the self-consciousness,
which the idea of

sarily render
spirit implies,
that idea
it
more
in
specific
would necesand defi-
nite
by analyzing
such
way
as
to
show the various elements which constitute its essence and by separating it from all else
that might be
confused with
is itself
it.
But such
an act of thought
tion.
a process of media-
Thus all strictly immediate knowledge is vague and indefinite, and the very act of making it definite and distinct necessitates the
subjecting of
mediation.
immediacy to a process of Without such a process all knowlits
edge
is
both unscientific and unphilosophical.

results
The
which have been reached through
Hegel's criticism of the various attitudes of
THE THEORY OP INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE

thought to the objective world
67
summarized
as follows
may
be briefly
The metaphysician has The

same.
his abstract
forms of
thought, but they prove to be empty.

empiricist has a vast wealth of material
but no thought forms iu which to express the
The
at
critical
philosopher
has
his
thought
forms, but that which seems to be the material
hand ready
for the casting, proves,
vestigation, to be
upon inshadowy and unsubstantial.

thought forms but
;
The
intuitionist possesses
they lack any distinctive pattern
and therefore
is
whatever
may
be the material which

is
run into
them, the casting which results
always the
same, possessing no specific characteristics and

therefore without significance or value.
The evident
into one
defects of these various types of
philosophy Hegel seeks to obviate by uniting
system the partial truths which they
severally contain.
By what method
it is
this
is
attempted and with what success
attended,
we
of
hope to see in the detailed exposition the Logic, the task which lies immediately
shall
before us.
CHAPTER VI
A GENERAL SURVEY OP THE LOGIC
three divided THE Logic Doctrine intoBeing. parts Lehre The
is
:
I.
of
(-Die
vom
Seyn.')
II.
The Doctrine The Doctrine

Begriff.')
of Essence.
{Die Lehre
QDie
vom Wesen.)
III.
of
the
Notion.
Lehre vom
These divisions represent the successive stages in the progressive unfolding of our knowledge
through which the various processes of thought
come They
rate
to
their complete
and
final
expression.
are to be
regarded as successive stages
only in the sense that by our analysis
we
sepa-
them
in
our thoughts, and think of one as
following the other.
But
in reality
we should
conceive of these elements of knowledge in such

a manner as to regard one as lying within the
other,
and
this in turn
within the third.

is
The
one
progress indicated in their development
not of advance so
much
68
as a
deepening insight
A GENEBAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC

into
69
more and more fundamental attributes and

-
relations.
The The
is it
doctrine of
being
is
the result of
an
is.
answer to the question as to what a thing

doctrine of
is
essence,
it
question of what
constituted.
answer to the composed and ly what

in
The
doctrine of the notion, in answer to the

to
question,
what end
is it
designed and
is
it
capable of progressing.
The complete knowledge

embraces the categories of
of its being,
of a thing, therefore,
its
being, the
its
ground
and the purpose of
being.
It will be readily seen that the first category-
involves the second,
in order to complete
its
meaning, and that the second involves the third

in a like
manner, and that the third underlies
the
other two.
For the
being of
to
a thing
becomes
definitely
known
it
us
only
when
we
it
are able to refer
to
its
appropriate ground,
as to
and when we possess some insight
whence
is
came and by what processes

;
its
being
mainof
its
tained and perfected
also the
ground
being finds
its full
significance only in the conit is
sideration of the
end which
realizing
and
which
its
being subserves.
Thus, the question
what implies the question whence ; and the ques-
70
tion
INTRODUCTION
whence leads irresistibly to the question
whither.
"We
may
call the
;
category of being the logic

essence,
of description
that of
the logic
of
explanation; that of the notion,

the final cause.
the logic of
The The
first
category, that of being, represents

to its simplest terms.
knowledge when reduced

least significance is that
affirmation of all others that possesses the
merely of being pure
and simple when
it
stands without further quali-
fication or specification, so that

less asserted of an object,
were anything knowledge would be
reduced to zero.
wont
There are certain terms by which Hegel is to characterize being, and an understandof the
ing of which will give us an insight into the
meaning
doctrine of being
and
at the
same time prepare us for the appreciation of the fundamental distinction which he draws between being and essence. Being, for instance,
is
referred to by
Hegel variously
;
as abstract, as
identity, as absolute identity

identity, as immediate, as
again as abstract
undetermined, and as
being in
itself
{an
sich).
By
" abstract "
is
meant that which
is partial
and incomplete.
The category of being is always
A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE
LOGIC
it
71 does
spoken of as abstract, representing as

the
first
sarily
rough draft of knowledge, and necesmarking the beginning of that which as
yet
incomplete and undeveloped. The term " identity " as applied to being means
is
a uniform sameness or homogeneity,
which shows
no distinction of parts or diversity of elements

within
as far as
is,
and which sustains no relations, known, to anything be}'ond itself. It therefore, a term used to imply that mere
itself,
being as regards any definite characteristics or

qualities
which
it
may
possess
is
colorless,
and
as regards
any
relations
is
which
it
may
sustain
to other things,
completely isolated.
is only an emphatic expression for the term " identity,"
The phrase "absolute identity"

is
and
or
" equivalent to the phrase " mere identity

" sameness."
mere
The phrase " abstract identity " is a combinaIt tion of the two ideas, abstract and identity.
is
equivalent to the phrase " an incomplete and
colorless
view of things."
The term "immediate," as we have already seen, when applied to knowledge, signifies that
which is given as a
processes
totality,
without any reference

it,
to the elements which constitute
or to the
by which
it is
produced.
Immediate
72
INTRODUCTION
is
knowledge
mere being.
that which
is
not subjected to any

is
analysis whatsoever,
and such
the nature of
The word
" undetermined " signifies the lack
of any definite qualities or attributes, and has the force of the adjective " indefinite " when applied
to being.
The phrase
which
is
" in itself " (an sicK)
means that
is
implicit or
potential;
it
used
in
distinction to the phrase " of itself " (fur
sieTi)
which
signifies
that which
is
explicit.
While
the former applies to being, the latter applies

to essence, indicating that the one
is
explicitly
is
what the other
is
implicitly.
Thus, being
transition
to of
be regarded merely as a
state
knowledge, the veriest beginning of knowledge

in fact,
definite
still
It,
inasmuch as that which may become and determined as essential being, is
indefinite
and undetermined
as
mere being.
all
however, does contain the potential of
that appears explicitly in essence.
We
being.
come now
to consider the
in
is
chief
charof
acteristics
of essence
contrast to
those
The
essence
is
the result of a deeper
insight than
represented by mere being.

is
The
essence of a thing
what
it is,
regarded no
longer as an isolated fact, but as a part of a
A GENERAL SURVEY OP THE

system of interrelated elements.
system
is
LOGIC
73
The
idea of
closely associated with a
technical
term which Hegel uses constantly in connection

with the category of essence
" reflection."
it is the word The essence of a thing is revealed only when we see the thing in its complete setting, and when we possess a thorough knowl;
edge of the relations which

part of the system to which
it
sustains to every
it
may
be referred.
The
thing, therefore, does not shine in its
own
all
light so
much
as in the light reflected
from
the coordinate elements with which
it is
related.
We
know
a thing only
when
it is
in the focal
point of the illumination due to its complete

setting.
It is in this sense
is
that
Hegel says
that the essence of a thing

of the category of reflection.
known by means
es-
Moreover, in order to understand fully the

sence of a thing
we must analyze
the total mass
and disclose the underlying elements and processes which have given rise to its being. As mere being, the thing appears as
of surface appearances,
an unanalyzed whole, a simple product without any reference to the processes which have proit. In this analysis into constituent elements and formative processes we employ in Mediaour thought the category of mediation.
duced
74
tion
is
INTRODUCTION
the process by which a thing comes to
it is
be what
as regards its inherent nature

;
and
is
essential characteristics
it
emphasizes especially
the means by which the

attained.
end in question
is always referred to as and undetermined, essence, on the contrary, is being which has become definite and determined. The definiteness which is char-
Again, while being
indefinite
acteristic of essence is
reached through a process

definite,
called negation.
To make
means
to
beyond which the thing what it is. The process of negation is therefore the setting up of bounds about a thing, forming an enclosing line which we may call the line of negation, as beyond that line there is nothing which can be regarded as
mark
off distinct limits,
in question ceases to be
properly belonging to the essence of the thing thus limited. Mere being, as we have homogeneous throughout, lacking all characteristic color and determination, and this
which
seen,
is
is
defect of being
various
parts
is
obviated by disclosing
their
its
and
reciprocal
relations.
But
in
doing this the several parts must be one of the
distinguished one from another, and the accom-
plishment of this
is
f anctions
of the
process of negation.
Negation, therefore,
may
A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC
75
be defined as the process of revealing the specific

differences
eral
between things, or between the sevelements and functions of one and the same
It
is,
thing.
in a sense, a twofold process,

is
the
discrimination of a thing from all that

to
it,
external
and
also the analysis of a thing into its It

is
component elements and functions.

as
a term,
used by Hegel, which
is
equivalent to the term
"differentiation,"
which has entered so largely

differentiation, for instance, of
into the terminology of biological investigation
and theory.
ing up of
The
its
an egg in the process of development is the breakinitial
homogeneity, which
we
might
call its
mere being, into the related parts

of
revealed in the living organism
the bird
newly hatched.
It is in this differentiation that

is
the essential nature of the bird
fully disclosed.
is
The Hegelian idea

negatio, that
is,
of negation
embodied
in
est
the dictum of Spinoza:
Omnis determinatio
we determine
the characteristic
and essential feature of a thing by a sharp distinction between that which it is and that which
it is
not.
When
is
no
line of distinction is
It is
drawn,
knowledge
just as
a blur.
without definition
plate
is
we say a photographic definition when we mean that

clear
without
the lines are not
and clean-cut.
76
INTRODUCTION
As
essence
may
be regarded as the develop-
in like
ment and completion of the category of being, manner the category of the notion is the
development and completion of that of essence.
Each stage marks a deeper penetration, and

progress
If
towards the
fulness
of
knowledge.
we
inquire as to the nature of the process
which necessarily underlies anything regarded

merely as a product,
tion as to its essence
we have
;
raised the ques-
and
is
if
then
we
probe
deeper and inquire as to the thought which has

devised the process, and
at the
same time
itself
both the dynamic source of the process
and
its
complete realization as well,
raised the question as to its notion,
that
we have
is,
creative
and sustaining reason.
The
notion,
therefore, embraces the truth, both of being

of essence.
It
and
has been before remarked that the cateof
gory
edge,
being
is,
represents
immediate
knowl-
that
the acceptance of an object of
knowledge
merely while yet unanalyzed and unexplained and that the category of
as a fact
;
essence represents mediated knowledge,

is,
that
cate-
knowledge analyzed and explained.
The
gory of the notion, therefore,

as
may
be regarded
of
the
combination
of
these
two kinds
A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC

knowledge.
It
77
embraces immediate knowledge
in the sense of
comprehending, from the beginas a finished prodas well, in the
ning, the
end to be realized
uct
it is
mediated knowledge
sense of its being the
knowledge
at the
of the process,
which
is
necessary in order to realize the end in

It
question.
possesses
same time the

that
capacity
process.
of
originating
and directing
been
Moreover, being
knowledgre
has
is
represented
as
which
indefinite
and undeter-
mined, and essence as knowledge definite and
determined
nection
the notion, therefore, in this con-
may
be
defined
as
the
principle
of
reason which has the capacity of determining

itself,
that
its
is,
of transforming the indefinite
and undetermined into the definite and determined, by
own
inherent self-activity.
Again, being has been represented as homogeneous, without any differentiation of

its parts,
and essence as the breaking up

sameness into distinct parts
fore,
;
this dull level of
the notion, thereself-
may
be regarded as the capacity for

the potential, and essence
differentiation or self-specification.
As being
actual,
is
the
ca-
the notion
may
be regarded as the
transition
pacity for effecting the
from
the
78
INTEODUCTION
potential to the actual, or the capacity of selfrealization.
These ideas of
nation,
self-realization, self-determi-
and
self-specification,
characterize
the
notion under the
several aspects of develop-
ment, freedom, and individuality.

ciple as this,
Such a
prinits
which
is
able freely to realize
own
ends,
is,
according to Hegel, to be considin the light of a substance,
ered not so
much
underlying and constituting the essential being

of all things, as a subject, because every manifestation of
tation.
which
it is
the ground
is
a self-manifes-
The
first
the doctrines of
and second parts of the logic, being and of essence, Hegel char-
acterizes as objective,
and the
third, the doctrine
Being and essence represent the manifestation in the world of

of the notion, as subjective.
reality, the
notion represents both the basis of

it
that manifestation and the end of

It will be seen that the
as well.
Hegelian system, as a
whole, represents a progressive evolution, and

it is
of
some
interest to note that as a process

it is
of
evolution
characterized by Hegel in
almost the same terms as Mr. Spencer employs

in his
tion.
well-known definition of biological evolu" Evolution," says he, " is a change
from an
definite,
indefinite, incoherent
homogeneity to a
LOGIC
79
dif-
coherent heterogeneity, through successive

ferentiations
and
integrations.
is
The change which

organism; the
first
indicated by the Spen.
cerian definition occurs
between two
states of
an
corresponds to that of mere
being, the second to that of essence.
The same and "incoherent," are used by Hegel to cliaracterize the state of mere being. The term " homogeneity " has a significance simiterms, "indefinite"
lar to the
Hegelian phrase of abstract identity,
that
is,
without distinction and characterization
of its parts.
So also the opposite terms "

the state of essence.
defi-
nite" and "coherent" permit of an exact application to
The term
" heterogeneity " indicates, moreover, the state in
which the
initial
sameness has been resolved into

in all propriety be applied to
separate elements possessing distinctive characteristics,
and may
the Hegelian conception of essence.

tion
The
is is
transi-
from the one state to the other

successive
differentiations
regarded
by Spencer as a process which

through
grations.
mediated
and
inte-
" Differentiation " corresponds to the
process of mediation
by negation
in the Hegelian
terminology, and
" integration " to the synthesis
which
is
the resulting product of such a process.

integration,
As every
according
to
Spencer,
80
INTRODUCTION
implies a previous differentiation, so according

to
knowledge must
has produced
istic
Hegel every so-called immediate element of be regarded as a product

Or, to use another character-
implying a previous mediation or process which

it.
phrase of Hegel's, while the Spencerian idea
of differentiation corresponds to the process of
negation, integration
may
is,
be regarded as correcalls abso-
sponding to the process which Hegel

lute negation,
that
the negation of a former
negation, which produces the effect of a
new
synthesis or affirmation.
There
is,
however, a marked point of depar-
ture in reference to the Hegelian conception of
evolution in contrast to that of
Mr. Spencer.
The
latter's definition
contains nothing which
corresponds to the
Hegelian category of the
notion. As to what may underlie the series of never ceasing changes, as to the origin of the
series itself
is
and
its final
consummation, there
in the philosophy of
great
Unkuowable.
Mr. Spencer only the Here, Mr. Spencer would

;
insist, is reason's barrier
of conjecture, of sentiment,
of
beyond lies the region and of hope but not

position
knowledge.
To an
agnostic
such
Hegel would enter a vigorous protest, and would urge that, given being and essence,
as this,

the thing
LOGIC
81
and
its historical
evolution, forming
of
part
of
the
cosmic
series
is
progressive
development, the thought

constrained
to
then necessarilyconstructive
postulate
and
determining principle of reason, as the

gent source and end of
moreover, that this
sufficient to
it all.
intelli-
Hegel maintains, principle of reason which is

is
account for the cosmic evolution

a self-
from the beginning to the end, which

contained, free activity, creating
and sustaining all things within its power, its wisdom and its goodness, can be no other than that which is the Absolute, which is God. When Hegel
takes the position, as
that the underlying
we have
already noticed,
ground
of all things
must
be regarded as a subject rather than a substance, thence the transition to the

identifica-
tion of this subject with the Absolute or
God
seems a most natural one.

as
And
it
will be seen
we advance
in the further exposition of the
Logic that the

cal
momentum
of the entire dialecti-
movement renders such
a conclusion neces-
sary.
PAET
THE DOCTRINE OF BEING
Das Seyn
schaueî
ist
nicht
zu emx)finden,
nicht
anzvr
ist
und
nicht vorzustellen, sondern es

cds soldier
der
reine
Gedanke und
macht
es
den Anfang.
Hegel.
PART

CHAPTER
QUALITY
VII
HEGEL
(2)'e
discusses
the
doctrine
of
its
being
three
Lehre vom Seyri) under

quality,
aspects
of
quantity,
and
measure.
upon the exposition of the Hegelian conception of quality, it would be well to examine somewhat more in detail the general doctrine of being. Such an undertaking will serve at the same time as an introduction to his more specific teaching conBefore
entering
cerning the quality of being.

If
we
are
agreed
to
regard knowledge as
an evolution, then the beginnings of that evolution
edge.
must represent the minimum of knowlSuch a beginning is found in the

In ascribing to an object
category of being.
mere being without any further characterization,
we render our
assertion
85
as
indefinite
as
86
it
THE DOCTEINB OF BEING

can well be made.
The knowledge which

is
ranges upon so low a level
equivalent to
no knowledge at
it,
all,
or as
Hegel tersely puts
The identification of being and non-being when thrust upon us as a bare statement and without commentary upon it, not only startles us
"
Being
is
the same as non-being."
but
also
arouses
very
natural
feeling of
protest,
to
and perhaps of indignation. We say ourselves " Is Hegel a mere juggler with
Is it possible that
is
words?
behind
this abrupt
us,
formula he
secretly
is
laughing at
and
that his whole system
merely a keen
satire
upon the limitations of the powers of reason?" So it would seem, at least after a rapid and superficial glance at such a proposition. But when we come to analyze the statement that being and non-being are the same, we find
that
that
it
is
only an epigrammatic expression of
which we
;
have
always
are
believed
to
most
say
thoroughly
that
for
we
of
accustomed
is
any statement which

is
indefinite
and
non-committal
as
no value or significance
should be put to us in
it
knowledge.
If it
the
it
form
of
promise,
would carry with
no weight of assurance that the promise would ever be fulfilled. For us it would
QUALITY
amount
proverb
:
87
to nothing.
This
is
is
expressed in the
" Some time
no time."
to
We see, then,
and nonthat
that Hegel's identification of being
being
is
equivalent
is
the
to
statement
whatever
definite,
presented
us as wholly into
its
ranks in reference
it
worth
If
it
as
is
knowledge as though
assent immediately.
were not.
put in this way, the Hegelian epigram wins our
sought
tion,
is
The critics of Hegel have him by asking the ques"Do you mean to tell us that a house
to
entrap
the same as
as
same
no house? that a man is the no man? that a God is the same as
no God?"
of
Such questions indicate a

being to
non-being.
radical
misunderstanding of Hegel's conception of the

relation
For in the
examples
ing;
cited, the house,
man, God, we have
something more in each case than mere be-
we have being which has already been
rendered definite and explicit,
and possesses the whole concrete content which these terms severally connote. These cases, therefore, fall wholly outside of the sphere of mere being, and hence are irrelevant to the point which
has been raised.
that being,
ization
What Hegel affirms is this mere being, without any characterindefinite
whatsoever, absolutely
and
88
THE DOCTRINE OE BEING

its essential qualities,
undetermined as regards
that such
But while
being
is
as nothing.
being, from one point of

is
abstract being,
the
view as same as non-being, from

however,
it
another point
different
of
view,
is
quite
from non-being.
is
For being in the

first
Hegelian system
in a series
of
regarded as the
It
term
befar
development.
marks a
it is
it
ginning,
therefore,
and
while
sicJi),
so
nothing explicitly (/iir
still
must be
regarded as something implicitly (aw sicK),

that
is, it
must contain the potentiality of someis to appear later on in the actual development. In it must be the " promise and
thing which
potency " of
the
all
that
is
to follow of
its
throughout
It
subsequent
stages
evolution.
to
would be a correct statement

top of a house
" This
assert con-
cerning a stone placed upon a parapet at the

:
stone
is
if
at
it it
rest.
It
has
no motion."
And
its
yet
should be
pushed away from

to
support,
would
fall
the ground below, because of the gravity
potential
position
which
alone.
it
it
possessed by virtue of
so
first
it
its
And
in the
would be correct
that
it
is
to state of
instance
both at rest and, nevertheless, potentially at

least,
possesses
motion.
The motion
is
not
QUALITY
actual, it is true,
89
but
is
it is
potential,
and so
far
forth
If
its
motion
is
real in a very true sense.
being
to be regarded, then, as the initial
term in a series of
think of
it
as
its
development, we must embodying a high potential in

latent qualities.
reference to
Suppose, therefore, that the being which
we
have conceived as the starting-point in this evolution begins to develop its potential qualities
into actual.
We
will find that
whatever has
been indefinite
now
tends to become more and
definite, and whatever has been undetermined will now grow more and more deter-
more
mined, as the
process
advances.
implies
is
The very
that each
idea of development itself
succeeding stage of the series

of
a manifestation
something which in the preceding stage had
as yet
no actual being.
of
It is in this sense that

is
Hegel affirms that becoming (^Werden')

unity
the
a
being
and non-being,
that
that
not to
is,
transition
from
which
is
that
which
is.
Let us suppose, for instance, that there

object barely discernible in the twilight.
is
an
Our
knowledge of
nature
it is
completely exhausted by the

is
bare statement that something

its
there.
its
What
charac-
may
be more specifically,
90

form, color, and the like,
is
teristics, as to
it is
what
our
in fact, that
it
is
unknown;
it
is
nothing.
But while
knowledge
so indefinite
as far as
of its true nature is

it
concerned that
we
correctly designate
it
as nothing, neverthe-
less,
contains at the same time the potenof
tiality
something
which
under
proper
so
circumstances
may
be revealed.
And
we
sur-
may imagine
rounds
it
;
that the light gradually grows
brighter, penetrating the darkness
which
and with the growing illumination the object becomes clearer, and all that a moment before was indefinite and unknown becomes definite and known. Such a process
is
one of becoming, and
it
consists of a transi-
tion from the

tion of
all
unknown
to the
known, a
revela-
hidden qualities; and this process
may
is,
be appropriately characterized as the unity
or the uniting of that or as
which
it,
is
not to that which
Hegel puts
the unity of non-being
and being.
Hegel maintains that
his
system of thoughtall
evolution brings together in one
the differ-
ent phases of philosophical speculation which

in turn have emphasized exclusively
some one
par-
stage of the total process of development, and
which have overlooked the relation of each
QUALITY
tial
91
point of view to the whole.
In a similar
persons
manner, for instance, several

describe a plant, one
of seed
might
by referring to the kind

sprang, another by drawits
from which
its
it
ing attention to
fruit,
blossom, or another, to
its
and
still
another, to
possible use for
medicinal purposes.
stage
in the
Each would represent

its
complete process of
growth.
to-
Each
tion.
is partial,
and
all
should be brought
gether in order to form one complete descrip-
Thus, in the system of Parmenides the
idea of being
tion to non-being
was regarded apart from its relaand becoming. The consethe

ele-
quence was that his system represented

world as consisting of rigidly unalterable
ments,
mere
products
ready made
and unHeracli-
changing, from which the idea of any process
whatsoever was completely excluded.

tus,
on the other hand, held that the truth of

he said,
being consisted of a perpetual becoming, irdvTa

pel,
all
things flow.
Thus the
cateall
gory of becoming in his system excludes

others.
Heraclitus, however, marks an advance
upon Parmenides, inasmuch as his idea of becoming carries with it also the implication of being, so that while he destroj^s the being of
Parmenides with one hand, he restores
it
with
92
THE DOCTEINE OF BEING

it
the other, regarding
as
an essential factor
It is of interest
in the process of becoming.
to note that this historical difference of opinion
has followed, as
tic
it
were, the lines of a dialec-
movement, inasmuch as the seemingly contradictory positions from one point of view are brought together in a higher unity, and
from a more comprehensive point of view,
the being of Parmenides
is
as
absorbed in the
becoming of Heraclitus.
he himself claims,
lines of
is
Hegel's dialectic, as
only a following of the
development which philosophical thought,

process of becoming, moreover, in any
instance,
as a whole, has described in its path of progress.
The
concrete
must
result
in
some
defi-
nite product.
The
process of becoming Hegel
likens to a fire
which is constantly consuming its material, and j'et, nevertheless, does not leave an empty nothing as a result. That which is destroyed in one form is conserved in
another.
The
result
process of becoming
is,
being
which
which is attained by the Hegel calls Baseyn, that has been rendered definite
through the manifestation of

qualities.
'
its
characteristic
The term Baseyn has
the force of the
phrase "definite being," and

lated.
may
be so trans-
QUALITY
That which renders being
(^die
93
definite is its quality
Qualitaf).
it is.
It is that
its
which constitutes
it
what
is
Modify
quality,
is
and being
itself dis-
likewise modified.
It
Hegel's plan to
cuss the bare idea of quality in general

to enter
and not
of
upon the discussion of the nature
any
tion
specific qualities in particular.
The
ques-
which he puts
is this,
"
What
do we under-
stand by the idea of the quality of a thing in
most general aspects?" He, at the outset, draws a distinction between the categories of quality and of quantity (^die
respect to its Quantitdty.
Quality
may
be defined as the
;
internal determining factor of being

tity as
and quan-
the external determining factor.
Any
it is
variation in that
which makes being what
will, of course, affect
the nature of being itself
may occur in that which determines how much or how little of the being in question may be taken, and yet this need not
but a variation
necessarily affect the nature of that being
itself.
drop in the ocean does not differ in quality

it is
from the entire body of which

finitesimal
but an
in-
portion.
It
is
obvious that being
and
its
quality are identical,
when we seek
It is
illustrations in the sphere of nature.
not
so obvious
when we seek them
in the sphere of
94
mind.

The
various
mental
definite
functions,
for
instance, cannot be so accurately described as
consisting of certain
qualities.
and invariable
The very complexity of the phemind renderj their simplification by means of definite qualities a more difficult nomena
of
if
not an impossible task.
There
is,
for
exam-
ple,
no
specific
memory
of
or volitional quality
attaching to consciousness as such.
The category
as
quality
is
to be
regarded
having a positive and a negative aspect.
Positively, the quality of a definitely determined
being constitutes
it is.
its reality,
it
makes
it
is
what
deter-
Negatively, the quality of being
mined by a certain natural limit beyond which,

if
we proceed
in thought, there
is
immediately
a marked change in quality and consequently

in the very nature of being itself.
There
are,
however, two kinds of limit

qualitative
(c?^'e
Crrdnze), a
and a quantitative
the
qualitative
its
limit.
is is
Of course
the reference in this connection

tative
to the quali-
limit;
essentially a
definite
limit as to kind,
and
bounds mark a
change
hand,
is
of kind.
The
quantitative, on the other
naturally a limit as to magnitude, and
marks a purely quantitative change.

purely qualitative limit
In the
we have
form
of
QUALITY
negative determination, in the sense that
if
95
its
bound
suffers
is
transcended, the
being in question
its
a radical change in
is,
nature.
Such
a limit
being.
therefore, the determining point of
To understand
the nature of the being
which we have in any particular instance, we must know, not only in a general way what
kind of being
at just
it is,
but
we must know
definitely
what point
a variation in
its
quality
will subject it to a
complete transformation into
some other kind of being altogether.

the very idea of a limit signifies that
a line of
It
is
Hegel
marks
wishes to emphasize especially the thought that

it
boundary between two kinds of being.
impossible to conceive of a limit which
would be the boundary of only one thing, for while it bounds one, it separates at the same time from something else. Therefore, every
determinate being necessarily implies that something
lies
beyond
its
its
limit;
this
something
were,
Hegel
calls
other.
This conception of an
it
other Qein Anderes}, the obverse face, as

of every definite being, plays a
very conspicuous
system.
and
significant
rSle
in
the Hegelian
The other which stands over against every

definite
being
is
not any other thing whatsolie
ever which happens to
outside the sphere
96
THE DOCTKINE OP BEING

but
it
of the definite being in question;
must
be that particular other which
is,
as it were, its to regard

ceris
next of kin.
a triangle
tain
It
would be incorrect
as an
its
and a horse definite being and
example of a
other.
The other
that which not only lies outside of the sphere
some definite being, but at the same time it must lie within the boundaries of some common system to which both may be referred. For instance, a true example of an other in
of
the Hegelian sense, would be that of the ellipse,
which
other.
is
naturally related to the circle as

cultivated fruit which grows
its
The
on
a branch grafted upon a wild stock would be
regarded as the other in reference to the main

tree.
As Hegel
ing an
its
puts
it,
every definite being in

considered merely within
the process of development has a certain meansioh,
that
;
is,
own
sphere
but
this
meaning
is
always parcompletion
tial
because undeveloped, and for
its
necessitates
a consideration of the nature of
the limit, and this in turn can be

as
known only
its
we
pass over into the adjacent sphere of
meaning, therefore, of any definite being can be grasped only when we

other.
full
The
it
consider
not merely an sich but also fur
QUALITY
Anderes as well,
97
in reference to its
that
lies at
is
is,
corresponding other.
This conception
of evolution,
the basis of the idea
which
a continuous change in
is
such a manner that every advancing stage

precedes
the necessary other of that which immediately

it.
As
the great cosmic system
is
one
of evolution, every determinate being in
it
must
show inherently
into
its
this
tendency to a continuous
alteration (die Verdnderlichkeit) a passing over

other.
But when we pass from any

its
definite
being to
other, this other, itself pos-
sessing definite being,

to
must
also
have
its
other
complete
its
meaning, and so on without

can never be satisfactory,
It is
limit.
We
thus find ourselves launched upon
an
infinite series that
because never complete.

gression,
an endless proto follow
and can only bring weariness unutter-
able to the
mind which attempts

of an infinite series,
infinity (die
it.
Such an idea
false
Hegel
styles a
or
negative
schlechte
oder
negative
Unendlichkeity.
It represents
merely
a tedious multiplication
of
finite
finite,
terms in a
according to
never ending process.

Hegel, within
The
may
be defined as that which contains

its
is
itself
own
contradiction.
its
Its
very
incompleteness
the cause of
breaking
down
98
THE DOCTBINE OF BEING own

weight.
of its
As Hegel
itselfi
characteristically
It needs
describes
it, it
negatives
always
to be referred to
some other being

its
as its cause
and explanation,
a process
is
necessary other.
limit, as
But such
seen. in spite
without
we have
is that,
Hegel's idea of the true infinite
of this indefinitely continued process of referring
some other beyond, there is an intimation that the underlying ground not only of the
on and on always
to
at each stage of such a process
particular stage of the process in question, but

of the entire evolution itself of
a very small
basis.
phase, rests
which it is but upon some absolute

it
Therefore, every cross-section, as
were,
is
of the continuous process of
development
This
to
be regarded as a manifestation of the eternal

reason, of the Absolute, of
God.
is
in full
accord with Hegel's fundamental principle of

absolute idealism.
In every change, therefore,
from any imperfectly determined being to some

other there
is
nevertheless a something which

it
remains unalterable, which when

into
its
passes over
calls Filr-
other is
still itself.
This Hegel
sichseyn, or being for itself,
that
is,
a concep-
tion of being as possessing a certain constant
core of self-identity in the midst of all variation,
and which preserves
its
own
integrity as definite
QUALITY
being in spite of
it
99
all
modifying forces to which

This essentially perma-
may
be subjected.
nent element in being partakes, according to

Hegel, of the nature of the Absolute, and encloses within its finite
divinity.
appearance a spark of
It is the true infinity Qdie wahrhafte
Vnendlichkeit')
Inasmuch, therefore, as the quality of any

definite
being
is
determined by a process of
it
negation which assigns to
a definite limit,
its
when we conceive
form of
as
of
being in
developed
this limit
being-for-self,
we must regard
its
in
a certain sense obliterated, because the other

fall
being thus conceived and
together
within one and the same sphere

reference.
of
common
limit
;
This
line is
obliteration
of
or
boundary
a process of negation
but
is
the fixing of the limit in the former process

also a negation.
is
The
obliteration of the limit
therefore to be regarded as the negation of a

it,
negation, or, as Hegel calls

tion,
an absolute negashoots
and
has, therefore, the force of an affirma-
tion.
Thus the seed develops
the
first
which appear above the ground, these change into the stalk and twigs, these put forth leaves,
blossoms, and finally bear fruit.
the growth changes into
its
Each stage
of
other, but they are
100
all
THE DOCTRINE OP BEING

in one
;
embraced
for the various limits
which
mark
the stages
of transition
disappear com-
pletely in our thought of the plant as a whole,
which perdures in
illustration of the
for-self
is,
its
integrity throughout the

itself.
whole process, even in the seed
The
best
Hegelian significance of being-
however, not found in the sphere of

It is
plant
life.
found in the higher sphere of
consciousness, in the nature of personality, of the
Ego.
The
personality of selfhood remains un-
changed amidst the innumerable alterations of

its
manifold
activities,
and so
far forth partakes
of the nature of that absolute

is
permanency which
infinite.
an essential attribute of the
The
its
idea of the Ego, of consciousness apart from
concrete manifestation in any particular individual (the Kantian
Bewuutseyn
iiherhaupi)
may
be regarded as the most comprehensive type of

the Absolute.
And
it
every individual
Ego must
"it lives
therefore partake of the nature of the Absolute
whose image
bears,
its
and
in
whom
and moves and has
being."
We
find,
moreover, in the category of beingideality.
for-self
an intimation of
is
Ideality,
according to Hegel,
in
all
that elemental principle
being which
its
is
dynamic and construcIt

is
tive,
working out
ends from within.
QUALITY
the
101
all
immanent reason within
being.
is
It is
the architectonic principle which
self-direct-
ing and self-manifesting.
As we have
be
seen,
determinate
being
is
to
referred to
the
category of reality; but

regard
ideality.
we
are constrained to
being-for-self
under
the
category of
The two
the
are not contradictory, how-
ever,
for
category of ideality represents
merely a deeper insight and implies the category

of
reality
as
its
necessary
the
is
correlate.
Hegel
senses.
draws
attention to
is
fact
that the
term "reality"
one which
used in two
In one sense, as has already been pointed

conceived as identical with the
out, reality is
positive side of determinate being,
that
is,
the
some renders being what it

manifestation of
definite
is.
quality which
of
it
the reality of a plan or of a purpose,
Thus we speak when
remains no longer merely an inner and subjective
thought, but has been realized in some
definite
form
of
actual
being.
The second
is
sense in which the term reality

signify that anything
is
used,
is
to
in a state completely
conformable to
its
essential nature, or, as

it
Hegel
its
would put
say, "
it,
when
conforms completely to
notion or essential idea.
For instance, when we
That
is
a real man,"
we mean by such
102

is
characterization that he
realized the ideal of
one
who
has perfectly
It
is
manhood.
as
in this
sense that Hegel insists that reality and ideality

are to be regarded
inseparable correlates.
The
is
real, therefore, is
the ideal, and the ideal
the real.
Inasmuch
as being-for-self
and
being-for-its-
thought by through the underlying unity which embraces it may them both in one and the same system, for instance, in one and the same organism, be, we consequently may regard these two phases of being as constituting a closed sphere. While the unit thus formed is complex, it is nevertheless to be regarded as one by itself, and separate
other are brought
together
our
from all others. To be for self, signifies to be some one individual thing or person. This marks the final stage in the development of the
category of
quality,
and
at the
same time
it
suggests a natural transition to the category of

quantity.
For the very idea of anything which
we can
The
designate as one and individual implies
that there
must be others
of
the same
kind.
idea of one necessitates the complementary
idea of the many.
The
it
idea of one
would be
meaningless were
trast
not for the suggested con-
between the one and the many.
QUALITY
103
together, each one
As now we can conceive of many ones grouped may be regarded as excluding

itself,
every other one from

as this is
and a relation such
But at same time it must not be overlooked that though in a sense reciprocally repelling, the
one of reciprocal repulsion.
the
naany ones nevertheless are
all of
the same kind

in
and consequently
system.
fall
together
single
There
bond
of
attraction
must be consequently some which thus holds them

complex unity we emphasize
to the fore the concept of
If,
is
together in an underlying unity.

If,
now, in
this
the idea of the separate individuality of each of

its
elements,
we bring
repulsion
(die
Repulsion).
however, we
emphasize the fact that each one
many
others of the
grouped with same kind, then we give

(die
their
prominence to the concept of attraction

Attrahtion)
being.
which
constitutes
common
The concept of the reciprocal repulsion of the many is found in the ancient atomic philosophy. But there the common bond was regarded as that of chance. The falling into the same group of a number of atoms was considered to be wholly
fortuitous.
In the Hegelian system, on the
contrary, the
common bond which
gives unity to
104
each and every system of being, and also unites

all
systems ultimately into one,
is
that incarnate
reason, the universal creator

If the
is
and organizer.
one in any particular system of being
regarded as one merely of
many where
all are
of the
same kind, then the idea of quality

sus-
becomes irrelevant, and may be regarded as
pended altogether.
is
It
is
thus that the transition
made
to the pure idea of quantity, in
which
is
the idea of the quality of a
number
of objects
wholly eliminated because reduced in every

case to a dead level of identity.
Hegel's development of being
may
be briefly
summarized as consisting
are
of three stages,
and
three corresponding processes.

:
The
three stages
1.
2.
Indeterminate being (^Seyn).
Determinate being (^Daseyii).

Being-for-self (^FursichseyTi).
3.
The three corresponding 1. Becoming (IFercêw).

2. 3.
processes are
und
Alteration (^Verdnderung').
Attraction and repulsion {Attraktion
Repulsion).
CHAPTER
VIII
QUANTITY
THE
idea
idea of quantity, as
we have
seen, is
that aspect of
mere being from which the

been eliminated.
of all quality has

is
:
The
category of quantity
three points of
1.
2.
view
described by Hegel from
Quantity in general
(^die
Quantitai).
Determinate quantity (das Quantum').
3.
Degree (der
will be seen
G-rad').
It
in the following exposition
that these three aspects of quantity correspond

to the three general divisions of quality
1. 2.
3.
:
Being in general.
Determinate being.
Self-determined being.
regards quantity in general,
it
As
may
be
re-
marked
applies
as a matter of terminology that
Hegel
the term magnitude (die
Q-rosse) to
determinate quantity rather than to the general

notion of quantity.
ever,
Quantity in general, how105
may
be considered apart from any refer-
106
THE DOCTKINE OF BEING
ence to definite magnitude, just as quality in

general was considered apart from any reference
While quantity in general may be regarded by itself as an essential moment in the evolution of the universal reason, it must not, however, be regarded as an exclusive
to specific qualities.
category.
Hegel has no sympathy with the

all
tendency to reduce
phenomena
of the uni-
verse to a quantitative basis, including even the
phenomena
of
mind.
He
insists that
a purely
mechanical view of the universe, which such a

quantitative reduction of all things implies,
is
by no means a
view.
complete or
comprehensive
The
falls
mechanical
view
may seem
to
suffice in its application to the
inorganic world,
but
it
short of an adequate explanation
cially
when we come to the organic world, and espewhen we seek to explain the phenomena
of free activity in the sphere of
mind.
is
Inasmuch
as the category of quantity
to be
regarded as a necessary evolution from the cate-
gory of being, and also marks a definite characteristic of being, it
may
be regarded from this
point of view, according to the general
method
of Hegel, as an attribute of the Absolute in one

of its manifold phases of
manifestation.
To
define the Absolute merely as quantity
would
QUANTITY
107
represent, of course, a very one-sided and exceed-
ingly limited conception
but
if,
on the other
were omitted altogether, the idea of the Absolute would prove wanting so far forth in an
hand,
it
essential
element of
its
characterization.
When we come
that
it
to a
more
specific inquiry as
to the nature of our idea of quantity,
we
find
may
be conceived from two points of
view.
Quantity
may
be
either
continuous
If
(kontinuirlich') or discrete (^diskref).
we
re-
gard quantity as an aggregate of

or, as it
many
is
parts,
may
be put, the one which
composed
of the
many,
and
we
if,
moreover,
the unity into
which the
we emphasize many blend, then we

If,
have quantity represented as continuous.

the other hand,
discount, as
it
on
were, in our
thought the connecting bond, and emphasize the

isolation
and reciprocal exclusiveness attaching
to the several parts, then quantity will appear

as discrete.
A line
of continuous
may be taken quantity. On the
as
an example
other hand, a
bushel of apples would be considered as a discrete quantity. The terms, however, " continu-
ous " and " discrete," are not mutually exclusive.
Quite in keeping with the Hegelian point of

view, either one of these terms apart from the
other,
and excluding the
other, represents a
108
THE DOCTRINE OP BEING
mere abstraction,
fore
that
is,
a partial and there-
misleading conception.
Truth
is
found
always in the unity of the two.
uous quantity
is
in a sense discrete
Every continand in like

;
manner
every discrete quantity
is
continuous.
line
it
that
may be regarded may be viewed

number
as discrete in the sense as
composed
of
an
in-
definite
of separate points, or divided
into several distinct sections, each containing
a definite
number
of centimetres or millimetres.
And
on the other hand, a bushel of apples may
be regarded as a continuous quantity when, for

instance,
we compare the
which
is
price of
apples per
bushel this year -with that of last year.

the unit
Here
as a
emphasized
is
the bushel and
not the single apple.
The bushel regarded

The Kantian
whole from
this point of
view represents therean-
fore a continuous quantity.
tinomy
in reference to space
and time, or the
constitution of matter,
may
be resolved by an
application of these considerations.

is,
The
truth
that regarded as continuous magnitudes they
are indefinitely divisible, but regarded as discrete
magnitudes they are not indefinitely
divisible.
The seeming
contradiction arises from a differ-
ence in point of view.
When we come
to the idea of definite
quan-
QUANTITY
tity,
it is
109
it,
or
quantum,
as
Hegel
styles
we
find that
an idea which arises necessarily in answer
to the question,
How much ?
It bears the
same
relation
to
quantity in general that
definite
being does to being in general.
Every quanbe conceived,
tum, or definite magnitude,
may
moreover, as composed of a number of parts
which are themselves quanta of

tude.
lesser
magni-
Every definite magnitude, regarded as distinct from all others, forms a unity, a closed sphere, as it were, apart and by itself, but subjected to further analysis within its
it is
own
limits
a manifold
made up
of its constituent parts.

it
From
these considerations
will be seen that
the idea of
quantum involves
that of number.
For number may be regarded as a concept

which comprehends the two momenta or factors
which are found in the idea of quantum.

two factors are the idea of a sum or
the idea of unity,
total,
These
which
corresponds to that of a discrete quantity, and
which corresponds
to that of
a continuous quantity.
Out
of the various com-
binations
factors
and reciprocal
relations of these
two
we may develop
all
the various modes of
reckoning which
obtain in arithmetic.
We
in the
may
regard
arithmetical operations as based
upon the principle of putting numbers
110
relation of
THE DOCTKINB OP BEING

unity,
and sum or
total
amount;
these two
and
of establishing the equality of
functions.
Thus the simplest arithmetical operation

that of counting.
cess
is
This
may
be defined as a pro-
which aims to construct an aggregate or sum
total
by putting together the separate

another.
units,
one
unit
after
In this operation each
ranks the same in value as every other.

is
There
in
no distinction of any kind between them.

it is
But
possible
to
conceive each unit
question as possessing a value different from
every other,
ceived as
that
is,
each unit
may
be con-
itself
an aggregate or sum, possessing

3, 7,
9,
varying values, as
4,
etc.
When we
come
to
enumerate these sums in order to find
the total value in simple units,
we
are perform-
ing the operation of addition.
In multiplication each unit

gate, but they are all alike
is also an aggreand do not vary in
value, whereas in addition they are ordinarily
unlike.
However, multiplication may be repre-
sented as a kind of addition.

following aggregates to count
We may
:
have the
8
8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8,
and we may do
are
all
this
merely as a special
alike.
by addition, regarding it case in which the aggregates

result
Or we can obtain the
QUANTITY
directly
111
times,
by taking eight seven
which
is
the process of multiplication.

it is
In multiplication
a matter of indifference as to which of the

as
two factors we regard which the unit.
the aggregate
and
is
The
process of raising a
number
to a
power
a special case of multiplication.
To
raise
any
number
to the second power, for instance, the

is
aggregate
taken as
many
Thus
times as
it
itself
contains simple units.

that
is,
8^ is 8 times 8,
8 taken 8 times.
In such a process
there
is
represented the equality of
sum
total
and unity.
the process.
To
raise
number
to a higher
power requires only a continued repetition of

Addition, multiplication, and the raising to a
power give an exhaustive division of the

ous
vari-
modes of arithmetical
calculation.
The
three other processes
of subtraction, division,
and taking the root of a number do not represent distinct types of arithmetical
operations,
but are to be regarded merely in the light of

inverse operations respectively to addition, multiplication,
and the raising
to a required power.
As
in reference to quantity in general
we have
found the distinction obtaining between continuous and discrete magnitudes, so in reference
112
to
THE DOCTBINB OF BEING

or determinate quantity, there
is
quantum
of
similar
distinction
expressed by the
opposite
terms
extensive
and
intensive
quantity.
Extensive magnitude corresponds to the idea of

continuous quantity and intensive magnitude
to that of discrete.
This correspondence will
be seen through the following considerations. Definite magnitude is such only as it possesses
a definite quantitative limit.
is
If the
magnitude
of the
line of
regarded as a continuous quantity, then the
limit is
marked simply by the contour

itself,
magnitude
definition.
that
is,
its
boundary
Moreover, from this point of view

is
the separate identity of each part
lost because
merged in the whole, which is one and not many, and all included within one and the same But if the magnitude limit of circumscription.
is
regarded as discrete, then any one of the
distinct parts nite limit.
by
its
position
may mark
defi-
Thus, when we take the temperature

it is
of
any body,
the limiting degree which
is
read off as significant.
The quantity
is
of heat
which
is
thus measured
given in terms of
intensity or degree {der Q-rad).
In reference to the intensity of quantitative

determination, the various discrete units
may
be
regarded as arranged in order so as to form a
QUANTITY
series;
113
all
they therefore do not
count
its
alike.
There will always be one which, by

in the series, will
position
mark
the limit, and therefore

it.
have a particular significance attaching to
And
as such a series rises or falls, proceeds for-
wards or backwards, as the case

different units
may
be, the
marking the varying
limit
in
every case will indicate corresponding grades of

intensity.
As
a continuous quantity
may
be regarded as
discrete, so also
an extensive magnitude
may
be
conceived as intensive, and an intensive magni-
tude as extensive.
intensity of heat
Thus, for
instance,
the
may have an
extensive signifi-
cance as interpreted by the height of the column

of
mercury.
This marks the extent which the
mercury, as a whole, has risen in the tube.
Hegel
illustrates this feature of a
change from
attention
an intensive to an extensive point of view as

seen in the sphere of mind.
to the fact that a
He draws
power
life
is,
man
who has accumulated a

at the
certain intensity of mental
same
sides,
time, the
man who
touches
on many
so that his capacities have evidently an extensive manifestation as well.
This application
is
somewhat
fanciful, it
would seem, and should
be taken in a figurative rather than in a literal
114

Hegel himself evidently
sense, which, however,
does not do.
Hegel again enters a protest against those
who would
subordinate the idea of intensive
magnitude to a mere form of extensive magnitude. He insists that while they are most
intimately correlated in thought, nevertheless
there
is
a real distinction between the two that
should not be overlooked.

contains an element which
The
is
idea of intensity
wholly lacking in
the bare idea of extension.
This, however,
must
not be interpreted as signifying that the idea of
an intensive magnitude
is
wholly independent of
that of extensive magnitude.

ever,
The
one,
how-
must not be so merged
in the other as to
lose its individual characteristics completely.
The very concept

that the limit which
its
of quantity itself
is
is
such
set to
it
so as to render
quantity a definite amount, or a definite
degree of intensity according to the point of

view, must be conceived as varying indefinitely
without affecting the nature or quality of the
magnitude
in question.
The
limit
is
which depurely an
termines the amount or degree
external determination, and the concept of quantity carries
with
it
the idea of the possibility

itself indefinitely.
of pushing out
and beyond
QUANTITY
There
is
115
restriction
no natural or necessary
limit,
upon a quantitative
and therefore the
continuous breaking down in our thought of any assigned limit necessitates the conception of an infinite quantitative progression. In this connection Hegel quotes Zeno,
idea in an enigmatical
to say a
who has put

" It
it
is
this
form
the same
thing once, and to say

infinite series gives,
forever."
Such an
false for
however, a false
It is
idea of the true significance of infinity.
the same reason that the qualitatively
infinite progression is false, as
we have
already
seen.
It is
infinity.
what Spinoza calls the imaginary As an instance of this conception,

:
Hegel quotes the lines of Haller ^

" Ich hauf e ungeheure Zahlen
Gebirge Millionen auf,

Ich seize Zeit auf Zeit
Und Welt auf Welt zu Hauf, Dnd wenn ich von der grausen Hbh'
Mit Schwindel wieder nach Dir seh', Ist alle Macht der Zahl Vermehrt zu Tausendmal, Noch nicht ein Theil von Dir." ^
1
Hegel's Werke, VI,
104.
up numbers immense, mountains of millions. I add time to time, and world to world. And when I turn from the awful height with reeling brain and look towards Thee, all the power of number increased a thousand fold is not yet one part of Thee.
2 I pile
116
THE DOCTBINE OP BEING

upon this passage, Hegel The same poet, however, well adds
of
In commenting
remarks
to
"
that description
the
false
infinity
the
closing line
'
Ich zieh sie ab,
und du
liegest
ganz vor mir.' ^

is
This means that the true infinite
not to be
regarded merely as another world which transcends the

finite
;
and
ate its significance,
if we we must
are ever to appreci-
disabuse our minds
of all notions of a progressus in infinitum."^
The doctrine of number, as is well known, was magnified by the ancient Pythagoreans into a complete system of philosophy. While in that school there was an undue exaggeration of the concept of number as expressing the essence of being, it must not be overlooked, however,
that
Pythagoras touched upon an important

teaching
truth in his
when he
insisted that
there are certain states of things, certain phe-
nomena
This
of nature, the character of
which seem
relations.
to vary according to a scale of
number
may
be illustrated in the variations in
tone and harmony which, according to

tradition, first
common
suggested to Pythagoras the con-
ception of the essence of all things as number.

1
These I sweep away, and Thou
liest fully
revealed be104.
fore me.
QUANTITY
117
Hegel, according to his general method, adopts

the teachings of this school not in the light of a
complete system of philosophy, but merely as
one phase
the
among many
in the
development
of
universal reason.
The Pythagorean docwith Hegel's
trine corresponds roughly, at least,
conception of quantitative relation, which idea
marks a natural transition to the third division

of quantity,
known
as measure.
Quantitative relation (das quantitative VerJialtniss)
may
be defined as that relation which
obtains
the
between numbers of such a nature that numbers themselves may vary indefinitely,
itself
:
provided only the relation

stant.
remains conis
Thus the
relation of 2 4
the same as
that of 3:6.
In the midst, therefore, of varyis
ing quantities, there

its
a constant which retains
own specific character through a process that may be indefinitely continued without limit.
This idea of certain constant features in the
midst of quantitative variation would seem to
indicate that this constant value has the force

of a
qualitative
it
is
character;
for,
as
we have
altera-
found,
the
quality which
remains un-
changed in the midst of quantitative

tion.
Thus
in
pushing forward the concept of

all its possible
quantity in the development of
118

we
find
implications,
tions in
between coincident
altera-
magnitudes which form a ratio a con-
stant relation obtaining of such a nature that
the concept of quantity will not explain.it satisfactorily,
and we
fall
back again upon the idea

it.
of quality in order to account for
Thus the
idea of quality
developed to
was found to be partial, and when its utmost limit, carried our thought
over into the sphere of quantity.

of quantity
Then
Is
the idea
when
fully developed, brought us
back again to that of quality.
the move-
ment
of thought only.a circle that
merely brings
us back to the starting-point?
According
to
Hegel's method, the incompleteness of thought

is overcome by the dialectic process which combines these two ideas of quality and
at this stage
of quantity into
one complete relation repre-
senting an advanced and higher point of view.
This relation Hegel calls that of' qualitative

quantity, or of measure (^das Maaas).
This
is
the third and last stage in the development of the idea of quantity,
insists,
and represents,
as
Hegel
both the unity and the truth of quality
and
of quantity combined.
CHAPTER IX
MEASURE
WE
tity
have seen how the category of being, when allowed to develop fully its own
inherent nature, discloses the phases of quan-
and of quality.
There now remains to be

itself
considered the relation which obtains between
quantity and quality, and which in

stitutes a distinct category.
con-
abstract
view
of quantity
is an extremely which regards it as
It
having no qualitative significance whatsoever. In the concrete which embraces the totality of
elements which constitute the significance of a
some quantitative differences which must be regarded as having marked qualitative equivalents. For instance,
concept, there are
least
at
the general size of any given species of animals

is
intimately associated with
the
complex of
determi-
properties
nants.
which form
is
its
qualitative
This
true to such an extent that the

itself as
element of magnitude ranks in

tative characteristic.
a qualisize of
For instance, the

119
120
THE DOCTBINB OP BEING

is
an elephant
regarded as one of
its
determin-
ing qualitative marks; so also the size of a
mouse
erties.
is
regarded as one of
its
essential prop-
The idea
of
an elephant having the
dimensions of a mouse, or a mouse bulking

large as an elephant,
essential features
of these animals.
would do violence
to the
which constitute the concepts
There
is,
of
course, a
margin of variation
to be regarded as an
which
size
is
allowable, so that the difference in

is
within certain limits
accidental property of an animal, having no specific
significance
whatsoever.
Beyond
is
certain
well-defined limits, however, this
not the case.
This relation of quantity to quality, which

indicates for every quantitative change a corre-
sponding qualitative value, Hegel calls measure

{das Maass}.
same sense
The term is used in almost the as the word standard, or type.

Maass
It
literally as
To
is it
translate das
measure does
it
not convey the full significance of the term as
used by Hegel.
would be better to
translate
Illustra-
as the standard measure, or type.
meaning in the Hegelian sense are found throughout the organic world where a
tions of its
definite species is associated
with a typical or
illustration
a standard size.
It finds
abundant
MEASUKE
also in
121
ele-
the inorganic world wherein each

its
ment possesses
own
definite specific gravity,
so that the quantitative coefiicient
becomes in
constantlyspecific
each case a distinctive mark of a definite group

of
correlated qualities
it.
which are
present with
Thus, for instance, the

is
gravity of gold
inseparably associated with all

it is
is
the essential properties of gold which give the specific
quality by virtue of which

it is.
is
it
constituted as
The
illustration
which
the most perfect
found in the scale of
rela-
tive differences in the
two corresponding
series,
on
the one
hand the
variation in lengths of
the chords in a musical instrument, and on the
other the accompanying variation in differences

of tone. tative
The former
represent purely quanti-
and the latter, qualitative. Between them there exists an exact correspondence. This may be further illustrated by the correlation which obtains between the wavedifferences,
lengths of light, and the corresponding differences in color.
All these illustrations emphasize
the essential relation which exists between a variation in quantity

tion in quality.
and the corresponding
varia-
In accordance with Hegel's general method

of
procedure,
it
will
be
remembered, every
122
THE DOCTBINB OF BEING
phase in the progressive development of being

is
to be regarded as a manifestation of
one of In this
the various attributes of the Absolute.
connection, therefore, the Absolute, or God,
may
abso-
be defined as
das Maass, that
is.
He is the
lute standard of measure, the ideal, or type, of all

creation.
This signifies that
God must
contain
within His
all
own
nature the norm or standard of

is
things.
This
essentially in accord with
the
Hebrew conception
of
God
its
as
One who
has appointed to everything
proper bound
to the sea, and land, to the and typical form, rivers and mountains, to plants and animals, and
also
to
man
himself.
:
wisdom, Job exclaims

"
In his description of
God understandeth the way

the place thereof.
thereof,
and he knoweth
For he looketh to the ends of the earth, and seeth under the whole heaven To make the weight for the winds and he weigheth the waters by measure. When he made a decree for the rain, and a way for the lightning of the thunder Then did he see it, and declare it he prepared it, yea, and searched it out." Q)
; ;
Moreover, in the religion of the Greeks this

idea
is
frequently expressed, especially in the

1
Chapter xxviii. vv. 23
ff.
MBASUKE
doctrine
of
123
points
is
Nemesis,
this
as
Hegel
riches
out.
According to
conception there
to
a natural
bound
definite
to
all
things,
power and pleasure, even

there
to pain
and honor, to and when the

corresponding
measure allotted
to each is exceeded,
its
must inevitably follow
opposite.
It is characteristic of Hegel's general
method
in this connection to gather
from the
ancient forms of religion, both an illustration
and at the same time a

point of view.
justification of his
own
The
religious
and philosophical
Hegel's opinion
it is
teachers of all ages have
in
touched upon important truths which

philosophical system that will embrace
his
peculiar task to gather together in the unity of a
Moreover, since there
is
them all. some form and size

an illustration
type
which
for
may be regarded
as the standard or type
any given
species, to take
from the organic world, then

departed from within
affecting the
this
may
be
certain
of
limits
without
integrity
the species, as has
already been pointed out.
Variations from the
type within such limits are to be regarded merely

as natural
departures from what Hegel calls the

" rule " (die Kegel)
is
rule.
The term
class.
used to
denote the standard form or size in reference to
any given
It has the
same
significance, in
124
THE DOCTKINB OF BEING
the Hegelian usage, as the term " mode," which

is
employed
to signify the prevailing type in
curves showing the relative distribution of variations, the
curve
itself
indicating the
manner
in
which the variations in question are distributed

about the type
is
itself.
In these curves the
mode
represented by the
maximum
ordinate, the
varying lengths of the other ordinates indicating the relative number of cases corresponding
to the different variations.
It is a significant fact,
however, that the range

is
of possible deviation
from the prevailing type

if it is
necessarily limited, so that

in
as
departed from
any way the type itself is so far changed to constitute an essentially new type, or a
species.
It
distinct
appears,
therefore,
that
there
may
be a continued alteration of quantity
by increasing or decreasing the given magnitude
up
to a certain definite limit,
and the various
changes will have no appreciable effect upon the

corresponding quality.
Thus, while the quantity
may
be regarded as a variable, the quality never-
theless remains a constant.
of variation at
But in this process some point must always be reached
duce a qualitative
illustrates this
which a quantitative change begins to prochange as well. Hegel

by calling attention to the fact
MEASURE
125
that the temperature of water seems to be quite
independent of
but as
its
qualitative state of liquidity,
we
increase the temperature through a

is
wide range of variation there nevertheless
reached finally a degree of heat which marks a

decided qualitative change as the liquid becomes
transformed into vapor
and
is
at the other limit,
where the freezing-point

of course
reached, the liquid

state.
changes into the solid
Between
these limits the various changes of temperature
seem to have no qualitative significance whatsoever; and, as Hegel remarks, in the approach
toward either
limit, the
advance
is
made
with-
out any accompanying circumstances to anticipate

it
as far as our observation goes, so that the
point which marks the beginnings of a corre-
sponding qualitative change

were, by stealth.
is
reached, as
it
The
illustration of Hegel's in
reference to the variations in the temperature of
water
may
be further supplemented in the
fol-
lowing manner, which

additional
is
may
possibly shed
some
upon Hegel's exposition. It a well-known phenomenon of physics that

light
before reaching the freezing-point, at 32 F, the
decreasing temperature causes a proportional

decrease of bulk in the water.
in
This decrease
bulk
is
continuous to about 39.
At
this
126

change is noticeable, for
point, however, a decided
the bulk of water
now
begins to expand instead
of contracting as before,
and so continues
until
the fluid passes into the solid state at the freezing-point.
This change seems to be a warning

is
note which
sounded to indicate that even a
more
radical
change may be anticipated.
The
points which
mark
in a series of
con-
tinuous changes the beginnings of a qualitative
corresponding to a quantitative difference, Hegel

calls the " nodes," or "
nodal points,"
term
which he has borrowed from astronomy.

line
The
which may be conceived as indicating the continuous changes which may occur between these points without effecting any qualitative
difference he calls, " the
line
of
nodes."
To
understand
this reference, it
may
be well to
give the technical definition of a node, which
Hegel, of course, has adapted to his purposes.
The node
as
used in astronomy
is
one of the
points at which any celestial orbit cuts the plane

of the ecliptic, the latter being a great circle of the
heavens in the plane of the earth's

node, therefore,
is
orbit.
The
a point having a double signifiits
cance by virtue of
being the intersecting

it
point of two circles, and therefore
may
be
conceived
first as
belonging to one and then
MEASURE
to the other.
127
This idea of a point having a
twofold
order
to
significance,
Hegel
has
seized
in
in
indicate
that
particular
point
quantitative variation which has at the same
time a qualitative significance as well.

a point possesses the
Such combined characteristics

its
which
its
is
constitute
both
qualitative
and
quantitative features, just as a point which
common
to
two
circles possesses the charac-
teristic features of each.
Between these nodes,

seem
to have no
however, or beyond them in either direction, the

various quantitative differences
significance whatsoever as far as producing
any
change of definite qualitative nature.

ever, therefore, quantitative
Whenbe
re-
changes possess no
cannot
qualitative
significance,
they
garded as constituting any standard or type of

measure, for the magnitude which they represent has no
quality
it.
corresponding to
designates
is,
or complex of qualities Such magnitudes Hegel

(^Maasslos),
as
measureless
essential
that
of a
lacking
the
characteristics
it
standard or a type.
Thus
will
be
seen
that the concept of quantity in itself does not
determine qualitative differences, inasmuch as
some magnitudes have no corresponding

tative characteristics at all.
quali-
The category
of
128
quantity, therefore, proves unsatisfactory as an
ultimate explanation of qualitative differences.
Inasmuch
weight,
it
as
it
falls, as
it
were, of
its its
own
very
seems to necessitate
by
inefficiency
some
additional
category
which
can satisfactorily explain the relation between

quantitative and qualitative variations.
A
stage
similar situation has developed at every

of
progress
in
the
evolution
of
the
thought processes from the simplest beginnings

in
mere being to the present condition under

Throughout, each
category
that
discussion.
has been reached in the progress of thought has proved insufficient to explain itself and
all
which have gone
before,
and has
laid
upon
thought the necessity of proceeding to some

further stage of development in order to supply
its
defects
and complete
the
its
meaning.
This
is
essentially
of thought.
Hegelian
dialectic
movement
have seen that the idea of mere being carried with it the necessary implication of a
We
complex system
of attributes designated as the
quality of determinate being.
This concept in turn has
been
found
to
necessitate the idea of oneness of being,

is,
that
being-for-self,
an individual separate in a
MEASURE
sense from all others. the individual,
129
This idea of the one,

to suggest
was then found
by
necessary implication the idea of the many,

a purely quantitative concept.
Starting then, with the idea of quantity,
its
highest
expression was
reached when
it
was
regarded as correlated with the idea of quality.
Thus the quantity-quality

calls
relation
which Hegel
measure, or better the standard measure,

to
would seem
be the consummation of the
entire process.
The relation however being unstable,

existing for others,
that
is,
existing for certain quantitative values
and not
procto
the thought
is
consequently
its
constrained by the very nature of

esses
own
and
its
own demands
is it
to press
onward
a further stage of development,

question,
and to ask the

underlies
these
What
which
at
various relations of quantity to quality, render-
ing
them
the
othei'S
significant
certain
coincidental
points, at
'nodes' according to Hegel, and

attaching
to
them no
significance
whatsoever?
ure
is
This category of a standard measvery limitations a challenge to

it
by
its
thought, that
produce something of a more

its
is
ultimate nature as
underlying ground.
That
which
is
demanded
some
satisfactory explana-
130
THE DOCTKINE OP BEING

which are found
tion of the various distinct types
in nature, each determined according to its

definite standard of measure.
own
The most complete expression

of being,
of the category
and the
final
term in the development
of that idea, the concept of standard measure,
has been found wholly insufficient to rank as

a
self-contained
and self-explaining category.

re-
This last term, therefore, can no longer be
garded as a
tional
last
term
the
its
it
suggests rather addi-
terms
in
process of development
which wUl form

explanation.
natural complement and
The immediately complementary term

line of the logical
in the
unfolding of the universal

Weseri),
reason
is
that of essence (^das
which
forms the second main division of the Logic.
The category
of essence
is
to be regarded as
the ground which underlies the various changes
which characterize the progressive development

of the
idea of being.
its
What
being
is
in
its
essence determines
qualitative characteristics
certain definite quanits
and
correlates
them with
titative
changes by the fundamental law of
own
nature.
The magnitude does not
deter-
mine the quality, nor does the quality determine

the magnitude, but the roots, both of the quan-
MEASUKB
titative
131
in being, lie
and qualitative elements

this in his
deeply concealed in the fundamental essence.
Hegel expresses
ner, "
epigrammatic man-
Essence
is
the truth of being."
PAET
II
Diess
ist
also uherhaupt der UhterscJiied der For-
men
des Seyns
und des Wesens.

Wesen dagegen
ist
Im Seyn
ist
ist
Alles
unmittelbar,
im
Alles
relativ.
Der Standpunkt des Wesens

punkt der Reflexion.
ilberhaupt der Standr
Hegel.
PART
II

CHAPTER X
THE DOCTRINE OE ESSENCE IN FEATURES
ITS
GENERAL
THE
The
doctrine
of
essence
(^Die
Lehre
vom
Weseri) forms the second part of the Logic.

transition
from the concept
of
being to
in
that of essence
marks a decided advance
thought, and involves the introduction of several
new
ideas.
Although these ideas have not
been explicitly manifest in the category of simple

being, they
have been, nevertheless, implicitly

exposition as to the nature
of
present, so that their appearance at the begin-
ning
of
is
the
essence
to be regarded as the developed ex-
pression of a potential factor already present in
the preceding stage of being.
The concepts which form

elements
follows
:
the
constituent
are
as
in
the
category of
essence
135
136
THE DOCTKINB OF ESSENCE

(2)
(1) Mediation;
tion
;
Negation;
;
(4)
Permanence
(5)
(3) ReflecSystemic inte-
gration.
We
as to
will discuss these in their order.
First
the idea of mediation, which we have
already referred to in a previous chapter.
We
found that Hegel regards mere being as immethat is, as something which diate (unmittelhar),
is
unaccounted
for,
that which
is
to be accepted
it,
as a fact, but
no reason assigned to
its
and not
referred to
or
by which
If,
any other thing as it might be conceived as being

explanation,
is
brought about by any process whatsoever.

however, a raison d'etre
given for any
determinate being, this at once connects the
being in question with
its
underlying ground,
It
it
and
is is
this is in itself a process of mediation.
that by which something comes to be

(yermitteW).
what
Being cannot explain

to
itself,
and although we come

of course the
accept as a matter
as
various attributes of being,
quantity, quality, degree, measure, etc., nevertheless

justify
they are not sufficient to explain or

themselves.
its
Being, pure
bears upon
face the
and simple, stamp of derivation. It
comes from something more fundamental than itself. It has had an origin, a life history, a
IN ITS GENERAL FEATURES

destiny, all of
137
disclose
which
lie
concealed.
To
these sources
them
ation
is
the office of mediation
and the processes depending upon and when medi;
has completely fulfilled

essence
of
its
offices,
the
true
being
will
stand
revealed.
The
difference
between mediate and immediate
knowledge may be more explicitly exhibited by noting the different adjectives which Hegel
employs in describing the two concepts.
While the immediate knowledge mediate knowledge is related.
is
unrelated,
The immediate
is
is
simply given ; the mediate
explained.
The immediate
developed.
is
elementary
the mediate
is
edge; the mediate

product.
The immediate marks the beginning of knowlits development and resulting

In the next place, the idea of essence implies
the negation of being.
Hegel, in the opening
paragraph upon the doctrine of essence, defines

his
conception of essence as " being coming into

itself
mediation with
itself."
1
through the negation of
tion contains
The technical terms which this definimay be elucidated by the following While the idea of being may at considerations.
'
112.
138
first
THE DOCTEINB OP ESSENCE

seem
to be quite independent
and imme-
diate, yet as
we have
seen in the examination
of the necessary relations
such an idea involves,
it
and connections which is found to be depenit
dent upon something else out of which

arisen,
has
and by which the integrity

is
of
its
com-
position
conserved.
This
is
in itself a proc-
ess of mediation, and this is what Hegel means by the phrase that " being comes into mediation
with
itself."
The category
ground.
It
of being, therefore,
regarded as self-constituted and self-sufficient

falls
to the
cannot bear
itself.
its
own
the
weight, and thus undermines
This
is
meaning
of the phrase that the idea of being
contains the " negation of itself."
Nevertheless,
self-
while dying as an independent, immediate,

contained form,
it
regains another
it
is
life
in the
underlying ground to which

referred
necessarily
specifically
is,
and by which
In
its
it
becomes
determined.
essence, being
it
being, as such as
Hegel puts
that mere aufgehohen.

is
This
is
a very significant
word
in the Hegelian
terminology and cannot be adequately translated
three distinct ideas which
by any one English word, for it conveys must be taken toits full significance.
gether in order to express
The verb aufhehen
possesses the threefold mean-

ing with Hegel,
139
to destroy, to
re-create in a
new form, and at the same time to elevate. To speak of anything as aufgeJiohen means
that
it
disappears in
its
given form, but that
it
reappears in a
new
form, and that the
new form
single
always represents a higher point of view and a

substantial progress in thought.
The one
English word which comes nearest to expressing this meaning

is
the
word transmute.
is
When
Hegel affirms that

he means that
it
in essence being
its
aufgehohen^
has lost
independence only
this
to find it again in a
dependence which has

it is
peculiar characteristic, that
not subordiits
nated to anything which

notion or idea, but which
is is
foreign to
own
at the last analysis

itself.
one with the
initial
being rests upon as

being itself;
external
That which must be a part of otherwise the relation would be

being
its
basis
and
valueless.
is
While, therefore, the

in a sense denied,
it
independence of being
is
in another
and a higher sense

is
reaffirmed.
The primary
tion
is
denial
a negation
the reaffirma-
brought about by the negation of the

negation.
former
This last
it,
is
the absolute
is
negation, as Hegel calls
which
equivalent
always to an affirmation.
of being
which
is
first
The independence denied gives way to a
140

is
dependence, but this in turn
denied, because
to be in reality
its
when
which
it is
analyzed
it is
found
a dependence of being upon

is
own ground,
equivalent to a self-dependence; and

is
a self-dependence
the same as independence.

is
Thus this second negation

thought through which
a reassertion of the
of
original independence; but, in the process

it
has passed,
;
it
has
it
acquired a richer and fuller significance

is
for
an independence which has been fully
justified.
it
The
tion
:
process of negation with Hegel,

is
must
be remembered,
it is
never extinction or annihila;
only a sublimation into a higher form

of being in essence
is
and the absorption

tion,
one
of the best illustrations of the process of nega-
which plays such an important and conIt

is
spicuous r81e in the Hegelian dialectic.

in this
way
of
that negation
is
to be regarded as a
means
more precise
characterization
and
determination in the progressive development
The nature of negation as a process may be summed up most completely in the term aufheben, the overthrowing, and the
of thought.
restoring
upon a higher plane,
as has already
been described.
The category
of reflection presents a point of
view from which the doctrine of essence may

be best understood and appreciated.
141
This has
is
been referred to in a previous chapter, but
so
important an idea in the general scheme of
Hegel that an additional reference may not

be out of place at this stage of the exposition.
Being
is
is
regarded by Hegel as a category which

It
not self-illuminating.
receives
its
light
from something else which

idea of expressing
reflection
is its
ground.
The
this
thought by the term

to
was suggested
Hegel through an
analogy with the well-known physical phenome-
non of
a glass
reflection.
is
As
a substantial form before
seen through reflection as an image
of itself, so
being
may
be regarded as the
reflec-
tion of that
the glass
which is its ground. The image in has an immediate reality in a certain

it
sense, but as regards its self-determination

is
illusory.
Its reality is
due
to its
reflection
of the object to
which
it
stands related, and to

in order to explain
which
it
must be referred
and
of
to justify its
own
being.
as
Thus
the ground
are
being,
and the being
manifested,
related to each other as substance
the
tion,
underlying essence
appearance.
There
are
and show, and the reflected two phrases which
are used frequently
and
their
by Hegel in this connecmeaning should be precisely
142
THE DOCTEINB OF ESSENCE

They
are the phrases Reflexion-in-
determined.
sich
and
Beflexion-in-Anderes.
The
usage,
signifi-
cance of these phrases will always be brought
out clearly in
translate
its
their
Hegelian
if
we
the former as that which shines in

light, the
own
latter as that
which shines
the
various
in the light of another.
We
light,
may
say,
therefore,
that
attributes of being
do not shine in their own
but in the light of some other, which
forms their necessary complement, and constitutes their essence or substantial ground.
Essence
is,
moreover, to
be distinguished
the permanent
from mere being, in that

basis (das Bleibe?ide'),
is
it is
which underlies that which
only the transient manifestation.
The
sev-
eral
changes which the dialectic movement has
been seen to produce among the attributes of

being allow no resting-place for our thought.
"We pass from quality to quantity, and from quantity back again to a quality which possesses
at this
stage of development the addiof
tional
characteristic
being
quantitatively
determined; and thence on to a quantitative

determination which has no qualitative
signifi-
cance whatsoever, and through

of being
is
it all
the idea
not able to show any basis of a per-
IN ITS
GENERAL FEATURES
which
it
143
its
manent nature
can
call
is
own.
Nevertheless, the nature of thought
such that
we
are constrained to
demand some permanent

to
underlying
ground
which
these
various
changes
may
be referred.
It is in the idea of
essence, the necessary
complement
of being, that
we
find the solid foundation
which underlies
and supports all the changing manifestations of being. While everything may be regarded,
according to Heraclitus, as ceaselessly changing, yet nevertheless
something remains.
as of
That
is
which remains, regarded

itself
a constant,
all
in
the
explanation
change,
and
vari-
through which
all variation
may
be reduced to
law and uniformity. The significance of the

able lies in the fact that
it
some underlying constant.
may be Where
referred to
there
is
no
constant, variables possess no significance.
The idea
of
acterizes essence
permanency which thus charis regarded by Hegel as having

Being
is
an etymological warrant.
Seyn, and essence, or
Wesen,
is
the
German
vergan-
its
German
equivalent
is
the same as past being, that
genes Seyn, as seen in the past participle gewesen.

is
This
signifies that
whatever has being,

therefore related
thus declared to be by virtue of that which

is
has been before, and which
144
to
it
THE DOCTRINE OP ESSENCE

as its Wesen,
or
ground.
The
priority
is,
which seems to be expressed in the Wesen

essarily
however, not asserted as a priority in time nec;
it
is
merely a logical priority.
The
which has been before, and which is to be regarded as the ground or essence of that which is, of being, is not past in the sense of
past, that
having been set
aside, or of disappearing
it is
rather to be regarded as conserved,
and living
again in the present being.

logical prius of being
is
The
it,
past as the
therefore merely auf-
gehoben, as
Hegel would express
past
and
yet perduring.
Hegel's derivation of the word Wesen, and by
this
means establishing
its
significance,
fur-
nishes a characteristic illustration of his general
habit of thought, and his conviction that the
most valuable thoughts of mankind are often found crystallized in language. As to the suggestiveness of language in this particular, Hegel
says
:
"
Language
has
compressed within
;
it
what man has made his own and what he has fashioned and expressed in speech contains, either embedded or elaborated, a category so
:
natural does logic

his
come
^
to him, or rather
it is
own very
nature."
1
Werke,
I,
10
IN ITS
Essence
is
GENERAL PEATUEES
145
to be regarded, moreover, as a conIt

is
stituted system of relations.
a complex
consisting of a manifold
of
various elements
which are throughout interrelated, and coordinated. This conception of essence also appears
in the
German,
as seen in
such words as das
Zeitungswesen, the newspaper system; das Postwesen, the postal system

;
das Steuerwesen, the
revenue system.
nection the
We
have a similar usage in

In such a conor essence, emphasizes
is,
our phrase, the railway system.
word Wesen,
the truth that everything which

being,
which has
must be referred
is
to
its
appropriate place
it
in the particular in
system to which
belongs and
which
to be found its true ground and proper
explanation,
and
that, moreover, there is
no kind
of being in the universe
which
is
unrelated to
itself.
others, or
which can remain apart and by
This idea of the ground of being conceived

as a
system of coordinated and necessarily

is
re-
lated elements
in
complete accord with the
modern theory of logic, which lays special emupon the order and uniformity which characterizes the world of knowledge and the systematic relation which every element must
phasis
sustain to every other
1
and
to the whole. ^
p. 7
f.
These,
Hibben's Inductive Logic,
146

Hegel would
mediation, ne-
then, are the chief factors, or, as

call
them, moments which constitute the con-
cept of essence,
gation,
the
ideas of
reflection,
permanency, and
systemic
integration.
It is in
keeping with Hegel's general point
of
view that he should define the Absolute as
essence.
Although we speak
of finite essences
itself
such as man, nevertheless the term

the Hegelian system implies that
in
we have
is
is
passed
beyond
infinite
finitude,
and that there

all
at the last
analysis one
supreme essence which

itself.
the true
and which embraces
other so-called
essences within
Therefore, according to
this conception, all else outside of the Absolute,
outside of Qod,
would possess no
essentiality.
God is not to be regarded merely as a being among many others, or as an essence, even the
highest.
He
is
preeminently the being and the

all
essence
special
underljdng
attention,
others.
Hegel draws
however, to the truth that

is
the nature of
God
by no means exhausted
of essence.
If
in the ascription to
Him
God
is
regarded as essence only. His universal and

irresistible
power
is
thereby assured, but His
other attributes are overlooked. the Lord,
He
is
merely
God Almighty, and
his
more personal
IN ITS
relations to the
in
GENERAL FBATXJEES
world in general, and to
not
recognized
in
147
man
particular,
are
such a
definition.
This
mon
defect in the
may be said to be the comMohammedan and Jewish

which the creator
is
religions alike, in
removed
by an impassable gulf from the creature.^

In the subsequent development of the dialectic
movement
it
will be seen that the category limitations, necessitate the
of essence will,
by its
complementary and
final
category of the notion,

of God,
or universal reason.
The conception
must
therefore, as essence merely,
also be
com-
pleted by the addition of those attributes
which
are involved in the category of the notion.
In the discussion of the category of essence
Hegel divides the subject into three parts which

will be treated in the three following chapters.
They
1.
are
Essence as
als
ground
of
existence
(Bas
Wesen
2.
3.
Grrund der Uxistenz).

(^Die Erseheinung).
Appearance
Actuality
1
(Î)ie
Wirklichkeit}.
Caird's Evolution of Beligion.
CHAPTER XI
ESSENCE AS THE GEOTJND OF EXISTENCE
THE
first
aspect under which Hegel treats

is
ground The conception of the ground of of existence. existence implies the idea of something which is
the category of essence
that of the
fundamental and permanent.

in a
We find ourselves
The
ele-
world of changing phenomena.
ments which form

indefinitely various,
their constituent parts are
and
it is
a natural impulse
to seek for some constant factor that will give
determinateness to the great world

Hegel's view
universe
is
problem.
in the
is
that every
phenomenon
its
the manifestation of
own
it
underlypreserves
that
ing ground, and that on this account
always
its
identity with itself;
also
the
phenomenal appearance must be regarded merely

as a reflection of the
underlying essence, and
that the fundamental law of identity connects

essence and appearance as one and the same.
The concept
categories
of
of identity reflection
is
one of the so-called

Reflexionshestim-
(^die
148
ESSENCE AS THE GROUND OF EXISTENCE 149

mungen').
identity,
As
illustrations of his conception of
Hegel cites that central integrity of being which characterizes the Ego, the logical notion, and God. God is to be regarded as a
self-identity,
inasmuch
as
He
is
the all-embrac-
ing constant, the underlying essence, of whose

eternal attributes all the glory
and splendor
of
the world are reflections.

life as
Man
in his conscious
a personality, as an Ego, also represents a
self-identity,
inasmuch as
all
his self-consciousness
forms a centre to which

periences
the variety of his ex-
may
be referred, and which forms the

life.
one constant factor in the equation of
Man's
activities are thus a reflection of his inner
personality.
differentiate
This self-identity alone serves to
man from
the brute which possesses
no such underlying ground of continuity, and

lives in
each present experience with no thought
before or after.
There
is,
moreover, in every
logical notion, also a constant element, the universal,
which maintains
its
identity in the midst
of the indefinite variety of its particular manifestations.
It is this constant
element which
forms the underlying ground of our thought

processes and gives
bility,
and
of
them definiteness and stawhich they are essentially the
reflection.
150
THE DOCTBINE OP ESSENCE

of formal logic
identity,
The laws
principle
of
which
refer to the
Hegel interprets in a
fol-
manner quite
lows
in accord with his general method.
These laws are commonly enunciated as

:
The law thing must

pressed,
is
of identity proper states that every-
be identical with
itself,
or briefly ex-
A = A.
is
The law
of contradiction
which
merely the negative expression of the law of

that
identity
cannot be at the same time
both
and not A.
As
thus expressed, Hegel insists, these laws are
merely products of the abstract understanding,
that
is,
a partial
and one-sided view of things.
As formulated
above, these laws allow for no
progress of thought whatsoever.
They form
hard and fast concepts corresponding to a world

in
which there can be no change, no interrelation

Instead of
of parts, no variety,
thought.
insists
and above all no life and an abstract identity, Hegel
upon a concrete identity, that is, an identity which exists in the midst of a diversity and whose significance is due to the very diversity with which it is brought into contrast. The formula which expresses the law of identity is
not
A = A.
It
should be
A = A',
that
is,
differs
from A', and yet in spite of the difference
ESSENCE AS THE GKOTJND OP EXISTENCE 151

is
one with
it.
The former
equation,
A = A,
is is
expresses merely an absolute identity which
wholly stripped of
all differences,
and
as
such
without significance and value.
Hegel defines
tity
identity, therefore, as
an iden-
which
reflects its
own
self in
every changing
variety of manifestation,
and
is
in
such a manner
that the reflection of self
different
from
it
it,
and yet so intimately connected with

be the same.
It
is
as to
a paradox, as thus expressed

lies in
but with Hegel, truth

idea of identity,
if it is
paradoxes.
The
sig-
to possess
any true
nificance, implies the correlated idea of differ-
ence;
and
in
the progress of thought Hegel
proceeds to discuss the concept of difference

(^der
Unterschied) as the second category of re-
flection.
its
The concept
of difference appears in
as
most elemental form
immediate difference,
for so
difference he
(^die
Hegel characterizes it. By immediate means mere diversity or variety VersehiedenheW). By diversity is meant
are,
that the various objects are each individually
what they
jects
and that the only connection

is
between them
an external one.
thus
externally
When
related
obare
which are
compared, they are identified to the extent of

affirming their likeness,
and
failure to identify
152
signifies that their likeness is denied.
At
this
point Hegel's conception of the relation be-
tween identity and difference is brought out most clearly, and considerable emphasis placed
upon
it.
He
asserts in
his
characteristically
paradoxical
manner
that
objects
which
are
judged to be alike are such only by virtue of an underlying difference, and that objects which
are judged to be unlike are such only
of an underlying identity.
its
by virtue
that
The one
Thus,
if
idea reflects
light
upon the
other.
we say
a triangle differs from a tree, the assertion has
no point, because the two objects compared have nothing in common by which they may
be brought together in thought;
their differ-
ences are not' illuminated by the light of any

identity.
Or,
if
we should say
is
man
is
a man,
the
assertion
would have no
stated
is
significance, for
the identity which
not illuminated
by the light of any difference.

case suppose that the difference
as in the lines of Burns,
"
But
is
in
this
suggested,
man's a
man
for a' that."
The thought has become

phrase " for
ference,
a'
significant, for the
that " introduces an implied difat once reflects its
and
this
meaning
ESSENCE AS THE GEOTJKD OP EXISTENCE 153

upon the original
less repetition.
assertion,
contrast of thought
which without this would remain a meaningif
Again,
we compare
a beech
and an oak, or
electrical
and steam power, the
elements of likeness and unlikeness appear as

significant because these objects represent con-
cepts
species of one
which are fundamentally connected as and the same genus, so that the
significance of the one is reflected in the light

of the other.
The
all
difference in such a case
which appears upon a background of an identity
underlying
species of the
same genus
may be
appropriately called specific difference,
or difference of reflection (ÛnterscMed der Reflexion oder Unterschied

ter
an
sich selbst, hestimm-
Unterschied^.
These differences occurring
within the area of a

separate
others.
common ground serve to and distinguish one species from all Cognate species admit of comparison,
and their differences are always significant for this very reason, that however various the species
may
appêar,
they
all
belong to one
common
vari-
genus.
Thus, the idea of mere diversity or
ety has been found to develop into a difference
which
is
significant only in the sphere of cog-
nate species,
difference.
that
is,
determinate or specific
154

is
There
still
another aspect of the idea of

is
difference,
which
that
of
opposition
(c?er
Here the kindred elements which enter into the same area of being are arrayed over against each other as positive and negative,
Cregensatz).
and yet
in the characteristically
Hegelian man-
ner of viewing such opposites, they are to be
regarded as constituent elements in one and the
same essence.
the logical
Their opposition
is
stated only
to be resolved in
a higher unity according to

of the dialectic
of logic
demands
law
movement.
as that of
The
traditional
known
the excluded middle (namely, that, of two opposite predicates, one,
to one
and one only, can be assigned and the same subject) must be regarded
as true merely of the abstract understanding,
but not of the reflective reason which regards

all
things in the concrete,
that
and
is,
in the full
light of all that they are
of all that they
imply.
The
of
truth of the idea of essence, accordlies in
ing to Hegel,
ideas
the very opposition of the
positive
and
negative
which
finds
universal expression in the fact that everything

in the universe has its significance only in its
connection
its
with
that
which confronts
it
as
For every positive there is a corresponding other which may be regarded as its
other.
ESSENCE AS THE GEOUKD OF EXISTENCE 155

negative.
The terms
positive
and negative do
not express an absolute difference.
The two
at
the last analysis are found to spring from the
same
the
root.
The terms
all
positive
and negative
in
may, under
circumstances, be transposed, and

of
meaning
If
the terms
not
any sense
altered. as
we
agree to designate distance east
+, then distance west would be designated but we might as well have called disas tance west +, and distance east The significance of the terms employed lies wholly in
;
.
their relation
one to the other.

it
In the concept of opposition

tinctly
must be
disis
understood
that
the
term which
regarded as positive must not be conceived as
opposed to any other whatsoever, but only by

that
which
is
peculiarly
basis
its
other by virtue of
some common
underlying
them
both.
it
According to a crude conception of the world, would seem to be composed of a multitude of

different objects,
dent of
and each one wholly indepenevery other. This is, however, a most
All elements in the great
related
erroneous conception.
cosmic process must be regarded as parts of a

systematized whole, so that each one
to that
is
which
is
peculiarly its other in one and
the same underlying system.
Thus the north
156

magnet
its
is
pole of the
opposed to and yet con;
nected with
south pole
so also positive
;
and
negative electricity are essentially related

acid, moreover, is related to its
every
corresponding
base.
The
opposite
may
be defined, therefore,
in general, as that
and
this
its
which embraces both itself corresponding other within one and the
of determination.
If it is
same area
asked what
one and self-same area of determination

be, it
may
This
ian terminology as
is
would be characterized in the Hegelthe ground {der Gtrund').

basis of the other two.
the third of the categories of reflection,
and forms the

is
Ground
defined by Hegel as the unity of identity and

It is the
difference.
determining factor which
renders objects sufficiently alike so that
we can
Thus,
all
observe their differences, or sufficiently unlike

so that
we can note
to
their resemblances.
the idea of ground contains the

that
truth of
attaches
the
complementary ideas of
It is the unity
identity
and
difference.
;
under-
lying diversity
it
;
is it
the essence underlying

is
specific difference
the connecting
bond
which unites
with
its
in
one every element of being
corresponding opposite, or other, within
the area of a
The
logical
common system. maxim in reference
to the con-

cept of ground
is
expressed in the fourth law of

associated with the
as the
thought, which
Leibniz and
reason, viz.
:
is
name
its
of
is
known
law of
sufficient
suffi-
" Everything must have
cient ground."
essential being of
is
This means that the true and
any
definite object of
thought
not to be conceived merely as a constant

its
underlying element which always preserves

strict identity,
nor
is it
to be conceived solely
as the
underlying source of variability which

;
produces manifest differences

positive,
it is
;
not merely
it
nor
is
it
merely negative
must be
how-
conceived as the synthesis of both these ideas,

so that
it
has
its
being in
its
other, which,
ever, falls within the area of its
own
essence,
and the two opposite thus become one.

relation
The
may
be illustrated by the analogy of

lie
two
sites
circles
which
wholly outside of each
other and
;
may
therefore be regarded as oppocircles
but then we can conceive the two
also as lying
wholly within a third, and as such
may
be regarded as parts of one and the same

point of view, to use the Hegel-
surrounding area.
From another
ian figure, essence as
ground
is
not to be conreflection-in-self
ceived as merely the abstract

(that
is,
as shining
merely in
its
own
light),
but
158

is,
as a reflection-in-its-other (that
as receiving
illumination from that which by the very nature

of things stands over against
it,
and yet at the

with
it
same time
its
is
essentially connected
as
its
necessary complement).
Every truth has
obverse side; and this must always be recog-
nized
ness.
if
we are to attain knowledge in its fulThe ground and whatever depends upon
the ground must be regarded, therefore, as one
and the same content, that is, the same matter of fact. The ground is a simple reference to itself; and what is grounded combines a reference to self with a reference to
its
other as well.
of mediation,
Such a reference involves the idea

or relativity, that
is,
the process of explaining
a given thing by a reference to something else
with which
it is
essentially related.
The law of sufficient that all phenomena are

referred to
reason, therefore, asserts

so related in an all-em-
bracing system that every
phenomenon must be
some other
as its sufficient ground.
There is throughout a complete interrelation and interdependence. The essence of anything, from this point of view, cannot be revealed by
showing merely what
it is in itself, or, as Hegel would put it, in a purely abstract sense but it must be shown what it is in reference to some;

thing else which
is
related to
it
as its other.
it
To know
which
which
it its
a thing, therefore,
to
all
we must know
possible
in reference
of
the
all
relations
may sustain to own essential

is
other things by
is
being
of
mediated.
is
The
most perfect example
what
meant
by ground
found in the third part of the
Hegelian system, the doctrine of the notion,
and universal reason. In such a conception, the idea of ground attains its complete expression inasmuch as it presents a content which is determined in itself and for itself,
or the active
and hence
may
be regarded as self-originating
Such must be the essensome form of superintending reason which is freely working out
and self-constructive.
tial
ground
of all things,
its
own
purposes.
This
is
the interpretation of
Leibniz in reference to the meaning of sufficient
ground.
His conception especially emphasizes
the function of final cause in reference to the
connection of phenomena with their ground,
and
it
is
in the self-activity of
is
the universal
reason that the fullest scope
allowed to the
play of final causes.

in the
But
at the present stage
development of the concept of ground it cannot be regarded as having as yet attained

this capacity of
determining
itself.
It is only
160

reach the third and final stage of the
self-
when we
directing
in
its
Hegelian system that the conception of a complete form.
and self-determining ground emerges
The
idea of ground,
therefore, at this stage of its
development must
nor does
not be regarded as the equivalent of final cause.

It is not as yet consciously active,
it
produce anything, working purposefully towards
some
fore,
definitely conceived end.
Being, there-
regarded as existence,
is
said
by Hegel to
issue or proceed
Hegel's con" existence " (die Uxistenz) ception of the term
from the ground.
he derives etymologically from the verb

the literal
to proceed.
existere,
meaning
It
of
which
is,
to
go
forth, or
would
follow, therefore, that ex-
istence
is
ground.
merely that which proceeds from the As such it may be regarded as hav-
ing left the ground behind, just as the product

as determinate being
the process of
was said to leave behind becoming which preceded it.

is
The
difference,
however, between determinate

that the latter represents
of
being and existence

a far deeper insight
and an advanced stage

is
development.
Determinate being
accepted
as immediately given,
no inquiry being started

Existence,
as to its explanation or justification.
on the other hand,
is
regarded as mediated,

that
is,
as referred to its appropriate ground,
and thus accounted for and duly explained. But

although having issued from the ground, existence
nevertheless contains
itself,
its
own ground
is
within
so that the
ground
not merely
a phase in the process of mediation which has
been passed through and completely
left behind.
The ground may properly be characterized as aufgeholen, that is, suspended, and yet transmuted into the more developed form of existence. This relation may be illustrated in our modern
conception of the conservation of energy, wherein
any given energy seems to be destroyed only

to reappear in
some changed form, and although

it
the ground of the result, nevertheless

serves its
preIt is
it
own
identity in the result itself.
a false view of existence

related to its
so that the
which regards
as
ground
different
in an external manner,
world comes to be regarded as a

of
objects,
collection
having
each
and related to each other ground and consequence, wherein everything bears an aspect of relativity, conditioned by and
a separate existence,
as
conditioning something else.

there
In such a world
would be nothing fundamental and final. Such a conception must be supplemented by

the
the doctrine of
notion which, as will be
162
seen, supplies an unconditioned basis of rationality
and purposiveness
for
all
that
is
contin-
gent and relative.
The
its
existent conceived as
itself is
having absorbed
ground within
all
;
in a sense relieved
of
dependence upon anything outside of

for
itself
whatever seems to
at the
lie
outside of
to
it,
itself,
and yet
is
same time related
must
its
is
be regarded as falling within the area of
own
being.
In other words, the circle which
drawn about any mark the bounds
object which has existence, to

of its being,
is
to be
drawn
itself
with so generous a sweep as to embrace everything by which the being in question

mediated, or to which
it is is
essentially related.
Whatever
exists in this sense,
Hegel
calls a thing
(das Ding).
He
very stoutly disclaims, however,
any reference
thing-in-itself
in this connection to the

(^das
I)iiti/
Kantian
an
sicli).
He
con-
siders this phrase
an empty and meaningless
abstraction
for
if
we
in
imagination take away
from
a thing its specific characteristics
and
its
relations to all other things, absolute emptiness
remains.
nificance
Hegel's
of
interpretation
of
tlie
sigis
the
phrase, the thing-in-itsclf,
quite
characteristic.
if it is
He
to
maintains
that the
thing-in-itself,
have any meaning at
ESSENCE AS THE GEOtTND OF EXISTENCE 163

all,
signifies
the thing, -whatever
it
is,
in
its
potential state,
its
specific
characteristics as
yet undeveloped and

child
unrealized.
Thus, the
may
be considered as the man-in-himself,
in the sense that the child is
indeed the father
of the
man.
So
also the patriarchal state takes
rank as the
seed
is
state-in-itself.
The germ
of
the
the plant-in-itself.
is
In the developed
form the thing

it is
not merely the thing-in-itself,
also the thing-for-itself (^das Dingfiir sicli),

is,
that
the thing whose specific qualities are
no longer implicit, but have become explicit and

fully developed.
The thing
(1)
is
variously characterized by Hegel
As possessing properties. As composed of material elements. (3) As a synthesis of matter and of form. That which we call a thing is said to possess
(2)
properties
ties
(^die
Eigenschaften^.
These proper-
have an internal connection.
The
various
properties do not constitute a diversity
among
themselves such as that which has already been

described, wherein the different terms have no
connection with each other except that which given by a comparison whose basis
to them.
is
is
external
in-
The
properties, however,
which
here in one and the
same thing are brought
164
THE DOCTKINE OF ESSENCE
together by a bond which forms an internal
connection and a stable centre of reference.
Again, a thing
is
composed
of material ele-
ments {die Materien).

of a thing
The
several properties
may
be regarded from one point of
view
as each inhering in its
own
material stuff
and
as therefore possessing a quasi
independence
of the thing itself.
From such
;
a point of view
the thing
is
conceived as only the
these various qualitative stuffs

describe a given thing as
color stuff, of so
table stuff, etc.
sum total of we might composed of so much

so that
much
of
saccharine stuff, vege-
This seems to be a sufficiently

certain
correct account
inorganic
things,
salt
especially chemical
compounds.
its
Common
may
be reduced to
constituent material ele-
ments, muriatic acid and soda.
Gypsum may
Sul-
be reduced to sulphuric acid and calcium.
phuric acid
may
be reduced to sulphur, hydro-
gen, and oxygen.
Such are the

to
illustrations
which Hegel
cites in this connection.
But when we come

into
organic nature
and
the more complex forms of being, an analysis
the elemental parts falls far short of a
true
and adequate account
of
what a living
All parts
is
organism essentially consists.

be revealed
;
may
but the vital bond
lacking,

that
which gives form and

It
specific characterisit
tics to
the material substratum, whatever

is
may-
be.
the form as distinct from the matter

It
of being. to
would be well
in this connection
remark in passing that the term form, as Hegel uses it, signifies not the completed form
thing,
which might be conceived as imposed upon

the
but
rather
the
active
formative
principle which, like the architectonic principle
of
the plant, operates

its
from within,
pro-
own material its particular form and qualities. To arrive at the true conception of the term thing, we must regard
ducing out of
it
as the synthesis of matter and of form. The thing is not a meeting-point merely of a number of related material elements, each of
an ultimate nature
rial
for the
fundamental mate-
elements out of which the various things

the universe
are
in
constituted
Hegel conone
insists
ceives as reducible at the last analysis to
and the same kind of matter, and he

that
the specific
differences
of
the
various
kinds of things arise from the variety of the
formative principles or agencies at work upon
and within
this
fundamental matter.
To go
upon
so far, however,
as to say that the form, or
constructive principle, operates externally
166
THE DOOTEINE OP ESSENCE

is
the matter, or that the matter
independent
of the form in any sense, would do violence Form and matter to the Hegelian conception. must not be separated in thought^ it is in
their unity
that the
thing
has
its
essential
being.
Form, or formative
sults
principle, operating there-
fore within matter, produces
many
varied re-
which appear
as
the essential properties
of the thing.
The
totality of these properties

is
represents the outshining of that which
the
essence of the existing thing
itself.
This out-
shining of the characteristic features of a thing

constitutes
its
so-called
appearance,
or
its
phenomenal manifestation (die Erscheinungy.
CHAPTER
XII
APPEARANCE, OR THE PHENOMENAL WORLD
HEGEL'S
On
that
doctrine of the thing unites
two
seemingly contradictory points of view.

the one hand, a thing
may
be regarded as
which is one and individual, as we would say,
a single thing.
On
the other, however, a thing the summation
may be regarded equally well as of its many parts and properties,

correlated in one
coexisting and
and the same unified system. The thing is thus both the one and the many, the unitary ground and the varied manifestation.
Thus
a plant
is
a single thing, but at the
same time
it is
a complex of manifold elements,
for into its

light, heat,
composition are brought together
water, ammonia, potash, starch, and
an indefinite number of material elements which

are completely coordinated in the single
system
life
which constitutes the essential being and

the plant.
of
Such an assemblage of these various elements which compose the properties of the
plant in their concrete
167
manifestation,
is
the
168

is
shining forth of the inner essence which

tred in the one
cen-
ground which forms
their under-
lying unity.
This shining forth of the inner

outer manifestation Hegel calls
It
is
nature in
its
die Erscheinung.
the actual revelation of
the essence of a thing.

festations gives us the
is
The sum
of such maniIt
world of phenomena.
the world of scientific description and inter;
pretation
it is
the world of inductive investi-
gation, of observation
and experiment
it is
the
world of exact measurement and of computation, the
world of relations and coordinations,

constituted
the world of uniformity and of law.
The
by
its
is
essence, according to Hegel,
is
two principal moments or

is
factors.
The
one
a reflection in itself (^Reflexion in sich), a reflection in something else
and the other

central core
(^Reflexion in Anderes).
The one
represents the
of being
and organizing principle

with
the other, all the correlated elements associated

essentially
it.
The
reflection
in
itself
refers, therefore, to that
which constitutes the
essence of a thing
for example, in the case of
a plant,
single
it is
that which constitutes the plant a
thing, its central, unifying
ground and
architectonic principle.
The
reflection in some-
thing else refers to
all the
elements which con-
APPEARANCE
tribute to the being
169
the plant, and
and
life of
to all its several parts

erties.
and
its distinctive
prop-
It is this
second moment of essence, the
reflection
or shining forth in something else,

its
which constitutes
tion.
phenomenal manifesta-
It is to
be observed, however, that there can be
no real separation between the essence and external appearance,
between the ground and the

the
manifestation, between
noumenon and
manifestation.
the
phenomenon.
therefore,
is
Hegel defines the Urscheinung,

the
essential
It
as
not the mere
show (der Schein),

;
as distin-
guished from the substance

reality as distinguished
it
is
not an unit is
from reality; but

is
the complete revelation of all that
essentially
immanent within.
therefore, to
It
is
wholly misleading,
speak of mere phenomena as though
phenomena were only the passing shadow with

no corresponding substance underlying them.
It will
be seen in the subsequent development
of the dialectic that
every phenomenon in the
universe represents an underlying reality, and

so the category of
Ersoheinung'), as
will
phenomenal appearance {die be seen, must lead of

(^die
necessity to that of actuality
WirkUchkeif),
which forms the third stage in the development
170
THE DOCTKINE OP ESSENCE

they are treated
of
of the category of essence;
separately for convenience
exposition, but
not in reality or in thought.

in this connection is directly
Hegel's position
opposed to that of
Kant.
The
latter insists that the
phenomenal
has a subjective
significance
merely, and he
postulates an abstract something lying behind
phenomena and beyond the range of our cogniHegel, on the tion, the indefinite Ding an sich. contrary, maintains most stoutly that all phenomena of the universe are so bound up with their immanent essences, that in knowing the outer manifestation we must know also the
essential
ground.
We
cannot
separate
one
from the other, and therefore to state that we
know
The
only phenomena does violence to
the
essential nature of the
doctrine of
phenomena themselves. the phenomenal as developed

of
It is
by Hegel may be presented in several pairs

correlative terms.
due
to the
fundamental
the base of
principle of reflection
which
fall
lies at
its
the category of essence, that manifestations
phenomenal
its
should
together in pairs,
representing each characteristic in
own
it
light
and
its
also in the light reflected

it
upon
by that
with which
other.
stands in essential relation as
APPEARANCE
These pairs of correlatives are as follows
(1)
(2)
171
:
Form and Content. The Whole and its

Theile.)
its
{Inhalt
Parts.
und Form.}
(J)as
Game
und
die
(3) Force and

(^Die
Phenomenal Manifestation
(^Das Innerliche
Kraft und die Aeusserung .)
(4) Inner and Outer. das Aeusserliche.y
und
As to we may
the relation of form to content^' while

refer all
material elements as the
phenomena to the underlying ground of their subsist-
ence, yet a deeper insight recognizes a formative principle
at the last analysis the
immanent in the matter, so that phenomena of the world

ma-
must be referred to the activity of the inner

constructive principle resident within the
terial
substratum of the phenomena themselves.

this inner
It
must be remembered that while
principle
may
it
be
called simply
the form of
means that which produces the form rather than merely the form which is prophenomena,
duced.
We
must not
lose
sight of
Hegel's
conception of the essence of phenomena,

is,
that
an active principle fundamentally dynamic
in its nature.
in
There are two senses, however, which form is used according to Hegel, and
it
is
which
necessary to keep distinct in our
172
minds.

It
is
used in the sense already noted as an immanent constructive principle such as

the architectonic principle which fashions
plant after
its
the
is
kind.
Form
in
this
sense
synonymous with the phrase "the law

nomena."
It is
of phe-
used also in a different sense,
however, as signifying that which in a negative
manner determines from without the bounds of phenomenal manifestation, by assigning to them
definite limits,
such as the form, for instance,

its
which
mould.
is
given to a casting by
enveloping
It is in the
former of these two senses, that

principle, that
if
of a
dynamic constructive
the
term form must be conceived

stance, that
it
is
to
be
in-
regarded as one with the content.
For
which makes the plant what
it is,
the
sum
of its elements
and
its
properties, its
content in fact, cannot be separated from the
immanent architectonic principle which forms and coordinates these elements into one complex whole. Phenomena are what they are by
virtue of the inner working of the fundamental
laws of their being.
The form,
is
therefore,
is
the
content, and the content
the form.
Separate
them, and unrelated they lose their significance.
Form without
content
is
empty.
Content with-
APPEARANCE
out form
is
173
it
so indeterminate that
cannot be
grasped as an object of knowledge.
true
work
of art
is
one in which form and content
are identical.
Iliad has
The
style
is
the
man.
This
The
is
no poetic content, Hegel

it
insists, if
we regard
tration
apart from
its
form.
true
of all great literary creations.
further illusdis-
may
be drawn from the present-day

to
cussion
in reference
the
relation
is,
between
formal and material logic,
that
between the
form which our judgments and inferences

take,
may
and
their significance as
determined in the
light of actual experience.
Form
in this conis
nection, without material significance,
barren
and without value.
In logic the form gives
significance to the content,
turn determines the form.

fore
be no real distinction
and the content in There can therebetween formal and
material fallacies.
the last analysis,

superficial
They must be regarded at and apart from verbal and distinctions, as one and the same.
But the content must be conceived not only form which has developed from within, but also as that which has been determined to a certain extent externally by other forms with which it stands in some essential relations. Acas
cordingly a
\
phenomenon may be regarded
as
174

of
composed
having
its
externally
related
parts,
all
each
peculiar form,
and yet
parts co-
ordinated by means of a
common bond which

This conceppair of correlato its parts.
constitutes an underlying unity.
tion leads
tives,
us to the second
relation of the
of that
the
whole
The concept
which we
call the
whole
of anything has its significance in the relation
which the parts sustain one to another, and each

to the
combined aggregation.
The whole
life.
dis-
appears
parts.
when we
This
is
divide
it
into its
component
especially true of organic

its
living
parts,
body cannot be divided into

and restored at
It is only the
separate
will to its original
form
all
and functions.
dead body that
admits of dissection.
The
significance of
the parts lies in their inherence in one and the
same organism and
their coordinated functions
in reference to each other
and
it is
to the whole.
The eye
is
an eye so long as
member
of
An organ severed from its organism becomes at once a meaningless and worthless
the body.
thing.
Hegel draws attention

psychologists
often
to the fact also that
speak erroneously of
the
parts of the soul, or the parts of the mind, as
though endowing such parts with a quasi inde-
APPEARANCE
pendence.
It
is
175
is
of interest to note that he
here emphasizing by
way
of
protest a truth
which modern psychology has most fully endorsed,
namely,
that
psychical
phenomena
in
must be regarded
but nevertheless
traditional
as a unity,
complex
the
true,
variety of functional manifestation,
it is
one
of
and not many.

separate
The
pro-
theory
psychological
faculties is here discarded

tests that there is
by Hegel.
He
not any separate faculty of

a separate organ of the body
of the as
memory, or of reason, or of imagination, any
more than there

whose
life
is
other members,
and function are independent and of the organism
the
central unity of
It
them
all.
may
be said in general, therefore, that

is
the form, or formative principle,
essentially
a principle of organization, uniting the

into one
many
and producing a symmetry of parts, harmony of functions, and a congruence of

so
relations,
that
the
world of
phenomena,
be conceived
whether of nature or of mind,
may
by us as a world of order and of law.

Hegel's conception of form, being essentially
dynamic, the bond of unity which underlies the

relation of the
whole to
its
parts
must be con-
ceived as a formative principle, also dynamic.
176

relation of the several parts in
The
any complex
the whole,
is,
system one to another, and
all to
must therefore be mediated

about
that
brought
by
;
the
outputting of
some energy.
(die
its
This dynamic element Hegel
calls force
Kraff)
its
outputting
is
called
.
external
manifestation (die Aeusserung~)

correlatives will be
This pair of
found necessary to complete
the idea of an underlying dynamic basis.
Any
of
phenomenon whatsoever from the standpoint

its its
reflection in itself,
own light,
presents
that
is,
regarded simply in
as its
most evident char-
a central and essential unity. The phenomenon appears, therefore, as an undivided whole. But from a different standpoint, and one that we dare not overlook, the phenomenon appears immediately to break up into a diversity of interrelated and coordinated parts. This is
acteristic
the standpoint of a reflection into something

else, or
the illumination of the central unity by
its component and their several functions. Consequently, that by which the one breaks up into the many and the many in turn become unified in the one, must be referred to some underlying force which
the light reflected from each of
parts
produces the specification of parts, and at the
same time holds them together
in an all-embrac-
APPEARANCE
ing unity within one
177
system.
common
Thus
the separate organs of an animal are developed
through successive differentiations and integrations,
separated into many, yet combined as
one,
and
this
is
attained
action of the vital forces
by the concerted which are constantly and which constitute
operative in the organism,

it
what
it
essentially
is.
Force, conceived of as mere force, and with-
out the additional considerations which will be
advanced later under the category of the notion, must be regarded merely as a blind force working without purpose or intelligence.
conceived, it would
As
thus
require for its activity, accord-
ing to Hegel, a special vehicle, as magnetic force
seemed
to require the presence of iron
it
would,
moreover, be brought into activity only by some

special solicitation, s\ich as the presence of
some
upon which it is dependent. Thus, every force would seem to be dependent upon some other, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, force from this point of view must be regarded as
other force
essentially finite, because it
is
necessarily de-
pendent and restricted.
To
speak, therefore, of
it
God
as force merely,
is
though
may
be writ large,
FORCE,
never-
theless an extremely impoverished conception of
178
THE DOCTEINE OF ESSENCE

This was
the fulness of the divine attributes.
the fundamental error in Herder's general conception of God.
For the category
of force
must be
complemented by the category of a

that
final cause,
thus introducing the conception of an activity

is
self-determining and purposeful.

insists
Moreover, Hegel
with characteristic
method and general point of view that the idea of force must not be divorced in our thoughts from its outer
consistency as regards his
manifestation.
It is of the very essence of force
to manifest itself.
Force and
It
is
its
manifestation
are one
and the same.
misleading, there-
fore, to state that force in itself is
unknowable.
;
It
is
knowable, but only in

is
its
manifestation
but
the manifestation
the essential expression of

is.
what the
force itself really
The
final relation, that of the
inner to the
outer, is a relation
which follows logically from

its
that of force and

its
manifestation.
Force in
essential
nature
represents the inner, and
its
manifestation of course represents the outer.

are essentially identical.
The two
nality or
Mere
exter-
mere internality are expressions which
represent an
empty and meaningless abstraction,
and nothing more.

It is
customary to regard the essence of a
APPEARANCE
thing as merely that which
is
179
It
inward.
it
must
be remembered, however, that
is
of the initself in
herent nature of the essence to reveal
some form of external manifestation.

illustration
As an
of
of
this
erroneous
point
view,
Hegel
ler,
cites the
poet Haller.
The
lines of Hal-
which, by the way, Hegel quotes incorrectly,

:
are
" Ins
Innere der Natur

G-eist
Dringt kein erschaffener
Zu
gliicklich
1
wann
sie
noch
die
aussere
Schale
weist."
With
these words of Haller there
may
be
compared the indignant comment of Goethe,

which runs as follows
'
" Ins Innere der ISTatur
O
'
duPhilister!
'
Geist.'
Dringt kein ersoliaifener
Mich und Geschwister Mogt ihr an solches Wort
Nur nicht erinnern Wir denken Ort fUr Ort Sind wir im Innern.
:
Gluckselig wem sie nur Die aussere Schale weist Das hdre ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen leh iiuche darauf, aber verstohlen. Sage mir tausend tausend Male
'
!
Alles giebt sie reichlich

1
und gem
140.
180

Natui- hat weder
Kern
Noch
AUes
Dioh
Schale,
ist sie
mit einem Male du nur allermeist Ob du Kern oder Sohale seist."

priife
Thus, as a
he inwardly.
man seems to be outwardly, so is What a man is, he does; and what

is.
he does, manifests what he
If his morality,
Hegel
nal
insists, is
if it
a matter of inner intention
merely, and
never bears fruit in any exter-
word or deed, then the inner purpose, however noble it may be, loses its significance and worth. It is the understanding again which seeks to separate the inner from the outer. Thus conceived, they become merely empty
abstractions.
Hegel draws attention in this connection to a tendency which seems to operate in ignoble minds to decry and belittle the great and heroic
" Into the inner depths of nature oh thou Philistine created mind can penetrate.' To me and mine it is hardly necessary to recall such a thought. We think that
1
' '
!
'no
but in secret.
we are in the inward parts. 'Happy the nature merely shows her outward shell.' I have heard this repeated for sixty years and curse it withal,
place for place
man
to
whom
I say to myself a thousand thousand times Nature gives everything lavishly and with good will. She has neither kernel nor shell. She is at the same time both the one and the other. Only, above all things, test thyself whether kernel or shell thou may'st prove to be."
:
APPEARANCE
181
deeds of history by insinuating that the external
action
may
motive of nobility within.

history,"
not have a corresponding " If the heroes of
says
Hegel, formal
"had been actuated by

interests
subjective
and
alone,
they
never would have accomplished what they have.
And
the
if
we have due regard

outer,
to the unity
between
inner and the
great
men purposed
to do
we must own that what they did, and
what they purposed." From any point which we may choose to view it, the distinction between inner and outer
that they did
is
resolved in a higher unity into which they
are
merged
as one
and the same.
It is
through
is
the manifestation of force that every inner

necessarily constrained (gesetzf) to
as
show
itself
outer.
Their distinction
is
to be
regarded
only as a necessary
of their
moment
in the expression
absolute identity.
We
speak of the
relation of inner to outer as
though they were

Their relation
is,
contrasted terms of a ratio.
however, that of a unity, in which the seemingly contrasted terms merge into one.
distinction
Their
merely serves to emphasize the dynamic process, by which the manifestation of the essence is mediated, and yet this is in no
I
141.
182
wise contradictory to their underlying unity as
embraced in one and the same system.
The
its
identity of inner
and
outer, of force
and
manifestation,
(^die
constitutes
.
the
category of
actuality
Wirkliehkeif)
This brings us
of
to the final
and most complete expression
the nature of essence; and this will be dis-
cussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER
XIII
ACTUALITY, OR THK KEAL
WORLD
ACTUALITY
to conceive
is
defined by Hegel as the

its
unity of essence and
manifestation, or
It is incorrect
the unity of inner and outer.
the inner as the actual, and the
outer as merely the phenomenal, the fleeting,

the unreal.
reveals
its
The
;
actual
is
the
essence as
it
innermost being through external

it is
manifestation
its
the noumenal as
it
discloses
nature in the phenomenal.
It is a false con-
ception, also, to regard the external expression
of that tion
which
is
actual as the result of a transi-
from a preceding state of quiescent being
to its outer manifestation, of
though the mediation
some force which acts in an external manner. The actual is not something which is produced,
turned out as
that which
if
by a machine, and therefore

It
is
to
be regarded as a mere product.

is
rather
self-producing.
of
It is
not merely
It
the result of a process

is
development.
underlies
the energizing force which

183
that
184
process as well.
We
have already seen

is
that,
according to Hegel's general conception of his

system, the
complete cosmic process
to be
conceived as the expression of

reason
is
reason, and that
essentially the creative, constructive,
and sustaining force in the universe.

conception
tial
But
this
may
also be regarded as the essen-
characterization of the actual, or the real.
The two
up
in the
points of view are in reality one
and
the same, and their significance
may be summed
The
real is the
Hegelian formula
"
rational,
and the rational
is
the real."
It is
absurd, therefore, to
of
draw the
distinc-
tion
between the unreality

of
all
thought and the

It
is
reality
objective
phenomena.
it
utterly misleading to say, therefore, that while
an idea
may be
good, or true, that
cannot be
realized in actual experience.
tion of the world of

reality,
ideas
Such a dirempfrom the world of
Hegel
the
insists,
can arise only in the
sphere of
abstract understanding,
is
that
devoid
separating function of the mind, which

of all synthetic capacity
and unifying power.
There
truth,
is
a popular misconception that Plato
recognized the idea and only the idea, as the
and that
Aristotle,
rejected the idea,
on the other hand, and retained only the actual.
ACTUALITY
The
that
185
these
between Greek thought is this: while the actual is the fundamental prin-
true conception of
the relation
two masters
of
ciple in the
less,
philosophy of Aristotle, neverthe-
the actual with
him
is
not merely the

it
brute fact immediately at hand, but
embraces
the idea as actuality also, which serves both to

interpret
and explain the given
facts of con-
sciousness.
Aristotle characterized the idea of
Plato as a mere Swa/xt?,

tiality,
and insisted that the idea must be conessentially

as
it
is,
that
is,
a mere poten-
ceived
reveals
itself
in
its
manifestation,
that
By
as ivepyeia.
He
there-
fore defines reality as
an entelechy (eyreXeêta)
that
is,
the self-realization of the essence in the

this conception Aristotle rec-
phenomena.^
onciled the antithesis between the Eleatic and

the Heraclitean points of view.
tion
is
Hegel's posi-
substantially the
same
of
as that of Arisis
totle; for in his
system throughout there

the
fundamental
recognition
necessity of
combining in one the complementary elements

of potentiality of
and
actuality.
From
this point
view the dialectic movement may be defined merely as a process of transition from the potential to
1
the actual.
tr., p.
See Wiadelband's History of Philosophij, Eng.
139
f.
186
THE DOCTBINE OF ESSENCE
Approaching now a more careful analysis of the concept of actuality, we find that its primary
and most fundamental element

possibility (die
is
the idea of
possible, ac-
Mo glichkeit')
is
The
It
is,
cording to Hegel,
an essential moment in
however, not
possibility of
every actual phenomenon.

to be confused
with the barren
mere fancy.
all
In the world of the imagination,

It is possible that the
things are possible.

fall into
moon might
the earth.
Csesar might
not have crossed the Rubicon.
Charles I of
England might have been exiled instead of beheaded. Napoleon might have been killed
at the battle of Waterloo.
ities of
All such possibil-
the imagination must rank as footless
speculations.
The name given
to
them by
is,
Hegel
is
that of formal
possibilities, that
having the mere form or outer shell of
reality.
signifi-
possibility,
is
however, to which some
cance
attached,
and which may be

it
called
a significant possibility to distinguish

the merely formal possibility,
from must always be

its
regarded as the preliminary stage of every form

of
development which in the very process of
unfolding reveals the necessity to which the

potential
to
must have been subjected

itself
in order
push
forth into the actual.
Such a
ACTUALITY
possibility
187
may
be called also with appropriate-
ness, real or actual possibility.
Actuality, however, considered apart from
its
inner potentiality as
its
essential ground, pre-
sents to us only its external face.

it
Looking
at
from
this point of
view exclusively, we find

discloses
ourselves confronted with the external aspect

of actuality
which immediately
(^die
the
category of contingency
its
Zufdlligheit') as
basal characteristic.
The contingent
refers
to the external relation
which obtains between
phenomena.
This relation
may
be such that one phenom-
enon depends externally upon some other phe-
nomenon
so that the one forms the condition of
the other.
The
idea of the contingent

a
when
is
definitely expressed in
concrete
relation
(^die
thus to be regarded as the condition

dingung')
Be-
upon the presence
or absence of which
depends the presence or absence of the phe-
nomenon which is related to it. The r81e of a phenomenon which

function of a condition
follows:
It is
;
fulfils
the
may
be characterized as
a special existence,
an immeit
diate thing
it
has also a vocation, as
were,
to be destroyed in its
primary form in order to

else.
conserve the realization of something
As
188
such
it

fulfils
its
its
own
destiny,
and although
it
dying in
other,
own
individuality,
lives in anit is
and the other form for which

its
was
evi-
dently designed by
of kin that
it
own
nature
so near
its
may
be properly regarded as
own
the
rise,
true self.
In other words, to use an Heis
gelian expression, the condition

resulting
aufgehohen in
it
phenomenon
to
which
gives
and into whose actuality

is
enters and
there conserved.
its own essence When, however,
the point of
to
view
is
not exclusively confined
the
external
manifestation, but
is
when
the
external manifestation
regarded as the neces-
sary development of an inner organizing activity
which has been characterized

or
of
as
the real
possibility,
the
possibility
regarded as the
potential,
potential
process,
reality,
then
the
the
and the resulting product may be confact,
ceived as constituting together the actual fact.
The
ing
actual
moreover, embraces
all
the
purely external relations of contingency, includall
the conditions which both contribute to

in the actual fact itself.
and are merged

potential tends
In such a process, wherein on one side the

to
become
actual,
and on the
other the purely external conditions themselves

contribute to the process as essential factors,
ACTUALITY
and so far forth
their relations,
189
lose the external character of
in such a process the developof necessity,
ment
reveals
some underlying necessity which
expresses itself as a law of uniformity and universality.
Hegel defines the idea

actual.
(& Nothwendigheif) as the unity of the potential

and the
The development
it
of the one
into the other
we
are constrained to believe
take place, and that
must take place

in
in
one definite
is
way rather than
any other.
must some That
what
is
meant by
necessity.
Necessity signi-
fies
something more than that one thing has been
derived from another.
The
idea of derivation
does not exhaust the meaning of necessity.

is
What
is
merely derivative
not through
is
a product which
what
it is,
itself
is
but through something

necessary contains the
else.
That which
itself
it must be what it is and through the activity of its own inner processes and even if it is derivative, it must still contain the antecedent whence
additional idea that
through
it
is
derived as a vanishing
element within
is
itself.
The necessary
is
something which
mediated (yermitteW) and yet mediated through that is, mediated that which belongs to itself,
by the inner constraint of
its
own
nature.
Such
an inner determination which
arises
from the
190
THE DOCTEINE OP ESSENCE

itself,
very nature of a thing

gesetzt.
is
Hegel
refers to as
Any
characteristic, according to Hegel,
said to be gesetzt
when
it
can be shown as the
necessary outcome
object to
of the very nature of the

referred.
which
it is
Whenever
that
which
to
is
given in thought leads by the very
necessity of the thought processes
themselves
it is
conclusion
the
dependent
upon
as
its
premise,
resulting
conclusion
always
described by Hegel as gesetzt.
All phases of
the dialectic process are gesetzt in the sense of
following by a necessary constraint of thought
from the very nature of that which precedes

them.
This term
is
so intimately associated with
the idea of necessity which underlies the whole

dialectic
worth while to explain

condition of a fact
movement of thought that it has seemed it somewhat at length.

is
The contingent represented by an external

not merely a condition
external to the fact and sustaining only a pass-
ing relation to
it
it
must be conceived
fall
also as
an essential element of the fact

condition and the fact
the
itself.
The
together in one and
same system.
It is the business of philoso-
phy
lies
to reveal the necessity which,
although at
a far deeper level, nevertheless always under-
the contingent.
ACTUALITY
It is again the
191
work
of
the abstract under-
standing which draws a sharp line of distinction
between the idea of necessity and that of
freeall
dom
(die
Freiheif).
When we
regard
phenomena as necessitated, ourselves included, we at first sight seem to occupy, as Hegel puts it, "a thoroughly slavish and dependent position." ^ It must be borne in mind, however, that any kind of freedom which is wholly devoid of the element of necessity is nothing more or less than mere caprice. There is such a thing
as a perfectly free activity
which nevertheless
its
it.
recognizes the inherent law of
own
a
being,
free-
and endeavors freely to
realize
Such
dom
fate
is
the only true freedom.
Were
man
to
feel that
he
is
under the
spell of
an inevitable
and that he is not in the remotest degree dependent upon his own exertions, then it would follow that all his activities would become paralyzed, and he would find himself out of harmony with the world system of which he
a part.
is
is
To
realize,
on the other hand, that
he
the architect of his

fate,
is
own
fortune and the
master of his
earnest
desire
to inspire
him with
the
the best that
is
and strong purpose to realize Hegel holds that the in him.
147.
192
THE DOCTKINB OK ESSENCE

of
individuality
embraced in the absolute universal as to be conserved and not destroyed. This conception will be more fully
man
is
so
developed when
we come
its
to the exposition of
the notion, which in
highest expression
all
is
the divine reason to which
personalities
at the
owe
their being,
and which constitutes

of their freedom.
is
same time the charter

Necessity,
then,
the
expression
of
that
binding connection which links together condition,

fact,
system,
itself.
and activity in one and the same and the question naturally suggests
is
What
the
fundamental
nature
of
that system
cessity as
which exhibits the underlying nea bond uniting all of its essential
?
elements
together
Hegel's
answer
is
to
this
question, as might be surmised,
a threefold
one.
He
views the idea of necessity under the

:
following categories
(1) Substantiality.
(2) Causality.
(^Bie Suhstantialitat.')
(Z>ie Kausalitdt.}
(3) Reciprocal kung.)
activity.
QDie
Wechselwir-
These categories express the several possible ways by which any fact is connected with its corresponding condition through some mediating activity.
ACTUALITY
The category of substantiality is ate and primary form which the
state
193
the immedirelation
of
necessity assumes in connecting every potential

of
development with
its
corresponding
actual.
The
actual which
is
;
present as a fact,
appears and then disappears

as a
for a fact regarded

re-
mere
fact,
and a separate existence
garded merely as a separate existence, have no
permanency.
Such facts rise and fall again and again are not. There is a perthey are petual ebb and flow, growth and decay, through;
out
all
nature.
"Our
little
systems have their day,

their
They have
day and cease to be."
But underlying
evanescent
all
these ephemeral forms and

there
is
properties,
basis
is
nevertheless
some underlying
constant.
which remains absolutely
This
the fundamental substance.
Upon its moment

into
arose.
surface all things appear in their brief

of individuality.
They sink again
the
all-absorbing
element whence they
Their fleeting existence marks them as
the veriest accidents of being in contrast to the
which characterizes the substance of which they are but the passing modes. They This are the many the substance is the one.
stability
;
distinction corresponds to that
which was drawn
194

its
between the whole and

ferred to in the
parts
already re-
preceding chapter upon the
nature of the phenomenal world.

Hegel's conception of substance bears upon
its
face the stamp of Spinoza.
There
ever, a radical point of departure,
is, howinasmuch as
Spinoza ascribes no reality to the phenomenal

world.
that
is,
The
ErseJieinung
is
is
merely Schein,
the phenomenal
only an illusion, and
possesses no separate individuality of its own.
Hegel suggests that this is an oriental strain which has appeared in Spinoza's thinking owing
to his
Hebrew
real
ancestry.
Hegel himself enters

In
this
a protest against the elimination of the idea

of a
individuality.
connection
he introduces into his system the principle of

individuality, as
insisted
upon by Leibniz
in
opposition to Spinoza.
At
this point
Hegel
also emphasizes the im-
propriety of calling
infidelity is
Spinoza an atheist.
His
of
not toward
God
is
so
much
as
toward
the world.
His system
essentially one
acosmism.
He
denied the reality of the world;
and
in losing the
world
lost his
same time,
logically
for the unreality of
own soul at the the Ego follows
which
it
from the unreality of the world of forms a part.
ACTUALITY
195
In the passage in which Hegel criticises the

defects of Spinoza's system,^
there
is
clearly-
revealed on
his
Hegel's part the
desire
to
save
own system from

It
is
a pantheistic
drift.
He
of
there disclaims
most stoutly any profession
pantheism.
his
a question, of course, whether
system as a whole
may
not logically lead
to pantheistic conclusions, despite its author's protests to the contrary.

fact
Nevertheless,
it is
which
is
most
significant, that
Hegel did
not himself judge that his system necessarily
demanded a
this fact
pantheistic
interpretation.
And
should not be ignored in a criticism of

In the third part of
Hegel's general position.
the Logic, moreover, Hegel maintains that the
Absolute
is
more than mere substance,
for in
the doctrine of the notion the supreme reason

or
God
is
regarded as subject rather than sub-
stance, a personality rather than

indefinite
an empty and
this qualifica-
abstraction.
Without
tion
the substance
it,
of
Spinoza would be, as
Hegel puts
ing
" merely the universal all-devour-
[negative]
power, like a vast, dark, and

all
boundless abyss, into which

are forever lost."
^
things sink and
Hegel's conception of substance marks but a

1
15i, ZusaJz.
151-
196
preliminary stage which must be further devel-
oped and supplemented.

stance,
The Hegelian
substance,
sub-
regarded
merely as
is
while
constant and abiding
nevertheless only static.
The
enal
individual manifestations of the
phenom-
occur in connection with

it
it,
proceeding
from
stance, as such, lacks

initiate action,
But suband again returning to it. the dynamic power to

and to produce the results flowit.
ing from
That which
is
thus connected
with
it.
it is
still
only accidental in reference to

is
And
therefore the concept of substance
necessitated
by the inner constraint

it.
of thought
to develop the idea of causality inherently con-
nected with
the static passes over into the dynamic.

relation of substance
The substance becomes cause The

;
and accident (that
is,
of
substance to any one of the properties connected
with
it
and which rank
as accidents in reference
to it)
we may regard
parts.
as corresponding to the
relation already discussed,

to
its
that
may
of the
whole
In a similar manner, also, the
relation of cause
and
effect
be considered
as corresponding to that of force

festation.
and
die
its
mani-
The German word

indicates
for
cause,
Ursache,
an
original or
originating
element.
ACTUALITY
Cause in this sense
sui.
is
197
to be regarded as a causa
this point of view, the
its effect
It possesses,
from
capacity of initiation, and of producing

as the necessary
consequence of
its
own being
and
activity.
From one
point of view cause and
effect are
distinct terms. But this represents and abstract view of their relations, such as is the result of the mere understanding. From a more comprehensive point of view the two terms, which seem to be distinct, in reality
a finite
fall
together as one.
The cause
it is
reveals itself
as a cause
effect.
only so far as
manifested in the
And
the effect has significance as an

it is
effect
only so far as
its
seen to be connected
with
rain
cause.
In a sense,
the
we speak
of the
as
the
cause of
dampness of the
is
ground, and yet a deeper consideration reveals

the fact that the
dampness
the rain
rain
itself,
only in another form.
The
causes the
dampness and
therefore,
is
it is
the dampness.
The
effect,
merely the manifestation of the
activity of the cause.
The cause
is
conserved in
the effect
and the
effect is potential in the cause.
Although the relation which obtains between

the cause
transition
and the effect may be regarded as a from one state to another, with an accompanying conservation of the former state
198
THE DOCTEINB OP ESSENCE

nothing to
thoroughly-
in the latter, nevertheless there is
limit this process
and so render
it
satisfactory as a final account of the matter.
Cause leads to
effect,
and the
effect
in turn
becomes a cause, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, the causal relation may be traced backward
from a given effect to
of that cause,
its
cause,
and the cause

limit, or forlimit.
and so on without
ward from
effect to effect also
without
There seems to be no starting-point and no end.
As
thus stated, the doctrine of causation
is in-
complete, and therefore most unsatisfactory.
A
its
natural complement to this conception of causation

is
one that
is
found growing out of

is
very limitations, and
known
as the doctrine
of reciprocal activity, or the relation of action
and
reaction.
is
Causation, therefore,
to be regarded, accordits
ing to Hegel, as finding
most complete
ex-
pression in the concept of reciprocal activity

(^die
Weohselwirkung'), which represents the rela-
tion obtaining
sisting
between cause and

effect,
effect as con-
of
a mutual interaction.
The cause
effect in turn
produces the
reacts
and yet the

in such a
upon the cause

is
manner
that
the cause
as
is
much
a product of the effect
as the effect
of the cause.
ACTUALITY
This principle of
trated
199
is
interaction
best illus-
by the reciprocal relations which parts of one and the same organism sustain to each
other,
for
example, in the
human body
way
in
the
several organs are related in a reciprocal

ner,
manas
so that they function in such a
to
act
and
react
upon
of
to of
one
another,
an
indefinite
variety
manifestations.
Hegel
of
to
draws
attention
also
the
a
relation
the
their
is
character and customs

constitution,
people
this
and
insists that
always
of
the nature of a reciprocal relation.

stitution is in a sense the
The
con-
outgrowth and the
expression of the national character, but from
another point of view the national character
is
intimately aifected and modified by the constitution.
So also we often say that drunkenness

it is
causes poverty;
quite as
true that pov-
erty causes drunkenness.

therefore,
as
There are instances,

these
illustrations,
indicated by
in
wherein the cause

to
question does not lead
an endless causal progression or regression, but the causal series in such cases is to be
conceived no longer as a line extending without limit in
either
direction,
but as a line
represent-
which bends backward upon
itself,
ing the reacting influence of the effect upon
200
the

supposed cause.
This
connection
being
established, the circulatory
movement
of causa-
works back again to the startingWithin the bounds of this circle there is disclosed a certain kind of self-sufficiency. Cause and effect fall together in one and the
tion always
point.
same
thing
area,
and
in
their
mutual dependence
of every-
they are
else.
its
nevertheless independent
The cause
finds in the effect, not
merely
is
other, but its
own
real self.
effect
Cause
not one thing,

is
and the
something
which
system.
outside of the cause,

it.
related to
and externally They together form one closed

this point of view, cause
From
of
must
self-
be
conceived as possessing in a measure the

initiative, of
power
self-direction,
and
construction.
It ranks
force resident in
It rises to
as a mere some underlying substance.
no longer
the
higher dignity of
proceeding
the nature
from a source which partakes of

of
subject
rather
than a substance.
The
underlying necessity, a self-imposed necessity,

is
such as
to
is,
form a
natural transition to
that which
therefore, actually the expression
of the truest kind of freedom.
The highest form
of
substance
found to be that of cause.
we have The highest form
ACTUALITY
of cause
is
201
that of reciprocal action
and
re-
action.
is
The
highest form of reciprocal action

passes
that which
over
action.
into
self-directed
and
self-determined
is
The
transition
now
a natural and easy one to the doctrine {der Begriff), the self-directing
of
of the notion
formative
principle
reason which
is
the
underlying and essential principle of
all being.
This transition from the category of essence

to that of
the notion
is
may
be
expressed in a
idea
of
word,
it
transition
from the
;
substance
to
that of subject
from the idea
of necessity to that of freedom.
PART
III
Der
Begriff
ist
das Princip
alles
Lebens und damit
zugleich das schlechthin Konkrete.
Der Begriff ist das

;
den Dingen
sind,
selbst
Innewohnende
wodurch
sie
das
was
sie sind.
ist
Die Idee
diess,
ist
die Wahrheit;
Objektivitdt
denn
die
Wahrheit
dass die
dem
Begriffe entspricht.
Hegel.
PART
III

CHAPTER XIV
THE GENERAL NATURE OP THE NOTION
WE
have followed the dialectic movement

cate-
through the various stages of the
and of essence, and have found the development logically continuous and progressive. Its most complete expression, as
gories of being
reached by our investigation thus

vealed a fundamental factor which
is
far,
has
re-
not merely
a determining
factor as well.
translate
factor,
but a self-determining
Hegel's Begriff, which

is
we
will
by the word notion,
nothing more
or less than this complete expression of all that

is
contained in the categories of being and of
essence.
Hegel
calls
the notion the truth of

It
is
being and of essence.
the underlying
substratum of
itself
all things,
needing no support
;
because
self-supporting
itself
requiring no
further
explanation of
because self-ex-
205
206
THE DOCTEINB OF THE NOTION

;
planatory
dependent upon no external deterit is
mination because
self-determined.
have already discussed the category of form, and have seen that Hegel uses this term
always to signify a constructive formative principle essentially
We
dynamic in
its
nature.
By
the
is
term notion he means not only that which

that which
source.
of at the
the source of this dynamic principle, but also

is
He
same time a self-sufficient has advanced from the conception

self-activity.
is
form as the principle of activity to that of
form as the principle of
The
notion, moreover,
not to be conceived
as merely a
form of the understanding, ranking

such as our idea of a uni-
as a logical concept
versal class or group of objects, as of

horse,
man, dog,
class idea,
is
and the
like.
Such a group or
a
ranking merely as
formal concept,
It is dead,
the
veriest skeleton of thought.
empty,
wholly
notion,
concrete,
abstract, as
on the contrary,
Hegel would put it. The is most thoroughly

thought as an active
It has
that
is,
it is
constructive and productive force.
more
than a mere subjective value.

idea in the mind.
It is
not a mere
is
The
is
true thought
a force,
self-
and the true force

active
;
self-determining
and
all
other thoughts and all other forces
THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE NOTION

are
207
true
but
the
shadows
of
reality.
The
thought manifests
ner,
itself in
some external man-
in
the inventions of the mechanician, in
the institutions of the state, in the charities of the church, in the paintings
artist,
in the deeds great
and statues of the and small of human
beings,
who
is
think,
and
plan,
and act
withal.
spirit of
Hegel regards the notion as the living

all
and dominating all forms of life and all phases of activity, from the simplest to the most complex, and from the
that
actual, pervading
lowest to the highest.
dently one of absolute idealism.
The standpoint is eviThe chief and

of
most characteristic feature of the doctrine

the notion
says again
is
that of subjectivity, for Hegel
and again that the underlying sub-
stance of the universe as conceived by Spinoza
should be a subject and not a substance.

notion he calls, therefore, the Ego,
The
is,
that
all
the
is
underlying power beneath, and in

also a personality . It is
things
It is essentially self-con scions

it is
not merely an intelligent force, but
an
intelligent force
purposefully.
working both consciously and There is in the Hegelian system
force, as conceived by von Hartmann, which works intelligently but unconsciously, and therefore blindly.
no place for a
208

of
The element
lies
necessity,
moreover, which
at the basis of the concept of substance

is
and
the
of causation,
in the doctrine
of
the notion
as
transmuted
necessity
is
into
freedom,
inasmuch
of
regarded as a self-imposed necessity.

the
The self-determining power

activity.
It is
notion
is
to be conceived, therefore, as essentially a free
an activity not merely an
sich,
that
nor
is,
possessing the potentiality of activity,

sich,
is it
merely fur
that
is,
the explicit
is
realization of the potential activity; it
and fur sich, that is, it possesses the self-sufficient power and capacity for self-deteran
sich
both
mined
activity,
its
an activity which consciously

notion, being spontaneous
transmutes
potential into the actual.
Thus conceived, the
and unconditional, may be regarded as the final and most complete characterization of the Absolute.
The Absolute,
therefore,
may
be most
is
adequately defined as the notion.
This
not
only the highest expression of the nature of the

Absolute,
as well.
it is
the all-comprehensive definition

the truth of
it
The notion embodying
all
phases both of being and of essence,
follows
that all the characterizations of the Absolute
contained in the categories of being and of

essence which the successive stages of the dia-

lectic
209
completely
movement have manifested, may now be summed up in the all-embracing

Hegel, therefore, defines
the
totality of
all
nature of the notion.

the notion
(^die
also as
It
things
Totalitaf).
represents the fulness of
all
content, being both self-contained and all
containing.
ity are
The moments
it.
of all forms of activIt

is
embraced within
the great uniIt
fying principle of the cosmos.

the
forms both
It
whence and the whither of must, therefore, be immanent The notion, moreover, contains
all things.
in
all
all
things.
earlier
itself.
the
determinations of thought as conserved in
The contradictions which have been
necessarily
involved in the earlier stages of the develop-
ment have been overcome by being sublimated

in its higher unity.
The
dialectic
is
movement from
the standpoint
of the notion
essentially one of
development
in respect to be
(die Untwickelung}.
That movement
to the earlier category of being
we found
that of a transition, the passage from definite
being to
its
corresponding other.
In the cateis
gory of essence, the dialectic process
mediated
by the idea of reflection which marks no transition from definite being to its other but rather an illumination of definite being by the light
210
cast

upon
it
by
its
other.
The other thus
func-
complementary correlative of the original being in question, and gives to it point

tions as the
and
significance.
But when we come

is
to the
category of the notion, there
an actual devel-
opment from that which is given into its other manner that the unity of the two is completely preserved, and the former finds in its other only that which is the complementary
in such a
part of
itself.
As such
and
it
forms the truth of
the transition which characterizes the dialectic
movement
The
is
in being,
of the reflection
which
characterizes the dialectic
movement
due
in essence.
evolution which
is
is
to the activity of
It
the notion
essentially a self-development.
it
of the very nature of the notion that

itself,
its
should
manifest
phases of
and
that, too, in all the various

possibilities.
manifold
The
idea of
all
development, the continuous unfolding of

that
is
potential in the notion,
demands a
single
unifying principle in the midst of the super-
abounding diversity of content, manifesting

self
it-
in
progressive
is
process
in
which each
succeeding stage
more completely realized

this principle takes place
than the one before.
The manifestation of
in time, producing the
present cosmic order;
211
nevertheless, the truth of this principle in its ful-
ness
and
in all the logically coordinated stages
of its evolution
must be regarded
is
as
unconessen-
ditioned and undetermined by time.

tial
The
nature of this evolution

is,
primarily dialectic,
that
essary
each stage must be regarded as the necof the

its
complement
it
one before, in the

contradictions
is
sense that
overcomes
and
supplies its defects.

logical
This
fundamentally a
it,
demand.
is
As Hegel would put

is
any
given stage
gesetzt
by that which precedes,

contained in the
necessarily constrained to
is
that
is,
from that which

is
former, the reason

infer the latter.
pulsion,
the compulsion
its
Thought
thus under com-
of its
own
nature to
develop
concepts from the simplest to the
more and more complex.

plete expression of truth,
Each
stage of such a
development, because unsatisfactory as the com-
demands a
its
fuller
and and
more satisfactory stage which

supplement
defects, but
lies just
beyond,
which will in a measure correct

its
errors
which in turn will to arise which it cannot cause new questions answer and new contradictions which it cannot resolve. And thus the onward dialectic move-
ment proceeds not from one period of time to another so much as from the idea of imperfec-
212

from the idea of
in-
tion to that of perfection,
completeness to that of completeness.

the temporal process has been completed,
nishes a completed product.
When
it fur-
You cannot go
backward, rolling
it
up
again, as it were, into its
closed potentiality, and then repeat the process

at will.
Movement
in time
is
from the bud to
the full-blown rose, but the rose cannot shut
and be a bud again. But this reverse movement is always possible in reference to the thought relations which underlie any series of Given certain premises, the conmust develop itself out of them; and given the conclusion containing its major and minor terms, it is possible to work backward
development.
clusion
when once the proper middle term has been

discovered to the original premises.
so-called
It is the
process of reduction which reverses
the forward
movement
the
of deduction.
is
Moreover, the development in time

tially
finite;
is
essenof
dialectic
development
thought
essentially infinite.
The
develop-
ment
fuller
in time represents a gradual
change from
is
stage to stage;
the dialectic development

of
and
fuller revelation
that which, in
is
spite of its indefinitely varied manifestations,
ever one and the same,
the
absolute.
The
THE GENERAL NATXJEB OP THE NOTION

temporal development
falls
213
within the dialectic

in
movement, and may be regarded as a moment

the larger process.^
In the revelation of the full significance of

the notion, or in other words, in
its
dialectic
movement, three stages appear which are so

related that either the first or the second taken
by itself proves to be misleading and unsatisfactory,
and has a
final significance
only
when
it
unites with the other to

thesis
form a complete synThese
which constitutes the third stage.
stages
form the three divisions of the category
of the notion.
They
are as follows
(1)
The Notion
The Notion The Notion
as
Subjective.
(Der sub-
jective Begriff.')
(2)
as Objective.
(^Ber objective
Segriff.')
(3)
jective
as
the Synthesis
(^Die Idee.')
of
Sub-
and Objective.
The fundamental
consists
thesis
which Hegel endeavthought

regards
ors to maintain is that the reality of
in
its
productiveness.
seen, as
He
thought, as
we have
constructive,
self-determining force underlying the universe

of things, fashioning all creatures,
1
and shaping
;
See Bailie
:
HegeVs Logic, Chapter IX
also
McTag-
gart
Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, Chapter V.
214
THE DOCTRINE OP THE NOTION

Now,
if
all events.
thought
its
is
merely subjec-
tive, it appears, as
regards
essential function
as a force centre
completely paralyzed.
is
On
the
other hand, mere objectivity which

as separated
regarded
soever
is
from any subjective thought whatessentially irrational, and such a state,
from the Hegelian point of view, must be considered as unreal.

against
The
objective
is
not set over

is
the subjective, but the subjective

in the objective
;
immanent
that
it
and
it is
of the very
nature of the subjective as a thought activity
should strive to realize
itself
in the
objective.
As Hegel
;
puts
it,
our " thoughts do
not stand between us and things, shutting us

off
from things
things."
they rather shut us together
with
The
synthesis
of
these two
in
its
moments form and

highest
constitutes
the notion
true
in its
function.
is
The notion thus

the
expression
is,
Idea
(die
Idee)
that
The
the supreme Reason, the Absolute.
and the objective notion and incomplete. In the synthesis of subject and of object, the world of thought and the world of reality, we find the
subjective notion
are each indeterminate
true type of notion,

abstract,
not
merely formal and

all-
but concrete, dynamic, conscious,
controlling, all-embracing, free.
CHAPTER XV
THE SUBJECTIVE NOTIOK
THE
subjective notion, as
we have
of the
seen,
is
the notion regarded merely in one of

aspects, as constituting the
its
sum
thought
processes.
These processes taken together form
a system in
are
which
all of
the thought relations
determined by the fundamental nature of

itself.
thought
These relations divide naturally

thought forms, and in
this
into three typical
division
Hegel follows the
These forms are as follows:

(1)
traditional
logic.
Notion.
The Notion regarded simply as a formal (JDer Begriff ah solcher.) The Judgment. (^Das Urtheil.') (2) iBer Schluss.) (3) The Syllogism. The primary type of thought which Hegel
the
notion, regarded
its
calls
simply as notion,
to the
corresponds in some of
main features
ordinary concept of formal logic.

in the
It is treated
its
Hegelian system without reference to

215
natural setting as one of the component parts
216
of

the judgment and
is
syllogism.
This view
of the notion
of course only a provisional
one
which
represents
merely
an
abstract
analysis of
the thought processes, preliminary
to a subsequent synthesis,
which will represent
their
component parts
unified.
as properly coordinated
and
The
notion thus conceived as a

is
separate thought element,
found to contain
of universal(^das
three essential factors, or as the Hegelian ter-
minology goes, moments,

ity,
that
of particularity, and of individuality
Allgemeine, das Besondere, das Eimelne).

It
should be noticed that Hegel does not
divide notions into three kinds, the universal,
the particular, and the individual, but he re-
gards the one and the same notion as embracing in a unity these three coordinated aspects.
Hegel
at the outset
in
the discussion of the
notion evidently wishes to emphasize the truth

that while the categories of reflection, such as
appearance and ground, cause and

the like,
effect,
and
not
may
its
be separately apprehended each

correlative, this
apart from
however
is
the case concerning the categories of the notion.
These categories must be conceived as inseparable
moments
all
of the
one notion, and
if
they
do not
appear in a complete synthesis of
THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION
217
thought, the very integrity of the simple notion

itself is essentially
impaired.
A notion regarded
is
as representing
class or
universal merely, that
must rank in our thoughts as an absolutely empty genus unless it contains some suggestion at least of the capacity to realidea,
ize itself
group
in
different kinds of species

its particularity.
which
would then represent

particular notion,
And
representing a species, not

is its
only implies a higher genus which

sary universal, but
it
necesalso
in turn
must suggest
the capacity of realizing itself in definite individuals.
The
relations of genus, species,
and
the
the individual, represent most clearly and ade-
quately the three Hegelian moments of

simple notion,
individuality.
universality, particularity,
and
Any
one of them necessarily
implies the other two.
Hegel's criticism of the traditional logic

that its general term or class idea
in
is
is
a notion
its
only one of
its
aspects,
that of
uni-
and that the other two moments of particularity and of individuality are overlooked. Thus it follows that the purely
versality,
formal logician, the

ticular instances
literalist,
often ignores parin accord with
which are not
his general notions, or else wrests his individual
218
facts SO that they
ceived theories.
ity in the notion
may conform to his preconIt is the moment of individual-
which constitutes its actuality, which differentiates it from the mere fancy
of
the
imagination.
The
individual
object
is
always the most convincing proof as well

the clearest
illustration
as
of
the
universal.
Nothing
alities
will so quickly reveal the emptiness
of thought as a succession of glittering gener-
which admit of no particular application And on the other hand, or definite verification. also, it must not be overlooked that if the significance of the individual
is
to be adequately
interpreted,
erringly to
it must be possible to refer it unsome universal. The work of the
scholar or of the
man
of science
is
not complete
however numerous they may be; he must relate fact to law and
when he has
rise
collected facts,
above the particular results of his investiof
gation to the appreciation
the
universal
in-
which they embody.

trates
This relation of the
dividual object to the universal, Hegel
illus-
by showing that
it
was only when the
world came to recognize every man, whether
Greek or barbarian, bond or free, as possessing an infinite and universal nature, that man's real significance for himself and for society was

fully
219
understood and properly valued.
The
recognition of a
thing
is
man as a person and not a simply the recognition that the prinThe
universal
is
ciple of personality is in reality a principle of
universality.
not to be con-
ceived, therefore, as merely the
sum
total of the
various elements which a
number
of individuals
have in
ple
common
it is
rather that active princiindivid-
which
specifies
and determines the

says,
uals, building
itself.
them together
in a unity with
As Hegel
" Things
are
what
they are through the action of the notion im-
manent
in them and revealing itself in them." ^ Thus every individual in the midst of all his particular traits of character and conduct re-
veals the universal strain of humanity.
Corresponding respectively to the three mo-
ments of universality, particularity, and individuality are the three categories
which were found
to constitute the
fundamental elements of the

that of identity, of
idea of essence,
difference,
namely,
and
of ground.
Thus the
universal
is, is,
in its nature essentially self-identical,
that
perfectly
distinction as to the particular varieties
homogeneous throughout and without which

illustrate
1
embody and
it.
It
is,
however, under
163,
Zusatz
(2).
220
THE DOCTKINB OF THE NOTION

irresistible
an
compulsion of thought
{ffesetzi)
to break
up
into particular varieties or species,
and
this it does
through the process of
differ-
entiation according to the category of difference.
But
in these particular manifestations it is the

is
underlying universal which
always present.
itself
Moreover, the universal can manifest
as
an identity in the midst of

in that
all
differences only
which can form the common ground of
such a union,
namely,
of
in a series of differ-
ent individuals.
When
more
of
the universal subjects itself
to
the
natural compulsion
specific
thought, and becomes
by manifesting the various aspects

then
its
particularity,
developed in the form of a judgment.

is
we have the notion To judge

complete
to
make
definite
and
specific the
nature of the notion.
This specification of the notion which

essential function of the
of breaking
is
the
judgment,
is
a process
up the homogeneity
a
of the notion
in
its
it
purely universal features, and showing
that
admits of
varied manifestation in
of particular instances of
respect to a
number
the universal, each ranking as a distinct species
within the all-embracing genus.

particular instances in
detail,
To
specify these
and give at the

same time their differentiating
221
characteristics,
would
necessitate a series of judgments
whose
full
sum, when complete, would exhaust the

significance
of
the
universal
for
notion as such.
The German word

Urtheil,
that
the
judgment
is
das
is,
the primary division,
and
thus signifies most strikingly the original breaking

its
up
of the notion into the particular forms of
manifestation, which, as
we have
seen, con-
stitutes the essential function of the
judgment.
in
The judgment when expressed
words
as-
naturally shapes itself in the following form,
"The
serts
individual
is
the universal."
This
an underlying identity between the uni-
versal, as such,
and
its
particular manifestation
instance.
in
some concrete individual
Hegel's conception of the essential function

of the copula will
be found to be in complete
the
accord with the view of
modern
logic.
The copula does not

and predicate
signify that the
subject
of a proposition
have been brought
together merely by a juxtaposition of thought,
form.
and thus connected by a convenient thought Its function is rather to emphasize the
two seemingly separate elements, appearing as subject and predicate terms, respectively, are in reality identical, and that their
fact that the
222

is
fusion into one
indicated by their union in
one and the same judgment through the connecting copula.
The
is
subject
and predicate
terms must not be regarded as two independent

extremes.
as
Nor
the predicate to be conceived
general characteristic, lying outside the
and having a separate existence someIt is an essential phase of where in our heads.
subject,
the subject
It
itself.
must be remembered in this connection that the judgment is merely an expanded form There is an obvious unity of the notion.
attaching to the essential nature of the notion.
This
unity
is
not
lost,
therefore,
when
the
notion puts itself in the more explicit form of

the judgment.
The seemingly
separate terms
which the copula connects have no really separate subsistence apart from their underlying
connection.
When we
say " This rose
is
red,"
we mean
field of
is
that the particular rose
now
in the
perception partakes of the nature, and
a specific instance, of the universal red; and

red, in
on the other hand, that the universal

itself in
connection with this particular rose, manifests

the specific shade of red which char-
acterizes this special rose in question.
In general,
it
may
be said, that in every judg-

ment the subject and predicate
gether that the particularity of
223
so blend to-
the
subject
partakes of the nature of the universality expressed in the predicate, and that on the other
hand the universality
of the predicate in turn
partakes of the nature of the particularity expressed in the subject.

subject
The
identity of the
and predicate, thus bound together in one, constitutes what Hegel calls the specific content of the judgment (^der bestimmte Inhalt
des Urtheils^.
It is that
which constitutes the which the subject not due to our
judgment's essential significance.
The
relation, moreover, in
and predicate become one

thinking, which, as
it
is
were, imposes this con-
nection externally upon things.
The
relation,
on the contrary, exists in the very nature of the

things themselves, and our thought about
is
them
only our discovery of a relation already exists

If the notion is to
ing.
be regarded, as Hegel
insists, as
the constructive force
immanent
in all
things, then the
judgment
is
merely the definite

in certain
manifestation of the indwelling potentiality of

the notion in an explicit
specific instances.
manner and
is
It is
an actual manifestation,
subjectively revealed
objective reality.
moreover, and one which

to be that which
it is
in
its
224
THE DOCTBINB OF THE NOTION
In this connection Hegel distinguishes between a judgment and a proposition (der Satz).
The
in
proposition contains an assertion in refer-
ence to a given subject, which does not stand
any
relation of universality to its predicate,
but expresses some single state or action which

is
the result of a contingent relation of subject

as the so-called
and predicate,
"It rained
proper,
narrative judg-
ments, such as " Caesar crossed the Rubicon," or

last
evening."
In the judgment
the connection
is
predicate
between subject and freed from any disturbing element

This distinction does not obtain,
logic, as the proposition
of contingency.
however, in the formal

is
a term there employed to indicate merely the

as expressed in language in the
judgment
form
of a sentence.
Hegel divides the judgment into three types, which correspond to the three main divisions of
the Logic
:
(1) The Judgment (2) The Judgment (3) The Judgment
of Being.
of Essence.
of Notion.
series of pro-
These types
of
judgment form a
gressive development.
The
distinctions
between
them
are
due
in each case to the logical signifi-
cance of the predicate.
There
is,
for instance,
225
a manifest difference in logical value between

the
two judgments The rose is red. The statue is beautiful. The former is the result
:
of a simple percep-
tion, while the latter is the result of
a more
is
complicated
thought
process which
based
upon a comparison between the object of perception

it
and the kind

realize,
ought to
that
of being
which we conceive
ideal or its es-
is, its
sential notion.
Corresponding to the category of being,

have the qualitative judgment
Urtheil)
we
(^das qualitative
Corresponding to the category of essence, we

have two judgments,
that
of
that
of reflection,
and
das
necessity
(das
Jiejtexionsurtheil,
Urtheil der Nothwendigkeit^.
Corresponding to the category of the notion,
we have
The
being,
the
notional
judgment (das Urtheil

judgment
of
des Bec/riffs).
qualitative judgment, or the
which ascribes to the particular subject a quality which is universal, Hegel

defines as one
and yet which does not characterize all the individuals of the same class to which the subject
belongs.
For instance, when we
say, "
The
rose
226
is
THE DOCTEINE OF THE NOTION

the
red,"
universal quality of
redness
is
it
ascribed correctly to the rose in question, but

is
roses generally.
rose
is
not possible to extend that ascription to all Therefore, in asserting " The
red,"
we imply
red.
that
some
roses exist
which are not

affirmative
Consequently, for every
a possible
judgment of this kind there must be negative judgment which parallels it.
under consideration, but not to
The
predicate, in other words, belongs to the
special subject
the underlying universal notion of which the

subject
is
a particular manifestation.
It is proper, therefore, to characterize a quali-
tative
judgment
is
as
correct
or
incorrect, but
to affirm that a
is
never as true or untrue.
For
judgment
essential
true
means that the predicate
an
element of the underlying notion to
which the subject must be referred. Hegel " In the judgment of the notion the predisays,
cate
is,
as it were, the soul of the subject

as
by
which the subject

instead of
a body
^
is
characterized
through and through."

If,
starting with
an affirmative
judgment and deducing by necessary implication
corresponding negative judgment,
we
should start with the negative judgment, such

1
172,
Zusatz.

as
227
"This rose
is
not red,"
we
are as necessarily
constrained to deduce the implied affirmative

for the negative
statement that the rose

color.
is
is
not
red implies
some other
Inasmuch
as the
subject in such cases
not a universal, the
negative either expresses an
empty
identity, that
the rose which you see has the color which you
see, or else it is to
be regarded as a so-called
infinite
judgment
is
in
which an absolute incomsuch as might be expressed

circle
is
patibility
in the
set forth
judgment "
not a tree."
In
the formal logic, such a
judgment is regarded representing the reductio ad absurdum of as But Hegel insists that a irrelevant negation. judgment of such a nature may possess some
significance as the
crete relations
description of certain con-
characterized.
whose nature can only be thus For instance, death is the infinite
life,
negative as regards
a total negation of
since death signifies
life.
Disease, on the other
hand, represents merely a simple negation, inas-
much
rily
as certain functions
is,
may
be only tempora-
impaired, that
this
contingently negatived;
at
and
negation
is
once overcome when

is is
with returning health the normal functioning
resumed, but not so with the negation which

expressed by death.
228
to the judgment of reflection, Hegel defines this type of judgment substantially as one in which the subject no
When we come
find that
we
longer appears as a special case or particular

instance, but
is
represented as related to someis
thing else
which
implied in the predicate.

is
The
for
relation
which
thus stated
is
true not
only for the particular subject in question but

all
others
of the
is
The following
"This plant
is
same class universally. a judgment of this type

:
edible."
This signifies a uniall
versal connection
between
plants of the same
kind represented by the subject and a certain

effect which it is possible for them to produce upon a definite part of the great world system namely, the gustatory to which they belong, and digestive processes of man. It is called a
judgment
light of
of reflection, because it
is
only in the
it
something else brought into relation to
that the adjective edible can be applied to a plant.

Its edibility is a characteristic
which arises simply
from
its
being brought into relation with man.
This type of judgment in general breaks up

into three varieties
:
The Singular Judgment. The Particular Judgment. (3) The Universal Judgment.
(1)
(2)

If
229
we have
a singular judgment such as the

is
following, " This plant
wholesome," there
is
implied in this that there are some other plants

also
which are wholesome.
This latter form

In some
would then be a particular judgment.

cases,
moreover, the nature of the particular
is such that it may be found possible upon further investigation to enlarge it to such an extent that it will embrace the universal as
judgment
well.
The
progress of knowledge
is
from the
singular to the particular, and then from the

particular to
start
the universal.
For
instance,
we
with the judgment, " This metal conducts
electricity."
Then we advance
metals
to the larger
statement in the form of a particular judgment
"Some
Finally
other
conduct
electricity."
we reach
the universal, "All metals
conduct electricity."
individual merges
acteristics
These judgments repre-
sent widening circles of knowledge.

its
Thus
the
seemingly individual char-
with those which are

of
common
may
to the
other
members
the same species, to every
one of which the same predicate
be applied
as was primarily applied to the individual in
the form of a singular judgment.

predicates,
There are
moreover,
of
such a nature that,
when
ascribed to an individual subject, imply
230
not merely an advance to a particular, but to
an all-embracing, universal judgment.

eases there are no negative instances,
fore the individual
is
In such
and
it,
there-
to be regarded as a type
of the whole class.
As Hegel
is
puts
"
The
individual
man
is
what he
in particular only
in so far as he
is
^
before all things a
man
as
man
and in general."
other
Any
and
property which belongs
to the individual,
at the
same time
to every
member
of
the same species, ranks as

It
is
a necessary attribute.
universal for the
very reason that

of reflection
it is
necessary.
The judgment
which expresses a universal relation
between an attribute and the subject as a whole,

as well.
must be consequently a judgment of necessity And thus the transition from the judgment of reflection to the judgment of necessity
is
a natural one.
Hegel discusses the judgment of necessity

under
its
three aspects,
as,
(1) Categorical. (2) Hypothetical.

theil.}
(^Bas kategorische UrtheilJ) (^Das
hypothetische
Ur-
(3) Disjunctive.
(^Das disjunctive Urtheil.')
In the categorical judgment, the predicate

expresses the essential nature
1
of the
subject.
175. Zusatz.

It represents the essence of the subject,
231 moreof
over, in respect to the
most elemental
that
of
the
categories
of
essence,
substantiality.
Thus, in the judgment of simple assertion, which

is
the characteristic feature of the categorical

is
judgment, such as " Iron

of metallity
is
a metal," the idea
regarded as the underlying subessential
stance which constitutes the

of iron.
nature
The
its
categorical judgment, however,

it
lacks
completeness, inasmuch as
does not
embrace in
ticularity,
statement the elements of paris,
that
of
definite
and
specific
description.
When we
introduce the specifying element
which renders a general statement more particular and therefore more definite, we have
always the hypothetical form of judgment,
if
is
B,
is
D,
that
is,
where the subject

leads
to
its
only under specified conditions

necessary consequent.
This specified condition In the

is
gives to the subject a particular aspect.
hypothetical judgment the relation which

forth
is
set
that of cause and effect, the second of
the categories of essence.
When, however,
genus,
is
the subject, regarded as a
completely specified through an exits
haustive division into
component
species,
232

the disjunctive judgment.
It is of the
we have
form, "A is either B, or C, or D." In such a judgment the predicate is coextensive viîth the subject, the genus always being equal to the
sum
total
of
is
its
several
species.
Therefore
the genus
totality of
expressed in
is its
its totality,
and the
any genus
notion.
This marks
the point of transition to the judgment of the

notion.
In this latter class of judgments the subject

is
regarded as conforming more or less adeto

its
quatelj"^
ideal,
that
is,
to
its
notion.
The
of
true,
predicates
which
wise,
are available in this

as the adjectives
form
good,
like.
judgment are such

beautiful,
perfect,
and
the
Each one implies a norm which the subject

question
is
in
judged as completely illustrating;

of
and in the negative judgments,

failing to illustrate.
course, as
The judgment
classes
:
of the notion divides into three
(1)
The Assertory Judgment.

The Problematic Judgment.
(^Bas asserto-
risohe Urtheil.')
(2)
(^Das proh-
lematische Urtheil.)
(3)
tische
The Apodictic Judgment.

Urtheil.)
QDas apodik-

The
full
233
assertory
judgment
its
is
one which contains

subject
is
the bare statement that a given
in
Such a judgment, however, may be challenged by one who holds

ideal.
accord with
an opposite opinion.
This gives
rise
to
the
second form, the problematic judgment.
qualified
The problematic judgment is one which is by the modal copula, may he, implying
it
obviously the possibility also that

be.
ject
may
not
However, if the relation between the suband predicate is reenforced by a subsidiary

or
statement, either expressed

indicates the
implied, which
ground
of their connection,
we have
the third form, the apodictic judgment.
The
is
apodictic
judgment
is
one which asserts

It is
that the relation between subject
such that
it
must be
true.
and predicate no longer a
matter of opinion, but of necessity.
When
the
reason which reenforces the cogency of a judg-
ment
is
fully elaborated,
we
pass by a natural
transition to the syllogism.
For example, the

will prove harmful
judgment that a certain law

to the best interests of the
community, can be
shown
unjust,
in
to be an apodictic judgment,
if
that
is,
necessarily true,
and our judgment would then be the following form

:
we show
that
it is
essentially
put
234
" This law, being obviously unjust, must necessarily
prove harmful to the best interests of the

of a syllogism,
community."
Expanded into the form would run as follows

:
it
All unjust laws are harmful.
This law
..
is
unjust.
must prove harmful. Whenever a judgment under challenge reveals its underlying ground as its justification, we have The statement that anything must a syllogism. be true is justifiable only when it can be shown
It
that there
is
a sufficient reason to warrant

is
it.
The
form
syllogism, therefore,
of the apodictic
merely the expanded

accom-
judgment.
is
syllogism
its
is
a judgment which
proof.
panied by ment,
own
In the apodictic judgsubject whose
we have an
individual
particular characteristics warrant our reference

of
it
to its universal.
In
its
elaborated form,
by the three terms which make up and universal are brought together by means of a comas expressed
the syllogistic structure, the individual
mon
term, the traditional middle term of the
formal logic, in such a

a logical unity.
ises
way
as to
form together
In the major and minor prem-
we have
separate judgments, their point of

articulation being the middle
tion of
;
235
the major
is
term this separaand minor terms in the

to the unitary
premises
clusion,
completely overcome in the con-
and we have a return
notion which holds the major and minor terms

together in one judgment.
Thus Hegel
defines
the syllogism as the unity of the the notion,!
judgment and
^lja,t is,
the separate judgments of
the premises coalesce in the one notion which underlies the conclusion.
The
statements con-
tained in the two premises are the result of the

analytic function of thought.
The
fusion of
is,
the major and minor terms in the conclusion
however, the result of the synthetic function.
The syllogism should not be regarded

arbitrary
as an
or
artificial
grouping of judgments
together in thought.
We
do
not, properly
speaking, construct syllogisms.

process
is
rather the universal
The syllogistic mode in which
the
phenomena
It
is,
of the universe manifest them-
selves.
moreover, a true description of the
by which the Absolute ever Hegel means by this that manifests Himself. all being and all activity of the universe are to
endless activity
be regarded as the manifestation of a universal
by means
of
certain
1
particular
181.
and
specific
236

which
it
characteristics
reveals in the sphere
of
some
definite
is
concrete individuality.
The
syllogism
of
merely an expression in general
the process which provides for the varied
interplay of the universal, the particular,
and
the
individual
in
their
manifold
relations.
Every notion as a universal manifests itself in individual instances through particular characteristics
which
differ
with the various species
which
it
embraces.
And on
its
the
other hand
every individual reveals only when

it
fuU significance
its
may
be referred to
its
correspond-
ing universal by virtue of

teristics.
particular charac-
It
seems to be of the very nature of
thought to bind together in one the three ideas

of universality, particularity,
and individuality,
than the syllogistic
its
which
is
nothing more or
less
process.
Therefore, reason by
itself in
very nature
tends to express
the form of a syllogism;
and
as it
is
of the essence of reason, according
to Hegel, to manifest itself dynamically as the

essential constructive force of the universe, it
follows that the syllogistic principle underlies
the active processes of all nature and of all
mind.
Hegel discusses the syllogism under

aspects as follows
:
its
three

(1)
237
The
Qualitative Syllogism.
(^Der quali-
tative Sohluss.)
(2)
The Syllogism
of Reflection.
(i)er Reflex-
ions- Schluss. )
(3)
The Syllogism of
Necessity.
(Z>er Schluss
der NothwendigJceit.')
In the qualitative syllogism the subject of the

conclusion as an individual
predicate,
is
referred to its
of
universal
it
because
a certain
quality which
possesses.
The
qualitative characteristics are expressed

is
by the middle term, which

a particular.
of the nature of
form of the syllogism the subject of the conclusion, which is always the minor
in the
Thus
term,
is
the individual.
predicate
of the
is
The
conclusion, which
is
always the major term,
the universal.
The middle
the particular.
term, which does not appear in

is
the conclusion but in each of the premises,
All this Hegel expresses in the
formula I-P-U, which means that P, the particular,

is
the middle
term
between
I,
the
individual as minor term, and U, the universal
as
major term.
is
In similar formulae the

all possible
same order
preserved to designate
varieties of syllogistic structure,
namely, the
238
first

letter
always represents the minor term;
the last, the major term;
and the middle
letter,
naturally, the middle term.^
Expanded
into the form of a syllogism, the

:
formula I-P-U would become
An
individual has certain particular charac-
teristics.
All such particular characteristics belong to

a certain universal.
..
The
individual belongs to this universal.
It will be noticed in the
above that the
first
premise stated
major.
is
the minor, and the second the
Reversing this order, and abbreviating,

:
the syllogism runs as follows
All
I
.-.
P
P.
is
U.
is
is
U.
This will be recognized as a syllogism of the

first figure, in
subject of the major premise,

of the minor.
which the middle term appears as and as predicate
premise in
Now, in this syllogism, each turn must be regarded in the light

which has been previously mediIn other
is
of a conclusion
ated by some other middle term.

words,
1
if
the ground of each premise

letters
fully
Hegel uses the
E,B,A
for das Einzelne, das
Besondere, and das Allgemeine, respectively.

expressed,
structure.
it If,
239
necessarily reveals
therefore,
a syllogistic
that
we should assume
the major premise, " All
P is U," is the conclusion

middle term in
the middle
of a subsidiary syllogism, the
that case
vidual.
must be
Putting
of the
it,
nature of an indi-
therefore, as
term between the particular as minor and the

universal
as major, the
formula for
this
new
syllogism
If this
would
be, P-I-U.
formula should be elaborated so as to

it
express fully the syllogistic structure,
be as follows
would
Certain individuals have particular marks.
These individuals
versal.
.-.
all
belong to a certain uni-
These particular marks characterize

versal.
this uni-
This syllogism
is,
is
in the third figure,
that
in
the
middle
term
appears
as
subject
each of the premises.
It will be observed that
such a conclusion
viduals
is
valid only
when
the indiof such
examined
are so
numerous and
a kind as to preclude the possibility of the dis-
covery of any negative instances
otherwise the
third figure can prove only a particular state-
ment.
If in
a similar way,
we assume
the minor
240

is
premise of the original syllogism, " This I
P,"
to be the conclusion of a subsidiary syllogism,
then the remaining term which does not appear

in this
would be the middle term, and the

formula would
be I-U-P.
conclusion,
in this case the universal,

syllogistic
In
its
expanded
:
form
it
gives the following syllogism
..
The individual is the universal. The particular is the universal. The individual is the particular.
in the second figure,
This
is
that
is,
the
middle term appears as predicate in each of the

premises.
The conclusion
is
not valid unless
we regard
of a
the major premise as having the force judgment in the following form, " Only
the particulars in question are the universal."
Otherwise, the second figure can prove only a

negative
conclusion.
To
secure from
it
affirmative conclusion, the major premise
an must
is
always be qualified in some such manner as

indicated above.
These
from
transitions,
which Hegel thus
effects
figure to figure
may
be seen more clearly
perhaps in the following concrete illustrations.
The syllogism
to
in the first figure, corresponding
the
:
formula I-P-U,
follows
may
be expressed as

This whale
is
241
mammal.
All mammals are vertebrates.

.*.
This whale
is
a vertebrate.
In this syllogism
I
= whale
(individual).
(particular species).
P = mammal
The syllogism
U= vertebrate
(universal genus).
its
in the third figure proves as
conclusion the major premise of the above, "All
mammals are vertebrates." It may be illustrated by
Its
formula
is
:
the following
P-I-U.
.'.
Certain individuals (I) are mammals (P). The same individuals (I) are vertebrates (U). All mammals (P) are vertebrates (U).
This conclusion follows only upon the supposition that the individuals
examined warrant
instances has
sylits
an inductive generalization upon the ground

that the possibility of negative
been completely eliminated.

logism in the
conclusion the minor premise
syllogism, " This whale
is
Again, the
as
second figure, proving

of
the original
mammal " may

I-U-P
be
as
illustrated according to the formula
follows
..
Only mammals (P) suckle their young (U). The whale (I) suckles its young (U). The whale (I) is a mammal (P).
242
THE DOCTEINE OP THE NOTION
In these syllogisms the judgments all express an identity in spite of differences, as when we
say
if
"The
individual
is
the universal."
Now,
in
is
such judgments the element of difference wholly eliminated, then the subject and predevery case
icate in
all the
may
be simply equated, and
terms in the syllogism will become strictly
identical, giving us the quantitative or
mathe-
matical syllogism which would appear in the
following form:
=P.
U.
P=
.-.I
=U.
The truth which

gism may
contained in such a syllobe expressed by the axiom, " Things

is
which are equal
to the
same third thing are
equal to each other."
This
may
be regarded as
the limiting case of the syllogism proper.
In the qualitative syllogism the individual

represented under the aspect of some one of
attributes, and, therefore,
is
its
an indefinite number
of syllogisms
may
be formed in reference to any
individual object of investigation or of interest,
according as
butes which
we choose
to vary the several attri-
may
for the time being
happen
to
attract our attention.
Thus we say
that a cer-
tain rose
is
red, or fragrant, or it is fading, or

is
243
not yet full blown, and so on indefinitely.

attribute
When, however, we choose an

is
which
an essential property
of all roses whatsoever,
we have always
that
is,
the syllogism of reflection,

is
the concept of a rose
illuminated by
its essential
the light reflected

attributes.
specific
upon
it
by one of
it
Or
in other cases,
may
not be a
rela-
property so
much
as
an essential
tion
which the object of thought sustains; when,
for instance,
we
fail to
understand the essential
significance of a certain tool until
we
discover
the particular use to which

this is
it is
adapted, and
allowed to reflect
itself.
its
light
upon the
is
nature of the tool
In the syllogism of
reflection, therefore, the quality
which
taken
as the
middle term
is
not merely one of
many
attributes chosen at random, or through caprice,
or suggested by
it
some passing circumstance, but
should be an attribute of such a nature that
it
must necessarily belong to every other member of the same species which is represented by
the individual, as well as to the individual
itself.
The
significance of the species
is
thus reflected
all its in-
in its characteristic attributes
which
dividual
members
same
possess in
common.
It is the
bond
of unity
which holds together

class in
all individ-
uals of the
one group.
244
THE DOOTEINB OF THE NOTION

of reflection therefore
:
The syllogism
(1)
divided into three subsidiary kinds
may
be
The Syllogism
of AUness.
(2>er Schluss
der Allheit.') (2)
The Syllogism of Induction. (Der Schluss The Syllogism of Analogy.

(Der Schluss
der Induktion.y
(3)
der Analogie.y
The primary form

tion
is
of the syllogism of reflecfirst
a syllogism in the
figure,
and
is
known
ors to
as the syllogism of allness.
It endeav-
show what
distinctive attribute or attrito all
butes are
common
members
of a class.
syllo-
Hegel
gism
:
illustrates this
by the traditional
are mortal.
All
men
is is
Caius
..
a man.
mortal.
Caius
The weakness
of this syllogism lies in the fact
that the universality of the major premise, " All
men
tacit
are mortal," obviously depends
upon the
is
assumption that the conclusion
true.
The major premise

Thus
ties of
implies that a previous in-
duction of an exhaustive nature has been made.

a transition is effected
by the
necessi-
thought to the inductive syllogism, such

:
as the following
245
This man, and this man, and so on indefinitely,

are mortal.
This
man and men
this
man, and so on
indefinitely,
constitute all men.

..
All
are mortal.
for
this
I.
The formula
syllogism would
be
U-I-P.
I.
etc.,
wherein
is
signified that the middle
term (I)
of a
is
indefinitely repeated,
of individual cases.
and
is
the
sum
number
Passing from the individual
instances,
universal,
however numerous they may be, to the which must necessarily transcend our experience, our reason rests upon the postulate
is
that whatever
observed to be an essential
property which a number of individuals have in
common,
will be
found to obtain in
all
the indi-
viduals which resemble
them
sufiiciently to be
class,
regarded as membera of one and the same

or species.
This gives us the third form of the syllogism of reflection, which expresses an underlying
analogy as the warrant for the inductive generalization previously performed.
In
this syllo-
gism of analogy the inference
is
based upon the
246

inasmuch
as
logical principle that

of a certain
some things
be
kind possess a certain well-marked

the
quality,
therefore
same
quality will
found in the case of other things of the same kind. The individual instance under investigation
may
be regarded as a
as
typical case, and,
therefore,
standing
for
a class,
of
it
so
far
forth
partakes of the nature
a universal.
The common bond, moreover, which unites together objects of the same kind, and by virtue of which they are what they are, cannot be
merely the result of a fortuitous coincidence of
similar qualities, but
is
a necessary and essential
characteristic of the very nature of the things
themselves.
This forms a natural transition to
the syllogism of necessity.
The syllogism
into three kinds
:
of
necessity
may
be divided
The Categorical Syllogism. The Hypothetical Syllogism. The Disjunctive Syllogism. (3)
(1) (2)
In the categorical syllogism the individual

referred to
of
its
is
appropriate universal by means
the
intermediate particular, or species to

it
which
follows
more
proximately
belongs.
This
as
syllogism would be in
:
some
such
form
247
certain individual belongs to a particular

species.
The species belongs to a certain genus. .'. The individual belongs to that same genus.
In the hypothetical syllogism the universal or
the genus
is
represented as the ground of the

Its
particular or the species.

of the form,
major premise
is
"If
is,
so
is
B."
The minor
premise represents the presence or the absence

of the necessary condition,
and the conclusion
the resultant realization of the effect, or the

failure to realize
it,
as the case
may
be.
is
In the disjunctive syllogism the universal

resolved into
est
its
component parts.
it
It is the high-
form of the syllogism, for

universal.
represents an
exhaustive manifestation of the full concrete

essence of the
The minor premise
of this syllogism
expresses what parts in any
given cases are present or absent, and the conclusion
expresses
the
resulting
presence
or
absence of the other parts as thus determined.
This syllogism in
its
disjunctive form marks
the natural transition also to the category of the
notion in
for
its
second aspect, that of objectivity
an exhaustive manifestation of the universal

total of its
shows not merely the sum

relations,
thought
that
is,
in reference to its purely sub-
248

would
jective aspect, for then its manifestation
be partial and not exhaustive, but
it
furnishes
as well scope for its external actualization in the
world
ity,
of reality.
The notion
represents a total-
and
that, too, is the essential function of the
disjunctive syllogism, object

of
is
to represent the given

totality.
thought in
its
Moreover,
is
there
no such thing as a totality which

in
all
not
realized
of
its
concrete fulness.
The
notion, therefore, as a
principle,
tive
is
fundamental constructive
system of
not to be regarded as a force opera-
in
vacuo, but in the concrete
things, of persons
and
of events, in life
possibilities.
and
its
wealth of inexhaustible
CHAPTER XVI
THE OBJECTIVE NOTION
AS we have syllogism
tive
seen,
Hegel regards the disjuncas the point of transition
from the subjective to the Let us examine

in order that
this
objective
notion.
detail,
statement more in
we may
notion.
the more clearly under-
stand the essential relation of the subjective to

the objective
The
disjunctive
syllo-
gism
is
merely the subjective notion expressed
in its highest
nifies
and most complete form.

its
It sig-
as regards
syllogistic
is
structure that
the
subjective
notion
essentially an active
is
process of thought, for this

the syllogism in general
;
the
meaning
of
and
as regards its dis-
junctive character,
in question is a
it
indicates that the process
complete unfolding of the total
significance of the notion.
Gathering together
these characteristics in a single statement,

find that in its
we
Hegel regards the subjective notion highest form of expression as an active

249
250
force,

revealing
its
various phases through a
process of mediation, in a
manner which gives

all
its
complete scope for the realization of

possibilities.
The
subjective
notion
as
thus
conceived contains within the very conception

itself
the ground of
its
objectivity.
In speak-
ing of the transition from the subjective notion

to the
objective,
we do not
express correctly
It
the significance of the Hegelian conception.

is
not a transition properly speaking, for the
objective lies within the subjective as a potential
moment
of the same.
Hegel
insists as a
fundamental postulate of his whole system that

the syllogistic process
is
not merely an act of
consciousness.
jective
We
have seen that the sub-
notion contains the implicit categories
of being, essence, existence, substantiality, cause
and
effect,
and the
like.
therefore, be regarded as the
The subjective may, programme of cosmic

is
evolution, while the objective
the historical
evolution
itself.
Either would be incomplete
without the other.

process which
is
Again, the idea of an active
the essential significance of the
subjective notion, necessitates a resulting prod-
uct
and the product, which

it is
is
the result of a
mediation,
true, is nevertheless as a
this
product
is
something immediate, and
immediacy
one

of
251
objectivity.
is
the
characteristic
features
as that
of
Hegel defines an object

There
tion,
all
is
which
"in-
dependent, concrete, and complete in
itself."
only one conceivable object which per-
fectly fulfils the
requirements of this defini-
the
Absolute,
God.
The
totality
of
things, the universe in its progressive un-
folding in space and time, represents the one
all-embracing object.
totality,
And
while within this
Hegel recognizes separate and indepenis
dent objects, nevertheless their reality
assured
only in so far as they partake of the nature of

the unifying Absolute underlying them, whose
essential nature
and being are independent

Hegel
of
space and of time.
At
this point
refers to Kant's criticism
of the ontological proof of the being of God,
which
is
based upon the statement that the
thought of a thing does not necessarily imply

its
existence,
and
insists that the highest expresis
sion of the subjective notion
an altogether
unique thought, of such a nature as to combine the notion of God and His being in one. Hegel
says, in
commenting upon the Kantian

:
criticism,
in the introductory part of his Logic
" The
unexampled favor and acceptance which

1
193.
252

the
ontological
attended Kant's criticism of
proof was undoubtedly due to the illustration
To mark the differwhich he made use of. ence between thought and being, he cited the
instance of a hundred thalers which, as far as
the notion
thalers,
is
concerned, are the same hundred

real or only possible,
whether
is
though
the difference
manifest as regards their effect
upon a man's purse.

fancy
is
Nothing can be more
obvious than that anything
we only think
or
not on that account actual, and that
a picture of the imagination or even a logical
notion cannot attain to being.

the fact that
it
Setting aside
may not
hundred
incorrectly be styled a
barbarism of language to apply the term notion

to things like a
thalers, it is still true
that they
who
like to taunt the philosophic con-
ception with the fundamental difference between
being and thought, might have admitted that

philosophers were not wholly ignorant of the
fact.
Can
there be, indeed, any more trivial

?
observation than this
Above
all,
it
must be
remembered, when we speak of God, that we

have an object of a very different kind than any hundred thalers, and unlike any particular
notion, idea, or whatever
it.
we may choose
of
to call
is
The very nature
everything
finite

expressed by saying that
space differs from
its its
253
being in time and
notion.
God
should be,
however, expressly conceived to be that which

can
only be 'thought of
as
existing.'
His
notion involves being.
It is this unity of the notion
and being that constitutes the notion of God." i The question which naturally suggests itself at
this point is
theistic,
whether Hegel's system
is
not pan-
whether the individuality
of
man
is
not completely lost in the universality of God.

If
man
is
only a spectator for a brief time of
an extremely limited portion of the great world

evolution which
tion of
is
solely the external manifestais
God, which
in fact
God, then the
whole Hegelian system, as the product of the
human mind,
contradicts and stultifies itself
by
thus eliminating the

real factor of the
human
individuality as a
system
itself.
The question
whether the system leads logically to pantheism,

it is
not in the scope and purpose of this work,

;
as one simply of exposition, to discuss

theless,
it
never-
may
be remarked in passing that
Hegel himself stoutly maintains that individuality is not suppressed in universality, but
is
conserved
(âufgehohen)
in
a higher state
of
being and existence, and he most emphatically

i5l.
254
disclaims for his system this imputation of a

pantheistic
It
taint.-'
has been seen that the warrant for the

is
notion of objectivity
contained at the last

the Absolute, " the
analysis in the notion of
only true being."
So
also, in a similar
manner,
the warrant for the notion of
human
personality,
Hegel
is
declares, is to be
found only in the unIt
derlying, all-embracing personality of God.
a thought similar to that of St. Paul, " In

live
Him we
and move and have our being."

of objectivity,
The notion
as developed
:
Hegel, manifests itself in three forms

(1) Mechanism. (2) Chemism. (3) Teleology.
by
(i)er Mechanismus.') (^Der Chemismus.')

(^Bie Teleologie.')
In the mechanical type, the objects stand related

in an external manner,
and without evincing any
natural affinity as regards each other.

are immediate,
others.
They
and each indifferent
to all the
In the chemical type, the objects exhibit an

essential
tendency to change and unite with
others, so that their significance really lies in
their union with
something
else.
In the third type, the teleological relation

1
See 151, Zusatz.

expresses the unity of
255
mechanism and chemism.

it is,
Like the mechanical object,
in a sense, a
self-contained totality, inasmuch as a purpose
has always some complete effect as an end in
view
at the
same time,
it is
subjected to the
in order
principle of differentiation
to realize the end,
and change
is
which principle
chemism.
of
the essential
characteristic also of
Hegel divides the principle

three kinds
:
mechanism
into
(1) Formal Mechanism.

ismus.y
(Formeller Mechan-
(2)
Mechanism
accompanied
by
affinity.
(^Differenter Mechanismus.')
(3) Absolute Mechanism.
(Absoluter Mech-
anismus.)
Formal mechanism possesses two

characteristics.
essential
The
object
;
has
the
notion
within
it
only as a potential
is
for the notion as

it.
subjective
primarily outside of
And
in
the second place, the objects remain independent and are related to each other only in an external
manner.
Figuratively,
we speak of a mechanical
memory, where ideas are associated externally and where the element of thought to a large Hegel says, "Whenever a extent is omitted.
man's mind and will are not in his actions, his
256

is
conduct
called mechanical."
The
relation
which
obtains
between
is
objects
which
are
mechanically connected
of impact,
forces.
one of pressure and
which operate essentially as external

of
The second form

with
it
is
mechanism has associated

affinity.
the
element of
An
object
which
is
operated upon by some external force
affected
by
it
not merely according to the

it,
nature of the force operating upon

well by
its
but as
Thus a billiard ball made of ivory and another made of putty behave differently when subjected to precisely Therefore, what it is possible the same impact.
own
nature.
for
any object
to effect mechanically does not

its
depend merely upon
own
native force, or as
(^die
Hegel puts
itat),
it,
its
own
centrality
Central-
but also upon the nature of the object

it
upon which
acts as well,
that
is,
the central-
ity of the other lying outside of itself.
In other
words, no object
is
fully self-centred
and when
two
objects are so related that the centre of
each must receive some complementary element
which belongs to the centre of the other in

order to complete
its significance,
the relation
between them
is
of
this
1
second type, that of
195.

mechanism with
this order of
257
affinity. The illustrations of mechanism which Hegel gives are
the relation of gravitation, in which the result

varies according
to
the relative
centrality of
;
each of the objects mutually attracted

tion of desire to its object
;
the rela-
and the
relation of
the
social
instinct
of
different
members
which binds together the one and the same society.

as
Every object may be regarded

within
itself.
a system
The
centre
of
such a system
is,
Hegel
calls
an abstract centre,
that
without
reference to anything outside of
itself.
When
relation,
two objects come into a mechanical
one to the other, the centre of each in turn
becomes the relative centre of the other.

objects
The
its
centre of that system which includes the two
and
their
relative
centres
within
scope
is
the absolute centre.
Absolute mechan-
merely the fully expressed form of the type of mechanism with affinity. These relaism
is
tions of the various kinds of centres
may
be
illustrated by the mutual attraction of two masses, each of which may be represented as concentrated at a single point, which is its
Each point has in turn a relative centre in the other, and both are referable to an absolute centre which lies between them.
abstract centre.
258

as its
Thus the earth revolves about the sun

relative centre
;
its
absolute centre lies between
earth and sun in such a
way
it.
that the earth and
sun both revolve about

lute centre
is
However, the absosun centre that the

refer simply to
so near the
difference
is
discounted,
and we
the earth's revolution about the
central sun.
But
to speak precisely, the real centre of the

lies
system
between the earth centre and the
sun centre.
relation, it is
Inasmuch
dynamic.
as this
is
a mechanical
And the dynamic
always
is,
expresses itself in a syllogistic process,
that
the mediation of two terms by means of a com-
mon
or
middle term.
We
P
have, therefore, a
triad of syllogisms, corresponding to the three
possible mechanical relations.
Let
I represent
any individual
tive
object,
its
particular or rela-
centre,
and
the universal or absolute
centre.
The
lows
:
resulting syllogisms
would be
as fol-
(1)
The type expressed by the formula

is
I-P-U, in which the relative centre

as the mediating term
regarded
between the individual
object
and
in
its
absolute centre.
(2)
U-I-P,
The type
expressed
by
the
formula
which the individual object forms

the
259
mean between
its
relative
and absolute
centres.
in
The type expressed by the formula P-U-I, which the universal or absolute centre is the mean between the individual object and its
(3)
relative centre.
As an
Hegel
illustration of these three syllogisms,
cites the state in its various relations to
the individual
first
and
his particular needs.
" In the
instance, the
individual in virtue of his

or
his
particular
being,
physical and mental
needs (which
civil society)
when completely developed

enters into union with
is,
give
the uni-
versal,
that
is
with
society, law, right, gov-
ernment.
individuals
Secondly, the will or conduct of the the intermediating force which
procures for these needs satisfaction in society,

in law, etc.,
their fulfilment
universal
and which gives to society, law, etc., and realization. But, thirdly, the that is, the state, government, and
is the mean, the underlying substance in which the individuals and their satisfaction
law
have and receive their
fulfilled
^
reality, inter-
mediation, and persistence."
In mechanism the related objects preserve a

quasi independence; but
1
when they
lose their
198.
260

affinity
independence in the
its
which each has
for
and they so coalesce that the identity of each is merged in the product resultantithesis,
ing from their combination, then the relation
thus characterized
natural transition
cal
is is
that of chemism.
Thus a
effected from the mechani-
relation
to
is
the
chemical.
The product
as the indi-
thus formed
a neutral,
inasmuch
vidual striving of each of the elements which

constitute
it
ceases completely
when
the process
has been finished and the product alone remains.
However,
concerning
this
it
neutral,
which we
may
regard as the mean,

analysis into
may
be
resolved by chemical
original extremes.
the
two
is
But the
inverse process
independent of the former combining process.
The
into
resulting product does not of itself separate

its
component exhausts itself, and
parts.
its
The
first
process
activity
ceases
when
is
once the product has been formed.
There
in these operations of chemical combination of chemical
and
analysis
no centre of
initiation.
Chemical
affinity
seems in a manner to be a
is
kind of selective attraction, and yet there

self-directing activity.
If there were, it
its
no
would
energy
pro-
have a longer
life,
and not consume

it.
in the process of using
The chemical

cess, therefore,
261
does not rise above a conditioned

"
and
finite
activity.
The
notion, as notion,
is
only the heart and core of the process, and does

not in this stage come to existence in
individual being.
process
is its
own
falls
In the neutral product the
extinct,
^
and the existing cause
outside of it."
This lack of spontaneous activity, of

tive, indicates
all initia-
a state which
is
unsatisfactory in
the extreme.
strains us to
relation
as
The very nature of thought condemand some more fundamental than either mechanism or chemism
principle
relation
of activity
in
the supreme
the
universe.
Such a
must involve the

It is in
element of purpose or finahty, in which there

is
a liberation of the notion or reason.

teleological
the
relation
that
we
find an
ex-
and undisguised manifestation of a supreme principle of intelligence in its free conscious activity. In mechanism and chemplicit
ism the notion

in the
is
present,
it is
true, but only
germ, and not yet evolved.
The
its
notion,
however, in the form of the aim or end (der

Zweck') comes into an existence of
own.
In
the lower relations the notion

it
is
imprisoned, as
were, behind the barriers of objectivity.

^
But
202, Zusats.
262
in the

teleological
relation
these
barriers are
burst asunder, the
the
of
objectivity overcome,
and
subjectivity
the
notion
this
completely
asserted.
Hegel expresses
immediate
by saying that
is
the idea of an end to be achieved

tion
of
the negais
objectivity
it
also
recognition of the antithesis between subject
and object, and the overcoming of the same. Thus when we entertain a purpose in mind,
its
subjective
character
is
antithetical to the
purpose conceived as realized objectively.
But
when
then
the purpose in the
mind goes
is
forth into
action,
and the objective end
actually realized,
all difference
between the end in view and

is
the end achieved has been overcome, and there
a complete synthesis of subjective and objective.
The
final
difference
between
efficient
cause and
cause
may be
it
indicated at this point.
The
efficient
cause appears as passing into

therefore loses
its
its other,
the effect, and
essential
priority in the latter
dependency.
by sinking into a sort of The aim or end, on the other

its
hand, must necessarily contain in
own
nature
the determining and significant factors of the
whole resulting process.

of otherness as regards
In the simple causal
relation the effect seems to emphasize its nature

its
cause.
263
of
By aim
the
sciousness,
objects
or end
we must not think merely
purposes which are ever present in con-
and which we achieve by means

to
us.
of
external
There
is
also
an
inner design, an immanent finality in things

themselves, as has been emphasized both by
Aristotle
sign,
and Kant.
The purely
to
external deends,
the adaptation of means
may
be seen in the various phenomena of
utility.
Hegel
cites as
an illustration of the relation
of the subjective to the objective in teleology
the case of appetite or desire.

subjective
object
desire,
There
is
the
on the one hand, and the

satisfy
which will
the two are apart,

tradiction
But it, on the other. and therein consists the conIt

is
between them.
its object,
only in the
complete satisfaction of the desire through the

attainment of
is
that this contradiction
overcome, and the
tivity
and
in
objectivity,
teleological
relation
two extremes, subjecbecome reconciled. The is represented by a syldesign

coaobject,
logism,
lesces
which the subjective

its
with
external
by means
of
a middle term which constitutes the unity The middle term is the means of both.
which
result.
is
used
to
bring
about
the
desired
264
THE DOCTEINB OP THE NOTION
Hegel marks three stages in the development

of the subjective design.
(1)
The Subjective End. The End
(i)er
subjective
Zweck.y
(2)
in process of accomplishment.
(^Der sich vollfuhrende Zweck.')
(3)
The End accomplished.

first
(JDer vollfilhrte
Zwech.')
The The The
syllogism of final cause

:
is
of the following three terms
made up
universal
particular
is is
the end indefinitely desired.
the end definitely desired, as
a particular
mode
of the universal in question.
is the self whose activity makes a particular choice out of the various possibilities which the indefinite universal
The
individual
embraces.
Thus,
view,
we might have
as an indefinite
end
in
the building of a house.
This would
stand as a universal admitting of an indefinite
modes of realization. The individual choice would then appear as the devariety of particular
termining force, initiating the actual process of
accomplishment towards a
specific end.
In the second place the initiative activity of

the individual throws itself immediately
upon
something objective which
it
appropriates to

itself as
265
means
of bringing about the desired

is
end.
Here the middle term

desired
the subjective
power
of the notion tending to bring together
the subjective end
and the
objective
material which
is
to be used in its realization.
In
finite
is
design the mediating term in this protwofold, a combination of the active
cess
powers of the
material
individual, and the objective upon which they work as the means of realizing the end in view. Thus, in the illustration of building a house, the materials used
in its construction
must be
first
immediately-
appropriated by the constructive mind before
they can become
its
instruments in the actual
putting together of part to part in the realization of the complete architectural design,
which
is,
process
is
essentially one of mediation,
that
syllogistic.
Or
to
cite
Hegel's illustration,
drawn from another and a higher source: " Every living being has a body the soul takes possession of it, and in that act has at once
;
objectified itself.
The human
its
it
soul has
much
to
do before
means.
it
makes
corporeal nature into a
Man
1
must, as
were, take possession
of his body, so that it his soul."
may
be the instrument of
208, Zusatz.
266

is
All this
preliminary to the actual realization
of the design
rials
and
forces
by means of the objective matewhich have been both invaded

This
is
and pervaded by the purposing mind.

brings us to the point where the end
ized,
finally real-
the third
and
last stage in the process.
Now while the subjective end rules

forces
these material
processes which are the mechanical and chemical
already described,
It
it
does so
without
losing itself in them.

their
takes advantage of
to
activity
and compels them

This Hegel
calls
serve
is
its
ends, while its controlling intelligence
in the of
background.
the
craft
reason (die List der
reason consists in the controlling

exercises
The craft of sway which it over objects while yet permitting them
Vernuff).
to obey their
own mechanical
world and
or chemical bent.
" Divine Providence," says Hegel, "

to stand to the
its
may
be said
processes in the
lets
capacity of absolute craft, i

their particular
1
God
men
direct
passions and interests as they word

List as
Wallace in
this connection translates the
apt to leave an incorrect and rather disconcerting impression. The word

it is
cunning.
When
applied to the Deity,
" craft," which may also offend the sentiments
of
some when
applied to God, seems, however, to be less objectionable in this respect, and has therefore been used in the above
translation.

please
;
267
but the result
is
accomplished,
differ
not
of
their plans
but of His, and these

^
decidedly
from the ends primarily sought by those
whom
He
employs."
realized
of the subjective
end expresses the complete unity and the objective but in finite design the accomplished aim is itself no less fragmentary and defective than was the ini;
The
tial
aim and means used in the process
of its
realization.
itself
The end which
is
achieved
is
only
an object, which
may
again become the
means or material on ad infinitum.

Infinite design
is,
for other purposes,
and so
of
on the other hand,

its
such
self
a nature that
it
comprises within
own
It is
the
means
to realize its ends.

is
The
process of
the same
one of self-mediation.
the
self-determined notion, representing the complete unity of subject

calls
and
object.
This Hegel
the idea {die Idee'),
a term which he has

its
selected in order to emphasize
nature as that
which
itself.
is
essentially and fundamentally reason
In mechanism and chemism the notion appears In the teleologithat is, implicit. as an sioh,
cal relation, it
is
1
fUr
sieh,
that
is,
explicit.
2/9, Zusatz.
268

in
But
itself
the eternal purpose

sieh,
Qdie Idee)
is,
it
is
both an sich und fiir
that
revealing
by the light of
its
own
nature in a maniself-
festation
completely self-determined and
directed.
CHAPTER XVII
THE IDEA OE THE ETERNAL REASON
HEGEL
identifies the idea with, truth.
By
is
truth he means the complete correspond-
ence of any object with
its
notion.
That
only a formal truth, mere correctness, which consists solely in a
reference to our consciousness.

is
Truth in a deeper sense of subject and object. In

lute
is
the identification
this sense the

itself.
Absoindi-
the idea, the truth
Every
vidual object of knowledge represents a phase

of
the Absolute, but a partial and imperfect
phase.
Every
and
finite
object fails to realize its

is
notion completely, and therefore

limited
far as
so far forth
defective.
All objects are true so
they prove to be what they ought to be.
The
true
man
is
the ideal man,
that
of
is,
one
who
perfectly realizes the idea of a man.
So
also the true state,
the true work
art, are
such so far only as they realize their
ideal.
The
is
idea, moreover, as
we have
already seen,
all
not merely the underlying substance of

269
270
things.

It
is
essentially
the subject.
It is
personal and
conscious as well as intelligent.
All individuals find their truth in this one universal
mind
v/hich
upholds
all
things by His
wisdom, power, and love. mere abstract conception, the idea

concrete of all possible
Far from being a

is
the most
it
manifestations, for
all
embraces the totality of

their truth only in this
idea.
objectivity.
The
find
of the
categories of being, essence,
and the notion
supreme category
The mere understanding would
criticise
the
doctrine of the idea as containing inconsistencies
and contradictions, such as are expressed in the terms, " subject and object," " finite and infinite,"
"the ideal and the
many."
of
idea,
Yet
it
real," "the one and the must be remembered that it is
the very nature of the dialectic
that the
inasmuch as
it
embraces the totality of

;
the universe, should involve contradictions
but
which, however, at the same time

to
it is sufficient
overcome, and to present in a profounder
unity.
The
of
activity
is
of
the
idea
is
eternal.
The cosmic
festation
itself
process
fundamentally the maniit
reason;
is
the idea revealing
in
objectivity.
The
idea represents an
consti-
infinite
judgment whose several terms
THE IDEA OR THE ETERNAL REASON
271
tute an independent totality of such a nature that each term growing to the
fulness of
its
own being passes
over into
its
other and advanced
form, thus providing for a progressive evolution

of the one central idea
which
is
eternally selfof the other
complete and
self-sufficient.
None
of
categories exhibits this totality as complete in

its
two
essential
aspects
subjectivity
and
objectivity.
Hegel refers
to the dialectic process of the mani(âb-
festation of the idea as an absolute negativity

solute Negativitaf),
that
is,
a process in which
is
there
first
is
an antagonism of opposites, which

;
the
negative
but this antagonism
is
overcome
by means of the negation
of the first negative,

real affirmation.
which is the absolute negation or
Thus
the notion as subjective
is
arrayed against
is
the notion as objective, but this contradiction
overcome by an immanent
its
dialectic
which
finds
way back
again
to
subjectivity
which
embraces objectivity as well. This state is something more than the mere unity of subjective and objective, or of the infinite and finite
for as
Hegel
insists,
the idea
is
essentially a
process which implies the idea of movement,
whereas the term unity implies rest. Moreover, it is not a mere unity in which the infinite
272

finite,
has been neutralized by the
the subjective
;
by the objective, thought by being

the overcoming
synthesis,
of antithesis
infinite
is
but in the
absolute negative function of the idea,
that
;
is,
by a more profound
to be
the
regarded as
so also
overlapping and embracing the
finite
thought embraces being, and subjectivity embraces objectivity.
The
idea in its process of
development
stages
:
passes
through
three
distinct
(1) (2)
The Idea as Life. (i)as Leien.') (^Das The Idea as Knowledge.
JEr-
kennen.')
(3)
The Absolute
first
Idea.
(^Bie absolute Idee.)

is
In the
form the idea
revealed in
is,
its
simplest state as immediate,
that
without
manifesting the underlying ground by which

it
is
constituted
and the
relations
which
it is
capable of sustaining.
In the second form the idea appears in

state of mediation or differentiation,
its
that
is, it
has become specified and definite by the manifestation

relations.
of its
It
is
particular
in
characteristics
and
form
this stage
itself.
that the idea
becomes conscious of
is
Its essential
that of knowledge, both theoretical
and prac-
tical.
The
process of knowledge leads to a final
THE IDEA OK THE ETERNAL REASON
273
synthesis which embraces all of the specific differ-
ences revealed in the process of development.
This gives the third form of

absolute idea which as the
last
the
idea,
the the
term
of
evolution proves
itself to
be the
first also,
and
the underlying basis of the process as a whole.

It
is
the source, ground, consummation all in one.
In
its
primary form the idea

life.
is
manifested im-
mediately as
This
is
the initial point in the
objectifying of the subjective notion.
As a begindatum
its
ning,
it is
to be merely accepted as immediately

of a
given.
Starting, therefore, with this
living being, Hegel proceeds to analyze
nature.
Every living being is an individual, preserving its individuality through all the various changes of
bodily growth, and the indefinite variety of
particular
its
moods and
activities.
Moreover,
all
particular manifestations are to be referred to a
central principle
which
is
is
the ground of their
unity and the source of their being and activity.
This central principle

universal.
by nature
essentially a
Thus in a living body we have
exhib-
ited the universal principle of its being, its soul

centre, also its particular activities
and phenomeis
nal manifestation, and the individuality which
self-preserved in the midst of all possible variations.
The
living body, therefore, embraces in
274

moments of individuality, particularity, and uniAll of its component parts form a
as
the simplest possible form the three
the notion,
versality.
complex system exhibiting,

unity which combines within
Hegel
styles
it,
a negative unity (jiegative Eiyiheit),
that
is,
itself differentiated,
opposed, but at the same time essentially related

parts;
it is
a unity in the midst of difference.

its
The
defect of life consists in the fact that

its
notion and
reality do not correspond.
It is
characteristic of life that soul

arable.
The notion
body
of life
is
and body are septhe soul, and the
soul has the
for its reality.
But
in its
is,
simplest and primary manifestation the soul

as it were,
poured out and diffused into the

is
cor-
poreal elements, and, therefore, the soul

earliest stage sentient only,
in its
and not yet

life
freely
self-conscious.
The
process of
consists in
overcoming
this preliminary stage of
being and
reaching the stage of self-consciousness.

process,
This
three
however, has to
it
run
through
stages before
attains to the higher level of
knowledge.
The
first
stage
itself.
is
the process of the living

Its corporeal parts are rela-
being within
tively external,
and present an evident distinction and antagonism between its elements which
275
are surrendered to one another, assimilate one
another,
and
persist
by reproducing themselves.
the architectonic principle
is
All these functions, however, are to be referred

to the activity of
within;
consequently the underlying unity
preserved in the midst of this indefinite variety

of seemingly independent functions.
cess of the vital subject within its
The proown limits

irrita-
appears in the three forms of sensibility,

bility,
and reproduction.
sensibility the soul is present in every part
As
of the body, so that their
independence and mu-
tual exclusiveness
is
only a seeming, and they
are in reality merely elements of one
and the
same central and all-pervading
subject.
As
As
irritability,
the living being seems to break

of differentiation.
is
up into separate parts, a process
reproduction, the living being
perpetu-
ally restoring itself out of the inner differentia-
tion of its members.
In the second stage the living being proceeds

to exert its
power over inorganic nature

it
it
sub-
dues and assimilates

this process is
to itself.
The
result of
not a neutral product as in chem-
ism, but the living being embraces the inorganic
elements within
ture,
its
own
life.
The
inorganic navital
however, which
is
subdued by the
276
THE DOCTEINE OP THE NOTION
agent, surrenders itself in the process because

it is
potentially
what
life is
actually.
This
is
in full accord with the
fundamental postulate
is
of the Hegelian system that there
but one
force,
elemental force in the universe, the
mind
and that
ter as
it
underlies the elements of inert mat-
well as the vital forces
and
activities.
When,
therefore, a living being assimilates its

is
corporeal elements, matter

level in
raised to a higher
which
is
effected the realization of its
potential essence.
Thus, even in
its
material
elements, the living body

itself.
may
be said to find
is
When, however,
body
the soul
separated
from
its
in death, the elemental forces of
objectivity
begin their play upon the
lower
is
mechanical and chemical level.
There
life is
even
in life a constant tendency in these forces to

assert their
lower functions, and
a per-
petual battle to subdue and elevate them.
The
result of this continuous process of assimi-
lation gives us the third stage in the develop-
ment of life, a combination of particular organs and functions constituting a definite and specific order of the living being, which Hegel characterizes as implicitly a
genus or kind Qeine
Grat-
tung an sicK).
The
living being, regarded as a
genus, ranks as a universal.
This universal
THE IDEA OR THE ETEKNAL REASON

particularizes itself in a
277
number
of individuals
through the connection of the living subject with another subject of its own kind.
The
process of the genus brings
it
to a being
is is
of its own.
But
the being as an individual
dependent and mediated.

implicitly
The
individual
a universal, but in his immediate

is
existence
merely an individual.
is
Death shows
that the universal
the power that upholds the
immediate individual.
proceeds so far in
its
The mere animal never

generic
life as to
have a
being of
its
own.
It yields to the
domination
to
of the genus.
this
Tennyson has given expression

:
Hegelian idea in the lines

"
Are God and Natiire then at strife, That Nature lends such evil dreams, So careful of the type she seems, So careless of the single life."
life,
is
In the process of
however, there
so that the idea
constant struggle to overcome the immediacy
which
is
the defect of
life,
may
as a
come
to itself,
and
realize its
own
truth in a free
existence of
its
own.
That which appears

itself as
generic universal in a lower sphere extricates

itself
and manifests coming
Ego
or conscious-
ness in its higher evolution.

of the idea
It is the process
to a consciousness of itself,
278

in this higher
and
itself.
In
this
and for consciousness, two judgments

form
it
exists free
are involved.
itself
The
first
is
a distinguishing of
as subjectivity;
in
its
pure nature
the
second, the recognition of an objectivity seem-
ingly external to
is
itself.
On
the one hand, there
the Ego, the universal reason, and, on the
other, the non-ego, or the objective world.
The
are
one
is spirit,
the other
is
nature.
The two
That the
implicitly identical but not yet necessarily rec-
ognized as explicitly identical.

tity of nature
is
iden-
and
spirit
should be only implicit

It is the peculiar office
the
mark
of finitude.
of reason to render explicit their fundamental

identity.
It is in the process of cognition, there-
fore, in the idea
coming
to a self-consciousness,
that the onesidedness of subjectivity

jectivity
is
and
of obis,
overcome.
In this process there
on the one hand, a rationalizing of the objective

world,
that
is,
its
translation into subjective

;
conception and thought
and on the
other,
an
assertion of subjective ideals in the midst of the
objective
phenomena
its
of being, modifying
and
adapting them to
needs and standards.
The
tendency of thought to rationalize the universe,
to
interpret
by reducing
it
to the simplest
its
forms of description and formulating
funda-

mental laws,
its
279
this is
the labor of science in
is, according to Hegel, cognition properly so called, or the theoretical
search for truth, and
activity of the idea.
The tendency
to
compel
the phenomenal world to conform to the ideals

of reason,
and to
realize the
ascendency of the
of
good,
is
the peculiar office
the
practical
activity of the idea, or volition.
tion
is
of
two kinds
Thus
or
cogni-
(1)
Theoretical
Knowledge,
(^Das
Cognition
Erhennen als solches.') Practical Knowledge, or Volition. (2) (^Bas

Wollen.)
Proper.
The
finite
cognition labors under the difficulty
of being unable to
overcome the antithesis
of
subject
rial
and
object.
The
reception of the mate-
data of the senses by the cognizing sub-
seems to be merely an assimilation by the thought process of that which is in a way

ject
foreign to
it.
Its categories
it.
never enter into
complete union with

son
is
Therefore, while reait is
active here as everywhere,
reason in
it
the form of the understanding merely, and

fails to
reach the higher level of reason in two

:
particulars
It presupposes
an objective world
already given and ready made, and secondly,

it
views the mind as a tabula rasa, which
is
280

in
perfectly passive
receiving
and recording
the subject in
impressions
perception.
its
made upon it by The true view

is
the data of senseof
cognition of the object
that the
mind
it,
is
an active force
underlying
not
merely confronting
it,
the
objective world, but in

it
and through
and
as well.
Finite cognition, working even
upon the lower

of the
level in which a ready-made world in antithesis
to the
knowing subject
two
is
the nature
presupposition framed by the perceiving mind,

operates in
distinct forms
:
(1)
The Analytic Method.
(i)ie analytisehe
Methode.)
(2)
The Synthetic Method.
(^Die synthetische
Methode.}
ual
its
The analytic method examines every individphenomenon for the purpose of discovering
various particular characteristics, separating
essential
it
the
from the unessential, and then
referring
to its appropriate genus, cause, or
law
as the case
its
may
be,
any one
of
which would
represent
corresponding universal.
of the synthetic
The movement
the reverse of the analytic method.

ing-point of the synthetic
universal.
method is The startthat of the
method
is
Its activity is essentially construe-

tive.
281
It
works
all
as
an architectonic principle to
particular manifestations
of
produce
itself
its
the
which are possible in accordance with essential and universal nature, and as re-
vealed ultimately in the organization and completed being of concrete individuals. For the
various elements which enter into the constructive activity of the notion,
following terms
Hegel employs the

fundamental uniis
The
tion.
essential nature of the
versal in its synthetic activity
given by
defini-
The
particular manifestations of which
it is
in general capable are given
by
division.
The concrete
some
complex
individuality,
which
is
always
definite object, constituted
by a nexus of
relations, is called a theorem.
The
process which supplies the necessary ele-
ments which serve as mediating terms in the nexus of complex relations is called the process
of
construction.
Its function
is
to fuse
into
one these different elemental parts.
The
process from which cognition derives the

is
necessity of this nexus
called demonstration.
Hegel has taken the names of these familiar which in the traditional logic are essentially thought processes, and in the
logical processes,
282
THE DOCTEINB OP THE NOTION

applied
present connection has
them
to
the
actual dynamic processes operative throughout the entire realm of nature in the production of
all
beings animate and inanimate, each fashioned
in particular
forms according to
its
kind.
More-
over,
it
is
the function of cognition to prove
that the relations between the different elements

in the objective world
which
it
perceives are
necessary relations.
It is in this process,
which
Hegel
calls
is
demonstration, that an underlying

revealed, whereas
in the primary
is
necessity
presupposition of finite thought the world
regarded as simply given and, as far as known,

its
relations contingent
and
variable.
But
in
the process of cognition
itself,
there has been
a progress towards an appreciation of existent

relations as necessary.
This necessity, Hegel

It is
affirms, is the necessity of reason.
reached
by subjective agency.
This subjectivity was
conceived at the starting-point by mere under-
standing as a tabula rasa.
This conception
must now give place

of
to the higher conception
the
reason.
Subjective thought must be
regarded as essentially active, as a modifying
and determining principle
in the
midst of the
crude data of sense-perception.
The knowing
mind
is
essentially active,
and
in the manifesta-

tion of this activity
it
283
determines the manner
and the end

tion
is
of that activity.
Thus the
to
transi-
effected
from theoretical
is,
cognition,
volition.
that
The
practical
to
from cognition proper
significance of this, according to
Hegel,
is
that a true appreciation of the nature
of the universal necessitates its
apprehension
as subjectivity, as a notion self-moving, active,
and imposing modifications.

sizes in
It
merely empha-
this particular
connection the funda-
mental principle of the entire Hegelian system,

the recognition of the ultimate nature of reason
as dynamic,
or, in other
words, that the
all-
embracing unitary force in the universe
is spirit
and not matter.

In volition the subjective idea
to assert itself
is
ever striving
and
its
to
mould the world, which

it,
stands seemingly opposed to
into a shape
is
conformable to
own
ends.
The end which
ever dominant in the activity of the universal
reason
is
the realization of the good.
point in Hegel's system the dialectic
At this movement
reaches a level at which the logical and ethical

lines converge.
Thus, intelligence takes the

it it
;
world as
it
finds
the will proposes to

be.
make
the world what
ought to
is
But
here the
finitude of volition
obvious, inasmuch as there
284

between the world
to be.
exists a constant contradiction

as it is
and the world

finitude
as
it
ought
How-
ever, in the process of the will itself, it abolishes
and overcomes the contradiction and this is effected by producing a unity between the theoretical and practical idea, that is, when that which is correits
own
therein involved,
sponds perfectly with that which ought to be.
The
and
idea possesses the deeper insight which
recognizes that the discrepancies between the real

ideal are
merely superficial, that essentially
they are in accord, and that the world perfectly

reveals the full purpose of
its
immanent
notion.
It
Thus
is
the idea
is
stripped of all finitude.

;
by Hegel, it is the unity of the theoretical idea which regards the world as it is, and the practical idea which endeavors to make the world what it ought to
the Absolute Idea
as defined
be.
Moreover, as cognition implies

is
life,
the
Absolute Idea
as well.
It
a unity of cognition
all
embraces naturally
and life the moments

In
which enter into the evolution

life,
of the idea.
regarded merely as immediate being, the

sicJi,
idea appears an
nition
it
appears fiir
that implicitly that the

is,
in cog-
sich,
is,
idea as
explicitly conscious of itself.
In the Absolute
sich,
Idea
it is
both an sich und fiir
that
is,

self-contained and all-embracing.
285
All the moveidea has need

;
ments of
of its
of
its
development
fall
within the sphere
own
determination.
The
no support upon which to

In
rest
it
acknowl-
edges no dependence upon any element outside

of
itself.
its
evolution there are no con"
tingent factors or external conditions.

idea," says Hegel, "
is
The
the
vo-qai';
voijaeo)';
which
Aristotle long ago termed the supreme form of
the idea."
The
true content of this idea, that
which it thinks about and acts upon, for it must be remembered that the idea is both cognitive and active, must be regarded as the
whose development we have been Of this evolution the Absolute Idea is the consummation, a consummation, howwhich is not the resulting product of the ever,
entire system,
following.
process itself; for while the idea
is
the last
term of the
series it is also the first term,
and
the ground of the whole process as well.

true significance of the idea
trated
is
The
illus-
admirably
by Hegel
is
in the following paragraph,

:
which
"
well worth quoting in full
With
this retrospect of the process of devel-
opment the Absolute Idea may be likened to an old man, who expresses the same religious
1
236,
Zusatz.
286
convictions as a child, but for

sess the
whom
his
they poslife.
added significance of
whole
Even
if
the child understands in a measure the

still
truths of religion,
they have value for him

lies
only in a limited sphere, outside of which

the whole span of
life
and the wide, wide world.
Such
ness.
is
the case with
human
life
in general
its ful-
and the various events which constitute

All labor
it is is
directed towards
some
end
goal,
and when
cover
reached,
we
are surprised to dis-
nothing else save
the bare
itself
which had been purposed.

ever, lies in the
The
interest,
how-
whole movement.
vocation, the mere
As
;
man
itself
pursues his
life's
end
may
appear to him very circumscribed

it
but in
the attainment, whatever
may
is
be, the
whole
decursus
vitce
is
comprehended.
So, also, the
content of the Absolute Idea
the complete
onward movement which we have followed thus far. There is, finally, the recognition that the development as a whole constitutes both its content and its interest. Moreover, it
sweep
of its
is
peculiarly the philosophical insight which
is
able to appreciate that while everything,
when
rela-
regarded in
nevertheless,
its isolation,
may
appear restricted,
its
its real
value consists in
its
tion to the whole
and
function as an essential

moment
it
is
287
or factor in the Absolute Idea.
Thus
is
that
having had the content, we now

this
have the knowledge that

living unfolding
of
is
content
the
this
the idea,
and that
simple retrospect
of the idea itself.
contained in the very form
surveyed
is
Each of the stages hitherto an image of the Absolute, at the

it is
beginning, however, with restricted limitations,
and consequently
the dialectic
self-constrained to press
forward to a complete revelation, which process

is
method
1
of development."
237, Zusatz.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE RELATION OP THE LOGIC TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OP MIND
THE exposition
of the Logic
would be incomtwo other

philo-
plete without a word, at least, in reference
to the relation of the Logic to the
sophical disciplines of Hegel.
The Philosophy
of Nature (^Lie Naturphilosophie'), The Philoso-
phy of Mind
(^Lie
Philosophie
des
Geistes').
These two form the second and third parts

respectively of the Lncyclopcedia of the Philosophical Sciences.
would seem at the first glance as though these sciences were arranged in the order of a serial development, so that The Philosophy of
It
Nature would represent an advance upon the

first
part of the LJncyclopcedia, the Logic; and
The Philosophy of Mind, the completion and consummation of the two preceding disciplines.
This view, however,
is
erroneous and mislead-
288
THE
ing.
fail to
LOGIC,
NATURE, AND MIND
289
careful
student of the Logic cannot

its
be impressed with
fundamental doc-
trine, that the
Idea,
of
all
is
the
creative
supreme reason, or the Absolute and sustaining principle

of
being,
and not merely a principle
abstract thought as such.
And
of
its
this present
exposition
it
will have
failed
purpose
if
has not left a similar impression upon the
reader's mind.
as
This principle, being granted

to the
is
fundamental and essential
system,
real
namely,
Hegelian
also the
that the rational
and that the laws
of being,
of thought are the laws
it
follows, consequently, that both

as falling
nature and
mind must be regarded
within the scope of the all-embracing reason, or

idea.
It
is
affirmed again and again of the
idea that
it
constitutes the totality of all being,

it
must comprehend the spheres both of nature and of mind. Moreover, Hegel himself insists that it is a
and as such, therefore,
false
mode
of statement to speak of the tran-
sition
from the idea to nature, and thence to
mind.
The term
It
transition
(der
Uelergang')
has acquired in the Hegelian usage a peculiar

significance.
means
always
an
advance
from an incomplete stage of development to a higher and more complete. This was found to be
290
THE DOCTUINB OF THE NOTION
the case in every step of the progress from the

simplest conception of immediate being to the
complete all-embracing idea.

over, represents that stage of
is
The
idea,
more-
development which
itself.
absolutely sufficient unto

all
It
not only
completes
defects,
all
removes
all
limitations,
it is
and resolves
fulness of
contradictions, but
in the
its
own
a
nature incapable alike of
supplementation or of deterioration.
therefore,
of
To
speak,
to
transition
from
the
idea
nature,
would
impjly that the idea
needed the
concept of nature as a necessary complement

in
its
order to suppjly
contradictions.
its
defects
and overcome
states that
it is
Hegel expressly
the idea does not

nature.
become nature, but that
From
this point of view, therefore.
The
PhiloHopJiy of Nature
may
its
be regarded as an
attempt to rationalize nature,

that throughout all of
that
is,
to
show
processes and under-
lying
all its
all its forces,
laws, there
is
and forming the essence of ever present the immanent
reason.
Again, the transition from any given stage of
development to a higher and complementary

stage
is
always brought about through the inner
constraint of thought.
The
transition
is
always
conceived as a necessary one (gesetzt.)
The
THE LOGIC, NATtJEE, AND MIND

nature of thought
to
is
291
such that
it is
constrained
proceed onward to perfection.

is
But from the

in
idea to nature there

sense.
no transition
such a
On
the contrar3-, Hegel insists
most
is
emphatically that the entire system of nature
the result solely and simplj' of the free activity

of the idea.
As he
as
expresses
the
it,
" the idea priits
marily resolves
outcome of
^
own
inherent being to allow
itself freely to reveal its
essential being as nature."
"We have seen that
the idea possesses not merely a
knowing
funcIt is
tion but also a willing function as well.

essentiall}'
an active
force.
The whole
is to
tenits
dency of
tion of
its
being as dynamic
reveal
activity along the lines of the free manifestaits
own
nature.
The Absolute
as
Idea,
however, by no means exhausts

itself
itself or loses
in
its
self-revelation
nature and as
mind.
The supreme
all
reason, the Absolute Idea,
God, however
through
scends them.
"
He may
This
is
be named,
is
in
and
His works, yet nevertheless tranunequivocally expressed

Lo[/if as follows
is
:
by Hegel in the larger
The content of tlie God as He is in His
Lof/ic
the revelation of
eternal essence before ever
the world was formed, or a finite spirit came

1
244.
292

-y^Q ^ây say, therefore, that it
into being."!
is
of
the very essence of the divine spirit to
reveal Himself, and that such a revelation com-
prehends both nature and mind, and yet the Absolute Ego
itself.
is
not absorbed in the revelation
But may
itself
is
it
not be possible that the revelation

a passing
?
illusory,
corresponding substance
shadow with no The dialectic move-
ment which we have been following from its beginning to end would seem to confirm this view, inasmuch as all finite beings and all finite relations fail of self-sufficiency and permanency
in the various stages of their development,
and
found a satisfactory resting-place for the thought which

only in the Absolute Idea
is
there
has tested
all
preceding stages and found them

are
wanting.
"
The things which
seen
are
temporal, but the things which are unseen are

eternal."
Is,
then, the whole cosmic process in

Is the spirit
time and space a fleeting show?

of
man but
the flashing ray of the central sun,
lost forever in the
dark and void, or perchance
returning again in other forms to be reabsorbed

in the primeval light ?
On
I,
in his Philosophy of Nature

^Log.,
the contrary, Hegel and his Philosophy of
33.
THE
LOGIC,
to
NATURE, AND MIND
293
Mind endeavors
ground these essential manifestations of being upon substantial foundations. Nature cannot be illusory, a mere seeming, for
there
is
immanent
in it the
Absolute Idea.
fall
And
so also the finite
mind does not

area
outside of
the infinite, but within the
of its being
and power.
lute Idea
is
Moreover, inasmuch as the Absoessentially a free activity,

spirit
and
as
the
human
its
partakes of the very nature

is
of this Idea, its
freedom
its
thereby assured and
with
freedom,
of
immortality.
it
By way
summary,
may
be stated that
the problem of the Logic

lute Idea, that
is
solved in the Abso-
fundamental principle of reason
which is self-explanatory and capable of explaining all lower categories which are to be regarded
merely as particular phases of
its
own
self.
But in the unfolding of the dialectic process which eventuates in the Absolute Idea, it is
discovered that reason
is
essentially a principle of
activity as well as a principle of knowledge.
The
Absolute Idea, therefore, as the

sion
of
supreme expresnature in the
reason, reveals
;
its
own
cosmic processes
and in
spite of the temporal
and spatial contingencies of the

system,
it
great world
demonstrates
as the
its
own
eternal nature
of
it all.
and purposes
ground and end
294
For the enduring and abiding elements in the cosmic order are those which partake of the
nature of the Absolute Idea, and which come to
a full revelation in the
mind
of
man, disclosing
his affinity with the Absolute

within
Mind, and stirring
his
breast intimations of divinity
and
immortality.
APPENDIX
A GLOSSARY OF THE MORE IMPORTANT PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS IN HEGEL'S LOGIC
Absolut: That which
things.
is
That
-which
unconditioned and conditions all is complete within itself, all-
embracing, all-determining, the infinite, the eternal, God. In its highest expression, it is the absolute Idee.
Abstrakt:
A one-sided and partial view of any object of knowledge a term used in contrast to concrete, which signifies a comprehensive view of things embracing
;
aU
possible considerations as to the nature of the
things themselves, their origin, and the manifold

relations
which they may

is
sustain.
Allgemein, Allgemeinheit:
Universal, universality.
The
universal
not merely the summation of the various
marks which are common to a number of individuals, by virtue of which they are regarded as members of one and the same group or class. The term has
attached to
it
the additional significance of possessis
ing a dynamic essence which

manifestations.
the source and the

all
its
active constructive principle of
particular
Analytisch: Analytical; in contrast with synthetical {synthetiscA).
individual
The analytical method examines eveiy phenomenon for the purpose of discover-
ing
its
various particular characteristics, separating
the essential from the unessential, and referring it to that is, to its its appropriate cause, law, or genus,
corresponding universal.
295
296
The
APPENDIX
synthetical
method
starts,
on the other hand,
with the universal.

structive.
Its activity is essentially con-
It
works as an architectonic principle to
the particular manifestations which are possible in accordance with its essential and universal nature, and as revealed ultimately in the organization
produce
all
and completed being
of concrete individuals.
Das Andere: The

aspect, of
that is, the complementary any object of knowledge which is necessary to the complete understanding of its significance its
other,
;
correlative.
the end for

used, or
related;
The other may be a cognate species, or which the object in question may be
it is
some other object with which

it is,
essentially
in short, the complete setting of the
object which gives to it depth and completeness of meaning. As applied to the process of development, the other of any stage in the process is the subsequent stage which lies immediately beyond it, and which for the time being is contrasted with it, but into which it passes through the constraint of the dialectic
movement. Anschauung : Perception. A direct and immediate knowing, as opposed to knowledge obtained by the mediating process of thought.
The
object
may
belong
See
is
either to the internal or to the external sense.

Vorstellung.
An
sich: In itself;
a phrase used to signify that which
implicit, or potential, in contrast to the phrase fiir

sich,
which
signifies that
is
which
is
explicit or actual.
of these
The phrase which

possesses
is
compounded
two con-
trasted phrases, an und fiir
sick, signifies
that which
the
capacity of
transforming whatever
manifestation of the
potential into the actual

;
same
it is
the capacity for self-determination and
self -direction.
APPENDIX
Aufheben, aufgehoben
:
297
There
this
To
transmute, transmuted.
are three distinct though related
term expressess,
form, to restore
it
to destroy a thing in
it
ideas which
its
original
in another form,
and to elevate
always a
upon a higher
plane.
It
represents
progress in thought and in development. It is difficult to translate this term by any one English
word. To transmute or to conserve would perhaps approximately express its meaning. Bedingung : Condition whatever is necessary in causa;
tion to the eventuation of the effect.

Begriff: Notion.
It
is
the universal principle of reason
which underlies all processes of thought. It is essentially dynamic. It is not merely the supreme category of thought, but it is also the fundamental law of being as well. It is the creative architectonic force of the universe. While Seyn is being, regarded merely as that which is immediately given, unexplained, unrelated, and unanalyzed, and Wesen refers
to the underlying principles of being,
relations,
its
manifold
and
essential ground, the Begriff represents

;
a far deeper insight

of determination
it is
more than the mere source

seH-specification, realizing
and
efficiency, it is the central force
of self-determination
its
and
own
subjective purposes through their essential
manifestation in the world of objectivity, and as such it constitutes the truth both of Seyn and of Wesen.
Beisichseyn
: Being by itself applied to an object of knowledge to indicate that it is self-sufficient and self;
contained.
Besonderheii
:
See Filrsichseyn.
Particularity
;
having significance
as
only,
of
however,
when
recognized
the
particular
some
is
universal.
:
Bestimmung
From
hestimmen, to define or determine
it
that differentiating capacity which gives to any
298
APPENDIX
The object of thought definite form and character. Denkbestimmungen are the most general forms of thought determination, and which themselves determine all others of a more particular or specific
nature,
the categories.
:
Bestimmt: Specifically determined.

Bestimmtheit
The
;
actual
realization
;
of
the
capacity-
expressed by Bestimmung
definiteness
it
it
signifies
a state of
refers to the specific
and determinate
character of any object of knowledge.
Beweis: Demonstration. See Definition. Beziehung auf sick: A phrase which indicates a relation
existing within the boundaries
of
the object of
knowledge itself. From such a point of view the object of knowledge is regarded as a closed system, and for the time being, at least, isolated in reference to any larger system or systems with which it may
sustain essential relations.
Beziehung in Aiideres : Indicates the essential relation
any object of knowledge to that which confronts its other, that is, its necessary complement in some larger system of thought within which the given object of knowledge together with
of
it
as peculiarly
its
other necessarily
fall.
Sich auf sick beziehende Negativitat.
See Negalivitat.
Daseyn
Being which is definitely determined in contrast to Seyn, mere being which is wholly indefinite and undetermined. Daseyn is also used in contrast to Existenz, which latter signifies being which is definitely determined, but with an implied reference
:
to the source of the being in question, its essential
The terms Seyn, Daseyn, Existenz, form a which represents successive stages in the progress of thought as regards a more precise determination and explanation.
ground.
series
APPENDIX
Definition: Definition.
299
Tlie essential nature of the funits
damental universal in
synthetic activity
is
given
by definition. The particular manifestations of which it is in general capable are given by division {Division'). The concrete individuality which is always some definite object constituted by a nexus of complex relations is called a theorem {Theorem). The process which supplies the necessary elements which serve as mediating terms in this nexus of complex relations
{Konstruktion)
is
;
called the process of construction

its
function
is
to
fuse
into
one
is
these different elemental parts.
The
process from
which cognition derives the
necessity of this nexus
called demonstration (Beweis).
Denkbestimmungen : Categories. See Bestimmung. Dialektik : Dialectic, a term used as a general characterization of the Hegelian method. It signifies that process of thought which recognizes the inherent contradiction involved in every finite statement, and at the same time possesses the capacity of overcoming
by an appropriate synthesis every observed contrar diction upon a higher level of thought. The term is used in two senses, the one referring to the threefold process as a whole the other solely
;
to the second .stage of the process, that of contradiction.
Different
Difference.
This term can be defined only in

Identitcit
its relation to
the term
(identity).
They
obtain
are
so
related that the differences which
between objects have significance only when contrasted with an essential identity which forms their background, and in like manner the identity which may be affirmed in any instance has significance only when brought into relief by the contrast of When identity and some underlying difference.
300
APPENDIX
difference are used as predicates -witliout this refer-
ence to each other, there arises the false and unmean-
Ding an
ing abstraction of mere difference or mere identity. This Kantian phrase sich : The thing in itself.
With him is used in a peculiar manner by Hegel. the Ding an sich refers always to the thing in its
germinal or potential
is
state.
The
is
seed, for instance,
the plant in itseK
the child
the
man
in himself.
Division: Division.
See Definition.
Eigenscha/t
Einzelnheit:
The
quality, property, or attribute of a thing.
Individuality.
The
individual
object
of
knowledge has significance only when the particular and differentiating characteristics are known which
make
it
possible to refer the individual in question
to its proper universal.
Entwickelung
it
Evolution,
is
movement
essentially
development. The dialectic one of development, though
traces the logical rather than the temporal stages
of the process.
Erkennen
Cognition
one of the higher forms in which
the Begriff manifests itself. It is the notion rising to the level of a consciousness of itself and its own
and the objects of its own knowledge. Appearance or phenomenon. It is that aspect of being which is revealed in the world of phenomena. It is to be distinguished from Schein, which is the mere appearance, the shadow, illusion. The Erscheinung is the shining forth of that which is the underlying ground and essence of being. With Hegel the phenomenon has no significance apart from its noumenon. The one is the necessary complement of the other. Etwas: A somewhat or something. Any object of knowledge which possesses determinate being (Daseyn). Every Etivas is posiliv by virtue of what it is, negaliu
processes
:
Erscheinung
APPENDIX
in so far as
it
301
excludes from
its
own being
its corre-
sponding other. Existenz: See Daseyn. Form : Form with Hegel

;
it signifies
structive principle,
which
is
immanent
a formative, conin the under-
lying substance of things.

Freiheil
:
:
Freedom.
Explicit, actual.
:
Fur
sich
See
Fursichseyn
fines its
ties.
Being for itself, that is, being which deown bounds and determines its own properIts
An
sich.
It is self-determined, self-contained being.
independence however is asserted but not explicitly justified. In Beisichseyn, the independence of being is regarded as fully justified. Gedanken : Thoughts a term often used by Hegel to mean merely abstract thoughts, the ordinary concepts of the formal logic. Gegensalz : Antithesis the second stage of every dialectic movement and an essential moment or
; ;
factor in the resulting synthesis
by which
it
is
united upon a higher plane to that which upon a lower level of thought appeared as its opposite. Any object of thought is Gesetzt ; From the verb setzen.
gesetzt
which
is
necessarily
and
explicitly determined
by the
is
logic of the situation.
Whenever
that which
given in thought leads by the very necessity of the thought processes themselves to a conclusion
scribed
depending upon it, that conclusion is always deby Hegel as gesetzt. Every phase of the
dialectic process is gesetzt in the sense of following
of thought itself from the nature of the stage immediately preceding it. Gesetztseyn : The condition or state of being gesetzt.
by the very momentum
Grad
Degree or intensity of qualitative variation, as
the degree of heat or cold, etc.
302
Griinze
:
APPENDIX
Limit, marking the line of diiierentiation beits
tween any object of knowledge and

Schranke.
other.
See
Grund
of
The ground underlying
all
surface appearance
the basis upon which the existence of any object
knowledge depends. It is the noumenon underIt is the constant every phenomenon. and permanent essence of all objects of knowllying
edge.
Idealitat,
Heel
Ideality, ideal.
The
ideal
is
essentially
characteristic of the truly infinite.
It is the
abiding
and constant element in every definite being underlying the changing and unstable elements which Therefore the finite and constitute its finiteness. the infinite, the real and the ideal, are not irreconcilable opposites. Every finite being possesses elements of infinity. The truly real is such by virtue of some
essential strain of ideality.
And
the
human
has the
capacity of becoming partaker of the divine nature.

Idee
Be griff, or notion, and self-determining essence, the consummation and the source of all knowledge and of all being.
:
;
The Idea the highest form
of the
as manifesting its conscious, free,
Identitat: Identity.
See Differenz.
:
;
Abstract identity an incomview of things. Absolute Identitat: Complete identity mere sameness, an indefinite homogeneity. Mit sich identisch : Self-identical, that is, presenting a sameness throughout and lacking any
Identitat
A hstrakte
and
plete
colorless
differentiation of parts or specification of functions.
Anything which
out
Inhalt
:
is
completely homogeneous through-
is
mit sich identisch.

It has
Content.
meaning only when
it
is
re-
garded as one with the form.
APPENDIX
Kausalitdt
:
303
The category
See Abstrakt.
:
of causality.
Konkret:
Concrete;
a complete comprehensive view of
things.
Konstruktion
List
:
Construction.
See Definition.
Craft.
It is a characterization of the
its
manner
in
ends in nature by bringing under its control the mechanical and chemical forces of the world and swaying them at will.
vphich reason vyorks out
Maass
to
Measure.
The standard measure
or typical
which
:
all
things in their several spheres,
form more
or less perfectly correspond.

Mitlelbar
INIediate.
This term
is
unmittelbar,
immediate.
mediate, which
used in contrast to is unmittelbar, imrepresented as an object of knowlis
Anything
edge given but unanalyzed and unexplained. And anything is mittelbar, mediate, which is regarded as a product due to a certain process by which it is brought about or mediated. Immediate knowledge is given mediate is explained. The immediate is unrelated; the mediate is related. The immediate is elementary the mediThe immediate marks the beginate is developed. ning the mediate, the result. Moglichkeit : Possibility, the possibility, however, not of the fancy, but that possibility which represents a
;
definite potential capable of actual realization.
Moment : Moment
or factor an essential element in any complex system or process. Negativ : Negative refers to the element of difference in the essence of any object of knowledge, and whose significance lies wholly in the relation to its comThe two unite plementary element; the positive. together in constituting the essential ground of being. Negativitdt : Negation the process of the so-called negative reason which confronts any primary thesis with
; ;
;
304
its
APPENDIX
corresponding antithesis.
The
absolute
Nega-
tivitat is
the overcoming of this
first
negation by
a denial which involves a higher point of view. This second negation, being the denial of the first negation, has the force of an affirmation. It is, however, not a simple reaffirmation of the
it is
primary
thesis
a process which, while affirming the primary thesis, at the same time embraces its contradiction in the resulting synthesis as one of its essential moments or factors. Negation as a process, more-
draws a line of distinction between any object knowledge and that which lies immediately beyond This is a line of definition, inasmuch it as its other. as it differentiates that which a thing is from that which it is not. In this sense negation is a process
over,
of
of determination.
Negative Einheit:
parts, all of
which
system containing many different are, however, united through an

it is
underlying unity;
diversity.
a unity in the midst of
Sick aufsich beziehende Negativitat
system which contains within the sphere of its own essential being certain contradictory elements which cause the system as it
negation,
is,
a,
that
A self-imposed
stands to fall of
its
own weight,
as
it
were, and
such contradictions by the introdaotiou of some higher category of thought. Nichts: Non-being. It is that stage which is not yet
reached in any process of development but
indicates the necessity of
overcoming
may
become Seyn, or actual being, through the process of becoming ( Werden)

Notliwendigkeit : Necessity.
Objectiv
:
Objective.
It is a
all
Kantian sense
that
term used to designate in the is universal and necessary
APPENDIX
in
305
any object of knowledge. Plegel adds, however, that thoughts as universal and necessary are not to be regarded merely as our thoughts but as the real essence of existing things as well.
Ohjectivitdt:
Objectivity; that stage in development of being which is the explicit manifestation of the subjective notion immanent within it.
:
Posit'w
its
Positive
relation
a term whose significance

to
its
lies
only in
See
correlative,
the
negative.
Negative.
Realitat
:
Reality.
The
positive aspect of
it
nate being which constitutes

it
what
forms an essential moment of
any determiand as such that which is truly

it is,
infinite
and therefore
Reflection
;
ideal.
See
Idealitat.
Reflexion
fundamental process of thought by which any object of knowledge is fully

.
that
revealed only
when we
see
it
in its complete setting
and possess a thorough knowledge of the relations which it sustains to every part of the system to which it is referred. The object itself, therefore,
cannot be said to shine in
its
own
light so
much
as
in the light reflected from all the coordinate elements
with which
it is
:
related.
Reflexion in sich
The
:
process
by which an
light.
object of
knowledge shines
Reflexion in Anderes
related to
is
in its
own
The
process by which an object of
knowledge shines
is
it
in the light of
something which
as its other, or
complement
that
which
essentially its correlative.
Setzende Reflexion: Positing reflection; that phase of the
process of reflection
which regards being
as self-
illuminated, and therefore as immediately given and
independent.
Voraussetzende Reflexion
:
Presupposing
reflection.
it
This
represents a deeper insight, in that
sees that the
306
APPENDIX
supposed immediacy and independence of a given object of knowledge must be referred to some other
which
is its
necessary presupposition.
:
A eiisserliche
Reflexion
External reflection
is
relation existing between being
in which the and that upon which

;
the being depends

relation, the
regarded as a purely external
one affecting the other wholly from
without.
Bestimmende Reflexion : Determining reflection which regards the seemingly external relation as in reality
;
obtaining between coordinate elements of one and

the same essential system of being.
Reflexionsbestimmungen
Reyel
Rule,
that
;
The categories
of reflection.
is
is,
the usual or tyjiical form which
found to characterize memVjers of the same

or species.
class
Salz
Proposition
a statement which is correct as regards

It differs in this respect
certain circumstances but does not hold true uni-
and necessarily. from the judgment (das

versally
this
Urtheil)
which contains
necessity.
element of
universality
and
The
proposition
maybe
to
said to be correct or incorrect;
the judgment, however,

Schein:
Show;
is either true or not true. be distinguished from Erscheinung,
Schluss
appearance or phenomenon, which see. This is not merely the logical form : Syllogism. of inference it is iLsed also to characterize every active process in the world of Vjeing which unites
;
together any two elements through the mediation

of a third, the
common
or middle term.
The
syl-
logistic process is one, therefore,
which underlies the
activities of
being as well as of thought.
Schranl-e
The bound
definite being
stage of its
marking the limit which any attained at any particular development, but which Vjy the inner
;
may have
Al'PENDlX
constraint of
its
807
mustti-ansciMiii in the
own nature
it
morn advanced
Si-i/n
:
stages of
its dovi'lopnieiit..
Hoinf];
in tlie souse of iiioro being, indefinite
and
nndeterniinod.
Siihjeiiir
:
See
/>((/)///'.
Subjeetive;
not merely that wliieh concerns

intei-ests
the individual and personal tliouglits and

in distinction
from tho whole body of fnets in the world of phenomena, bnt that wliioli is at the same time immanent in the tact, and as thus immanent eoustitiit.es the very truth of the fact itself and its informing priuoiple.
Siihslcmtialilcit,
Stih.<iftnz
:
Substantiality, substance; that
wliieh
of all
is
the absolute fornnitive principle and source

in the universe.
power and necessity

substanee
is
last analysis,
is,
revealed as subjeet,
that
At
its
the power of an absolute personality.

:
Si/nlht'tisfli
Syutlietieal
see .[milytisch.
Theorem
Theorem.
See Dijinition.
total of all properties
Toldliiiil:
The sum
and
relations
pertaining to any objeet of know ledge taken not as a
mere sum, but as a systematic unity. Transition; a term used to indicate the passage of tliought from any given stage of its development to that whieh lies immediately in advance and -whieh is essentially connected with tlie former by the inner necessity of the thought process itself. Umvnnitlelt : That whieh is not mediated. It is a term
Uebergani/
:
used to imply that although a process of mediation

it is
doubtless underlies the object of knowledge to which applied, nevertheless that proeess is not as yet See MiltcUmr. reeogiiized or rendered explieit.
:
Unmillelhnrkeil
Immediaey.
Tt
See
Milldbar
and
Un-
nnilklt.
:
Untersrhii'i]
HitTerenee.
1
is
mere
diversity
'<
r.icAiViA iiAi i7)
something more than it also signifies a

;
308
APPENDIX
determinate and specific diiference (hestimmter Unterschied)
which serves
as the differentiating
mark
of
a definite species.
Ursache: Cause;
its root meaning indicating that the cause as the primary essence must underlie its effect
(Wirkung).
Urtheil
meaning signifies a division and this significance is preserved iu the essential function of the judgment which is the process of breaking up an indefinite and incoherent universal into particular forms of its manifestation which are both definite and coherent. As a process, judgment applies not merely
:
Judgment
its
root
into elementary parts,
to the activity of
thought but to the activity of

applied especially to the relation
being as well.
Verhiiltniss
:
Relation
which obtains between any object of knowledge and its correlative as mediated by the category of reflection,
such as the causal relation or the relation of
reciprocal activity.
Vermittelt, Vermitlelung
:
Mediated, mediacy.
See Mittel-
and Unvermiltelt. Vernunft : Reason as distinguished from Verstand, the understanding. Reason is that function of the mind which overcomes, in a higher synthesis, the contradictions which it is the function of the understanding to observe and which, however, it cannot
bar
;
reconcile.
The understanding regards the various

knowledge
as distinct, separate, isolated.
objects of
Reason
while
it
is
the synthetical function of thought which,
by no means ignores the differences amidst
the world of phenomena, nevertheless possesses the capacity of apprehending the unity which underlies
all differences.
Verschiedenheit: Diversity.
APPENDIX
Verstand
:
309
Understanding.
:
See Vernunft.
Voraussetzung
Vorstellung
:
Postulate.
generalized image of a class or group
of objects in distinction
from Anschauung, which
is
the immediate perception of an object, and Begriff which is the thought grasp of the essential signifi-
cance of a universal idea without any adventitious aid from the pictures which the imagination may
attempt to form of the same.

Wahrheit : Truth
;
according to Hegel truth consists in

Begriff,
the complete conformity of any object of knowledge
with
its
fundamental
and
this
implies a
its
process in
relations.
which
it
is
seen in the totality of
Wechselwirkung :
The
category of reciprocal activity.
Werden:
Becoming; the process through which nonSee Begriff.
being issues into being.
Wesen: Essence.
Widerspruch
Wirklichkeit
:
Contradiction.
Actuality.
The
concrete unity of essence
and appearance. Wirkung: Efiect. See Ursache.

Zufalligkeit
:
Contingency
other.
the contingent
its
is
that which
itself,
does not have the ground of

in
being in
but
some
INDEX
Absolute, 20
106
f.,
f., 62, 81, 98, 100, 122, 14(i f., 208, 212, 214, 2:, i51, 269.
Cosmological proof, 53. Craft of Reason, 266 f. Critical philosophy, Chap. FV.
Definition, 281.
IH'Krec, 105, 112.
Abstract, 70. Actuality, 169, Chap. XIII. Alteration, 97. Antinomies, 51 i., 108. Appeariiiice, 166, Chap. XII.
Aristotle, 8, 184, 185,
2(;:i, 28.5.
Demonstration, 281.
Hevelopraent, 209
Dialectic, 10
f.
f.
f .,
185, 209 f
;
Arithmetical Operations, 109 Atomic philosophy, 103.

Attraction, 103.
Aufgehoben, 138
2S3.
f.,
161,
188,
Difference, 151 f. 219, 242. Diari an sich, 48, 163, 170. Discrete, 107 f. Diver-iity, 151 f. Division, 281.
Dualism,
34.
III.
Becoming, 89 f. Being, 68 f determinate 160 f for itself, 98 f. of God, 33 f.,

. ; .
Empiricism, Chap.
;
53,65.
Categories, 8 f. Causality, 192, 196 f Centrality, 256 f syllogistic formulEB of, 258 i. Chi'mism, 260 f. Cognition, 278 f. Conceptual capacity, 5. Condition, 187. Construction, 281. Content, 171 f.
; .
Empiricist, 67. End, 2(;i f. subjective, 264 f. accomplishin process of ment, 264 f.; accomplished, 264 f. Entelechy, 185. Essence, 68 f., 72 f., 78, Part
II.
Ethics, 42, 57
f.
Excluded middle,
Existence, 160
Explicit, 267.
f.
154.
Extensive quantity, 112

Feuerbach,
43.
f.
f.
Contingency, 187. Continuous quantity, 107.

Contradiction, 150.
Force, 171, 176
Copula, 221 Cosmology,
Form
32
f.
;
165
f.,
171
f.,
f.
172,206.
28,
51.
Freedom,
311
33, 191
312
Genus, 276.
INDEX
Kant,
263.
30,
45
ff.,
100, 251, 252,
Gesetzt, 181, 190, 211, 220, 290.
Goethe,
179.
;
Ground, 219 Chap. XI.

Haller, 115
of
existence,
Leibniz, 157, 159, 194. Limit, 94. Logic, formal, 217;

221.
modem,
179 f
207.
43.
Von Hartmann,
Heraclitus, 91
Hegelians of the Left,

f.,
Magnitude,
105.
185.
Herder, 178. Hindoo Philosophy, 26.
Hume,
41.
Idea, 20, 213
f.
;
Chap. XVII
as life, 272 f. as knowledge, 272 f ahsolute, 272 f., 284, 286 f., 291 f. Idealism, 19 f., 49, 100 f.
; .
Manifestation, 171, 176 f. Materialism, 43. Matter, 164 f Measure, Chap. IX. Measureless, 127. Mechanism, 106; formal, 255; with affinity, 256 f. abso;
lute, 257 f
Mediation, 62 189 f.
f.,
73, 136
f.,
158,
Ideality, 5.
Identity, 71, 150 f ., 219, 242. Immediacy, 62 f., 71, 136 f.

Implicit, 267.
Metaphysical systems, 23 f., Chap. II. Metaphysician, 67. Method, 11 f. analytic, 280;
;
Individual, 216
f.
synthetic, 280 f
Infinity, 97, 212.
Inner, 171, 178 f. Intensive quantity, 112 Intuition 67.

,
f.
Mind, 31, 56; philosophy of, Chap. XVIII. Mode, in frequent curves, 124.
Nature, 35; philosophy Chap. XVIII.
Necessity, 33 189 f Negation, 14 f., 55, 74 absolute, 14 f., 271.
;
Intuitive knowledge. Chap. V.
of,
Jacobi, 62.
Judgment, 221
specific con-
f.,
136
f.
tent of, 223; of being, 224; of essence, 224; of notion, qualitative, 225 f 224, 225 f of reiiexion, 225 f. of necessity, 225 f singular, 228 f particular, 228 f universal, 228 f categorical, 230 f hypothetical, 230 f disjunctive, 2,30 f assertory, 232 f problematic, 232 f. apoditic, 232 f.
. ; .
Negative, 1.55. Neutral, The, 260. Nodes, 126 f Non-being, 86 f Notion, 18, 29 f., 68 159, 201, Part III.;
jective.
f.,
jective.
Chap. XVI. Chap. XV.
76 f., the obthe sub-
Noumenal, 183. Number, doctrine
of, 116.
INDEX
Objective, 46 f., 213 f. Ontology, 2S f. Ontological argument,
251.
313
Religion, 42.
56
.,
Repulsion, 103. Rule, 123 .

Socrates, 11. Soul, 30, 50 f Spencer, 66, 78
Opposition, 154. Other, tlie, ii5 f Outer, 171, 178 f.
Pantheism, 34, 253. Parmenides, 91 f.

Particular, 216 f. Parts, 171, 174 f.
Permanence,
Personality,
207, 277.
136, 112 f
6,
100,
149,
194,
Phenomenal, Chap. XII.

Philosophy, Logic as a system history of, 16 f ol, 3 fE. Physico-theological proof, 53.
;
Plato, 11, 184, 185.
Spinoza, 75, 115, 194, 195, 207. Strauss, 43. Subjective, 46 f. 213 f Substantiality, 192 f. Sufficient reason, 157. Syllogism, 54, 2:!4 f qualitative, 237 f. ol reflection, 237 f of the notion, 237 f formulae of, 237 f figures categorical, 24C, I. of, 238 f hypothetical, 246 f. disjunctive, 246 f. System, 136, 144 f ., 158, 257.
;
.
Pneumatology,
Positive, 1-54
f.
28, 30.
Teleology, 261
f.
Possibility, 186
193, 250.
f.
Potential, 72, 77, 88, 185, 188
f.,
Tennyson, 277. Theology, 28, 33 Theorem, 281.
The
thing, 162
f.,
167.
of,
Property, 163 f Proposition, 224. Psychology, 28, 30. Pythagoras, 116 f.

Quality, Chap. VII. Quantity, 93 f.. Chap,
Thought, General nature

Iff.
Totality, 209. Transition, 289
1.
Truth, 22.
vm;
determinate, 105, 109.

Reality, 101.
Understanding, 12 f Unity, negative, 274.

Universal, 3f., 216
f.
Reason, 12
tive, 12.
negative, 12
posif
Volition, 279
f.,
283.
Wallace, 266
n.
Reciprocal activity, 192, 198

Reflection,
209.
73,
Whole,
171, 174 f.
136,
140,
168,
Zeno, 10, 115.

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the United States on the use of the

JOHN GEIER HIBBEN,

STUAKT PROFESSOR OF LOGIC IN PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

CuBhing & Co. Berwick & Smith Norwood Masa. U.S.A.

Sie sind's, die

weben Deines Lebens Band.

Hegel has endeavored to incor-

porate the essential principles of philosophy

insight into the Hegelian sys-

preciative grasp of the history of philosophy in

the salient features of

serves also as an excellent introduction to the

study of German philosophy which

Hegelian system must prove

of inestimable value to the student of philoso-

Unfortunately the proverbial obscurity

Hegel has deterred many from undertaking

to simplify all technical

terms and explain their

significance in the light of the definitions as

fundamental Hegelian doctrines

volume received valuable suggestions from my

During the preparation

Professor Creighton of Cornell University, to whom I gladly express my indebtedness.

THE DOCTRIXE OF BEING

THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE

The Doctrine of Essence

Essence as the Ground of Existence

Appearance, or the Phenomenal World

THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION

Vo7i der Grosse

und Macht des

gross genug denJcen.

Universums hat keine Kraft

Beichthum und seine Tiefen ihm vor Augen legen

und zum Genusse bringen.

THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OP PHILOSOPHY

not a logic in the formal

and restricted sense

which that term

usually understood, as the science or the art

does a complete system of philosophy

Philosophy, according to Hegel,

science of things in a setting of thoughts

the science of the universe as

face answereth to face

That intelligence which

observing mind and the world which

the object of the observation

one and the

In order to understand the essential

features of the Hegelian system,