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Cassandra Ysobel Retino Teodosio On Rationality and the Intentional Subject

April 22-23, 2012

The faculty of the will (intention) is inherently present in the rational subject. The domain of rationality (generally) involves the reflective capacity of the subject (imagination), consciousness on the reflexivity of judgment, the receptability of experience either through the perception of the senses or the intuition. From these faculties, it follows that the subject is capable of forming beliefs (different from holding faith on the justifiability or the truth of the belief) of ones immediate world, capable of assessing and teasing false beliefs reliably, and capable of recognizing the differences and the nuances of reasons, from (seeming) desires, motivations, considerations, inclinations and intentions. This also assumes that the subject is capable of objectifying its acts and its beliefs according to its own criteria (with the assumption that it shares similarities with the communities criteria as well). From this, the subject must be able to provide good reasons for ones actions and from ones acceptance of a belief. Such choice and ascription of goodness to the reason reflects the underlying normativity that asks for the agent to justify ones reason. This goodness of (ones) reason while subjected to a maxim also carries a normative force to which the subject uses in negotiating or explaining supposed problematic choices to other agents. Since Scanlon does not divorce the subject from its relations and vice versa, it must be noted that Scanlon proposes a multi-level of relations: subject with itself (beliefs and actions), subject ones maxim, subject with the others and vice versa, subject with the normative maxim, subject with the real physical world. The inequality of some of these relations allows the insistence of grounding motivations of actions and beliefs on good reasons. The qualifier good allows the existence of a maxim to which rational beings could institute. The subjective condition of the agent should not inhibit the capacity of the subject for rational choice. Nevertheless, this choice could not be held responsibly unless intended with good reasons. Scanlons insistence on the sufficiency of good reasons as motivation and justification puts the subject

into the position of fully owning to the conception and consequences of ones judgment. It also places the subject into the awareness of its limitedness in terms of time since all actions, beliefs and reflections upon them are subject to time and to the laws of causality. The awareness of time allows the subject to perceive the consequences as it assumes its place in passage of the past-present-future continuum together with the projections of the will towards a future goal, and the judgment necessarily given to past actions. Choice can be found in the present since all recollections are summoned within the present. Such presences cannot be seen in the past or the future since it is bound by the law of causalityof alterations and relations. The assumption of the ideality of the subject and of experience assumes one of the foundations of reason as key to the perfectability of a maxim allowing subjects to arrive at the right reasons for specific situations. The subject does not only live a potentiality but achieves ideality through reason. From this, it is assumed that only rational subjects are capable of willing the good since we arrive at the conception and the practice of the good through good reasons and not from the whims and tyranny of desire and the incompleteness of motivation. Furthermore, it is also assumed that reasons are brought about by a correct way of thinking (e.g. of willing a good reason to justify an action or belief) to which the presence of the will carries the whole method to its fruition. According to Scanlon, reasons can be swayed by considerations at all levels of deliberation which sieves desires from good reasons. Thus, what keeps the subject from straying from ones aim is ones good reasons and the iron will to follow through these reasons. Reasons without the stubbornness of the will could not fully relish the desirability of ones action or belief; reasons without the guidance of the will could not fully integrate the goodness of ones action or belief into the hierarchy of values one upholds; reasons without the resoluteness of the will would definitely fall short of ones aspirations. Nonetheless, the will without the calculability of reason would blindly pounce on every goal it wants to attain, would hastily reach at any choice, and would readily offer judgment on every matter. It is the discriminatory practice of reason

which reigns the will into falling into recklessness close to wanting; while the will ensures that reason has the weight and force against odds. Thus, one could not divorce reason from the will in the practice of morality. The primacy on rationality is rooted in the assumption of the consent of all rational beings as a pre- requisite for understanding and communication. The universality of the practice of maxim reflects a certain order of the world at a specific point of relations amongst its objects and the perceptions achieved and shared by its subjects. It should always be remembered that the world is composed of objective things and intentional subjects. These existences (or presences) are further complicated by their relations (deliberate/ intended, necessary or accidental) amongst each other. It is these relations which inhibits or supports the will of these beings and which ask for the necessity of reasons. Reasons in relation to an objective reality can be underscored as declarative statements about the state of affairs. Nevertheless, reasons in relation to intentional subjects are normative statements subjected to the affairs of morality. Given reasons (may it be good, right, and even unreasonable) tips the balance on the normative status and forces of statements on morality and declarative statements. The tensions given by the two is reflected within the use of the subjects maxim tested through the subjects experience of ones relations with others and the physical world, formed by its subjective conditions1 (its limitations as reflected by its desires2 and considerations) contracted3 together with other rational subjects. The limits of rationality and irrationality then depends on the relations of these consensual subjects on what they deemed as good and right and set as norms and method of correct reasoning.
These subjective conditions are understood to be pluralistic in the sense that every rational being experiences the world differently. Yet, this pluralism does not lead to an absolute relativism for Scanlon adheres to the general framework of reasoning inherent to human beings. 2 Even seeming or the what seems to the subject hints at a preferred area of judgments and possibilities associated and entertained by the subject. 3 This supposed contract is beyond altruistic goals. For a moral universe to uphold itself, rational beings must put value into a maxim to which others can understand and practice to reinforce the relations forged among themselves. Thus, the need for the assumption of rationality given upon human beings, for rationality must be held responsibly for it holds the freedom of the will.
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The attack against rationality from the disease of irrationality is warranted on the grounds of irrationalitys impending threat on the integrity of rationality. Rationality must be guarded due to its thrust towards an ideally perfect cognizance of the real-physico world4. One must also accept the possibility of not fully knowing the intentions of the other. The immateriality of the will5 or the intention to either will the good or the bad can be contested on these grounds due to the fleetingness of human emotions and since not all human beings are capable of being aware of their intentions6 most of the time. Grounding morality upon good reasons and the universality of maxim allows the flourish of discourse upon the multiplicity of voices and experiences across space and time since the argument for good reasons encompasses other realms of the rational subject such as language, shared values, and through will, freedom. To deny the existence of reasons and of the will is to deny the possibility or reality of freedom. It is the presence of the will which situates the subject in the practice of freedom. It also allows the subject to assert its subjectivity in relation to the competing declarative and normative statements that exists in the world.

References T.M. Scanlon. What We Owe to Each Other T.M. Scanlon. Metaphysics and Morals (JSTOR) Hannah Arendt. The Life of the Mind: Willing (Introduction)

For Zagzebski, this would be the agents cognitive contact with reality which allows knowledge to be justified in connection with the agents practice and formation of virtues. Since the attainment of knowledge can be done through the perfection of the virtues 5 This is also discussed by Arendt in The Life of the Mind: Willing. The practice or the existence of the will has always been doubted or frowned upon (by the Christian traditions inability to harmoniously weld the divine will with mans free will) 6 Thus the importance of reflection and articulation of the subject to which one must be capable and courageous enough to submit the self to examination. The subject must be capable of arriving at his/ her own narrative about his/ her situation.