SAMPLE Q N A Persons and Family Relations QUESTION No.1: Four employees of Act Theater Inc.

were apprehended by the police officers for allegedly tampering a water meter. On the basis of the foregoing, the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System cut the water service connection of Act Theater a few hours after a notice to such effect was served upon the latter. Did MWSS properly exercise its proprietary rights? ANSWER: NO. Concededly, MWSS, as the owner of the utility providing water supply to certain consumers including the respondent, had the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised. Article 19 of the New Civil Code states that Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable. In this case, MWSS failed to act with justice and gave Theater Act what is due to it when the former unceremoniously cut off the latters water service connection. (Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs Act Theater Inc., GR No. 147076, June 17, 2004) QUESTION No.2: The spouses Pahang obtained a loan from Metrobank. The said loan was secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land owned by the spouses Pahang. For failure of the latter to settle their obligation, Matrobank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage and the mortgaged property was sold to Metrobank as the highest bidder. Before the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the spouses Pahang filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale alleging that Metrobank bloated their obligation to frustrate their chances of paying the loan. After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, Metrobank consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed property and, thereafter, filed a petition for Writ of Possession. This was opposed by the spouses Pahang on the ground that the complaint filed by them is a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings before the court. Is the complaint filed by the spouses Pahang a prejudicial question to Metrobanks petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession? ANSWER: NO. A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The complaint of the petitioners for annulment of extrajudicial sale is a civil action and the respondents petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is but an incident in the land registration case and, therefore no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two actions. (Spouses Pahang vs Vestil, GR No. 148595, July 12, 2004) QUESTION No.3: Rodolfo and Marietta were married on March 5, 1959. On December 6, 1992, Rodolfo left the conjugal home and abandoned Marietta and their children. In the meantime, Rodolfo, who was desirous of contracting another marriage, filed a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Marrieta on the ground of psychological incapacity. Fully aware that Marrieta had already transferred to another residence, Rodolfo still indicated in his petition that summons can be served upon Marrieta in her previous address. As a consequence of which, Marrieta did not receive any summons and failed to file an answer. The court, upon motion, declared Marrieta in default and allowed Rodolfo to adduce evidence ex parte. The public prosecutor who appeared for the state offered no objection to the motion of Rodolfo. The court rendered a decision declaring the marriage of Rodolfo and Marrieta void ab initio. Was the grant of annulment of marriage by default proper? ANSWER: NO. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead,

should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application of legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. (Ancheta vs Ancheta, GR No. 145370, March 4, 2004) QUESTION No.4: Alfredo and Encarnacion were married on January 8, 1960. During the subsistence of their marriage, they acquired 100,000 shares of stock in Citycorp and registered the same in the name of Alfredo. On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc (PBMCI)obtained a loan from Allied Bank. As added security for the said loan, Alfredo, as the Executive Vice President of PBMCI executed a continuing guarantee with Allied Bank binding himself to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing to Allied Bank. PBMCI failed to settle its obligation with Allied Bank. Allied Bank filed an application for a writ of preliminary attachment which was granted by the court. As a consequence of which, the sheriff levied on attachment the 100,000 shares of Citycom stocks in the name of Alfredo. Encarnacion, assisted by Alfredo, thereafter filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. Should the Motion to Set Aside the levy on execution be granted? ANSWER: YES. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. It is not even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. As long as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. In this case, the evidence adduced by Encarnacion is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in Citycorp were issued and registered in its corporate books in the name of Alfredo when the said corporation was incorporated on May, 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of Alfredo and Encarnacion. The shares of stock are thus presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of Alfredo and Encarnacion. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp solely in the name of Alfredo does not constitute proof that Alfredo, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same. (Ching vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 124642, February 23, 2004) Note: Under the Family Code, Article 93, the presumption is that property acquired during the marriage belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those exclused therefrom. The presumption in Article 116 of the Family Code will only arise if the future spouses agree in their marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during the marriage pursuant to Article 105 FC.

PERSONS QUESTION: A, a German citizen, married B, a Filipina, in Germany and begot two children. In 1996, B filed an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage. In 1997, while a second motion to dismiss was pending, A obtained a decree of divorce in Germany which granted parental custody over their children to him. An order granting the Motion to Dismiss was issued because of the dissolution of the marriage. However, a motion asking that the case be set for hearing for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of their properties was granted and the lower Court issued an order partially setting aside the former order. Said order was opposed on the ground that there was nothing to be done anymore as the marital tie of the spouses had already been severed by the divorce decree and that the decree has already been recognized by the court in its order. Is the contention proper? Why? ANSWER: NO. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary (Roehr vs. Rodriguez,et.al., G.R.No.142820, June 20, 2003). QUESTION: What requisites must be complied with in order that there may be legal ratification of marital cohabitation? ANSWER: In order that there may be legal ratification of marital cohabitation, the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage (Manzano vs Sanchez) NOTE: With respect to the second and third requisites, the Supreme Court, in Ninal vs Bayadog, held that cohabitation for 5 years under this Article should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. It is therefore required that the parties must be without legal impediment not only at the time of marriage, but also at the time of the cohabitation. QUESTION: During their courtship period, Darwin consistently and persistently asked Margaret to have carnal knowledge with him. Margaret, however, would always tell Darwin to be patient and wait until after their wedding is over for she had made a vow to give up her virginity only after she had been lawfully wedded to her husband. During the night of their wedding day, Darwin discovered that Margaret was no longer a virgin, and the same was admitted by Margaret. Darwin thereafter filed an action to annul the marriage. a) Will the action prosper? b) What are the acts that constitute fraud that would warrant annulment of marriage? ANSWER: a) NO. The law provides that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for the annulment of marriage. (Art. 46, FC) b) Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in No.3, Art. 45, FC: 1. Non-disclosure of previous conviction by final judgment of the other part of a crime involving moral turpitude;

2. 3. 4.

Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband; Concealment of a sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.

QUESTION: A man complained about the sexual infidelity of his wife. Aside from that, he said that during the marriage, she turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extramarital affairs with several men including a Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim whom she married and with whom she had two children. When the Ibrahim left the country, she returned to the man bringing with her the two children which the man accepted as his own. But some time in December 1995, she abandoned him once again to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. During the trial, witness for the plaintiff declared the wife as suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity. This, he alleged amounted to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Does the aberrant sexual behavior of the wife fall within the term psychological incapacity? ANSWER: No. The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, her sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill to such extent that she could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that her promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is in fact, disclosed by the records was a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children. Her sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. (David B. Dedel vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004) QUESTION: What are the jurisprudential guidelines to prove psychological incapacity? ANSWER: 1. 2. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently proven by experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision 3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the of the celebration of the marriage; 4. Such incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; 5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of the marriage; 6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced in Arts. 68-71, Family Code as regards husband and wife, as well as Arts. 220, 221 and 225 of the same in regard to parents and their children; 7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; 8. The trial courts must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor general to appear as counsel for the State (Republic vs CA, Molina)

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For

indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. (REPUBLIC vs HAMANO, GR No. 149498, MAY 20, 2004) QUESTION: Under what grounds may the legitimacy of the child be impugned? ANSWER: The legitimacy of the child may be impugned only on the following grounds: 1. That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; 2. That it is proved that for biological or scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in par. 2, Art. 164, Family Code; or 3. That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence (Art. 166, Family Code). QUESTION: PNP Gen. Carlos and Corrina were married on August 18, 2002 without a marriage license. On August 18, 2004, Gen. Carlos contracted a subsequent marriage with Gwendolyn, this time, complying with all the essential and formal requisites outlined in Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code. On August 1, 2005 Gen. Carlos died. As a consequence of which, Corrina was able to collect P500,000 and Gwendolyn, P50,000 as death benefits. Gwendolyn now claims that she is entitled to of what Corrina received on the ground that she is the lawful wife of Gen. Carlos, alleging in support of her claim that the marriage between Gen. Carlos and Corrina was celebrated without a marriage license. a) What is the status of the marriage between Gen. Carlos and Corrina? b) Is Gwendolyn correct in claiming that her subsequent marriage with Gen. Carlos was valid and thus entitles her to a share of what Corrina received? c) Is Gwendolyn entitled to of what Corrina received? Why or why not? d) What is the property regime of Gen. Carlos and Corrina? ANSWERS: a) Art. 4 Family Code provides that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio. Hence, for having been celebrated without a marriage license, a formal requisite presrcibed in Article 3, Family Code, the marriage between Carlos and Corrina is void ab initio. b) NO. The fact remains that her marriage with Carlos was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of Corrina and the deceased Carlos void. Hence, the marriage of Gwendolyn and the deceased Carlos, is likewise null and void because the law requires that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remmariage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void (Art. 40, FC) and that a marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void (Art. 41, FC) c) NO. Article 148 provides, in part, that only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common. Considering that the marriage of Gwendolyn and Carlos is a bigamous marriage, the application of Article 148 is in order. The disputed P500,000, being remunerations, incentives, and benefits from the government earned by the deceased as a police officer, are not owned in common by Gwendolyn and the deceased, but belong to the latter alone and that Gwendolyn has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And Gwendolyn, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. (Carino vs Carino) d) The property regime between Gen. Carlos and Corrina is governed by article 147 of the Family Code which applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nontheless void for other reasons, like the absence of marriage license. Under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. (Carino vs Carino, GR No.132529, Fab.2, 2001)

QUESTION: When Elna and Bruno were still live-in partners, they purchased on installments a condominium unit as evidenced by a Contract to Sell between Bruno as buyer and JVSCC as seller. Upon completion of payment, title to the condominium was issued in the name of Elna. The two got married on March 14, 1985. This marriage was however later declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The lower court ruled that the condominium belonged to Bruno considering that it was purchased by exclusive funds from him prior to the marriage. Is the lower court correct? ANSWER: NO. The rule on co-ownership should govern in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code. In order for Article 147 to apply, the man and the woman (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. The disputed property was purchased on installment during the time when they were already living together. Hence it should be considered as their common property and hence, should be divided in accordance with the law on coownership. QUESTION: Rosalina married Isaac on November 17, 1974. During the subsistence of their marriage, Rosalina gave birth to Vicente. Isaac died on January 15, 1981. As a consequence of which, Rosalina and Vicente inherited a 5,000 square meter lot located in Cubao. Vicente died on January 18, 1999. Soon thereafter, Maria, claiming to be an illegitimate daughter of Vicente as evidenced by a birth certificate signed by the latter, filed a case for partition with damages against Rosalina. Rosalina however countered that the birth certificate signed by Vicente was insufficient to establish filiation. If you were the judge, will you sustain Rosalinas position? Explain. ANSWER: NO. The act of Vicente in signing the birth certificate of Maria was an act of acknowledgement of his paternity. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by: a) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or final judgment; or b) An admission of illegitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by : a) the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child; or b) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.(Article 175 in relation to Article 172, Family Code) The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or any authentic writing is in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. (Eceta vs Eceta, GR No. 157037, May 20, 2004). QUESTION: Can an illegitimate children use the surname of his father? ANSWER: YES. Article 176 of the Family Code has been amended by RA 9255, otherwise known as an Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use the Surname of their Father which was approved on February 4, 2004. The said law provides that illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through: a) the record of birth appearing in the civil register; or b) an admission in a public document or a private handwritten instrument. Provided that the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove nonfiliation during his lifetime.

QUESTION: Judge Salvador, an MTC judge of Bulatan, Camarines Sur visited his relatives in Nabua, Camarines Sur. Judge Salvador was approached by his brother Mario one morning and begged that he solemnize the marriage of the latters best friend Lino. Mario explained that the priest which was about to celebrate the marriage just died of heart attack and that the would be couple, their relatives and friends were already waiting as everything has already been prepared. In order not to embarrass his brother and out compassion to the parties concerned, he solemnized the marriage of Lino and Grace. Is the marriage valid? ANSWER: YES. In Mercedita vs Judge Occano (AM No. MTJ-02-1390, April 11, 2002), the facts of which are in fours with the case under consideration, the Supreme Court, citing Navarro vs Domagtoy, held that judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside of his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which, while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

PERSONS 1. Bon, a Filipino, got married to Naiz, an Australian citizen, but the marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree on May 18, 1989 issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, Bon became an Australian citizen and got married to Elaine on January 12, 1994. They lived separately without judicial decree. On March 3, 1998, Elaine filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Bon on the ground of bigamy stating that prior to the marriage, she did not know that her husband had a previous marriage. On July 7, 1998, Bon was able to obtain a decree of divorce from Elaine, hence he prayed in his answer to the complaint that it be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. The court dismissed the case on the basis of the divorce which dissolved the marriage and recognized the Philippines. Was the divorce between Elaine and Bon duly proven? NO, Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce, hence our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Arts. 15 and 17, NCC. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Art. 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws (Van Dorn vs. Romillo). The same must be proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient (Garcia vs. Recio; Roehr vs. Rodriguez, June 20, 2003). 2. Au and Jay are married without a valid license. During their marriage, Jay contracted a subsequent marriage with Jen. Au discovered that Jay was cohabiting with Jen and that he was disposing of their properties without her consent. A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed by Au. Jay filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action it being superfluous and unnecessary, their marriage being void. Is Jays contention tenable? NO. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is explicitly required either as cause of action or a defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void (Art. 40, FC). With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

3. In 1975, Roberto, a Filipino pensioner of the U.S Govt., contracted a bigamous marriage with Joan, despite the fact that his first wife, Sofie, was still living. In 1977, Roberto and Joan jointly bought a parcel of riceland, with the title being placed jointly in their names. Shortly thereafter, they purchased a house and lot which was placed in Joans name alone as the buyer. In 1981, Roberto died and Sofie promptly filed an action against Joan to recover both the Riceland and the house and lot claiming them to be conjugal property of the first marriage. Joan contends that she is the owner of the house and lot and the Riceland is co-owned by her and Roberto. Assuming that Joan fails to prove that she had actually used her own money in either purchase, how do you decide the case? Sofies action to recover both the Riceland and the house and lot is well founded. Both are conjugal property in view of the failure of Joan to prove that her own money was used in the purchases made. The Supreme Court, in one case applies Article 148 of the Family Code despite the fact that the husbands death took place prior to the effectivity of the said law. However, even under Article 144 of the Civil Code, the same conclusion would have been reached in view of the bigamous nature of the second marriage. 4. Jun and Angel signed a marriage contract but their marriage was not solemnized. Subsequently, Jun married Rhea. Can Jun be liable for bigamy? NO. The subsequent marriage of Jun and Rhea is valid. Since the marriage of Jun and Angel was not solemnized, Jun cannot be charged with bigamy when he contracted a second marriage. The mere signing of the marriage contract was a mere private act. Thus, the marriage of Jun and Angelica did not exist in the eyes of the law (Morigo vs. People). 5. George and Cynthia Abad, both Filipino citizens, contracted marriage in 1990. Sometime in 1996, George and Cynthia, together with their two children, migrated to the United States. After two years of stay in the US, their marriage turned sour. As a consequence, Cynthia and their two children went back to the Philippines. After George successfully obtained US citizenship, he filed for a divorce and was granted by the court. Subsequently, George went back to the Philippines and married his childhood friend, Marian. What is the status of the marriage of George and Marian? Explain. The marriage of George and Marian is void ab initio because it is a bigamous marriage contracted by George during the subsistence of his marriage with Cynthia. The marriage of George and Marian does not validly exist. Art. 26 of the Family Code do not apply because the marriages covered by the said provision are only mixed marriages from the very beginning. In addition, Art. 15 of the New Civil Code provides that regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. 6. Pam and Toshio, a Japanese national started a common-law relationship in Japan. The two thereafter lived in the Philippines. After some time, Pam gave birth to their child. Pam and Toshio were married under a civil ceremony. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas. That promise was not fulfilled as Toshio never came back to them. Toshio likewise stopped giving financial support to her and their child. Pam then filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. a. Were the alleged acts of abandonment and irresponsibility of Toshio amount to psychological incapacity? NO. The guidelines under Republic vs. Molina incorporate three basic requirements: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of

evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. If the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. However, the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some psychological illness. b. Is Pam entitled to moral damages? NO. Pam cannot claim moral damages unless there is evidence that the marriage was done deliberately and with malice by Toshio who had knowledge of his disability and willfully concealed it. Since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must discharge or assume, it removes the basis for the contention that Toshio purposely deceived Pam (Buenaventura vs. Buenaventura, March 31, 2005). c. Assuming that the marriage is declared void by reason of psychological incapacity, what shall be the effects of such void marriage? The effects of a marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity are as follows: (1) The property relation is co-ownership; (2) The same shall be partitioned and distributed equally; and (3) Properties acquired are prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts and industry. 7. Ismael, a wealthy business man, is married to Noeli with three children. During their marriage, Ismael had an affair with Vida, and a child named John, was born out of such union. When Ismael died, VIda filed an action to compel the children of Ismael and Noeli to recognize John as Ismaels illegitimate son. Will the action prosper? NO. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy. Secondly, only the husband, and in exceptional cases, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of the child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour (Liyao, Jr. vs. Liyao, Mar.7, 2002). 8. Sharlyne holds a public document signed by her alleged father, containing an admission of legitimate filiation. Is there a need for Sharlyne to seek a decree of recognition from the courts? NO. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public instrument or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned is a complete act of recognition without need of court action (De Jesus vs. De Jesus, Oct. 2, 2001). 9. Jem and John contracted marriage without a valid marriage license. Subsequently, Jem and Edwin contracted another marriage. John then filed a criminal action for bigamy against Jem. On the other hand, Jem filed a civil case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to John. Jem claimed that the civil case constitutes a prejudicial question in the criminal case for bigamy. Is the contention of Jem tenable? Explain. NO. The elements of a prejudicial question are the following: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In the case at bar, the criminal action for bigamy was instituted or filed ahead of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of marriage. The civil case must be filed ahead of a criminal case in order to be considered a prejudicial question.

Moreover, as held in Mercado vs. Tan, it is only a judicially declared prior void marriage which can constitute a defense against a criminal charge for bigamy. The previous void marriage of A and B must be judicially declared a nullity before A can use it a defense in the criminal action instituted by B.

MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED TOPICS IN CIVIL LAW

Source: U.P. Law Center
Persons and Family Relations
TOPIC: REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE (1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002) I What is the status of the following marriages and why? A. B. C. D. E. A marriage between two 19-year olds without parental consent. A marriage between two 21-year olds without parental advice. A marriage between two Filipino first cousins in Spain where such marriage is valid. A marriage between two Filipinos in Hong Kong before a notary public. A marriage solemnized by a town mayor three towns away from his jurisdiction. (1999)

ANSWERS: A. The marriage is voidable. The consent of the parties to the marriage was defective. Being below 21 years old, the consent of the parties is not full without the consent of their parents. The consent of the parents of the parties to the marriage is indispensable for its validity. B. Between 21-year olds, the marriage is valid despite the absence of parental advice, because such absence is merely an irregularity affecting a formal requisite i.e., the marriage licenseand does not affect the validity of the marriage itself. This is without prejudice to the civil, criminal, or administrative liability of the party responsible therefore. C. By reason of public policy, the marriage between Filipino first cousins is void [Art. 38, par. (1), FC], and the fact that it is considered a valid marriage in a foreign country in this case, Spaindoes not validate it, being an exception to the general rule in Art. 26 of said Code which accords validity to all marriages solemnized outside the Philippines x x x and valid there as such. D. It depends. If the marriage before the notary public is valid under Hong Kong law, the marriage is valid in the Philippines. Otherwise, the marriage that is invalid in Hong Kong will be invalid in the Philippines. E. Under the Local Government Code, a town mayor may validly solemnize a marriage but said law is silent as to the territorial limits for the exercise by a town mayor of such authority. However, by analogy, with the authority of members of the judiciary to solemnize a marriage, it would seem that the mayor did not have the requisite authority to solemnize a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction. Hence, the marriage is void, unless it was contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the mayor had the legal authority to solemnize this particular marriage [Art. 35, par. (2), FC]. ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:

C. The marriage is void. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a marriage valid where celebrated is valid in the Philippines except those marriages enumerated in said Article which marriages will remain void even though valid where solemnized. The marriage between first cousins is one of those marriages enumerated therein, hence, it is void even though valid in Spain where it was celebrated. D. If the two Filipinos believed in good faith that the Notary Public is authorized to solemnize marriage, then the marriage is valid. E. The marriage is valid. Under the Local Government Code, the authority of a mayor to solemnize marriages is not restricted within his municipality implying that he has the authority even outside the territory thereof. Hence, the marriage he solemnized outside his municipality is valid. And even assuming that his authority is restricted within his municipality, such marriage will, nevertheless, be valid because solemnizing the marriage outside said municipality is a mere irregularity applying by analogy the case of Navarro vs. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the celebration by a judge of a marriage outside the jurisdiction of his court is a mere irregularity that did not affect the validity of the marriage notwithstanding Article 7 of the Family Code which provides that an incumbent member of the judiciary is authorized to solemnize marriages only within the courts jurisdiction. OTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS: C. By reason of Article 15 in relation to Article 38 of the Civil Code, which applies to Filipinos wherever they are, the marriage is void. E. The marriage is void because the mayor has no authority to solemnize marriage outside his jurisdiction. II On Valentines Day, 1996, Elias and Fely, both single and 25 years of age, went to the city hall where they sought out a fixer to help them obtain a quickie marriage. For a fee, the fixer produced an ante-dated marriage license for them, issued by the Civil Registrar of a small remote municipality. He then brought them to a licensed minister in a restaurant behind the city hall, and the latter solemnized their marriage right there and then. A. Is their marriage valid, void, or voidable? B. Would your answer be the same if it should turn out that the marriage license was spurious? Explain. (1996) ANSWERS: A. The marriage is valid. The irregularity in the issuance of a valid license does not adversely affect the validity of the marriage. The marriage license is valid because it was in fact issued by a Civil Registrar (Arts. 3 and 4, FC). B. No, the answer would not be the same. The marriage would be void because of the absence of a formal requisite. In such a case, there was actually no valid marriage license. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: A. It depends. If both or one of the parties was a member of the religious sect of the solemnizing officer, the marriage is valid. If none of the parties is a member of the sect and both of them were aware of the fact, the marriage is void. They cannot claim good faith in believing that the solemnizing officer was authorized because the scope of the authority of the solemnizing officer is a matter of law. If, however, one of the parties believed in good faith that the other was a member of the sect, then the marriage is valid under Article 35(2), FC. In that case, the party in good faith is acting under a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law.

TOPIC: PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE (1989, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000) I In 1973, Mauricio, a Filipino pensioner of the U.S. Government, contracted a bigamous marriage with Erlinda, despite the fact that his first wife, Carol, was still living. In 1975, Mauricio and Erlinda jointly bought a parcel of Riceland, with the title being placed jointly in their names. Shortly thereafter, they purchased another property (a house and lot) which was placed in her name alone as the buyer. In 1981, Mauricio died, and Carol promptly filed an action against Erlinda to recover both the Riceland and the house and lot, claiming them to be conjugal property of the first marriage. Erlinda contends that she and the late Mauricio were co-owners of the Riceland; and with respect to the house and lot, she claims she is the exclusive owner. Assuming she fails to prove that she had actually used her own money in either purchase, how do you decide the case? (1998) ANSWER: Carols action to recover both the Riceland and the house and lot is well-founded. Both are conjugal property in view of the failure of Erlinda, the wife in a bigamous marriage, to prove that her own money was used in the purchases made. The Supreme Court in a case applied Art. 148, Family Code, despite the fact that the husbands death took place prior to the effectivity of said law. However, even under Art. 144, Civil Code, the same conclusion would have been reached in view of the bigamous nature of the second marriage. ANOTHER ANSWER: Under Art. 148 of the FC, which applies to bigamous marriages, only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Moreover, if one of the parties is validly married to another, his share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community/conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. Thus, in this case, since Erlinda failed to prove that she used her own money to buy the Riceland and house and lot, she cannot claim to be the co-owner of the Riceland nor the exclusive owner of the house and lot. Such properties are Mauricios. And since his share accrues to the conjugal partnership with carol, Carol can validly claim such properties to the exclusion of Erlinda (Art. 144, Civil Code). II In 1970, Bob and Issa got married without executing a marriage settlement. In 1975, Bob inherited from his father a residential lot upon which, in 1981, he constructed a two-room bungalow with savings from his own earnings. At that time, the lot was worth P800,000 while the house, when finished cost P600,000. In 1989, Bob died, survived only by his wife, Issa and his mother, Sofia. Assuming that the relative values of both assets remained at the same proportion: A. State whether Sofia can rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal but exclusive property of her deceased son. B. Will your answer be the same if Bob died before August 3, 1988? (1998) ANSWERS: A. Since Bob and Issa got married in 1970, then the law that governs is the New Civil Code (Persons), in which case, the property relations that should be applied as regards the property of the spouses is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains (Art. 119, Civil Code). By conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry (Article 142, Civil Code). In this instance, the lot inherited by Bob in 1975 is his own separate property, he having acquired the same by lucrative title (Art. 148, par. 2, Civil Code). However, the house constructed from his own savings in 1981 during the subsistence of his marriage with Issa is conjugal property and not exclusive property in accordance with the principle of reverse accession provided for in Art. 158, Civil Code.

B. Yes, the answer would still be the same. Since Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way back in 1970, then the property relations that will govern is still the relative community or conjugal partnership of gains (Art. 119, Civil Code). It will not matter if Bob died before or after August 3, 1988 (effectivity of the Family Code), what matters is the date when the marriage was contracted. As Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way back in 1970, the property relation that governs them is still the conjugal partnership of gains. (Art. 158, Civil Code) ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS: A. Sofia, being her deceased sons legal heir concurring with his surviving spouse (Arts. 985, 986, and 997, Civil Code), may rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal but belong to the hereditary estate of Bob, the value of the land being more than the cost of the improvement (Art. 120, FC). B. If Bob died before August 3, 1988, which is the date the Family Code took effect, the answer will not be the same. Art. 158, Civil Code, would then apply. The land would then be deemed conjugal, along with the house, since conjugal funds were used in constructing it. The husbands estate would be entitled to reimbursement of the value of the land from conjugal partnership funds.

III For five years since 1989, Tony, a bank vice-president, and Susan, an entertainer, live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were capacitated to marry each other. Since Tonys salary was more than enough for their needs, Susan stopped working and merely kept the house. During that period, Tony was able to buy a lot and house in a plush subdivision. However, after five years, Tony and Susan decided to separate. A. Who will be entitled to the house and lot? B. Would it make any difference if Tony could not marry Susan because he was previously married to Alice from whom he is legally separated? (2000) ANSWERS: A. Tony and Susan are entitled to the house and lot as co-owners in equal shares. Under Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the property acquired during their cohabitation are presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts , work or industry and shall be owned by then in equal shares. This is true even though the efforts of one of them consisted merely in his or her care and maintenance of the family and of the household. B. Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when the parties to the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment, only those properties acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. The efforts of one of the parties in maintaining the family and household are not considered adequate contribution in the acquisition of the properties. Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the house and lot, she has no share therein. If Tony cohabited with Susan after his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot is his exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan before his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot belongs to his community or partnership with Alice. IV

Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Luis is gainfully employed. Rizza is not employed, stays at home, and takes charge of the household chores. After living together for a little over twenty years, Luis was able to save from his salary earnings during that period the amount of P200,000 presently deposited in a bank. A house and lot worth P500,000 was recently purchased for the same amount by the couple. Of the P500,000 used by the common-law spouses to purchase the property, P200,000 had come from the sale of palay harvested from the hacienda owned by Luis and P300,000 from the rentals of a building belonging to Rizza. In fine, the sum of P500,000 had been part of the fruits received during the period of cohabitation from their separate property. A car worth P100,000 being used by the common-law spouses, was donated just months ago to Rizza by her parents. Luis and Rizza now decide to terminate their cohabitation, and they ask you to give them your legal advice on the following: A. How, under the law, should the bank deposit of P200,000, the house and lot valued at P500,000 and the car worth P100,000 be allocated to them? B. What would your answer be (to the above question) had Luis and Rizza been living together all the time, i.e., since twenty years ago, under a valid marriage? (1997) ANSWERS: A. Art. 147 of the FC provides in part that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules of co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. A party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Thus: 1) The wages and salaries of Luis in the amount of P200,000 shall be divided equally between Luis and Rizza. 2) The house and lot valued at P500,000 having been acquired by both of them through work or industry shall be divided between them in proportion to their respective contribution, in consonance with the rules on co-ownership. Hence, Luis gets 2/5 while Rizza gets 3/5 of P500,000. 3) The car worth P100,000 shall be exclusively owned by Rizza, the same having been donated to her by her parents. B. The property relations between Luis and Rizza, their marriage having been celebrated 20 years ago (under the Civil Code) shall be governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, under which the husband and wife place in common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouse shall be divided equally between them (Art. 142, Civil Code). Thus: 1) The salary of Luis deposited in the bank in the amount of P200,000 and the house and lot valued at P500,000 shall be divided equally between Luis and Rizza. 2) However, the car worth P100,000 donated to Rizza by her parents shall be considered to her own paraphernal property, having been acquired by lucrative title (par.2, Art.148, Civil Code) TOPIC: DECLARATION OF NULLITY

ANNULMENT (grounds, declarations and effects) (1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002) LEGAL SEPARATION (grounds and effects) (1989, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2002) I Bert and Baby were married to each other on December 23, 1988. Six months later, she discovered that he was a drug addict. Efforts to have him rehabilitated were unsuccessful. Can Baby ask for annulment of marriage, or legal separation? Explain. (1996) ANSWER: No, Baby cannot ask for annulment of her marriage or for legal separation because both these actions have already prescribed. While concealment of drug addiction existing at the time of marriage constitutes fraud under Art. 46 of the FC which makes the marriage voidable under Art. 45 of the FC, the action must, however, be brought within 5 years from the discovery thereof under Article 47(3), FC. Since the drug addiction of Bert was discovered by Baby in June 1989, the action had already prescribed in June of 1994. Although drug addiction is a ground for legal separation under Art. 55(5) and Art. 57 of the FC requires that the action must be brought within 5 years from the occurrence of the cause. Since Bert had been a drug addict from the time of the celebration of the marriage, the action for legal separation must have been brought not later than 23 December 1993. Hence, Baby cannot, now, bring action for legal separation. II A. Give a brief definition or explanation of the term "psychological incapacity" as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage. B. If existing at the inception of marriage, would the state of being of unsound mind or the concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism be considered indicia of psychological incapacity? Explain. C. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, would these constitute grounds for a declaration of nullity or for legal separation, or would they render the marriage voidable? (2002) ANSWERS: A. "Psychological incapacity" is a mental disorder of the most serious type showing the incapability of one or both spouses to comply with the essential marital obligations of love, respect, cohabitation, mutual help and support, trust and commitment. It must be characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability and its root causes must be clinically identified or examined. (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 1995]) B. ln the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Supreme Court held that being of unsound mind, drug addiction, habituaI alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality may be indicia of psychological incapacity, depending on the degree of severity of the disorder. However, the concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality is a ground for annulment of marriage. C. ln accordance with law, if drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they: 1) Will not constitute as grounds for declaration of nullity (Art 36, Family Code); 2) Will constitute as grounds for legal separation (Art. 55, FC); and 3) Will not constitute as grounds to render the marriage voidable (Art. 45 and 46, FC). III

Cadio and Corona contracted marriage on June 1, 1982. A few days after the marriage, Corona discovered that Cadio was a homosexual. As homosexuality was not a ground for legal separation under the Civil Code, there was nothing that Corona could do but bear with her problem. The couple, however, started to live separately. With the enactment of the Family Code, Corona decided to be legally separated from Cadio based on the new ground of homosexuality. Corona brought her action for legal separation on September 15, 1988. Will the action prosper? Give your reasons. (1989) ANSWER: Yes, the action will prosper because the cause arose only on August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code, and the action had not yet prescribed. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The action will prosper. The offense of homosexuality as a continuing offense can be a ground for legal separation. The prescriptive period of five years will apply only when the offense has a fixed period of time and, therefore, the date of its occurrence can be computed. A. RN and DM, without any impediment to marry each other had been living together without benefit of church blessings. Their common-law union resulted in the birth of ZMN. Two years later, they got married in a civil ceremony. Could ZMN be legitimated? Reason (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: A. ZMN was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of RN and DM because at the time he was conceived, RN and DM could have validly married each other. Under the Family Code, children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the formers conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other are legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents.