MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE 11. ALMARIO VS PHIL. AIRLINES G.R. No.

170928 DIGESTED BY: CHRISTINA ANGELI ESPINA

Sept. 11, 2007

FACTS: Vicente S. Almario (Almario), was hired by PAL as a Boeing 747 Systems Engineer. On April 28, 1995, Almario, then about 39 years of age and a Boeing 737 First Officer at PAL, successfully bid for the higher position of Airbus 300 First Officer. Since said higher position required additional training, he underwent, at PALs expense, more than five months of training consisting of ground schooling in Manila and flight simulation in Melbourne,Australia. But after completing the training course and after 8 months of service, he rendered his resignation for personal reasons. PAL then wrote Almario stating that they invested heavily on his professional training on the basis that he would continue to serve the Company for a definite period of time which is approximately 3 years and urged him to reconsider his resignation or reimburse the Company in the amount equivalent to the cost of his professional training and the damaged caused to the Company. Despite this, Almario pushed through with his resignation. Hence, a reimbursement case was filed. RTC ruled in favour in favor of Almario. CA reversed the trial courts decision under Article 22 of the Civil Code (unjust enrichment). RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: There exists an innominate contract of do ut facias (I give that you may do) with Almario in that by spending for his training, he would render service to it until the costs of training were recovered in at least three (3) years. This is based on Article XXIII, Section 1 of the 1991-1994 CBA and which was taken from the decision of the Secretary of Labor: Pilots fifty-seven (57) years of age shall be frozen in their position. Pilots who are less than fifty-seven (57) years of age provided they have previously qualified in any companys turbojet aircraft shall be permitted to occupy any position in the companys turbo-jet fleet. The reason why pilots who are 57 years of age are no longer qualified to bid for a higher position is because they have only three (3) years left before the mandatory retirement age [of 60] and to send them to training at that age, PAL would no longer be able to recover whatever training expenses it will have to incur. PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Almario insists on the absence of any written contract or explicit provision in the CBA obliging him to reimburse the costs incurred by PAL for his training. He argues that no unjust enrichment because petitioner was entitled to the benefit of training when his bid was accepted, and x x x PAL did not suffer any injury because the failure to include a reimbursement provision in the CBA was freely entered into by the negotiating parties ISSUE: W/N Almario is obliged to reimburse PAL for the cost of his training. HELD: The reason behind the three-year period in the Article XXIII, Section 1 of the 1991-1994 CBA is the prohibitive training costs. At an earlier time, when the CBA between PAL and its employees were still negotiated, the Secretary of Labor ruled that PAL should be allowed a return on investment for their pilots training expenses. Thus, the provisions that pilots 57 years of age shall be frozen and pilots less than 57, provided they have previously qualified in any companys turbo-jet aircraft, shall be permitted to occupy any position in the companys turbo-jet fleet, were incorporated in later incarnations of the CBA. It bears noting that when Almario took the training course, he was about 39 years old, 21 years away from the retirement age of 60. Hence, with the maturity, expertise, and experience he gained from the training course, he was expected to serve PAL for at least three years to offset the prohibitive costs thereof. The pertinent provision of the CBA and its rationale aside, contrary to Almarios claim, Article 22 of the Civil Code applies. This provision on unjust enrichment recognizes the principle that one may not enrich himself at the expense of another. Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It may consist of some positive pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony of the defendant, such as: (1) the enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff; (2) the benefits from service rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or personal; (4) the increase of value of property of the defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the acquisition of a right of preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a right in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the conditions of life of the defendant. The enrichment of the defendant must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage, or injury to the plaintiff. This prejudice may consist, not only of the loss of property or the deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of non-payment ofcompensation for a prestation or service rendered to the defendant without intent to donate on the part of the plaintiff, or the failure to acquire something which the latter would have obtained. The injury to the plaintiff, however, need not be the cause of the enrichment of the defendant. It is enough that there be some relation between them, that the enrichment of the defendant would not have been produced had it not been for the fact from which the injury to the plaintiff is derived.

In the present case, PAL invested for the training of Almario on the expectation that they may recover by availing of Almarios services for at least three years. This expectation was not fully realized, however, due to Almarios resignation after only eight months of service following the completion of his training course. He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of training without violating the principle of unjust enrichment.