IRAQ SUNNI KURD vs.

SHIITE MUSLIMS 1980s LAURA MCGEE

During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the regime implemented anti-Kurdish policies and a de facto civil war broke out. Iraq was widely condemned by the international community, but was never seriously punished for oppressive measures such as the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of civilians, the wholesale destruction of thousands of villages and the deportation of thousands of Kurds to southern and central Iraq. The genocidal campaign, conducted between 1986 and 1989 and culminating in 1988, carried out by the Iraqi government against the Kurdish population was called Anfal ("Spoils of War"). The Anfal campaign led to destruction of over two thousand villages and killing of 182,000 Kurdish civilians.[71] The campaign included the use of ground offensives, aerial bombing, systematic destruction of settlements, mass deportation, firing squads, and chemical attacks, including the most infamous attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988 that killed 5000 civilians instantly. On 17 September, in a statement addressed to the Iraqi parliament, Saddam stated that "The frequent and blatant Iranian violations of Iraqi sovereignty...have rendered the 1975 Algiers Agreement null and void... This river...must have its Iraqi-Arab identity restored as it was throughout history in name and in reality with all the disposal rights emanating from full sovereignty over the river.",[43] The objectives of Iraq's invasion of Iran were 1. Control of the Arvand river waterway by Iraqis 2. Acquisition of the three islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, on behalf of the UAE 3. Annexation of Khuzestan to Iraq 4. Prevent the spread of the Islamic Revolution in the region

Sunni-Shia Relations in Iraq

Iraq Table of Contents Until the 1980s, the dominant view of contemporary political analysts held that Iraq was badly split along sectarian lines. The claim was that the Sunnis--although a minority--ran Iraq and subjected the majority Shias to systematic discrimination. According to the prevailing belief, the Shias would drive the Sunnis from power, if once afforded an opportunity to do so. There was some basis to this notion. For many years Iraq was ruled by-and-large by Arab Sunnis who tended to come from a restricted area around Baghdad, Mosul, and Ar Rutbah-the socalled Golden Triangle. In the 1980s, not only was President Saddam Husayn a Sunni, but he was the vice chairman of the ruling Baath Party (Arab Socialist Resurrection). One of the two deputy prime ministers and the defense minister were also Sunnis. In addition, the top posts in the security services have usually been held by Sunnis, and most of the army's corps commanders have been Sunnis. It is also true that the most depressed region of the country is the south, where the bulk of the Shias reside. Nonetheless, the theory of sectarian strife was undercut by the behavior of Iraq's Shia community during Iran's 1982 invasion and the fighting thereafter. Although about threequarters of the lower ranks of the army were Shias, as of early 1988, no general insurrection of Iraq; Shias had occurred. Even in periods of major setback for the Iraqi army--such as the Al Faw debacle in 1986--the Shias have continued staunchly to defend their nation and the Baath regime. They have done so despite intense propaganda barrages mounted by the Iranians, calling on them to join the Islamic revolution. It appears, then, that, however important sectarian affiliation may have been in the past, in the latter 1980s nationalism was the basic determiner of loyalty. In the case of Iraq's Shias, it should be noted that they are Arabs, not Persians, and that they have been the traditional enemies of the Persians for centuries. The Iraqi government has skillfully exploited this ageold enmity in its propaganda, publicizing the war as part of the ancient struggle between the Arab and Persian empires. For example, Baathist publicists regularly call the war a modern day "Qadisiyah." Qadisiyah was the battle in A.D.637 in which the Arabs defeated the pagan hosts of Persia, enabling Islam to spread to the East. The real tension in Iraq in the latter 1980s was between the majority of the population, Sunnis as well as Shias, for whom religious belief and practice were significant values, and the secular Baathists, rather than between Sunnis and Shias. Although the Shias had been underrepresented in government posts in the period of the monarchy, they made substantial progress in the educational, business, and legal fields. Their advancement in other areas,

such as the opposition parties, was such that in the years from 1952 to 1963, before the Baath Party came to power, Shias held the majority of party leadership posts. Observers believed that in the late 1980s Shias were represented at all levels of the party roughly in proportion to government estimates of their numbers in the population. For example, of the eight top Iraqi leaders who in early 1988 sat with Husayn on the Revolutionary Command Council--Iraq's highest governing body-- three were Arab Shias (of whom one had served as Minister of Interior), three were Arab Sunnis, one was an Arab Christian, and one a Kurd. On the Regional Command Council--the ruling body of the party--Shias actually predominated. During the war, a number of highly competent Shia officers have been promoted to corps commanders. The general who turned back the initial Iranian invasions of Iraq in 1982 was a Shia. The Shias continued to make good progress in the economic field as well during the 1980s. Although the government does not publish statistics that give breakdowns by religious affiliation, qualified observers noted that many Shias migrated from rural areas, particularly in the south, to the cities, so that not only Basra but other cities including Baghdad acquired a Shia majority. Many of these Shias prospered in business and the professions as well as in industry and the service sector. Even those living in the poorer areas of the cities were generally better off than they had been in the countryside. In the rural areas as well, the educational level of Shias came to approximate that of their Sunni counterparts. In summary, prior to the war the Baath had taken steps toward integrating the Shias. The war placed inordinate demands on the regime for manpower, demands that could only be met by levying the Shia community--and this strengthened the regime's resolve to further the integration process. In early 1988, it seemed likely that when the war ends, the Shias would emerge as full citizens-- assuming that the Baath survives the conflict.
Source: U.S. Library of Congress

Kurds: Kurds represent 25 per cent of the Iraqi population. Many Kurds hold dreams of an independent

Kurdish state, this is unlikely to be achieved given the vehement opposition of Turkey and other regional powers; Turkey launched air raids on the Kurdish region in 2007, claiming that Kurdish rebels had been using the region as a base for attacks on Turkish soil. The Kurdish region was officially recognised as an independent federal Region of Iraq in the Iraqi Constitution ratified in 2005. It is governed by the Kurdish Regional Government run by a President, Prime Minister, a National Assembly and its own Constitution.

ShiaSunni discord in Iraq starts with disagreement over the relative population of the two groups. According to most sources, including the CIA's World Factbook, the majority of Iraqis are Shia Arab Muslims (around 65%), and Sunnis represent about 32% of the population.[57] However, Sunni are split ethnically between Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen. Many Sunnis hotly dispute their minority status, Sunnah and Shi'a are two sects of Islam, very much like Catholicism and Protestantism.

Sunni roughly refers to adherents to the precedence set by the Prophet Mohammed. They are more or less the "orthodox" Muslims. There are four major Sunni sub-sects. The overwhelming majority of Iraqi (and probably world) Sunnis follow the Hanafi doctrine. This is named after the revered scholar Abu Haneefa who is buried in the Adhamiya district of Baghdad. Shiite (or Shia) roughly means "followers" or "cohorts" of Imam Ali, the Prophet's cousin, protg and son-in-law. Shiites believe that Imam Ali (and his sons) should have succeeded the Prophet in running the affairs of the Muslim nation. Imam Ali, the fourth Caliph (successor) moved the Islamic capital from Medina near Mecca to Kufa in Iraq. He is buried in Najaf - hence the religious significance of Najaf. The desert city actually evolved around his shrine. Najaf has what is probably the largest cemetery in the world. Most Shiites (religious and not) prefer to be buried there. The technicalities of theological differences may not be of much interest to most of the readers and will therefore not be mentioned only differences relating to the present day topics will be briefly outlined. One notable difference worth mentioning is that Shiites believe in the Resurrection of the "Absent 12th Imam", who disappeared in childhood and who, on his return, will fill the earth with Peace and Justice. He is called al Mehdi (or Mahdi)- hence the name "Mehdi Army" of Moqtada al Sadr. The site of his disappearance is in Samarra, in the heart of what is now known as the Sunni triangle!! Sunnis generally go to mosques; Shiites go to Husseineyyahs. A Husseineyyah is, for all intents and purposes, a mosque where, in addition to the usual prayers and services, additional services are performed in mourning of the Imam Hussein [Imam Ali's son and Profit Muhammad's grandson who is buried in Kerbala and who is much revered by most Muslims but particularly by Shiites for his heroic stand for what he believed in, in the face of certain death. In an uneven battle, he and all 72 of his extended family were massacred]. Another notable difference is that the Shiites, being generally outside governance for the past 14 centuries, have developed strict and independent academic rules for the hierarchy of their clergy, and consequently hold them in higher reverence. Rise within the hierarchy is primarily on academic theological merit, determined by peers. The Sunnis, on the other hand, as a rule, have their clergy appointed by the powers of the day and are therefore generally, but not always, regarded as almost "government officials". Consequently, contemporary clergy are not held with the same regard. For centuries, the "Hawza" in Najaf has been more or less the Supreme University for the Shiite clergy world-wide. Senior clergy had much sway over the religious Shiite population all over the world. During the past 30 years, two factors led to a significant shift in the role of the Najaf Hawza: one was the continuous pressure and harassment of the Saddam regime; the other was Khomeini's revolution in Iran. For decades, the Hawza in Qum, Iran played a more significant influence than Najaf, especially in Iran.

The once-supreme influence of the Najaf Hawza on Iran's Shiite population is now much reduced. Devout Shiites generally willingly pay the equivalent of 20% of their yearly profits to the clergy of their choosing. Similar donations used to come from all over the world. This of course means considerable liquidity at the disposal of senior clergy. There is nothing equivalent to this in the Sunni doctrine, apart from sporadic donations by philanthropists. Sunnis are a majority in the Arab and the Muslim world. In Iraq, Shiites are a majority. The vast majority of Kurds are Sunnis. Turkmen are mostly Sunni. Within the Arab population of Iraq, the Sunni and Shiite doctrines are not related in any way to any ethnic or racial differences. As with other sects in Islam, there is no question regarding the ultimate source of all their belief: it's the Koran the word of God. One source, one book, one code differences are in the interpretation of things not specifically mentioned. All sects also agree on the precedence set by the practices established by the Prophet Mohammed (the Sunnah) except for some differences regarding the reliability of different source and references. Differences stem from questions of details of practice or life, government, marriage, inheritance, minor differences in prayer time, determining when the moon is born, etc.

Kurdish Revolt1983-1988 During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Iraqi Kurds, aided by Iran, fought against Iraqi government forces. In 1987 and 1988, the Iraqi military used chemical weapons to kill thousands of Kurds (including many civilians) in a successful effort to break the back of the resistance.

The First Persian Gulf War (also known as the Iran-Iraq War)1980-1988 - In 1975, Iraq and Iran came to an agreement on the disputed Shatt al-Arab waterway which provides Iraqs only outlet to the sea. In exchange for Iran stopping support for Kurdish rebels, Iraq agreed to share the Shatt al-Arab with Iran. This and other disputes over their common border, plus the belief that the 1979 revolution had weakened Iran, led Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to launch an invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980. After initial successes, the Iraqi army ground to a halt and soon retreated under repeated assaults by the numerically larger Iranian Army and Revolutionary Guards. After the Iranians pushed the war into Iraq, Saddams forces began using chemical weapons. By 1988, both nations faced exhaustion and, after nearly a million casualties between them, agreed to end the conflict.