The Inevitable Destabilization of the Argentine Military Junta (1976-1983) and the Rapid Escalation of Democracy as a result of the

Falklands War The fall of the second Peronist administration under Isabella Peron would see the introduction of one of Latin America's most infamous and brutal military dictatorships ever witnessed. Known in English as the National Reorganization Process, this self-imposed political authority would seek to deconstruct years of Peronist political and economic strategies, while simultaneously attempting to legitimize and justify its continued existence. The method of gaining such sought after recognition would come via the constant need for objectives that created unity within the regime, as well as proof of effective completion of these tasks.1 These requirements would prove to be the hardest task faced by the regime as crises after crises continuously undermined their reputation as an efficient governing body, and thereby begun to fracture the unity of leadership. After a series of repeated failures and embarrassments that brought the dictatorship to the brink of implosion, the junta under the head of president Leopoldo Galtieri launched an invasion of the long contested Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in an effort to stir national sentiment and close growing political divisions. What transpired would become a complete catastrophe for the regime and ultimately end in the removal of military government and a return to representative elections. Due to the the close proximity of the Falklands debacle and the end of the regime, many believe that the collapse resulted from the effects of military defeat. This view is obscured as for years before 1982 the junta had been straining evermore under the weight of disunity and inefficiency; what the war ultimately accomplished was an escalation of a by now inevitable return to democracy. The coup of 1976 that resulted in the overthrow of the Peronists was viewed by the conspirators as a consequence of years of a stagnant economy, out of control inflation, and what the regime termed as leftist terrorism.2 Once the removal of the problematic Peronists from office was complete however,
1 Pion-Berlin, David. The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina:1976-198. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol.27 No.2 (Summer 1985): 57. 2 Schumacher, Edward. Argentina and Democracy. Foreign Affairs, Vol.62 No. 5 (Summer 1984): 1075.

there was the issue of what should be done to ensure effective government and a return of stability to the country. As time progressed it soon became apparent that the military conspirators held no intentions of letting the government return to civil rule. Rather, it was their belief that in order to save and maintain the unity of the nation they must stay in power at all costs. Indeed, numerous officers were of the opinion that at least a term of ten to fifteen years were needed to wipe out subversive elements and to restore the economy before any sort of shift from military influence could even be contemplated.3 The issue however lay in the fact that although the leaders believed in the necessity of their actions, the nation needed to understand the importance of their continued existence. Once opposing subversives were eliminated (originally deemed as the pivotal threat to sovereignty) the military junta would have to seek out legitimization for its existence and justification for its opposition to allowing a return to democracy. What resulted was the an answer that become coined as the 'proceso'.4 This newly defined conflict would be a struggle to restore economic vitality, national stability and safety, proper moral values, and once 'ready' a representative democracy.5 The implementation of multiple goals to be reached would thus ensure prolonged military rule. On the economic front a project would be conceptualized that aimed to re-shape and create a modern economy based on monopoly capitalist influence.6 This approach would consequently place the motives and desires of the Junta at odds with the working class and certain members of the petty bourgeois.7 Under the watch of Jose A. Martinez de Hoz ( the newly appointed Minister of Economics) drastic changes would be implemented that would attempt to break free the economy from State influence while simultaneously combating inflation; the result would see the introduction of harsh austerity policies.8 De Hoz's methods would see the reduction of inflation as the priority in his overall
3 Pion-Berlin, David. The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina:1976-198. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol.27 No.2 (Summer 1985): 55. 4 Ibid., 57. 5 Ibid., 57 6 Ronaldo Munck. The Modern 'military' Dictatorship in Latin America: The Case of Argentina (1976-1982). Latin American Perspectives, Vol.12 No.4 (Autumn 1985): 52. 7 Ibid., 52. 8 Pion-Berlin, David. The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina:1976-198. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol.27 No.2 (Summer 1985): 57.

economic overhaul, and would come in three stages: interest rates once controlled by banks would now be free of control, banks could voluntarily decide to reward depositors or charge borrowers, the third being restraining the rise of wages.9 This last action would lead to discontent among many workers as real wages would drop by almost fifty percent in contrast to the last five years. This would also be followed by the price of public services increasing, and the termination of subsidies in relation to programs including housing and health.10 Tariffs on imports and subsidies on exports would also be reduced in a bid to bring international investment into the economy.11 These extreme measures did very little in terms of yielding a positive outcome as inflation remained outrageously high by the second year of the program (1980).12 Also, many domestic firms suffered to the point of ruination at the hands of foreign companies who could enjoy the uneven exchange rate and thus offer lower prices; this would go hand-in-hand with the abysmal wages that although had risen somewhat, in actuality had remained under the level recorded at the beginning of the eighties (in terms of real wages).13 The ultimate showing of how unrealistic the regime's methods of repairing the economy would be however the sudden collapse of several of the nation's most preeminent banks during the final week of March 1980. Due to the inability of borrowers to pay back debts (thanks to unrestricted interest rates) these institutions as a result held debts which could not be paid, and regardless of the Central Bank's stringent efforts nothing could be done to halt the fleeing of monetary capital.14 De Hoz would do his best to deflect blame from his policies and instead accuse the banks of mismanagement and irresponsible lending practices.15 Such attempts would however prove to be in vain as many could see the true source of the economic crisis (a view even shared by some of those in the military), that the Junta's

9 Ronaldo Munck. The Modern 'military' Dictatorship in Latin America: The Case of Argentina (1976-1982). Latin American Perspectives, Vol.12 No.4 (Autumn 1985): 58. 10 Ibid., 58. 11 Ibid., 58. 12 Pion-Berlin, David. The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina:1976-198. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol.27 No.2 (Summer 1985): 59. 13 Ibid., 59. 14 Ibid., 60. 15 Ibid., 60.

planned out goals had failed to materialize and had instead been the root cause of the current dilemma.16 The consequences of economic failure would begin to have a profoundly negative effect on the regime, not only in its attempt to legitimize itself as the protector of the nation, but would even begin to threaten the very unity of the military itself. One voice that exemplifies this fracture would be that of Commander-in-chief of the Navy, General Armando Lambruschini who would publicly denounce the split in opinion by publicizing the Navy's 'displeasure' with the current direction of economic policy.17 Such disapproval by high ranking military officials would not only shake the foundation of the Junta's economic philosophy, but would land its architect de Hoz along with his cabinet in several meeting before high ranked military leadership, thus evidencing the theory that those in power believed their own policies were related to the economic crisis crippling Argentina.18 In a reference obviously directed toward the economics minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Brig. General Omar Rubens Graffigna stated, We (the Junta) do not remain indifferent to those responsible for the regime's problems.19 This apparent lack of political cohesion would begin to seriously erode the legitimacy of the dictatorship as its very existence supposedly rested on the fact that the national objectives were infallible and crucial to the survival and well being of the State. Such disunity over policy would therefore not only begin to discredit the effectiveness of policymaking from the Junta itself, but also on its ardent opposition to a civil government. Even president Leopoldo Galtieri would augment the image of indecisiveness to the general public during his term in office. In a speech given at his inaugural address on the 28th March 1981 he would publicize a plan of national integration that appeared to restore some of the rights previously stripped from unions and political parties.20 Furthermore, Galtieri even went as far as suggesting talks between the regime and the opposition in order to create a national consensus over political transition.21 To many this would give the impression that the government had begun to make
16 17 18 19 20 21 Ibid., 60. Ibid., 61. Ibid., 61. Ibid., 61. Ibid., 64. Ibid., 64.

sincere steps towards a re-democratization of the government. Any hope that of a return to political freedom would soon be lost however when Galtieri responded to questions about future elections buy saying the ballot boxes are well guarded.22 Also out of the question then would be an exit from the proceso. The fact that even the leadership of the Junta could be seen floundering when it came to formulating a concise political plan for the future would weaken it and make it all the more unpopular. The complete collapse of the economy would also lead to mass unemployment, another reason that would led to mass disapproval of the government. By 1980 one million Argentinians would become unemployed out of a total working population of seven and a half million.23 As a result of major cuts to the public sector, by 1980 there would 1,200,000 state employees. This was a dramatic drop from 1976 when there had been 1,700,000.24 Likewise in the industrial sector, the results of deindustrialization would mean that only 790,000 would maintain employment in 1980, as opposed to 1976 where their had been 1,030,000 workers.25 Dissatisfaction would soon lead to anger in spite of staunch government repression to any form of oppression. In April of 1979 a general strike by workers would form that would manifest itself in the ports, railways, car plants, and virtually within any industry branch.26 During this same period the Ministry of Labor would allow for the first time since the coup the election of union delegates, a move that demonstrated a reemergence of leadership within the working class.27 The regime's strong penchant for eliminating subversive 'threats' to the integrity of the nation ironically created far more opponents and unpopularity in what would infamously by remembered as the Dirty War. The victims of this brutal assault on human rights belonged to many backgrounds in Argentine society including journalists, union officials, workers, priests, businessmen, judges, policemen, and even children.28 Argentina would as a result become a society where bloodshed and disappearances would be a
22 Ibid., 65. 23 Ronaldo Munck. The Modern 'military' Dictatorship in Latin America: The Case of Argentina (1976-1982). Latin American Perspectives, Vol.12 No.4 (Autumn 1985): 65. 24 Ibid., 65. 25 Ibid., 65. 26 Ibid., 66. 27 Ibid., 66-67.

28"Military Junta, Rights Group on Argentina's 'Disappeared'." Historic Documents of 1983, 455-70.

common feature, and thus the citizenry would live their lives in a continuous state of fear. Beginning during the reign of Alfonsan, the junta established death squads to deal with the attacks initiated by the Montoneros and other leftist guerillas. Military officials would defend their tactics stated that such actions were the only methods capable of combating unconventional guerrilla warfare.29 However, it would soon become apparent that many with little to non-existent affiliations with oppositional groups would also find themselves hauled away and sent to undisclosed prison facilites.30 Early on, many of the relatives believed that their loved ones had simply been detained and hoped that they would soon be released. This belief would soon be crushed as the stories of secret jails and mass graves became widespread. A mass cemetary in Cordoba would be discovered that held hundreds of bodies, to which witnesses had contested had been murdered by government firing squads.31 In all it is calculated that perhaps 8,900 individuals became members of that infamously ghostly category known as the disappeared.32 The sudden loss of so many would cause those left behind to question the sincerity of their government's claim of defending the nation even more. Contrary to uniting and strengthening society through the liquidation of subversive groups, the regime had created a situation where there was even more factionalism than before. It is in this mess of failing policies and falling popularity that Galtieri and his cabinet desperately searched for anything that could turn the tide and make the presence of the military relevant to the administration of government once again.33 It would be in this context that he would decide on the only solution left to him, a military option. The military Junta had since December 1981 considered as a serious proposal the possibility of invading the Falklands (Malvinas), a group of islands off the coast of Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1984. http://library.cqpress.com.ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/historicdocuments/hsdc83-0000112497. 29Argentine Report on the Disappearance of Persons." In Historic Documents of 1984, 789-94. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1985. http://library.cqpress.com.ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/historicdocuments/hsdc84-0001131033.
30 31 32 33 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Pion-Berlin, David. The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina:1976-198. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol.27 No.2 (Summer 1985):68.

the Tierra del Fuego that had long been the subject of a sovereignty dispute between Argentina and Great Britain.34 Galtieri and his government would thus attempt to manipulate a sensitive topic in Argentine society towards their benefit. The Junta instead of ceasing this opportunity as on overt desire to mask failures to the public, instead did so thinking that the masses would view the action as a just cause to defend the nation's sovereignty and pride.35 In carrying out the invasion on April 2, 1982 the Junta had made a fatal error in judgment. It had wrongly assumed that Britain (at the time widely considered a waning power) would do little to respond to an act of aggression.36So confident was this perception that the leadership conscripted teenagers with only two weeks training, and then under the command of General Menendez ( who had never commanded fighting units) were sent to capture the islands with no real knowledge of the terrain.37 The result of such horrendous planning would prove to be an absolute catastrophe for the military regime. Not only did Britain respond to Argentina's show of force, but had done so with much more efficiency; a fact that quickly showed as Argentine military officers quickly scrambled to find an honorable exit out of the conflict.38 By this point however the damage had already been done as the regime fresh from defeat appeared even weaker and incapable of leadership than ever before. Soon afterwords, defeated and humiliated the military would relinquish control over the government, and representative democracy would return to Argentina. Often it is assumed due to the chronology of events that the Falklands fiasco directly led to the downfall of the military Junta in Argentina. A more accurate observance would be, however, that it had in actuality sped up what was to be inevitable. As observed by the researcher Ronaldo Munck, were it not for the Falklands/ Malvinas crisis beginning in April 1982, one could have predicted a gradual 'decompression' of military rule such as that carried out by General Lanusse in1973 or that embarked on

34 35 36 37 38

Ibid., 70. Ibid., 70. Ibid., 70. Ibid., 70. Ronaldo Munck. The Modern 'military' Dictatorship in Latin America: The Case of Argentina (1976-1982). Latin American Perspectives, Vol.12 No.4 (Autumn 1985): 68.

in recent years by the Brazilian generals.39 Indeed, it was observed that the estimated 250,000 people who assembled in front of the presidential palace to voice support for the Falklands war, simultaneously voiced their dissatisfaction towards the regime.40 Therefore it would appear that regardless of the outcome of the invasion, the days of the regime were being numbered. Although broad support did manifest itself behind the regime for the conflict (as the Junta had intended), the masses did not forget the years of corruption, inefficiency, and human rights abuses that had plagued the country since the installation of the dictatorship. As it was, the failure of the Falklands operation stripped the government of any options to justify its rule, and severely weakened it to the point that it was soon replaced. The wounds to Argentine society however had long been present, and with or without the war it had become apparent during the Junta's final years that opposition had been growing at its expense. Sooner or later as happens with all unpopular and weak regimes, a change in administration would have been within sight.

39 Ibid., 68. 40 Pion-Berlin, David. The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina:1976-198. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol.27 No.2 (Summer 1985): 71.