G.R. No. L-28153 January 28, 1971 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CAMILO PE?

and A DOMINGO CAJIPE, Respondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.: chanrobles virtual law library Appeal by certiorari from the Court of Appeals decision (CA-G.R. No. 29903-R) affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Civil Case No. 45953, enjoining respondents therein, the President of the University of the Philippines (hereinafter termed UP), the Board of Regents and the Director of the Philippine General Hospital, from dismissing the petitioners Camilo V. Pe? and Domingo Cajipe, respondents herein, from a the service as classified civil service employees of the Philippine General Hospital (hereinafter called the PGH) .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Petition for Injunction in Special Civil Case No. 45953 filed by Messrs. Camilo V. Pe? and Domingo a Cajipe with the Court of First Instance of Manila on 4 January 1961 arose when said petitioners, as Assistant Cashier and Special Disbursing Officer and Collection Officer, respetively, of the PGH, were administratively charged and investigated (with seven others) by a UP-PGH Investigating Committee for "grave misconduct and dishonesty" and "infidelity in the custody of public documents." After fifty-nine hearings, excluding executive sessions, the Committee submitted its report to the authorities of the University of the Philippines, on the basis of which the Board of Regents adopted a resolution approving the report and fixing the penalties, which, with respect to respondents herein, was dismissal. With the filing of the Petition for Injunction, petitioners therein sought to restrain the UP President from dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not be dismissed from the PGH by the UP President but by the Civil Service Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals under Republic Act No. 2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959 to declare petitioners who are classified civil service employees as governed by Republic Act No. 2260 and not by the UP Charter in so far as removal, dismissal or separation from the government service are concerned: and to nullify the findings of the Investigating Committee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On 9 January 1961, the trial court issued an order restraining the petitioner herein from carrying out the acts complained of, and on 14 January 1961, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the said court. On 6 February 1961, Pe? and Cajipe filed a a supplemental petition for injunction, impleading the Board of Regents of the UP and the Director of the PGH as additional respondent. On 10 July 1961, after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision granting both the original and supplemental petitions for injunction, and making permanent the preliminary

writ restraining respondents therein from dismissing petitioners Pe? and Cajipe. A motion to have the a decision reconsidered was denied. On 15 September 1961, petitioner herein appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in its decision of 29 August 1967, sustained the trial court's judgment. A motion for reconsideration was also filed, but the same was denied. Hence, this instant petition for Review by Certiorari with this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The sole issue raised by petitioner in this appeal is whether the dismissal of respondents by the Board of Regents is final, or requires further action by the Civil Service Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library From its inception, under the Civil Commission of the Philippines, down to the inauguration of the Philippine Republic,1 the Civil Service laws have conferred upon the Director (later Commissioner) of Civil Service exclusive charge of all formal investigations against civil service employees, and his decision or recommendation regarding discipline, removal, separation and suspension of civil service employees was, and is, made final, subject only to appeal first to the Chief Executive or later to the Civil Service Board of Appeals.2 This authority of the Civil Service Commission was applied to the employees of the Philippine General Hospital, that from 1936 to 1947 was under the administrative jurisdiction of the Office of the President, with the power of removal over the the personnel thereof being exercised by the Commissioner of Civil Service.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library However, Republic Act No. 51, enacted on 4 October 1946, and entitled "An Act Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Reorganize Within one year the different Executive Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities of the Government, including the Corporations owned or controlled by it," provides that SECTION 1. In order to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent Government of the Republic of the Philippines, and for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in its operation, the President of the Philippines is authorized to effect by executive order from time to time, for a period not exceeding one year from the date of the approval of this Act, and within the limits of the total authorized appropriation for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and forty-seven, such reforms and changes in the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of the Government, including the corporations owned or controlled by the Government, as he may deem necessary, with the power to diminish, add to or abolish those existing and create new ones; consolidate related undertakings; transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, property, records, and personnel from one

department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality to another; eliminate duplicated services or authorize new ones not provided for; classify, combine, split or abolish positions; standardize salaries; and do whatever is necessary and desirable to effect economy and promote efficiency in the government service. Pursuant to the authority thus granted, the President, by Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947, section 158, prescribed as follows: The Philippine General Hospital is hereby transferred from the Office of the President to the University of the Philippines, together with its personnel, powers, functions, duties, records, equipment, supplies and unexpended balance of appropriations. The appropriations for the Philippine General Hospital shall continue to be itemized in the annual general appropriations act. It is the contention of private respondents herein (petitioners below) that, despite the transfer of the Hospital to the U.P., the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commissioner over them, as civil service employees, in matters affecting administrative discipline, suspension, and removal, as provided in the various Civil Service laws, remained unimpaired and did not pass to the University authorities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner University, upon the other hand, invokes disciplinary power over the private respondents on the basis of the express words of Section 6(e) of the University Charter (Act No. 1870, as amended) couched in the following terms: To appoint, on the recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them in its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after investigation and hearing shall have been had. (Act No. 1870, as amended by Act No. 2759, 23 February 1918, and Act No. 3745, 24 November 1930). (Emphasis supplied) Respondent Hospital employees, Pe? and Cajipe, in a support of their position, stress the provisions of Section 695 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, to the effect that SEC. 695. Administrative discipline of subordinate officers and employees.-The Commissioner of Civil Service shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the removal, separation and suspension of subordinate officers and employees in the Civil Service and over all other matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such subordinate officers and employees, and shall have exclusive charge of all formal administrative investigations against them. He may, for neglect of duty or violation of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the public

service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, suspend him without pay for not more than two months, reduce his salary or compensation, or deduct therefrom any sum not exceeding one month's pay. From any decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service on administrative investigations, an appeal may be taken by the officer or employee concerned to the Civil Service Board of Appeals within thirty days after receipt by him of the decision. The employees' contention, that the Civil Service Commissioner's statutory jurisdiction excludes that of the UP authorities, would be cogent and tenable were it not for the fact that the Legislature itself has established specific exceptions to the exclusive authority of the Civil Service Commissioner, by lodging in various entities administrative disciplinary power over their employees. One instance is that of the UP Charter, Section 6(e), heretofore quoted. Another exception is found in Section 14 of the Central Bank Charter (Republic Act No. 265) which this Court has ruled to vest in the Monetary Board the power of investigation and removal of Central Bank officials (except the Bank Governor), "though they be subject to the Civil Service Law and Regulations in other respects" as declared in Castillo vs. Bayona, 106 Phil. 1121. The existence of these exceptions to the general jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commissioner is confirmed by the Civil Service Law of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260), which in its Section 16, defining and enumerating the Commissioner's powers, specified that (i) Except as otherwise provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and to prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline; (Emphasis supplied) Since it must be presumed that the President was cognizant of the administrative disciplinary powers, particularly that of removal, vested by law (the UP Charter) upon its Board of Regents and President, the act of the Chief Executive in transferring the Philippine General Hospital from the Office of the President to the University of the Philippines clearly evinced the intention to place the Hospital employees under the administrative power of the University in matters of their discipline, suspension or removal, on a par with the other employees of the University. Had the intent been otherwise, the 1947 Executive Order No. 94 would have excepted or reserved the disciplinary power of the Commissioner of the Civil Service over the transferred employees, in the same manner that said Executive Order specified that the appropriations for the Hospital "shall continue to be itemized in the annual general appropriations acts" (Executive Order No. 94, Section 158, supra). In this connection, the previous uncontested acts of the Civil Service authorities in endorsing to the University for

action the administrative cases of Hospital employees Fernandez and Gorospe, and declaring that "the Bureau had no disciplinary jurisdiction over said employees in view of the provisions of the University charter," constitute contemporary executives interpretation of highly persuasive character.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Since the Hospital is intended to serve, and does serve, the academic, training, and research requirements of the students enrolled in the UP College of Medicine, which College is part of the UP and under the administrative control of the University President and Board of Regents, the requisite harmony and cooperation between the Medical College and the Hospital would be greatly impeded by subjecting the two units to different administrative controllers, with one governed by the UP President and Board of Regents and the other by the Civil Service Commissioner and the Civil Service Board of Appeals. The simplicity, economy and efficiency sought to be attained by Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the reorganization of the Executive branch of the Government would not be achieved by such division of authority; and the maintenance of the dichotomy (which would invite obnoxious comparisons and friction between two sets of employees is not to be implied, absent solid evidence of the existence of any such purpose on the part of the Legislature or the President of the Philippines. We have found no such evidence to exist.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Ultimately, which is important is that the provisions of Article XII, Section 4, of the Constitution that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law," as well as the due process clause of the Bill of Rights, should be fully observed and implemented; and the record is clear that in the case of herein respondents Pe? and Cajipe, no deficiency exists on a this score. Pursuant to the express precept in the University charter [in its Section 6 (e)] that its employees be removed only "for cause after investigation and hearing shall have been had," the herein respondents were investigated by a committee of the University and the committee recommended their dismissal after mature deliberation. Before the proceedings were closed, these respondents manifested that they had no complaints regarding the procedure adopted, and were satisfied with the way the investigation was conducted; and the Court of Appeals explicitly stated in its decision that: . ... we find that the petitioners-appellees had a fair hearing and full opportunity to defend themselves, and that their substantive right to due process was not violated by the action of the University authorities in adopting the report and recommendation of the UPPGH investigating committee for the dismissal of petitioners-appellees. Under the circumstances, provided due process is observed, who is to have the final say on the

dismissal of these respondents actually becomes of secondary importance. The Constitutional provisions on the Civil Service (Article XII) are silent on the point, thus emphasizing its trifling weight. Whether the final decision should be made by the Civil Service Commissioner, and on appeal by the Civil Service Board of Appeals (as they contend), or by the President of the University and its Board of Regents, does not in any way impair any of the substantial rights of these respondents. But the autonomy necessary to the fulfillment of the educational and academic mission of the University demands that the administrative decision of its authorities be made final as to its employees, there being no statutory or administrative provision to the contrary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The considerations adopted by this Court in the Castillo v. Bayona case (ante) in support of the administrative and disciplinary authority of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank over its civil service employees apply, mutatis mutandis, to the President and Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines: ... In other words, the Civil Service Law is the general legal provision for the investigation, suspension or removal of civil service employees, whereas Section 14 is a special provision of law which must govern the investigation, suspension or removal of employees of the Central Bank, though they be subject to the Civil Service Law and regulations in other respects. We must not lose sight of the fact that the Central Bank is called upon to administer the monetary and banking business in the country (Section 2, Republic Act No. 265); and its powers and functions are exercised by the Monetary Board. So, it is but just and reasonable that in order to perform the functions assigned to it by law, it be given broad powers in issuing such rules and regulations as it considers necessary to direct and effect the operation and administration of the Central Bank, and with the recommendation of the Governor, the authority to appoint, fix the remunerations, and remove all officials and employees of the Central Bank with the exception of the Governor, which power to remove naturally includes the authority to investigate. PREMISES CONSIDERED, we rule that the President and Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines possess full and final authority in the disciplining, suspension and removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari applied for is granted, and the decisions under appeal are reversed and set aside. Costs against private respondents Camilo Pe? and Domingo Cajipe. a

G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M. MENDOZA, Respondents. G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, Respondents. G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y UBALDO, Respondents. G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO REFUNCION, Respondents. MUOZ PALMA, J.: These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them - the details of which will be

recounted below - an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A - The Information filed by the People - chanrobles virtual law library 1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima follows: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused. Crim. Case No. 19639 chanrobles virtual law library VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081 chanrobles virtual law library INFORMATION chanrobles virtual law library The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows: chanrobles virtual law library That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-?inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-?inches, which the said accused carried outside of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66) The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused. CRIM. CASE NO. 29677chanrobles virtual law library VIOL. OF PAR. 3, chanrobles virtual law library PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI chanrobles virtual law library No. 266 of the Chief chanrobles virtual law library Executive dated April 1, 1975

INFORMATION chanrobles virtual law library The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975, committed as follows: chanrobles virtual law library That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8?inches, the same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32) The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused. CRIM. CASE NO. 933 For: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF chanrobles virtual law library DEADLY WEAPON chanrobles virtual law library (VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9) INFORMATION chanrobles virtual law library The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows: chanrobles virtual law library That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao, Province of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood, which act committed by the accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997) B. - The Orders of dismissal - chanrobles virtual law library In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense that one essential element of the offense charged is

missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner: ... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like outside residence may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that the possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases under consideration suffer from this defect. xxx xxx xxx And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless - now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can never be assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are inclined to backsliding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire of this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66) 2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows: chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one that abets subversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that also made the carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or provisions. xxx xxx xxx The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in one's person and if not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and punishable by law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made unlawful and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention of the person carrying such weapon because the law makes it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while on his way home by law enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a store in order that the same may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's home, such person will be liable for punishment with such a severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife is going to be used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and applied in the manner that that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the President in promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion. xxx xxx xxx It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President intended to make unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is

one that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L46229-32) 3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the Information filed before him, thus: ... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential decree, the same should be or there should be an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country was issued because of wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law would mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused. xxx xxx xxx It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their farm implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997) In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release unless held on other charges.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library C. - The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit: PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 chanrobles virtual law library DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES

THEREFORE.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been placed under a state of martial law; chanrobles virtual law library WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me; chanrobles virtual law library WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons; chanrobles virtual law library NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that: chanrobles virtual law library 1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer: chanrobles virtual law library (a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and is attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the performance of their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons, property or chastity causing the death of the victim used in violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081: chanrobles virtual law library (b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph; chanrobles virtual law library (c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, members of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any public or private firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives, including, but not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other incendiary device consisting of any chemical,

chemical compound, or detonating agents containing combustible units or other ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on continguous objects or of causing injury or death of a person; and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the commission of or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the particular offenses committed or intended to be committed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two. (SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS President Republic of the Philippines D. - The arguments of the People - chanrobles virtual law library In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. 1 chanrobles virtual law library The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of

criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 2 chanrobles virtual law library E. - Our Ruling on the matter - chanrobles virtual law library 1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 3 chanrobles virtual law library Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4 chanrobles virtual law library To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides: Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months, or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We do not agree with petitioner that the abovementioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or misguided official action - a fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial functions are daily exposed to such dangers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the body of the Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the presidential decree in question? chanrobles virtual law library We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure - a presidential decree in these cases - the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8 chanrobles virtual law library There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3). First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997) chanrobles virtual law library We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which

justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." (West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied) chanrobles virtual law library While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble") In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with other provisions. 9 Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states: NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that: xxx xxx xxx From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted hereunder: chanrobles virtual law library WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted government and against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities have seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order and safety and the security of the nation, ...

xxx xxx xxx WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the forces of our duly constituted government and the New People's Army and their satellite organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders, assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless they have fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this country by overthrowing our present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39) It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else. Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied) chanrobles virtual law library When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied) 5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. 9-a It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. 10 chanrobles virtual law library At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following: And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained

persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless - now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66) And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To his example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him under arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived to produce such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results? chanrobles virtual law library 6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 12 chanrobles virtual law library Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz: Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246) chanrobles virtual law library The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 692) F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the

latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. 13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash the complaint or information when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14 chanrobles virtual law library In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited did not constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15 chanrobles virtual law library G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of other available remedies below.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow: Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. - If the motion to quash is sustained the court may order that another information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in custody, shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not made or if having been made another information is not filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on some other charge.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. - The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz: chanrobles virtual law library First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information to include the second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the case should

not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the Information. 16 chanrobles virtual law library Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Section 8. Rule 117 states that: An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this rule. Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the criminal action or liability had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h]) chanrobles virtual law library As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in all these cases should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library H. - We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of the government true to the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in evaluating the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe penalty imposed for the offense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the following: In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of carrying bladed weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted authorities, may not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9. 17 Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial task and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation. We have to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances, which renders the measure an

instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their faith in their government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject howeverto Our observations made in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Without costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Aquino, J, took no part. chanrobles virtual law library Separate Opinions BARREDO, J., concurring.chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction is possible, without the need of amending the information, for violation of other laws or ordinances on concealment of deadly weapons. Makasiar, J, concurs. CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring: chanrobles virtual law library I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly be convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the Philippine Commission or of the ordinance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Separate Opinions BARREDO, J., concurring.chanrobles virtual law library I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction is possible, without the need of amending the information, for violation of other laws or ordinances on concealment of deadly weapons. G.R. No. 39085 September 27, 1933 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appelle, vs. ANTONIO YABUT, Defendant-Appellant.

BUTTE, J.:chanrobles virtual law library This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, convicting the appellant of the crime of murder and assessing the death penalty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library The appellant, Yabut, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of murder upon the following information: That on or about the 1st day of August, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the accused Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, in said city, did then and there, with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously, assault, beat and use personal violence upon one Sabas Aseo, another prisoner also serving sentence in Bilibid, by then and there hitting the said Sabas Aseo suddenly and unexpectedly from behind with a wooden club, without any just cause, thereby fracturing the skull of said Sabas Aseo and inflicting upon him various other physical injuries on different parts of the body which caused the death of the latter about twenty-four (24) hours thereafter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library That at the time of the commission of this offense, the said Antonio Yabut was a recidivist, he having previously been convicted twice of the crime of homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final sentences rendered by competent tribunals. Upon arraignment, the accused plead not guilty. The court below made the following findings of fact which, from an independent examination of the entire testimony, we are convinced, are supported by the evidence beyond reasonable doubt: La brigada de presos, conocida como Brigada 8-A Carcel, el 1.?de agosto de 1932, estaba compuesta de unos 150 o mas penados, de largas condenas, al mando del preso Jose Villafuerte, como Chief Squad Leader, y del preso Vicente santos, como su auxiliar. forman parte de esta brigada el occiso Sabas Aseo, o Asayo, el acusado Antonio Yabut y los presos llamados Apolonio Saulo, Isaias Carreon, Melecio Castro, Mateo Bailon y los moros Taladie y Hasan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Entre siete y media y ocho de la noche de la fecha de autos, estando ya cerrado el pabellon de la brigada, pues se aproximaba la hora del descanso y silencio dentro de la prision, mientras el jefe bastonero Villafuerte se hallaba sentado sobre su mesa dentro de la brigada, vio al preso Carreon cerca de el, y en aquel instante el acusado Yabut, dirigiendose a Carreon, le dijo que, si no cobrada a uno que la debia, el (Yabut) le abofetearia. El jefe bastonero Villafuerte trato de imponer silencio y dijo a los que hablaban que se apaciguaran; pero, entre tanto, el preso Carreon se encaro con el otro preso Saulo cobrandole dos cajetillas de cigarillos de diez centimos cada una que le debia. Saulo contesto que ya le pagaria, pero Carreon, por toda contestacion, pego en la cara a

saulo y este quedo desvanecido. En vista de esto, el jefe bastonero se dirigio a su cama para sacar la porra que estaba autorizado a llevar. Simultaneamente Villafuerte vio que el preso Yabut pegaba con un palo (Exhibit C) al otro preso Sabas Aseo, o Asayo, primeramente en la nuca y despues en la cabeza, mientras estaba de espaldas el agregido Sabas, quien, al recibir el golpe en la nuca, se inclino hacia delante, como si se agachara, y en ese momento el acusado Yabut dio un paso hacia delante y con el palo de madera que portaba dio otro golpe en la cabeza a Sabas Aseo, quien cayo al suelo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library El jefe bastonero Villafuerte se acerco al agresor Yabut para desarmarle, pero este le dijo: "No te acerques; de otro modo, moriras." No obstante la actitud amenazadora de Yabut, Villafuerte se acerco y Yabut quiso darle un golpe que iba dirigido a la cabeza, pero Villafuerte lo pudo desviar pcon la porra que Ilevaba. Los dos lucharon y Ilegaron a abrazarse hasta que se le deslizo a Villafuerte la porra que llevaba. Continuaron luchando ambos y el acusado Yabut llego a soltar el palo Exhibit C con que acometia a Villafuerte y habia malherido al preso Sabas Aseo. Despues de aquello, Yabut consiguio zafarse de Villafuerte y se dirigio al otro extremo de la brigada, escondiendose dentro del bao y alli fue cogido inmediatamente despues del suceso por el preso Proceso Carangdang, que desempenaba el cargo de sargento de los policias de la prision. We reject, as unworthy of belief, the testimony of Yabut that it was Villafuerte, not he, who gave the fatal blow to the deceased Aseo. The testimonies of Santiago Estrada, resident physician of the Bureau of Prisons and Dr. Pablo Anzures of the Medico Legal Department of the University of the Philippines, clearly establish that the death of Aseo was caused by subdural and cerebral hemorrhages following the fracture of the skull resulting from the blow on the head of Aseo. They further confirm the testimony of the four eyewitnesses that the deceased was struck from behind.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library On appeal to this court, the appellant advances the following assignments of error: 1. The lower court erred in applying article 160 of the Revised Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library 2. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence of the defense are contradictory and not corroborated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library 3. The lower court erred in holding that the crime of murder was established by appreciating the qualifying circumstance ofalevosia.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library 4. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

In connection with the first assignment of error, we quote article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, in the Spanish text, which is decisive: Comision de un nuevo delito durante el tiempo de la condena por otro anterior - Pena. - Los que comentieren algun delito despues de haber sino condenados por sentencia firme no empezada a cumpir, o durante el tiempo de su condena, seran castigados con la pena sealada por la ley para el nuevo delito, en su grado maximo, sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la regla 5.a del articulo 62.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library El penado conprendidoen este articulo se no fuere un delincuente habitual sera indultado a los setenta aos, si hubiere ya cumplido la condena primitiva, o cuando llegare a cumplirla despues de la edad sobredicha, a no ser que por su conducta a por otras circunstancias no fuere digno de la gracia. The English translation of article 160 is as follows: Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense - Penalty. - Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency. The appellant places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the English translation of the headnote of article 160 and would have us accept his deduction from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the new crime which is committed by a person already serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. Inasmuch as the appellant was serving sentence for the crime of homicide, the appellant contends the court below erred in applying article 160 in the present case which was a prosecution for murder (involving homicide). While we do not concede that the appellant is warranted in drawing the deduction mentioned from the English translation of the caption of article 160, it is clear that no such deduction could be drawn from the caption. Apart from this, however, there is no warrant whatever for such a deduction (and we do not understand the appellant to assert it) from the text itself of article 160. The language is plain and unambiguous. There is not the slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that said article applies only in cases where the new offense is different in character from the former offense for which the defendant is serving the

penalty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text, especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows. (Cf. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.) A mere glance at the titles to the articles of the Revised Penal code will reveal that they were not intended by the Legislature to be used as anything more than catchwords conveniently suggesting in a general way the subject matter of each article. Being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the articles of the Code, they cannot, in any event have the effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words of the text. Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library The remaining assignments of error relate to the evidence. We have come to the conclusion, after a thorough examination of the record, that the findings of the court below are amply sustained by the evidence, except upon the fact of the existence of treachery (alevosia). As some members of the court entertain a reasonable doubt that the existence of treachery (alevosia) was established, it results that the penalty assessed by the court below must be modified. We find the defendant guilty of homicide and, applying article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in connection with article 160 of the same, we sentence the defendant- appellant to the maximum degree of reclusion temporal, that is to say, to twenty years of confinement and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Sabas Aseo (alias Sabas Asayo), in the sum of P1,000. Costs de oficio.chanrob G.R. No. L-23196 October 31, 1967 LAUREANO OLIVA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. NICOLAS V. LAMADRID and ROSA L. VILLALUZ, Defendants-Appellees. CONCEPCION, C.J.: chanrobles virtual law library Appeal by the plaintiff from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte dismissing the complaint herein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Plaintiff Laureano Oliva was the owner of a parcel of land of about 3,5258 hectares, located in the sitio of Pinagdamhan, barrio of Lalawigan, municipality of Daet, province of Camarines Norte. The property was covered by Homestead Patent No. 18863 and Original Certificate of Title No. 363 of the Office of the Register of Deeds for said province, issued, in his name, on May 8, 1932. On October 2, 1958, he mortgaged the property to the Rural Bank of Daet, Camarines Norte, as security for the payment of a loan in the sum of P250.00. He having subsequently

defaulted in the payment of this obligation, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the property sold, by the provincial sheriff, at public auction, to the Bank, as the sole bidder, on February 4, 1961, for the aggregate sum of P188.00, representing P160.00, as unpaid balance of the loan, plus P12.00 as interest, and P16.00 as attorney's fees. The certificate of sale, issued by the sheriff, on February 6, 1961, stated that the property could be redeemed "within . . . two (2) years from and after the date of the sale, or until February 4, 1963." chanrobles virtual law library No redemption having been made within said period, the corresponding deed of sale was executed in favor of the Bank, on February 27, 1963, on which date said Original Certificate of Title No. 363 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3968 issued in the name of the Bank. On March 2, 1963, the latter sold the property to Nicolas V. Lamadrid for the sum of P350.00, and, accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3968 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3978 issued to Lamadrid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Prior to May 31, 1963, plaintiff offered to repurchase the property for said sum of P350.00, but the offer was turned down. Hence, on said date, he instituted the present action against Lamadrid and his wife, Rosa L. Villaluz, to compel them to reconvey the property to him, for said sum of P350.00, which he deposited with the Clerk of Court, and to recover damages, attorney's fees and costs. He claimed that, as holder of a free patent and a torrens title, he is entitled to redeem the property within five (5) years from February 4, 1961, the date of the auction sale, pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Upon the other hand, defendants alleged in their answer that the right of redemption expired on February 4, 1963, under the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 2670, which, they maintain, is controlling.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered judgment for the defendants. Hence, this appeal, taken by the plaintiff, directly to the Supreme Court, on questions purely of law. The main issue is whether the period of redemption is governed by Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as asserted by the plaintiff, or by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended, as contended by the defendants and held in the decision appealed from, upon the theory that Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 refers only to voluntary conveyances and that the foreclosure sale had been made under Republic Act No. 720.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As early as July 30, 19511 it has been settled, however, that Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is applicable to foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or free patent. Besides, on February

28, 1963,2 this Court explicitly rejected the theory that said provision "refers exclusively to voluntary conveyances and not to involuntary ones," upon the ground that "the law does not distinguish between the two kinds of conveyances." chanrobles virtual law library Upon the other hand, Section 5, of Republic Act No. 720, as amended provides: Loans and advances extended by Rural Banks, organized and operated under this Act, shall be primarily for the purpose of meeting the normal credit needs of any small farmer or farm family owning or cultivating, in the aggregate, not more than fifty hectares of land dedicated to agricultural production, as well as the normal credit needs of cooperatives and small merchants. For the purposes of this Act, a small merchant shall be one whose capital investment does not exceed twenty-five thousand pesos. In the granting of loans, the Rural Bank shall give preference to the application of farmers whose cash requirements are small.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Loans may be granted by rural banks on the security of lands without torrens titles where the owner of private property can show five years or more of peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession in the concept of an owner or of homesteads or free patent lands pending the issuance of titles but already approved, the provisions of any law or regulations to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, That when the corresponding titles are issued the same shall be delivered to the register of deeds of the province where such lands are situated for the annotation of the encumbrance: Provided, further, That in the case of lands pending homestead or free patent titles, copies of notices for the presentation of the final proof shall also be furnished the creditor rural bank and, if the borrower applicants fail to present the final proof within thirty (30) days from date of notice, the creditor rural bank may do so for them at their expense: And provided, finally, That the applicant for homestead or free patent has already made improvements on the land and the loan applied for is to be used for further development of the same for other productive economic activities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The foreclosure of mortgages covering loans granted by rural banks shall be exempt from the publication in newspapers now required by law where the total amount of the loan, including interests due and unpaid, does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00). It shall be sufficient publication in such cases if the notices of foreclosure are posted in at least three of the most conspicuous public places in the municipality where the land mortgaged is situated during the period of sixty days immediately preceding the public auction. Proof of publication as required herein shall be accomplished by the foreclosure sale and shall be attached with the records of the case: Provided, That when a land not covered by a

Torrens Title, a homestead or free patent land is foreclosed, the homesteader or free patent holder, as well as their heirs, shall have the right to redeem the same within two years from the date of foreclosure: Provided, finally, That in case of borrowers who are mere tenants the produce corresponding to their share could be accepted as security. It should be noted that the period of two (2) years granted for the redemption of property foreclosed under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 2670, refers to lands "not covered by a Torrens Title, a homestead or free patent," or to owners of lands "without torrens titles," who can "show five years or more of peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of an owner, or of homesteads or free patent lands pending the issuance of titles but already approved," or "of lands pendinghomestead or free patent titles." Plaintiff, however, had, on the land in question, a free patent and a Torrens title, which were issued over 26 years prior to the mortgage constituted in favor of the Bank. Accordingly, there is no conflict between section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended, and the period of two (2) years prescribed in the latter is not applicable to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Moreover, the legislative history of the bills3 which later became said Republic Act No. 2670, amending Republic, Act No. 720, shows that the original proposal was to give homesteaders or free patent holders a period of ten (10) years within which to redeem their property foreclosed by rural banks; that this proposal was eventually found to be unwise, because its effect would have been to dissuade rural banks from granting loans to homesteaders or free patent holders - which were sought to be liberalized said period of redemption being too long, from the viewpoint of said banks; and that, consequently, the proposal was given up, with the specific intent and understanding that homesteaders or holders of free patent would retain the right to redeem within five (5) years from the conveyance of their properties, as provided in the general law, that is to say the Public Land Act, or Commonwealth Act No. 141.4 chanrobles virtual law library It is, therefore, our considered view that plaintiff herein has the right to repurchase the property in question within five (5) years from the date of the conveyance or foreclosure sale, or up to February 4, 1966, and that having exercised such right and tendered payment long before the date last mentioned, defendants herein are bound to reconvey said property to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Although plaintiff had offered to redeem it for the sum of P350.00 paid by Lamadrid and the former has actually deposited this amount in the lower court, as redemption price, plaintiff now alleges that he is bound to pay no more than P188.00, this being the

sum for which the property had been foreclosed by the Bank. Independently of the amount due under section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, we cannot entertain this pretense entailing as it does a substantial change of the theory under which plaintiff had litigated in the lower court, which is not permissible on appeal.5 chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered declaring that, upon the judicial consignation of the sum of P350.00 by plaintiff herein, the property in litigation had been redeemed by him, and, accordingly, directing the defendants to execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance in his favor, and that, thereafter said sum of P350.00 be turned over by the Clerk of Court to the defendants, with costs against the latter. Said deed of reconveyance shall be executed by the Clerk of the lower court, in the event of failure of the defendants to comply with this decision, within 30 days from the date on which it shall have become final and executory. It is so ordered.cha G.R. No. L-38969-70 February 9, 1989 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, vs. FELICIANO MUOZ, alias "Tony", et al., accused, MARVIN MILLORA, TOMAS TAYABA, alias "Tamy Tayaba" and JOSE MISLANG, defendants-appellants. CRUZ, J.: Of the four persons convicted in this case, one has not appealed and thus impliedly accepted his sentence. The others have questioned their conviction and insist that they are innocent. The prosecution did not think so, and neither does the Solicitor General now. The brief for the appellee would affirm the finding of guilt and in fact even increase the penalty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The prosecution presented a bizarre case of arbitrary condemnation and instant punishment meted out by what appear to be the members of a private army. Eleven persons, most of them bodyguards of the town mayor, went out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who had complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers. Having found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of them in cold blood without further ado and without mercy. One was shot in the mouth and died instantly as his son and daughter looked on in horror. The second was forced to lie down on the ground and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified wife and son. The third, who was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until he bled before he too had his brains blown out. To all appearances, the unfortunate victims were only innocent farmers and not the dangerous criminals they were pronounced to be.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Bizarre but true, as the trial court agreed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Of the eleven persons who were charged with murder in three separate informations, the four who stood trial were found guilty. 1The other seven have yet to be identified and tried. The sentence of Feliciano Muoz, who did not appeal, has long become final and executory and is now being served. 2 We deal here only with the appeals of the other convicts, namely, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, and Jose Mislang, who all ask for a reversal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The killings occurred in the morning of June 30, 1972, in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. 3 chanrobles virtual law library As established by the prosecution, Feliciano Muoz, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified men went to the house of Mauro Bulatao and asked for the address of his son Arsenic. All four of them went inside while the rest surrounded the house. All eleven men were armed. Mauro, who was then bathing his horse, was called by the accused. As he approached and while under his house, he was met by Millora who simply shot him at arm's length with a "long firearm," hitting him in the mouth and killing him as he fell. At that precise time, Muoz, Tayaba and Mislang were standing by Millora, evidently giving him armed support. None of them made any move to restrain or dissuade him. 4 chanrobles virtual law library After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the house his sixteen year old son, Aquilino, and knocked him down. Muoz kicked him several times in the head as he lay on the ground while the others looked on in silent approval or at least without objection. They then took the bleeding man with them to look for their third target, Alejandro Bulatao. 5 chanrobles virtual law library In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them and direct them to her husband. They found him tending to their cows with his son Pedro. Muoz ordered Alejandro and his wife to lie down and then, even as Pedro pleaded for his father's life, shot Alejandro twice in the head, killing him instantly. Millora, Tayaba and Mislang, along with their companions, merely stood by as the brutal act was committed. Juana watched her husband's death in terror and the 12-year old boy made a desperate run for his life as one of the accused fired at him and missed. 6 chanrobles virtual law library The second victim having been murdered as the first, the accused then vented their violence on Aquilino, whom Muoz again brutally kicked as the others looked on. Aquilino was entirely defenseless. Finally, Muoz ended the boy's agony and shot him to death, hitting him in the head and body. Muoz and Minora then picked up all the empty shells and fled with the rest of their companions, leaving the terrified Juana with the two grisly corpses. 7 chanrobles virtual law library The above events were narrated at the trial by Melecia Bulatao, 8 Mauro's daughter and Aquilino's sister; Jose Bulatao, 9 Mauro's son and Aquilino's

brother; Juana Bulatao, 10Alejandro's wife; and Pedro Bulatao, 11their son. Their testimony was corroborated by Dr. Juanita de Vera, 12 who performed the autopsy on the three victims.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Melecia and Jose testified on the killing of their father by Marvin Minora as the other accused stood by and the mauling of their brother Aquilino before he was dragged away by the group. The trial court especially noted the straightforward account given by Jose, who positively identified Minora as the killer and described the participation of the others, including the savage kicking of his brother by Muoz. 13 Melecia earlier pointed to Mislang as the one who had shot her father but changed her mind later on crossexamination and named Millora as the actual killer. She explained her turn-about by confessing that she had earlier agreed to exonerate Minora in exchange for the sum of P3,000.00 promised by his father although she actually did not receive the money. 14For her part, Juana related how she was threatened with death unless she accompanied the accused to where her husband was. She narrated in detail how Alejandro was killed before her very eyes and how Aquilino was later kicked and then also shot to death, also by Muoz, while the other accused stood by. 15 Her testimony was corroborated by Pedro, her son, whom the accused had also thought of killing because he was "talkative" and indeed was shot at when he successfully escaped after his father's murder. 16 chanrobles virtual law library The defense makes much of the fact that it was only months after the killings that it occurred to these witnesses to denounce the accused and suggests that this delay should impugn their credibility. As correctly pointed out by the trial judge, however, these witnesses were naturally deterred from doing so for fear that they would meet the same fate that befell their relatives. These were humble barrio folk whose timidity did not allow them to report their grievances beyond the barrio officials they knew, more so since the higher authorities appeared to be indifferent and gave no attention, much less encouragement, to their complaints.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is true that there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of these witnesses as painstakingly pointed out by the appellants, 17but these are minor flaws that do not detract from the essential truthfulness of their accounts of the ruthless killings. 18 chanrobles virtual law library The brutality of the murders and the veracity of the testimony of the said witnesses are emphasized by the medical reports 19of the injuries sustained by the victims, as follows: Mauro Bulatao: chanrobles virtual law library 1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper lip left side around 1 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head around 1-1/2 cm. in

diameter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. Gunshot wound at the lower lip left side of the mouth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Alejandro Bulatao: chanrobles virtual law library 1. Lacerated gunshot wound at the left eye with the whole eye practically lacerated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. Lacerated gunshot wound of the right eye and the forehead practically opened with the brain tissue outside.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Aquiline Bulatao: chanrobles virtual law library 1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper right jaw bone around 1- 1/2 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head around 2 cm. in diameter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. Gunshot wound at the upper left shoulder out the middle of the left clavicle around 1- 1/2 inches in diameter. The three appellants invoked individual defenses which the trial court correctly rejected as false and unbelievable. All claimed the Bulataos were killed as a result of an exchange of gunfire with a rather hazy group and each claimed he was not involved in the shoot-out.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Testifying for Millora on the alleged encounter between the Bulataos and their adversaries, Victoriano Bacani said that the latter included Tayaba, Mislang and five others who fled from the scene in a jeep. 20Graciano Muoz, corroborating Bacani, said he himself saw seven men in a jeep coming from the sound of the gunfire after he had paid Mauro P400.00 to redeem his stolen carabao. 21Another witness for Millora, Orlando de los Santos, testified to having seen the encounter between the Bulataos and the other group and declared that the former were armed with carbines and Garand rifles. 22 chanrobles virtual law library The trial court rejected Bacani's testimony because he appeared hesitant and suspicious on the stand and did not give the impression that he was telling the truth. 23Moreover, it took him all of one year to report the alleged shooting encounter, which he also did not mention that same afternoon when he visited Mauro's family to condole with them. 24It is also not believable that the group would flee because they had no more bullets when their supposed three adversaries were already dead in the field. The alleged redemption made by Muoz was described by the trial court as preposterous, especially since no shred of evidence had been presented to show that Mauro was a cattle rustler, let alone his 16 year old son. 25As for De los Santos, no firearms were discovered beside the dead bodies of the Bulataos, including Mauro, who was found not in the supposed battleground but under his

house, as testified to by Dr. De Vera. 26 chanrobles virtual law library Millora's own defense was that he was in Dagupan City at the time of the killings, having gone there in the evening of June 29, 1972. He claimed he had stayed there overnight with a female companion after drinking beer with Atty. Antonio Resngit returning to San Carlos City only between 8 and 9 o'clock the following morning or June 30, 1972. 27The lawyer corroborated him, 28 but he cannot be more credible than Mauro's own children, Jose and Melecia, who positively identified Millora as the person who actually shot their father in the face and killed him instantly. Such a traumatic experience could not have been forgotten by these witnesses who saw their father murdered without warning or mercy nor could their memory of the heartless killer have been easily wiped out from their minds.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is stressed that Juana Bulatao and her son Pedro also categorically declared that Millora was with the group that she took to the field where her husband and Aquilino were killed by Muoz. 29 chanrobles virtual law library Tayaba and Mislang offered a common defense, also of alibi. Both claimed that Mislang having complained of cattle rustlers, a group of policemen, including Tayaba, stayed in the former's house the whole night of June 29, 1972, leaving only at 8 o'clock the following morning of June 30, 1972, after Mislang had served them breakfast. 30Significantly, however, barrio Bacnar where Mislang's house was located, is only two kilometers from Balite Sur. 31 Moreover, the trial court doubted the testimony given by Sgt. Lomibao, who corroborated them and spoke of having heard the gunfire narrated by Millora's witnesses. The decision noted that Lomibao was mysteriously absent when the police chief and Dr. de Vera went to the scene of the crime at 9 o'clock that morning to investigate the killings. In fact, it expressed the suspicion that Lomibao and Patrolman Liwanag, who also testified for the accused, might have been among the seven unidentified persons who were with Muoz and the three appellants herein when the Bulataos were murdered. 32 chanrobles virtual law library All told, we affirm the findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses at the trial and assess their credibility. As we said in a previous case: We see no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to assess their credibility. The written record will not show that nuance of tone or voice, the meaningful contrast between the hesitant pause and the prompt reply, and the expression or color or tilt of face that will affirm the truth or expose the fabrication. All these subtle factors could be considered by the trial judge in weighing the conflicting declarations before him, and

we do not find that he has erred. 33 chanrobles virtual law library We agree that the three appellants, together with Muoz and their seven other companions, participated in the killings of the three Bulataos in the manner described by the witnesses for the prosecution. The defenses of the herein appellants should be, as they properly were, rejected as undeserving of belief in the light of the more convincing and telling evidence submitted by the government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library However, we do not accept the different degrees of participation assigned by the court a quo to each of the appellants in each of the three offenses imputed to them. In Criminal Case No. 0176, Millora was found guilty as principal and Muoz and the other two herein appellants only as accomplices, and in Criminal Case Nos. 0177 and 0178, Muoz was found guilty as principal and the herein appellants only as accomplices. 34In support of this finding, the trial court said that there was no evidence of conspiracy to justify holding each of the accused equally liable for the three murders.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We hold that there was. Indeed, it is clear that from the very start, when the eleven men went out to look for the suspected cattle rustlers, there was already an agreement among them to ferret out and punish the Bulataos whom they had condemned beforehand. They knew whom they were looking for. They knew where to look for them. They sought each of them with drawn and ready weapons. When they reached Mauro Bulatao's house, four of them went inside while the rest deployed themselves in strategic positions. When Millora shot Mauro, the appellants and the others stood by with guns at the ready. Nobody moved to dissuade or stop him. Together they dragged Aquilino from the house and the rest watched while Muoz kicked him in the head while helpless on the ground. Together, they took him with them and then forced Juana Bulatao to lead them to her husband. The rest stood by with their weapons as Muoz shot Alejandro in the head. No one interceded to stop him from also killing Aquilino. There is no question that the group moved in concert, pursuing a common design previously agreed upon, that made each of them part of a conspiracy. 35 As such, each of them is liable in equal degree with the others for each of the three killings. Each member of the conspiracy to commit the crime of murder is guilty as a coprincipal, regardless of who actually pulled the trigger that killed the three victims. It is settled that in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. 36 chanrobles virtual law library Each of the three killings constituted the crime of murder, qualified by alevosia. There was treachery because every one of the three victims was completely helpless and defenseless when shot and killed by the accused with no risk to themselves. Mauro was completely taken by surprise when he was

shot in the face. Alejandro was lying down when he was shot in the head. Aquilino was seated when he was shot in the head and shoulders. None of the three victims had a chance to resist.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution providing as follows: Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for under the said article but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua as mandated by the above provision. The maximum period of the penalty was thus in effect lowered to the medium, the same period applied, as before, where the offense was not attended by any modifying circumstance, with the minimum period, i. e., reclusion temporal maximum, being still applicable in all other cases. The three-grade scheme of the original penalty, including death, was thus maintained except that the maximum period was not imposed because of the constitutional prohibition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In People v. Gavarra 37Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua" thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera in People v. Masangkay 38and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People v. Atencio 39divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People v. Intino, 40as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetuaas the maximum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however, is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the

more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19(l) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. 41 chanrobles virtual law library At that, the Court finds that such resort, even if made, would not be of much assistance either in the case at bar. Accepting arguendo that it was the intention of the framers to abolish the death penalty, we are still not convinced from the debates in the Constitutional Commission that there was also a requirement to adjust the two remaining periods by dividing them into three shorter periods. This is not a necessary consequence of the provision as worded. The following exchange cited by those in favor of Masangkay is at best thought-provoking but not decisive of the question: FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the penalty is abolished.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the statutes, especially in the General Criminal Law, which is the Revised Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly with death. Sometimes it has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to death. And what would be the effect on the judges, for example, if the range is reclusion temporal to death and he can no longer impose the death penalty? He will have difficulty in computing the degrees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the specific

situation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I suppose that the judges will be equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if there is a range, the range cannot go as far as death (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, 749).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death remain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of the penalty for murder consists of three periods. The maximum period of reclusion temporal under the present status is the minimum period for the penalty for murder. The medium period isreclusion perpetua. The maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty, we will, therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You cannot divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30 years, it is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium period now until such time that Congress gets around to accommodate this amendment? chanrobles virtual law library FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about. All we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the death penalty (Record, CONCOM July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 750). So there we have it - "this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about." Assuming that Commissioner Bernas's answer reflected the consensus of the body, we are still not persuaded that it was the intention of the framers to lower not only the maximum period but also the other periods of the original penalty. That is not necessarily inferable from his statement that "the judges will be equal to their task," especially so since he also said and we think with more definiteness-that "all we are saying is that the judges cannot impose the death penalty" (Emphasis supplied). We understand this to mean that they were not saying more. The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they also meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubt as to its meaning. One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that this might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing

and said another-or strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere - did not say enough.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two members 42at that time still sit on the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in the composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(l) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Court relies that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death penalty and another who committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked longer than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount. When he complained because he felt unjustly treated by the householder, the latter replied: "Friend, I do you no wrong. Did you not agree with me for a penny?' chanrobles virtual law library The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them and

have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we impose on all the accused-appellants for each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It remains to observe that the crimes inflicted upon the humble farmers would have remained unpunished were it not for the vigilance of certain responsible officials, especially the police and the prosecuting officer, who took up the cudgels for the victims' families. The courage and conscientiousness they displayed are still the most potent weapons against those who, in their arrogance, believe that they can flout the law and frustrate justice because they have the protection of powerful patrons.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and all the accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty as principals in Criminal Case Nos. 0176, 0177 and 0178. Each of them is sentenced to suffer three (3) penalties of reclusion perpetua, and to pay solidarily to the heirs of their victims civil indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 for each of the deceased, or a total indemnity of P90,000.00, with costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library Concurrence is expressed in so far as conviction of the appellants is concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Dissent is registered, however, as to the penalty imposed which, in our view, should adhere to that provided in the Gavarra, followed byMasangkay, Atencio and Intino cases, which is more reflective of

the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Simply put, the question is: did Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, abolish the death penalty or not? The pertinent portion thereof provides: ... Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx The majority pronouncement is that said provision did not abolish the death penalty but only provided for its non-imposition. Our reading, however, is that when the Constitution states that the death penalty shall not be imposed, it can only mean that capital punishment is now deemed non-existent in our penal statutes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is because of the imperfection ("awkward" as termed by the majority) of the language used, and its susceptibility to two conflicting interpretations, contrary to the majority opinion that the text is plain, that resort must be had to judicial construction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is elementary in statutory construction that it is the intent of the statute that must be given effect. The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines the construction thereof, and the Court looks less to its words and more to its context, subject matter, consequence and effects (Manila Race Horse Trainers Association vs. de la Puente, 88 Phil. 60). A statute must be read according to its spirit and intent, and where legislative intent apparently conflicts with the letter of the law, the former prevails over the latter (Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051). This intent must be ascertained from the words of the statutory provision itself. However, in a situation such as in the case at bar, where the intent does not decisively appear in the text of the provision as it admits of more than one construction, reliance may be made on extrinsic aids such as the records of the deliberations of the body that framed the law in order to clearly ascertain that intent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The records of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) leave no doubt as to the intention of that body to abolish the death penalty. Thus, Fr. Bernas spoke of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty in his speech sponsoring the provision: My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not on whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution-in which case it cannot be restored by the legislature-left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it

is never carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just to presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is mare valuable than an institution intended precisely to service human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the reason which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 676). (Emphasis supplied) Expounding on this abolition, Fr. Bernas also stated: "Rather than wait for legislative discretion to abolish the death penalty, the Commission went ahead to abolish it but left the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its discretion for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." "By a show of hands, the abolition of the death penalty was approved, 19 to 18. On motion of Commissioner Rodrigo, nominal voting was called and the outcome was still for abolition, 22 to 17" (Bernas, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, pp. 442443).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Another member of the CONCOM, Mr. Florenz Regalado, now a member of this Court, spoke for the retention of the death penalty, arguing that the law has provided numerous procedural and substantive safeguards that must be observed before the death penalty could be carried out. Among the safeguards are the requirements that evidence still be presented to justify the imposition of the death penalty although the accused has pleaded guilty, and the automatic review of such death penalty when imposed by Trial Courts. Commissioner Regalado also mentioned the fact that the Supreme Court has modified the death sentences imposed by Trial Courts in many instances. According to him, this only shows that the imposition of capital punishment goes through all the stages of screening and processing to avoid the possibility of error (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 745-746).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In response, Fr. Bernas said that the numerous safeguards that must be observed before the death penalty could be carried out precisely show the tremendous reluctance of Philippine society to impose the death penalty, which reluctance must be translated into a constitutional prohibition. To quote him: FR. BERNAS: The reluctance is so grave that so many obstacles are put up against the execution of the death penalty and judges agonize whether they have to impose a death penalty or not. Legislators have made it more difficult for the death penalty to be imposed. Thus, the total abolition of the death penalty by the Constitution facilitates everything for the judges and for the legislators. it removes the agonizing process of having to decide whether the death penalty should be imposed by them or not.

(Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 746) (Emphasis supplied) It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The following interpellation during the CONCOM deliberations sheds further light: MR. MAAMBONG: Just one clarificatory question. On the assumption that this proposed amendment will be granted, what would happen to the laws which presently punish certain penal omens by death, because those laws may have to be repealed later by the National Assembly? But as of this moment, there are so many penal offenses which are punishable by death. What would be the effect of the grant of these amendments?chanrobles virtual law library FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the penalty is abolished. (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 748-749) (Emphasis supplied) It is true that Article III, Section 19(l) also grants Congress the power to provide for the death penalty in cases involving heinous crimes. Congress was given this power precisely because it is only the lawmaking body which can legislate back into existence something that has been eliminated from our penal laws. Thus, the Constitution, while abolishing capital punishment, also left to Congress the power to restore it in certain cases. It is clear, however, that unless and until Congress enacts the necessary legislation, the death penalty remains non-existent in our statute books. Again, the deliberations in the CONCOM prove this point: FR. BERNAS: The sense of this proposal is that upon the ratification of this Constitution, the legislature, if it wants to reimpose the death penalty, must repeat the act. In other words, the penalty disappears and there is need of a new act of the legislature to put it back.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library MR. MAAMBONG: Could we put it more simply, Madam President? Could we say that once this amendment is accepted, all penal offenses punishable by death will no longer carry the death penalty? chanrobles virtual law library FR. BERNAS: That is correct (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 749). (Emphasis supplied) The following exchange on the floor when the CONCOM was deliberating on the provision giving the Legislature the power to provide for the death penalty in cases involving heinous crimes shows the understanding among the framers of what the consequences would be when the legislature does not pass a law reimposing death penalty for certain heinous crimes:

MR. DE CASTRO: What happens if the National Assembly does not pass any law concerning death penalty such as on heinous crimes? chanrobles virtual law library MR. MONSOD: Then there is no death penalty. MIL DE CASTRO: That is the effect of the amendment? chanrobles virtual law library MR. MONSOD: Yes (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, pp. 747-748) (Emphasis supplied) To say that the wordings "neither shall death penalty be imposed," do not provide for the abolition of the death penalty, but only provides for its nonimposition is to adopt a rather literal and restrictive construction that goes against the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The literal import or meaning of a statute must yield to its apparent intent, purpose or spirit. Intent is the spirit which gives rise to legislative enactment. It must be enforced when ascertained although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. The language of the Constitution "should be read in a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption" (Eisner v. Macomber, 15, 6 Ed 421, 424). The intention of the legislature and its purpose or object, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, control the literal interpretation of the particular language of a statute and a language capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in such a sense as to harmonize with the intention and object and effectuate the purpose of the enactment (US vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Coming now to the penalty for Murder-the majority reverses the Decisions of this Court in People vs. Gavarra (L-37673, October 30, 1987, en banc, 155 SCRA 327), People vs. Masangkay (L-73461, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 113), People vs. Atencio (L-67721, December 10, 1987, 156 SCRA 242) and People v. Intino (L-69934, September 26, 1988) with respect to the imposable penalty for Murder in the absence of modifying circumstances. Those cases held that with the constitutional ban on capital punishment, the penalty for Murder now becomes reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Applying the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Article 61 [3]), the medium period would be the higher half of reclusion temporal maximum or 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years, and the minimum period is the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum, or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 18 years and 8 months. The maximum period is, of course, reclusion perpetua because of the prohibition regarding the death penalty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The foregoing is but in faithful adherence to the graduated three-period scheme in the Revised Penal Code whereby if an aggravating circumstance attends the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the maximum period; if a mitigating circumstance, the minimum period; and in the absence of any

modifying circumstance, the medium period.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The majority assails the foregoing interpretation, however, in that the requirement of the modification of the penalty is not at all expressed in the Constitutional provision in question nor indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. However, to require the inclusion of such an additional provision would have made for more prolixity to a document that already is. That detail was best left to the Courts as indicated by the discussions on the floor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Indeed, when the abolition of the death penalty was being discussed on the floor of the CONCOM, the issue of the proper penalty for Murder, specifically with regard to its medium period, was raised. The following interpellation, also repeated in the majority opinion, tackled that issue: FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the penalty is abolished.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the statutes, especially in the General Criminal Law, which is the Revised Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly with death. Sometimes it has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to death. And what would be the effect on the judges, for example, if the range is reclusion temporal to death and he can no longer impose the death penalty? He will have difficulty in commuting the degrees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the specific situation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I suppose that the judges will be equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if there is a range, the range cannot go as far as death (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 749). xxx xxx xxx FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death re- main.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of the penalty for murder consists of three periods. The maximum period of reclusion temporal under the present status is the minimum period for the penalty for murder. The medium period is reclusion perpetua. The maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty, we will, therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years ' of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You cannot divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30 years,

it is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium period now until such time that Congress gets around to accommodate this amendment? chanrobles virtual law library FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about. All we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the death penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 750) The fact that the medium period of the penalty for Murder was at all discussed not only bolsters the holding in the Gavarra and related cases that the death penalty had been abolished, and that the penalty for Murder was consequentially to be reduced to two periods, but also shows a keen awareness that "difficulty" would be encountered by the Courts by reason thereof The Supreme Court had proven itself "equal to the task" by resolving that "difficulty in the cited cases. If it were, as the majority says, that "they (the proponents) were not saying more," wherein would the "difficulty" lie? It would have been an easy matter for the proponents to have simply answered that the medium period was to be maintained at reclusion perpetua since anyway, as the majority concludes, the death penalty had not been abolished.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library If, as opined by the majority, reclusion perpetua is retained as the penalty for Murder even in the absence of aggravating and modifying circumstances, while imposed also as the new maximum penalty for the crime, then, the presence or absence of modifying circumstances will no longer lead to the imposition of a higher or lesser penalty depending on the attendant circumstances, as the Penal Code has prescribed. The distinction is erased between Murder committed with a generic aggravating circumstance and Murder carried out with neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance. In both cases, the same penalty is imposable. As a consequence, the reason of the law in creating penalties divided into periods and in providing for various modifying circumstances with different effects, that is, the need to penalized more severely a Murder attended by an aggravating circumstance than a Murder with neither aggravating nor modifying circumstance, is rendered nugatory. Certainly, the CONCOM, in banning the imposition of capital punishment, could not have also intended to discard the underlying reason of the Penal Code in imposing three-periods for the penalty for Murder, i.e., to punish the offense in different degrees of severity depending on the offender's employment of aggravating or mitigating circumstance, or the lack thereof. To say that this is "the will of the Constitution" is inaccurate for the matter was clearly left to the Courts which were expected to be "equal to the tasks." chanrobles virtual law library In keeping with that expectation, this Court held that the modified penalty for Murder, or, reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua, must retain the three-period scheme. In the application of the new penalty, a medium period, less severe than the maximum penalty, must be provided for so that

the original intention of the law to penalize Murder in different degrees of severity depending on the attendant circumstances, remains in effect. That was the basis for the ruling in the Masangkay and the related that the majority is now abandoning. In those cases, the Court did not prescribe a penalty, a function admittedly legislative. It merely effectuated the Constitutional ban on capital punishment and harmonized it with the basic tenets underlying our Penal Code. Narvasa, Paras, Sarmineto, Cortes and Regalado, JJ., concur. chanrobles virtual law library Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library Concurrence is expressed in so far as conviction of the appellants is concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Dissent is registered, however, as to the penalty imposed which, in our view, should adhere to that provided in the Gavarra, followed byMasangkay, Atencio and Intino cases, which is more reflective of the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Simply put, the question is: did Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, abolish the death penalty or not? The pertinent portion thereof provides: ... Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx The majority pronouncement is that said provision did not abolish the death penalty but only provided for its non- imposition. Our reading, however, is that when the Constitution states that the death penalty shall not be imposed, it can only mean that capital punishment is now deemed non-existent in our penal statutes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is because of the imperfection ("awkward" as termed by the majority) of the language used, and its susceptibility to two conflicting interpretations, contrary to the majority opinion that the text is plain, that resort must be had to judicial construction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is elementary in statutory construction that it is the intent of the statute that must be given effect. The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines the construction thereof, and the Court looks less to its words and more to its context, subject matter, consequence and effects (Manila Race Horse Trainers Association vs. de la Puente, 88 Phil. 60). A statute must be read according to its spirit and intent, and where legislative intent apparently conflicts with the

letter of the law, the former prevails over the latter (Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051). This intent must be ascertained from the words of the statutory provision itself. However, in a situation such as in the case at bar, where the intent does not decisively appear in the text of the provision as it admits of more than one construction, reliance may be made on extrinsic aids such as the records of the deliberations of the body that framed the law in order to clearly ascertain that intent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The records of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) leave no doubt as to the intention of that body to abolish the death penalty. Thus, Fr. Bernas spoke of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty in his speech sponsoring the provision: My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not on whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution-in which case it cannot be restored by the legislature-left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just to presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is mare valuable than an institution intended precisely to service human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the reason which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 676). (Emphasis supplied) Expounding on this abolition, Fr. Bernas also stated: "Rather than wait for legislative discretion to abolish the death penalty, the Commission went ahead to abolish it but left the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its discretion for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." "By a show of hands, the abolition of the death penalty was approved, 19 to 18. On motion of Commissioner Rodrigo, nominal voting was called and the outcome was still for abolition, 22 to 17" (Bernas, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, pp. 442443).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Another member of the CONCOM, Mr. Florenz Regalado, now a member of this Court, spoke for the retention of the death penalty, arguing that the law has provided numerous procedural and substantive safeguards that must be observed before the death penalty could be carried out. Among the safeguards are the requirements that evidence still be presented to justify the imposition of the death penalty although the accused has pleaded guilty, and the automatic review of such death penalty when imposed by Trial

Courts. Commissioner Regalado also mentioned the fact that the Supreme Court has modified the death sentences imposed by Trial Courts in many instances. According to him, this only shows that the imposition of capital punishment goes through all the stages of screening and processing to avoid the possibility of error (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 745-746).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In response, Fr. Bernas said that the numerous safeguards that must be observed before the death penalty could be carried out precisely show the tremendous reluctance of Philippine society to impose the death penalty, which reluctance must be translated into a constitutional prohibition. To quote him: FR. BERNAS: The reluctance is so grave that so many obstacles are put up against the execution of the death penalty and judges agonize whether they have to impose a death penalty or not. Legislators have made it more difficult for the death penalty to be imposed. Thus, the total abolition of the death penalty by the Constitution facilitates everything for the judges and for the legislators. it removes the agonizing process of having to decide whether the death penalty should be imposed by them or not. (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 746) (Emphasis supplied) It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The following interpellation during the CONCOM deliberations sheds further light: MR. MAAMBONG: Just one clarificatory question. On the assumption that this proposed amendment will be granted, what would happen to the laws which presently punish certain penal omens by death, because those laws may have to be repealed later by the National Assembly? But as of this moment, there are so many penal offenses which are punishable by death. What would be the effect of the grant of these amendments?chanrobles virtual law library FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the penalty is abolished. (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 748-749) (Emphasis supplied) It is true that Article III, Section 19(l) also grants Congress the power to provide for the death penalty in cases involving heinous crimes. Congress was given this power precisely because it is only the lawmaking body which can legislate back into existence something that has been eliminated from our penal laws. Thus, the Constitution, while abolishing capital punishment, also left to Congress the power to restore it in certain cases. It is clear, however, that unless and until Congress enacts the necessary legislation, the

death penalty remains non-existent in our statute books. Again, the deliberations in the CONCOM prove this point: FR. BERNAS: The sense of this proposal is that upon the ratification of this Constitution, the legislature, if it wants to reimpose the death penalty, must repeat the act. In other words, the penalty disappears and there is need of a new act of the legislature to put it back.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library MR. MAAMBONG: Could we put it more simply, Madam President? Could we say that once this amendment is accepted, all penal offenses punishable by death will no longer carry the death penalty? chanrobles virtual law library FR. BERNAS: That is correct (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 749). (Emphasis supplied) The following exchange on the floor when the CONCOM was deliberating on the provision giving the Legislature the power to provide for the death penalty in cases involving heinous crimes shows the understanding among the framers of what the consequences would be when the legislature does not pass a law reimposing death penalty for certain heinous crimes: MR. DE CASTRO: What happens if the National Assembly does not pass any law concerning death penalty such as on heinous crimes? chanrobles virtual law library MR. MONSOD: Then there is no death penalty. MIL DE CASTRO: That is the effect of the amendment? chanrobles virtual law library MR. MONSOD: Yes (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, pp. 747-748) (Emphasis supplied) To say that the wordings "neither shall death penalty be imposed," do not provide for the abolition of the death penalty, but only provides for its nonimposition is to adopt a rather literal and restrictive construction that goes against the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The literal import or meaning of a statute must yield to its apparent intent, purpose or spirit. Intent is the spirit which gives rise to legislative enactment. It must be enforced when ascertained although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. The language of the Constitution "should be read in a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption" (Eisner v. Macomber, 15, 6 Ed 421, 424). The intention of the legislature and its purpose or object, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, control the literal interpretation of the particular language of a statute and a language capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in such a sense as to harmonize with the intention and object and effectuate the purpose of the enactment (US vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Coming now to the penalty for Murder-the majority reverses the Decisions of this Court in People vs. Gavarra (L-37673, October 30, 1987, en banc, 155 SCRA 327), People vs. Masangkay (L-73461,

October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 113), People vs. Atencio (L-67721, December 10, 1987, 156 SCRA 242) and People v. Intino (L-69934, September 26, 1988) with respect to the imposable penalty for Murder in the absence of modifying circumstances. Those cases held that with the constitutional ban on capital punishment, the penalty for Murder now becomes reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Applying the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Article 61 [3]), the medium period would be the higher half of reclusion temporal maximum or 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years, and the minimum period is the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum, or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 18 years and 8 months. The maximum period is, of course, reclusion perpetua because of the prohibition regarding the death penalty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The foregoing is but in faithful adherence to the graduated three-period scheme in the Revised Penal Code whereby if an aggravating circumstance attends the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the maximum period; if a mitigating circumstance, the minimum period; and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, the medium period.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The majority assails the foregoing interpretation, however, in that the requirement of the modification of the penalty is not at all expressed in the Constitutional provision in question nor indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. However, to require the inclusion of such an additional provision would have made for more prolixity to a document that already is. That detail was best left to the Courts as indicated by the discussions on the floor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Indeed, when the abolition of the death penalty was being discussed on the floor of the CONCOM, the issue of the proper penalty for Murder, specifically with regard to its medium period, was raised. The following interpellation, also repeated in the majority opinion, tackled that issue: FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the penalty is abolished.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the statutes, especially in the General Criminal Law, which is the Revised Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly with death. Sometimes it has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to death. And what would be the effect on the judges, for example, if the range is reclusion temporal to death and he can no longer impose the death penalty? He will have difficulty in commuting the

degrees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the specific situation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I suppose that the judges will be equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if there is a range, the range cannot go as far as death (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 749). xxx xxx xxx FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death re- main.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of the penalty for murder consists of three periods. The maximum period of reclusion temporal under the present status is the minimum period for the penalty for murder. The medium period is reclusion perpetua. The maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty, we will, therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years ' of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You cannot divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30 years, it is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium period now until such time that Congress gets around to accommodate this amendment? chanrobles virtual law library FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about. All we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the death penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 750) The fact that the medium period of the penalty for Murder was at all discussed not only bolsters the holding in the Gavarra and related cases that the death penalty had been abolished, and that the penalty for Murder was consequentially to be reduced to two periods, but also shows a keen awareness that "difficulty" would be encountered by the Courts by reason thereof The Supreme Court had proven itself "equal to the task" by resolving that "difficulty in the cited cases. If it were, as the majority says, that "they (the proponents) were not saying more," wherein would the "difficulty" lie? It would have been an easy matter for the proponents to have simply answered that the medium period was to be maintained at reclusion perpetua since anyway, as the majority concludes, the death penalty had not been abolished.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library If, as opined by the majority, reclusion perpetua is retained as the penalty for Murder even in the absence of aggravating and modifying circumstances, while imposed also as the new maximum penalty for the crime, then, the presence or absence of modifying circumstances will no longer lead to the imposition of a higher or lesser penalty depending on the attendant circumstances, as the Penal Code has prescribed. The distinction is erased between Murder committed with a generic aggravating circumstance and Murder

carried out with neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance. In both cases, the same penalty is imposable. As a consequence, the reason of the law in creating penalties divided into periods and in providing for various modifying circumstances with different effects, that is, the need to penalized more severely a Murder attended by an aggravating circumstance than a Murder with neither aggravating nor modifying circumstance, is rendered nugatory. Certainly, the CONCOM, in banning the imposition of capital punishment, could not have also intended to discard the underlying reason of the Penal Code in imposing three-periods for the penalty for Murder, i.e., to punish the offense in different degrees of severity depending on the offender's employment of aggravating or mitigating circumstance, or the lack thereof. To say that this is "the will of the Constitution" is inaccurate for the matter was clearly left to the Courts which were expected to be "equal to the tasks." chanrobles virtual law library In keeping with that expectation, this Court held that the modified penalty for Murder, or, reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua, must retain the three-period scheme. In the application of the new penalty, a medium period, less severe than the maximum penalty, must be provided for so that the original intention of the law to penalize Murder in different degrees of severity depending on the attendant circumstances, remains in effect. That was the basis for the ruling in the Masangkay and the related that the majority is now abandoning. In those cases, the Court did not prescribe a penalty, a function admittedly legislative. It merely effectuated the Constitutional ban on capital punishment and harmonized it with the basic tenets underlying our Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting: Concurrence is expressed in so far as conviction of the appellants is concerned.chanrobles virtual law library Dissent is registered, however, as to the penalty imposed which, in our view, should adhere to that provided in the Gavarra, followed byMasangkay, Atencio and Intino cases, which is more reflective of the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.chanrobles virtual law library Simply put, the question is: did Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, abolish the death penalty or not? The pertinent portion thereof provides: ... Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it. xxx xxx xxx The majority pronouncement is that said provision did not abolish the death penalty but only provided for its non- imposition. Our reading, however, is that when the Constitution states that the death penalty

shall not be imposed, it can only mean that capital punishment is now deemed non-existent in our penal statutes.chanrobles virtual law library It is because of the imperfection ("awkward" as termed by the majority) of the language used, and its susceptibility to two conflicting interpretations, contrary to the majority opinion that the text is plain, that resort must be had to judicial construction.chanrobles virtual law library It is elementary in statutory construction that it is the intent of the statute that must be given effect. The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines the construction thereof, and the Court looks less to its words and more to its context, subject matter, consequence and effects (Manila Race Horse Trainers Association vs. de la Puente, 88 Phil. 60). A statute must be read according to its spirit and intent, and where legislative intent apparently conflicts with the letter of the law, the former prevails over the latter (Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051). This intent must be ascertained from the words of the statutory provision itself. However, in a situation such as in the case at bar, where the intent does not decisively appear in the text of the provision as it admits of more than one construction, reliance may be made on extrinsic aids such as the records of the deliberations of the body that framed the law in order to clearly ascertain that intent.chanrobles virtual law library The records of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) leave no doubt as to the intention of that body to abolish the death penalty. Thus, Fr. Bernas spoke of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty in his speech sponsoring the provision: My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not on whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution-in which case it cannot be restored by the legislature-left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just to presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is mare valuable than an institution intended precisely to service human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the reason which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 676). (Emphasis supplied) Expounding on this abolition, Fr. Bernas also stated: "Rather than wait for legislative discretion to abolish the death penalty, the Commission went ahead to abolish it but left the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its discretion for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." "By a show of hands, the abolition of the death penalty was

approved, 19 to 18. On motion of Commissioner Rodrigo, nominal voting was called and the outcome was still for abolition, 22 to 17" (Bernas, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, pp. 442443).chanrobles virtual law library Another member of the CONCOM, Mr. Florenz Regalado, now a member of this Court, spoke for the retention of the death penalty, arguing that the law has provided numerous procedural and substantive safeguards that must be observed before the death penalty could be carried out. Among the safeguards are the requirements that evidence still be presented to justify the imposition of the death penalty although the accused has pleaded guilty, and the automatic review of such death penalty when imposed by Trial Courts. Commissioner Regalado also mentioned the fact that the Supreme Court has modified the death sentences imposed by Trial Courts in many instances. According to him, this only shows that the imposition of capital punishment goes through all the stages of screening and processing to avoid the possibility of error (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 745-746).chanrobles virtual law library In response, Fr. Bernas said that the numerous safeguards that must be observed before the death penalty could be carried out precisely show the tremendous reluctance of Philippine society to impose the death penalty, which reluctance must be translated into a constitutional prohibition. To quote him: FR. BERNAS: The reluctance is so grave that so many obstacles are put up against the execution of the death penalty and judges agonize whether they have to impose a death penalty or not. Legislators have made it more difficult for the death penalty to be imposed. Thus, the total abolition of the death penalty by the Constitution facilitates everything for the judges and for the legislators. it removes the agonizing process of having to decide whether the death penalty should be imposed by them or not. (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 746) (Emphasis supplied) It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights.chanrobles virtual law library The following interpellation during the CONCOM deliberations sheds further light: MR. MAAMBONG: Just one clarificatory question. On the assumption that this proposed amendment will be granted, what would happen to the laws which presently punish certain penal omens by death, because those laws may have to be repealed later by the National Assembly? But as of this moment, there are so many penal offenses which are punishable by death. What would be the effect of the grant of these amendments? FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those statutes-only the death penalty.

The statute is not abolished, but the penalty is abolished. (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 748-749) (Emphasis supplied) It is true that Article III, Section 19(l) also grants Congress the power to provide for the death penalty in cases involving heinous crimes. Congress was given this power precisely because it is only the lawmaking body which can legislate back into existence something that has been eliminated from our penal laws. Thus, the Constitution, while abolishing capital punishment, also left to Congress the power to restore it in certain cases. It is clear, however, that unless and until Congress enacts the necessary legislation, the death penalty remains non-existent in our statute books. Again, the deliberations in the CONCOM prove this point: FR. BERNAS: The sense of this proposal is that upon the ratification of this Constitution, the legislature, if it wants to reimpose the death penalty, must repeat the act. In other words, the penalty disappears and there is need of a new act of the legislature to put it back.chanrobles virtual law library MR. MAAMBONG: Could we put it more simply, Madam President? Could we say that once this amendment is accepted, all penal offenses punishable by death will no longer carry the death penalty? FR. BERNAS: That is correct (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 749). (Emphasis supplied) The following exchange on the floor when the CONCOM was deliberating on the provision giving the Legislature the power to provide for the death penalty in cases involving heinous crimes shows the understanding among the framers of what the consequences would be when the legislature does not pass a law reimposing death penalty for certain heinous crimes: MR. DE CASTRO: What happens if the National Assembly does not pass any law concerning death penalty such as on heinous crimes? MR. MONSOD: Then there is no death penalty. MIL DE CASTRO: That is the effect of the amendment? MR. MONSOD: Yes (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, pp. 747-748) (Emphasis supplied) To say that the wordings "neither shall death penalty be imposed," do not provide for the abolition of the death penalty, but only provides for its nonimposition is to adopt a rather literal and restrictive construction that goes against the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The literal import or meaning of a statute must yield to its apparent intent, purpose or spirit. Intent is the spirit which gives rise to legislative enactment. It must be enforced when ascertained although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. The language of the Constitution "should be read in a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption" (Eisner v. Macomber, 15, 6 Ed 421, 424). The intention of the legislature and its purpose or object, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, control the literal interpretation of the particular language of a statute and a language

capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in such a sense as to harmonize with the intention and object and effectuate the purpose of the enactment (US vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128).chanrobles virtual law library Coming now to the penalty for Murder-the majority reverses the Decisions of this Court in People vs. Gavarra (L-37673, October 30, 1987, en banc, 155 SCRA 327), People vs. Masangkay (L-73461, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 113), People vs. Atencio (L-67721, December 10, 1987, 156 SCRA 242) and People v. Intino (L-69934, September 26, 1988) with respect to the imposable penalty for Murder in the absence of modifying circumstances. Those cases held that with the constitutional ban on capital punishment, the penalty for Murder now becomes reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Applying the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Article 61 [3]), the medium period would be the higher half of reclusion temporal maximum or 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years, and the minimum period is the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum, or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 18 years and 8 months. The maximum period is, of course, reclusion perpetua because of the prohibition regarding the death penalty.chanrobles virtual law library The foregoing is but in faithful adherence to the graduated three-period scheme in the Revised Penal Code whereby if an aggravating circumstance attends the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the maximum period; if a mitigating circumstance, the minimum period; and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, the medium period.chanrobles virtual law library The majority assails the foregoing interpretation, however, in that the requirement of the modification of the penalty is not at all expressed in the Constitutional provision in question nor indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. However, to require the inclusion of such an additional provision would have made for more prolixity to a document that already is. That detail was best left to the Courts as indicated by the discussions on the floor.chanrobles virtual law library Indeed, when the abolition of the death penalty was being discussed on the floor of the CONCOM, the issue of the proper penalty for Murder, specifically with regard to its medium period, was raised. The following interpellation, also repeated in the majority opinion, tackled that issue: FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the penalty is abolished.chanrobles virtual law library MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the statutes, especially in the General Criminal Law, which is the Revised Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly with death. Sometimes it has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to death. And what would be the effect on the judges, for example, if the range is

reclusion temporal to death and he can no longer impose the death penalty? He will have difficulty in commuting the degrees.chanrobles virtual law library Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the specific situation.chanrobles virtual law library FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I suppose that the judges will be equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if there is a range, the range cannot go as far as death (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 749). xxx xxx xxx FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death re- main.chanrobles virtual law library MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of the penalty for murder consists of three periods. The maximum period of reclusion temporal under the present status is the minimum period for the penalty for murder. The medium period is reclusion perpetua. The maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty, we will, therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years ' of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You cannot divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30 years, it is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium period now until such time that Congress gets around to accommodate this amendment? FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about. All we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the death penalty (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 750) The fact that the medium period of the penalty for Murder was at all discussed not only bolsters the holding in the Gavarra and related cases that the death penalty had been abolished, and that the penalty for Murder was consequentially to be reduced to two periods, but also shows a keen awareness that "difficulty" would be encountered by the Courts by reason thereof The Supreme Court had proven itself "equal to the task" by resolving that "difficulty in the cited cases. If it were, as the majority says, that "they (the proponents) were not saying more," wherein would the "difficulty" lie? It would have been an easy matter for the proponents to have simply answered that the medium period was to be maintained at reclusion perpetua since anyway, as the majority concludes, the death penalty had not been abolished.chanrobles virtual law library If, as opined by the majority, reclusion perpetua is retained as the penalty for Murder even in the absence of aggravating and modifying circumstances, while imposed also as the new maximum penalty for the crime, then, the presence or absence of modifying circumstances will no longer lead to the imposition of a higher or lesser penalty depending on the attendant circumstances, as the Penal Code has prescribed. The distinction is erased between Murder committed with a generic aggravating circumstance and Murder carried out with neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance. In both cases, the same penalty is imposable. As a consequence, the reason of the law in

creating penalties divided into periods and in providing for various modifying circumstances with different effects, that is, the need to penalized more severely a Murder attended by an aggravating circumstance than a Murder with neither aggravating nor modifying circumstance, is rendered nugatory. Certainly, the CONCOM, in banning the imposition of capital punishment, could not have also intended to discard the underlying reason of the Penal Code in imposing three-periods for the penalty for Murder, i.e., to punish the offense in different degrees of severity depending on the offender's employment of aggravating or mitigating circumstance, or the lack thereof. To say that this is "the will of the Constitution" is inaccurate for the matter was clearly left to the Courts which were expected to be "equal to the tasks." In keeping with that expectation, this Court held that the modified penalty for Murder, or, reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua, must retain the three-period scheme. In the application of the new penalty, a medium period, less severe than the maximum penalty, must be provided for so that the original intention of the law to penalize Murder in different degrees of severity depending on the attendant circumstances, remains in effect. That was the basis for the ruling in the Masangkay and the related that the majority is now abandoning. In those cases, the Court did not prescribe a penalty, a function admittedly legislative. It merely effectuated the Constitutional ban on capital punishment and harmonized it with the basic tenets underlying our Penal Code. G.R. No. L-8888 November 29, 1957 SONG KIAT CHOCOLATE FACTORY, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and VICENTE GELLA, in his capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines, Defendants-Appellees. BENGZON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library The question in this appeal is whether cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant imported sun dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent totalling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax under section 2 of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that had exacted payment; and in its amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines. The suit was filed in the Manila Court of First Instance, wherein defendants submitted in due time a motion to dismiss on the grounds: first, the complaint stated no cause of action because cocoa beans were not "chocolate"; and second, it was a suit against the Government without the latter's consent.

.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Hon. Gregorio S. Narvasa, Judge, sustained the motion, and dismissed the case by his order of November 19, 1954. Hence this appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The lower court, appellant contends, erred in dismissing the case and in holding that the term "chocolate" does not include sun dried cocoa beans.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SEC. 2 of the aforesaid Act provides that "the tax collected or foreign exchange used for the payment of costs transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour ..soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup .. shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation . . ." chanrobles virtual law library In support of its contention appellant quotes from dictionaries and encyclopedias interchangeably using the words "chocolate", "cacao" and "cocoa". Yet we notice that the quotations refer to "cocoa" as chocolate nut" "chocolate bean" or "chocolate tree." And the legal exemption refers to "chocolate" not the bean, nor the nut nor the tree. We agree with the Solicitor General and the other counsel of respondents that in common parlance the law is presumed to refer to it1 - chocolate is a manufactured or finished product made out of cocoa beans, or "cacao" beans as they are locally known. We may take notice of the fact that grocery stores sell powdered cocoa beans as chocolate, labeled "cocoa powder", or simply "cocoa". They are, however, really chocolate; they are not cocoa beans. The manufacture of chocolate involves several processes, such as selecting and drying the cocoa beans, then roasting, grinding, sieving and blending.2Cocoa beans do not become chocolate unless and until they have undergone the manufacturing processes above described. The first is raw material, the other finished product.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The courts regard "chocolate" as "Chocolate" is a preparation of roasted cacao beans without the abstraction of the butter and always contains sugar and added cacao butter. Rockwood & Co., vs. American President Lines, D. C. N. J., 68 F. Supp. 224, 226.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Chocolate is a cocoa bean roasted, cracked, shelled, crushed, ground, and molded in cakes. It contains no sugar, and is in general use in families. Sweetened chocolate is manufactured in the same way but the paste is mixed wit sugar, and is used by confectioners in making chocolate confections. In re Schiling, 53 F. 81, 82, 3 C. C. A. 440. In view of the foregoing, and having in mind the principle of strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation,3 we are of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in the above section 2

does not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter is ready for human consumption; the former is not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library However, we cannot stop here, because in August 1954 - suit was brought in May 1954 - Congress approved Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by substituting "cocoa beans" for "chocolate." This shows, maintains the appellant, the Legislature's intention to include cocoa beans in the word "chocolate." In fact, it goes on, the Committee Chairman who reported House Bill No. 2676 which became Republic Act 1197, declared before the House. Mr. ROCES: Mr. SPEAKER, on line 8 page 1, after the word 'canned', strike out the words, 'fresh, frozen and' and also the words 'other beef', on line 9 and on the same line, line 9, after the word 'chocolate', insert the words '(COCOA BEANS)' in parenthesis ( ). I am proposing to insert the words '(COCOA BEANS)' in parenthesis ( ) after the word chocolate, Mr. Speaker, in order to clarify any doubt and manifest the intention of the past Congress that the word 'chocolate' should mean 'cocoa beans. In reply to this, appellees point out that said chairman could not have spoken of the Congressional intention in approving Republic Act 601 because he was not a member of the Congress that passed said Act. Naturally, all he could state was his own interpretation of such piece of legislation. Courts do not usually give decisive weight to one legislator's opinion, expressed in Congressional debates concerning the application of existing laws.4 Yet even among the legislators taking part in the consideration of the amendatory statute (Republic Act 1197) the impression prevailed that, as the law then stood5 chocolate candy or chocolate bar was exempted, but cocoa beans were not. Here are Senator Peralta's statements during the discussion of the same House Bill No. 2576: SENATOR PERALTA: I signed that conference report and I am really bound by it, but, Mr. President, a few hours ago I received some information which maybe the chairman would like to know, to the effect that we allow chocolate bar, chocolate candy to come this country except from the 17 per cent tax when we do not allow cocoa beans, out of which our local manufacturers can make chocolate candy, exempted. So why do we not take off that exemption for chocolate and instead put 'cocoa beans' so as to benefit our manufacturers of chocolate candy? xxx xxx xxx. Senator PERALTA: Yes, I agree with the chairman, only I was just wondering if the chairman, might not consider the fact that in view of the information, this seems to be inconsistent we allow chocolate to come here exempt and not exempt cocoa beans which is used by our manufacturers in making chocolate candy. And Senator Puyat is quoted as saying, in the same connection:

MR. PRESIDENT, On the same page (page 1), line 9, delete "cocoa beans". The text as it came to the Senate was misleading. In the original law the exemption is for chocolate and the version that we got from the Lower House is "(cocoa beans)"giving the impression that chocolate and cocoa beans are synonymous. Now I think this is a sort of a rider, so your committee recommends the deletion of those words. (Journal of the Senate, July 30, 1954, re H. B. No. 2576, Emphasis ours.) Other parts of the Congressional record quoted in the briefs would seem to show that in approving House Bill No. 2576, the Congress agreed to exempt "cocoa beans" instead of chocolate with a view to favoring local manufacturers of chocolate products.6 A change of legislative policy, as appellees contend7 - not a declaration or clarification of previous Congressional purpose. In fact, as indicating, the Government's new policy of exempting for the first time importations of "cocoa beans," there is the President's proclamation No. 62 of September 2, 1954 issued in accordance with Republic Act No. 1197 specifying that said exemption (of cocoa beans) shall operate from and after September 3, 1954 - not before. As a general rule, it may be added, statutes operate prospectively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Observe that appellant's cocoa beans had been imported during January-October 1953, i.e. before the exemption decree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After the foregoing discussion, it is hardly necessary to express our approval of the lower court's opinion about plaintiff's cause of action, or the lack of it. And it becomes unnecessary to consider the other contention of defendants that this is a suit against the Government without its consent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The order of dismissal is affirmed, with costs against appellant.chanroblesvirtualawl G.R. No. L-42821 January 18, 1936 JUAN BENGZON, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE INSULAR AUDITOR, respondents-appellees. Mario Bengzon for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellees. --> MALCOLM, J.: chanrobles virtual law library This case was brought by a former justice of the peace to test the validity of the veto by the GovernorGeneral of section 7 of Act No. 4051, the Retirement Gratuity Law. In the trial court the petition for a writ of mandamus directed to the Secretary of Justice and the Insular Auditor was dismissed. Thereupon the losing party appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The facts, as stipulated disclose the following: Juan Bengzon, the petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for the municipality of Lingayen, Pangasinan, on March 7, 1912. Having reached the age of sixtyfive, he ceased to hold this position on January 14, 1933, by reason of the provisions of Act No. 3899. On that date, acting pursuant to instructions received from the Judge of First Instance for the district, he turned over the office of Justice of the peace to the auxiliary justice of the peace of the municipality. Subsequently the petitioner addressed communications to the Secretary of Justice, the Governor-General, and the Insular Auditor applying for gratuity under Act No. 4051, but all of these officials advised him that he was not entitled to the benefits of the Act. Accordingly, on March 7, 1934, the instant complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Act No. 4051 is entitled, "An Act to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired from the service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of personal thereof, including the justice of the peace who must relinquish office in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes." The body of the Act provides in several sections for the officers and employees who may be granted gratuities thereunder, the rates of of gratuities to be paid, and other matters. Among these sections, as the bill passed the Philippine Legislature, was section 7, reading: "The justices of the peace who must relinquish office during the year nineteen hundred and thirty-three in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, shall also be entitled to the gratuities provided for in this Act." Following this is section 10, reading: "The necessary sum to carry out the purposes of this Act is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated," and section 12 reading: "If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is disapproved by the Governor-General or is challenged in a competent court and is held to be unconstitutional or invalid, one of the other sections or provisions hereof shall be affected thereby and such other sections and provisions shall continue to govern as if the section or provision so disapproved or held invalid had never been incorporated in this Act." The Act was "approved" by the GovernorGeneral, section 7 excepted, February 21, 1933." The Philippine Legislature accepted the veto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 19 of the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, established the practice for the enactment of a law, including the sanctioning of the veto power by the Governor-General. Specifically it provided: "The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the object." The

Constitution of the Philippines, article VI, section 11 (2) contains ab exactly similar provision, except that the words "The President" are substituted for the words "The Governor-General," and except that succeeding sentences in the constitution prescribed the procedure for vetoing one or more items of an appropriation bill in a more explicit manner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The first thought that occurs to one in resolving the appeal of the petitioner is that, within the meaning of section 7 of Act No. 4051, on the assumption that it be restored to the law by the judiciary, he has not shown himself to be a justice of the peace who was forced to relinquish office during the year 1933. At least, he did not takes steps to vindicate an alleged right as did the justices of the peace of the municipality of Malinao, Albay, and the municipality of Alabat, Tayabas. (Regalado vs. Yulo [19351, 61 Phil., 173; Ta? vs. Yulo [19351, 61 Phil., 515.) ada However, this point has not been advanced by the Government either in the lower court or on appeal, and so it would seem to be inappropriate to manufacture a defense for the respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Something might also be made of the proposition on which the trial judge relied for dismissal and which is brought into view by the first assigned error. In other words, since the duty which the petitioner claims is enjoined by law upon the respondent not only does not exist but would require the intervention of the Governor-General, who is not a party, to exist, no cause of action is made out. This, however, merely results in hiding behind a technicality to keep the parties from securing the opinion of the courts on the main issue. We prefer to satisfy the petitioner by ruling on the question suggested by the first sentence of this decision and which is raised squarely by the second assigned error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Governor-General purported to act pursuant to the portion of section 19 of the Organic Act which is above quoted. The key words of that sentence are "appropriation bill" and "item or items." An appropriation in the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a specified purpose. An item is the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. No set from of words is needed to make out an appropriation or an item (State vs. Moore [1896], 50 Neb., 88; Callaghan vs. Boyce [1915], 17 Ariz., 433.) chanrobles virtual law library Within the meaning of these word, is Act No. 4051 an appropriation bill? Are there particular items in that bill which the Governor-General could constitutionally veto? We are led to answer both question in the affirmative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature and must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise inference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto the same as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Commonwealth vs. Barnett [1901, 199 Pa., 161; L.R.A., 882; People vs.Board of Councilmen [1892], 20 N.Y.S., 52; Fulmore vs. Lane [1911], 104., Texas Co. vs. State [1927], 53 A.L.R., 258.) chanrobles virtual law library In determining whether or not the Governor-General stepped outside the boundaries of his legislative functions, when he attempted to veto one section of Act No. 4051, while approving the rest of the bill, we are not without the aid of the construction placed on his action by both legislative and executive departments. That the Philippine Legislature intended Act No. 4051 to be an appropriation measure with various items is apparent from a reading of section 12 thereof whereby the Legislature anticipated the possibility of a partial veto of the bill by the Chief Executive. Not only this, but after the Chief Executive took action, the Legislature made no attempt to override the veto or to amend the law to bring into being the section which the GovernorGeneral had eliminated. Then the same question came again before the executive department, and all of its united in sustaining the validity of the Government General's veto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library While contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, yet where a construction of statutes has been adopted by the legislative department and accepted by the various agencies of the executive department, it is entitled to great respect. It is our understanding that it has been the practice of the Chief Executive in the interpretation of his constitutional powers to veto separate items in bills analogous to that before us, and that this practice has been acquiesced in previously without objection, so that it would require a clear showing or unconstitutionality for the courts to declare against it.

Since, therefore, legislative intent and executive purpose is evident, it devolves upon the judiciary to give differential attention to the attitude assumed by the other two branches of the Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Viewed from another direction, there can be no doubt that Act No. 4051 is an appropriation bill. That is manifest from its provisions, and particularly from section 10 by which the necessary sum to carry out the purposes of the Act was "hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated." It has, however, been faintly suggested that by an appropriation bill is meant a general appropriation bill. We are shown nothing substantial to support this allegation. Unlike in other constitutions, the word "general" was omitted, and we presume intentionally, from the Organic Act and the Constitution. Under such conditions, the courts would not be authorized to insert a word and by so doing amend the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The same considerations hold true with regard to the question of whether or not there was a particular item which the Governor-General could validly veto. No further action by the Legislature was contemplated. The accounting officers would have experienced no difficulty in setting up the different items provided for under Act No. 4051. It would have been a facile matter to eliminate the money needed to make section 7 thereof effective. The Chief Executive had the right to object to the expenditure of money for a specified purpose and amount without being under the necessity of at the same time refusing to agree to other expenditures which met with his entire approval, and that intention was unequivocably expressed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We have gone to the trouble to examine all of the authorities cited by the parties and other authorities not brought to our attention by them. It will be found that in practically all of these cases there was a conflict between the legislative and executive departments which the judiciary had to decide. Here there is no such conflict, but unison between the two. Here on the contrary the judiciary is asked to take the initiative and to restore a section to a law against the explicit confirmation of executive authority by the Legislature and against explicit action taken by the Chief Executive. In our opinion, it was never intended by a mere process of reasoning, however plausible, for the courts to breathe life into a portion of an Act which has not been given life by the other departments of the government acting in conformity with the Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Deciding, therefore, the main issue as requested by the petitioner and appellant, we are constrained to rule against him and to hold that the veto by the Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative purpose and the

provisions of the Organic Act. For this reason, the judgment brought on appeal will be affirmed, without pronouncement as to the costs in either instance. Avance? C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial, Diaz, a, and Recto, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library The phrase "any particular item or items of an appropriation bill" used in section 19 of the Jones Law refers to an appropriation bill which is composed of several items of appropriation and not to one which contains only an item of appropriation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Act No. 4051, as its title indicates, in "An Act to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired from the service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel thereof, including the justices of the peace who must relinguish office in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes." In other words, said Act is a gratuity law, appropriating in its section 10 the necessary sum to pay the gratuities herein granted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Outside of section 10 there is no other provision or item appropriating any other sum of money which may be considered an item of an appropriation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of section 1 classify the officers and employees who shall be entitled to gratuity and establish the rate thereon according to salary and years of service.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 2 establishes the preference in the separation and retirement of employees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 3 determines the salary on which the gratuity should be based.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 4 gives the separated or retired employee and officer the choice between the present gratuity law and other gratuity laws under which they may be entitled to gratuity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 5 designates the person to whom payment of gratuity shall be made in case of death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 6 establishes the conditions under which a separated or retired officer or employee under the law may be

reappointed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 7 extends the benefit of the law to justices of the peace under certain conditions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 8 provides that the offices and positions created shall be considered abolished ipso facto, with certain exceptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 9 excludes from the benefit of the law officers and employees who have voluntarily retired.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 10 appropriates the necessary sum for the payment of the gratuities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 11 fixes the date on which the law shall take effect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 12 provides that the disapproval by the Governor-General of any section or provision of the Act, or the declaration of unconstitutionality of the same shall not effect the other sections.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It will be seen that none of the sections above enumerated, except section 10, contains any appropriation of money.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library All the twelve sections of Act No. 4051, with the exception of section 10, contain only conditions under which the money appropriated in said section 10 may be paid. If this is true, the vetoing by the GovernorGeneral of section 7 which extends the gratuity payment in said law to justices of the peace is unauthorized by the Constitution because, as stated above, it contains no appropriation of money but a mere designation of the officers to whom the money appropriated may be paid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of State vs. Holder (76 Miss., 158; 23 So. Rep., 643), the question was whether the following endorsement and qualified approval of "An act to appropriate money for the support and maintenance of the Industrial Institute and College for the years 1898 and 1899," was constitutional or not: "I approve that part of this bill preceding the word "provided," in the first section; and approve the suggestion in said section that by-laws provide for equal dormitory privileges to all pupils, whether taking industrial or academic courses, single or together; and I approve that part of said section providing for the expenditures of said money under the direction or approval of the trustees, and for report thereof to the legislature; and I approve section 2. The other parts, by authority of section 73 of the state constitution, I disapprove. . . .".

Section 73 of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi provides as follows: SEC. 73. The governor may veto parts of any appropriation bill, and approve parts of the same and the portions approved shall be law. The law in question reads as follows: An act to appropriate money for the support and maintenance of the Industrial Institute and College for the years 1898 and 1899.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Mississippi, that the following sums of money be and the same are hereby appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the support and maintenance of the Industrial Institute & College: For salaries of teachers and officers: For the year 1898 $20,490.00 For the year 1899 For extending sewer For painting building and repairs 20,490.00 1,600.00 1,600.00

Trustees' meetings, commencement 800.00 exercises, printing, etc. All of said amounts to be drawn by draft of the president of the college, approved by the governor and the auditor of public accounts, and the auditor shall issue his warrant on the state treasurer for the said several sums: provided that no part of the money hereby appropriated for wages or salaries shall be available unless the board of trustees shall first adopt and enact rules and by-laws to the following effect: First. Conferring upon the president of the college the power to recommend to the board of trustees all the teachers who may hereafter be employed, and to select and remove other employees who are not teachers, and giving the president the authority for sufficient cause in his discretion to remove or suspend any members of the faculty subject to the approval of the trustees. Second. Conferring upon the president of the college subject to the approval of the trustees to arrange and specify the course of study and to fix the schedules of studies and classes and to establish rules of discipline for the government of the pupils. Third. By-laws providing for equal dormitory privileges to all pupils whether taking industrial or academic courses, singly or together, and by-laws to enforce the faithful discharge of duties of all officers, professors or employees, and before the auditor shall issue any warrant under this act, the board of trustees shall file with the auditor a certified copy of their action complying with the above conditions. All of said money to be expended under the direction or approval of the trustees of the college, and a report of the expenditures made to the legislature. In deciding the case the Supreme Court of Mississippi said in part the following: Section 73 of the Constitution relates to general appropriation bills, or those containing several items

of distinct appropriations; that is to say, special appropriation bills, with distinct items of appropriations. It applies to such as are made up of parts, and consist of portions separable from each other as appropriations. It was not designed to enable the governor to veto objectionable legislation in appropriation bills, for that is provided for in section 69. . . . The same court, in another portion of the decision, said the following: chanrobles virtual law library . . . The signing of the bill by the governor was qualified in the act and on the enrolled bill, and did not become law in part, because it was not an approval of parts and disapproval of parts of such a bill, as is in view in section 73 of the constitution; the bill in this case, in the parts vetoed, not being an appropriation bill, within its meaning, and not being a veto of parts of distinct and separable appropriations. To hold that the bill became law as a whole would be to make it so without the governor's approval, and in the face of his approval, of the conditions. Both legislative declaration and executive approval are essential prerequisites to the enactment of any law. The action of the governor having been unconstitutional, and therefore void, his action in dealing with the bill was a nullity; but the legislature having adjourned within five days after the presentation of the bill to the governor, the bill, in legal contemplation, must be held to be yet in the hands of the governor, and may become law, unless sent back by him within three days after the beginning of the next session of the legislature. . . . On the same principle and for the same reason the veto of the Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 which is not an item o f appropriation is null and void as in excess of the power granted to him by section 19 of the Jones Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The fact that section 12 of Act No. 4051 has provided that "If, for any reason, any section or provisions of this Act is disapproved by the Governor-General or is challenged in a competent court and is held to be unconstitutional or invalid, none of the other sections or provisions hereof shall be affected thereby and such other sections and provisions shall continue to govern as if the section or provision so disapproved or held invalid had never been incorporated in this Act," could not have rendered valid and unconstitutional the disapproval by the GovernorGeneral of said section 7; for the only power which the legislature has in case a bill is vetoed by the Governor-General is to override said veto by a twothird vote of its members and it cannot ratify or validate an invalid veto because of its unconstitutionality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library It is suggested in the majority opinion that the Governor-General having vetoed section 7 of Act No. 4051 and the Legislature not having overriden said veto the presumption is that the act of the GovernorGeneral was constitutional and this court must respect

said implied approval. If such doctrine should prevail, then the executive may encroach upon the powers of the legislature, and if the latter should acquiesce in said encroachment either by sanctioning it in the bill which is the subject of encroachment or by failing to override said veto, and the courts must respect such encroachment when the constitutionality of said bill is put in question, then the judicial branch of the government instead of being the guardian of the Constitution will become an accomplice to its violation, and the rights of the people will have no protection.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion: First, that while Act No. 4051 contains an appropriation to give it effect, it is not an "appropriation bill" containing itemized appropriations and therefore is not one which the Governor-General can veto under the last paragraph of section 19 of the Jones Law; second, that section 7 of Act No. 4051, which extends to justices of the peace the gratuity granted in said Act, is a condition for the payment of the money appropriated in section 10 thereof and not an "item" of appropriation, and, therefore, the disapproval of the same by the Governor-General is unconstitutional and as such null and void; and third, that the proviso contained in section 12 of Act No. 4051 to the affect that the disapproval of any of its sections by the Governor-General shall not affect the rest of the bill, did not and could not validate an unconstitutional exercise of the veto power.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is, therefore, the opinion of the undersigned that the decision of the lower court should be reversed and the writ granted. G.R. No. L-12727 February 29, 1960 MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., PetitionerAppellant, vs. GAMES AND AMUSEMENTS BOARD, ET AL., respondents-appellees. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, INC., petitionerintervenor-appellant. BARRERA, J.: chanrobles virtual law library This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by petitioner Manila Jockey Club, Inc., in the Court of First Instance Manila (Civil Case No. 31274), in which the Philippine Racing Club, Inc., intervened as party in interest with leave of court, praying that judgment be rendered against respondents Games and Amusements Board (GAB), Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon: (a) Interpreting Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 1502 in such a manner that the 30 Sundays unreserved for charitable institutions and therefore belonging to the private racing clubs under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309 continue to pertain to said private entities, and that the 6 additional sweepstakes races authorized under Republic Act No. 1502 should be held on 6 of the 12 Saturdays not reserved for any private entity or

particular charitable institution under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, or on any other day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday and legal holiday; chanrobles virtual law library (b) Holding that respondent PCSO does not have the right or power to appropriate or use the race tracks and equipment of petitioner without its consent, nor can respondents compel petitioner to so allow such use of its race tracks and equipment under pain of having its license revoked. Respondents duly filed their respective answers to said petition and the case was heard. After hearing, the court, on July 5, 1957, rendered a decision which, in part, reads: The court does not deem it necessary to rule on the deprivation of property of the petitioner and the intervenor without due process of law, as feared by them, because as they have stated, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is using their premises and equipment under separate contracts of lease voluntarily and willingly entered into by the parties upon payment of a corresponding rental. There is therefore no deprivation of property without due process of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Wherefore, the court is of the opinion and so holds that once a month on a Sunday not reserved for the Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross and other charitable institutions by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is authorized to hold one regular sweepstakes draw and races, pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1502, thus reducing the number of Sundays which may be alloted to private entities by the Games and Amusements Board. . . . From this judgment, petitioner and intervenor interposed the present appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The issue is the proper placement of the six (6) additional racing days given to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, in virtue of Republic Act No. 1502, approved on June 16, 1956.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, the basic law on horse racing in the Philippines, as later amended by Republic Act No. 983, are as follows: A. Sundays:

(5) For private individuals and entities duly licensed by the GAB, other Sundays not reserved under this Act, a may be determined by the GAB ........................................... or 30 for Leap years Total for the year .................... or 53 for leap years. B. Saturdays: (1) For the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society ..... (2) For the White Cross, Inc. .......................................

(3) For private Individuals and entities duly licensed b GAB and as may be determined by it ..................................

(4) For races authorized by the President for charitable relief, or civic purposes other than the particular charitable institutions named above, all other Saturday not reserved for the latter ....................

Total ................................................................ C. Legal Holidays: All, except Thursday and Friday of the Holy Week, July 4th and December 30th, have been reserved for private individuals and entities duly licensed by the GAB. As stated, Republic Act No. 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO to twelve, but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races, the GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by six. Appellants protested, contending that the said increased should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the President, for charitable, relief, or civic purposes, or should be assigned to any other day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday, and legal holiday.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Appellants' contention cannot be sustained. Section 4 Republic Act No. 309, as amended by Republic Act No. 983, by express terms, specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16 Saturdays for the Philippine AntiTuberculosis Society, the White Cross, Inc. and the PCSO, and 12 Saturdays to the President for other charitable, relief, or civic purposes. These days can not be disposed of by the GAB without authority of law. As to the remaining racing days, the law provides: SEC. 4. Racing days.-Private individuals and entities duly licensed by the Commission on Races (now GAB) may hold horse races on Sundays not reserved under this Act, on twenty-four Saturdays as may be (1) For the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis determined by the said Commission (GAB), and on Society .................. legal holidays, except Thursday and Friday of Holy (2) For the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office Week, July fourth, commonly known as (PCSO) . Independence Day, and December thirtieth, commonly known as Rizal Day. (3) For the White Cross, It is clear from the above-quoted provision that Inc. ............................................. appellants have no vested right to the unreserved (4) For the Grand Derby Race of the Philippine AntiSundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except, Tuberculosis Society ........................................................ perhaps, on the holidays), because their holding of Total ................................................................ races on these days is merely permissive, subject to

the licensing and determination by the GAB. When, therefore, Republic Act No. 1502 was enacted increasing by six (6) the sweepstakes draw and races, but without specifying the days for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races, as it did, form among the only available racing days unreserved by any law - the Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject to licensing and determination by the GAB.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is suggested that the GAB should have chosen any week days or Saturday afternoons. In the first place, week days are out of the question. The law does not authorize the holding of horse races with betting on week days (See Article 198 of the Revised Penal Code). Secondly, sweepstakes races have always been held on Sundays. Besides, it is not possible to hold them on Saturday afternoons as, it is claimed, a whole day is necessary for the mixing of the sweepstakes balls, the drawing of winning sweepstakes numbers, and the running of the sweepstakes races. Be that as it may, since the law has given certain amount of discretion to the GAB in determining and allocating racing days not specifically reserved, and since the court does not find that a grave abuse of this discretion has been committed, there seems to be no reason, legal or otherwise, to set aside the resolution of the GAB.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Furthermore, appellants contend that even granting that the six (6) additional sweepstakes races should be run on Sundays, yet if they are held on a club race day, the GAB should only insert them in the club races and not given the whole day to the PCSO, to the exclusion of appellants. In support of this contention, the following quotation from the debate in the House of Representatives before voting on House Bill No. 5732, which became Republic Act No. 1502, is cited: Mr. ABELEDA. If there are no more amendments, I move that we vote on the measure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Mr. MARCOS. Mr. Speaker, before we proceed to vote on this bill, I want to make it of record that it is the clear intention of the House to increase by two the ten regular and special Sweepstakes races making it all in all, twelve, and that in cases where a sweepstakes race falls in a club race days the Sweepstakes races should be inserted in the club race.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Mr. ABELEDA. The gentleman from Ilocos Norte is correct. . . . (t.s.n., Proceedings in House of Representatives, Congress, May 17, 1956; emphasis supplied.) Appellants cite in their briefs a number of authorities sustaining the view that in the interpretation of statutes susceptible of widely differing constructions, legislative debates and explanatory statements by members of the legislature may be resorted to, to

throw light on the meaning of the words used in the statutes. Upon the other hand, the appellees, likewise, quote in their briefs other authorities to the effect that statements made by the individual members of the legislature as to the meaning of provisions in the bill subsequently enacted into law, made during the general debate on the bill on the floor of each legislative house, following its presentation by a standing committee, are generally held to be in admissable as an aid in construing the statute. Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not safe guides and, hence, may not be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other.1 chanrobles virtual law library In view of these conflicting authorities, no appreciable reliance can safely be placed on any of them. It is to be noted in the specific case before us, that while Congressmen Marcos and Abeleda were, admittedly, of the view that the additional sweepstakes races may be inserted in the club races, still there is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally enacted, which would indicate that such an understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House of Congress were received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely devoid of any such indication. This is, therefore, not a case where a doubtful wording is sought to be interpreted; rather, if we adopt appellants' theory, we would be supplying something that does not appear in the statute. It is pertinent to observe here that, as pointed out by one of appellants' own cited authorities,2 in the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses that meaning. The legal act, so to speak, is made up of two elements - an internal and an external one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the latter may defeat the former. The following, taken from 59 Corpus Juris 1017, is in the line with this theory: The intention of the legislature to which effect must be given is that expressed in the statute and the courts will not inquire into the motives which influence the legislature, or individual members, in voting for its passage; nor indeed as to the intention of the draftsman, or the legislature, so far as it has been expressed in the act. So, in ascertaining the meaning

of a statute the court will not be governed or influenced by the views or opinions of any or all members of the legislature or its legislative committees or any other persons. Upon the other hand, at the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1502 in June, 1956, the long, continuous, and uniform practice was that all sweepstakes draws and races were held on Sundays and during the whole day. With this background, when Congress chose not to specify in express terms how the additional sweepstakes draws and races would be held, it is safe to conclude that it did not intend to disturb the then prevailing situation and practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library "On the principle of contemporaneous exposition, common usage and practice under the statute, or a course of conduct indicating a particular undertaking of it, will frequently be of great value in determining its real meaning, especially where the usage has been acquired in by all parties concerned and has extended over a long period of time; . . . (59 C. J. 1023).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Likewise, the language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase, clearly speaks of regular sweepstakes draws and races. If the intention of Congress were to authorize additional sweepstakes draws only which could, admittedly, be inserted in the club races, the law would not have included regular races; and since regular sweepstakes races were specifically authorized, and it would be confusing, inconvenient, if not impossible to mix these sweepstakes races with the regular club races all on the same day (and it has never been done before), the conclusion seems inevitable that the additional sweepstakes draws and races were intended to be held on a whole day, separate and apart from the club races.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Appellants' contention that to compel them to permit the PCSO to use their premises and equipment against their will would constitute deprivation of property without due process of law, deserves no serious consideration. As the lower court has found, every time the PCSO uses appellants' premises and equipment, they are paid rentals in accordance with the terms of separate contracts of lease existing between them and the PCSO.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The decision appealed from, being in consonance with the above findings and considerations of this Court, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary G.R. No. L-27761 December 6, 1927 PHILIPPINE SUGAR CENTRALS AGENCY, Plaintiff-Appellee , vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, DefendantAppellant. STATEMENT chanrobles virtual law library

This case had its origin in the Court of First Instance of Manila where it was tried and submitted upon the following stipulation of facts: Come now the parties, plaintiff and defendant, in the above-entitled cause, by their undersigned attorneys, and respectfully submit to this Honorable Court the following statement of facts, which the court may find as true and enter judgment thereon: chanrobles virtual law library I. That the plaintiff at all times and in all transactions herein mentioned have always acted as representative and attorney-in-fact of the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library II. That in May, 1926, the plaintiff herein shipped at Pulupandan, Occidental Negros, on the steamship Hannover 5,124,416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar consigned to the United States.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library III. That said sugar was laden through a wharf built, owned and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Company, a domestic corporation, on a foreshore public land at Pulupandan, Occidental Negros, leased to it by the Government of Philippine Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library IV. That the defendant herein through the collector of customs of the collection district of Iloilo, assessed and collected wharfage dues on sugar mentioned in paragraph II hereof at P2 per thousand gross kilos or a total amount of P10,248.84.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library V. That the plaintiff paid, under protest, the said amount of P10,248.84 but its protest was overruled by the defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library VI. It is further agreed by the parties herein that Pulupandan through which the sugar in question was exported, was at the time of the shipment, and is now, a port of entry of the Philippine Islands, having been declared as such by Act No. 3106. In which judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for P10,248.84, the amount of plaintiff's claim, without costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On appeal the defendant assigns the following errors: I. The lower court erred in declaring that the plaintiff was not bound to pay duty as a charge for wharfage on the goods exported through Pulupandan, a port of entry of the Philippine Islands, since the wharf used by the plaintiff for shipping said goods did not belong to the Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library II. The lower court erred in ordering the defendant to return to the plaintiff the sum of P10,248.84 in question instead of dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

III. The lower court erred in not granting a new trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library JOHNS, J.: chanrobles virtual law library As tersely stated by the trial judge, the question at issue is whether or not the Government of the Philippine Islands can legally collect the duty of $1 per gross ton of 1,000 kilos as a charge for wharfage on goods, wares and merchandise exported through a port of entry of the Philippine Islands or shipped therefrom to the United States, where it appears that the Government does not own the wharf and that the sugar in question was loaded from a wharf which was the sole property of a private person.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 16 of the original Customs Tariff of November 15, 1901, is as follows: There shall be levied and collected upon goods of all kinds exported through the ports of entry of the Philippine Islands a duty of seventy-five cents ($0.75) per gross ton of 1,000 kilos as a charge for wharfage and for harbor dues whatever be the port of destination or nationality of the exporting vessel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library That law was enacted by the United States Philippine Commission by the authority of the President of the United States, and with the approval of the Secretary of War. It was reenacted in section 16 of an Act of Congress of the United States of March 3, 1905, entitled "An Act to revise and amend the Tariff laws of the Philippine Islands and for other purposes," as amended by the Act of Congress of February 26, 1906, entitled "An Act to amend an Act entitled "An Act to revise and amend the Tariff laws of the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes," approved March third, nineteen hundred and five. August 5, 1909, the Congress of the United States passed what is known as the "Philippine Tariff Act of 1909," entitled "An Act to raise revenue for the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes," section 14 of which, under the head of "Wharfage," is as follows: That there shall be levied and collected upon all articles, goods, wares, or merchandise, except coal, timber and cement, the product of the Philippine Islands, exported through ports of entry of the Philippine Islands, or shipped therefrom to the United States or any of its possessions, a duty of one dollar per gross ton of one thousand kilos, as a charge for wharfage, whatever be the port of destination or nationality of the exporting vessel: Provided, that articles, goods, wares, or merchandise imported, exported, or shipped in transit for the use of the Government of the United States, or of that of that of the Philippine Islands, shall be exempted from the charges prescribed in this section. By a comparison, it will be seen that the law of 1909 changes the duty of seventy-five cents ($0.75) per gross ton of 1,000 kilos to $1 per gross ton, and that

the words "as a charge for wharfage and for harbor dues" now read "as a charge for wharfage." That is to say, that the words "and for harbor dues," found in the Customs Tariff of 1901 and 1905, were omitted from the Tariff Act of 1909.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The question now before the court is the meaning of the words "as a charge for wharfage," as those words are used in section 14 of the Tariff Act of 1909.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The law in question is an Act of Congress, and it is a revenue law for the Philippine Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In Words and Phrases, volume 8, page 7435, it is said: Wharfage is a charge or rent for the temporary use of a wharf.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Wharfage is the fee paid for tying vessels to a wharf, or for loading goods on a wharf of shipping them therefrom.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Wharfage is money due or money actually paid for the privilege of landing goods upon or loading a vessel, while moored, from a wharf.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Wharfage or keyage is a toll or duty for the pitching or lodging of goods upon a wharf, or pay for taking goods into a boat and from thence. By the same author and in the same volume, on page 6997, the word "Tonnage" is defined to be the cubical contents or burden of a ship in tons, or the amount of weight which one or several ships will carry. And on page 6998, it is said: A "duty on tonnage" is a duty or tax or burden imposed under the authority of the state, which is, by the law imposing it, to be measured by the capacity of the vessel, and is in its essence contribution claimed for the privilege of arriving and departing from a port of the United States. And on page 6999, it is said: A "duty on tonnage" is a duty on a vessel for the privilege of entering a port, and does not prohibit wharfage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A "duty of tonnage," within the constitutional provision that no state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any "duty of tonnage," is a charge, tax or duty on a vessel for the privilege of entering a port; and though usually levied according to tonnage, and so acquiring its name, it is not confined to that method of rating the charge. It does not include a charge for wharfage. In the syllabus to the case of Cincinnati, Portsmouth, Big Sandy and Pomeroy Packet Company vs. Board of Trustee of the Town of Catlettsburg, Kentucky (26

Law, ed., 1169), the Supreme Court of the United States laid down this rule: 3. A city or town, situated on navigable waters, may build and own a wharf suitable for vessels to land at, and exact a reasonable compensation for the facilities thus afforded to vessels by the use of such wharves, and this is no infringement of the constitutional provisions concerning tonnage taxes and the regulation of commerce.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. Appropriate regulations prescribing places for the landing of vessels and placing the matter under the control of a wharfmaster or other officer, whose duty is to look after it, are valid and constitutional, and the States may prescribe them until Congress assumes to do so. And on page 1170 of the opinion, it is said: The effort of the pleader, undoubtedly, is to bring the case with the constitutional prohibition of a tax upon tonnage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library If, however, the Trustees of the Town had a right to compensation for the use of the improved landing or wharf which they had made, it is no objection to the ordinance fixing the amount of this compensation that it was measured by the size of the vessel, and that this size was, ascertained by the tonnage of each vessel. It is idle, after the decisions we have made, to call this a tax upon tonnage (Cannon vs. New Orleans, 20 Wall., 577 [87 U. S., XXII 417]; Packet Co. vs. St. Louis, 100 U. S., 428 [XXV, 690]; Packet Co. vs. Keokuk, 95 U. S., 80 [XXIV, 377]; Guy vs. Baltimore, 100 U. S., 442 [XXV, 746].)chanrobles virtual law library Still less ground exists for holding that the penalties imposed for a refusal to obey the rules for places of landing and the orders of the wharfmaster on that subject, are taxes on tonnage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Nor is there any room to question the right of a city or town situated on navigable waters to build and own a wharf suitable for vessels to land at, and exact a reasonable compensation for the facilities thus afforded to vessels by the use of such wharves, and that this is no infringement of the constitutional provisions concerning tonnage taxes and the regulation of commerce, see cases above cited. An on page 1171, it is said: We are not aware that in any instance Congress has attempted to exercise it. If it be a regulation of Commerce under the power conferred on Congress by the Constitution, that body has signally failed to provide any such regulation. It belongs, also, manifestly, to that class of rules which, like pilotage and some others, can be most wisely exercised by local authorities, and in regard to which no general rules, applicable alike to all parts and landing places, can be properly made. If a regulation of commerce at all, it comes within that class in which the States may prescribe rules until Congress assumes to do so. (Cooley vs. Board of Wardens, 12 How., 299;

Gilman vs. Philadelphia, 3 Wall., 727 [70 U. S., XVIII, 100]; Crandall vs. Nevada, 6 Wall., 42 [73 U.S., XVIII, 746]; Pound vs. Turck, 95 U. S., XXIV, 526].)chanrobles virtual law library There is, probably, not a city or large town in the United States, situated on a navigable water, where ordinances, rules and regulations like those of the Town of Catlettsburg are not made and imposed by authority derived from state legislation, and the long acquiescence in this exercise of the power, and its absolute necessity, are arguments almost conclusive in favor of its rightful existence. In the syllabus to the case of Parkersburg an Ohio River Transportation Company vs. City of Parkersburg (27 Law, ed., 584), the Supreme Court of the United States laid down this rule: 2. The ordinance in this case imposed certain rates of wharfage on vessels "That may discharge or receive freight, or land on or anchor at or in front of any public landing or wharf belonging to the city, for the purpose of discharging or receiving freight;" held that the ordinance only intended to charge for the use of a wharf, and not for entering the port, or lying at anchor in the river.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. Wharfage is a charge for the use of wharf, made by the owner therefor by way of rent, or compensation; a duty of tonnage is a tax or duty charged for the privilege of entering, or loading or lying in, a port or harbor, and can only be imposed by the government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 5. That, although wharves are related to commerce and navigation as aids and conveniences, yet being local in their nature, and requiring special regulations for particular places, in the absence of Congressional legislation on the subject, the regulation thereof properly belongs to the States in which they are situated. And on page 586 of the opinion, it is said: But whether a charge imposed is a charge of wharfage or a duty of tonnage must be determined by the terms of the ordinance or regulation which imposes it. They are not the same thing; a duty of tonnage is a charge for the privilege of entering or trading or lying in a port or harbo; wharfage is a charge for the use of a wharf. Exorbitant wharfage may have a similar effect as a burden on commerce as a duty of tonnage has; but it is exorbitant wharfage and not a duty of tonnage; and the remedy for the one is different from the remedy for the other. The question whether it is the one or the other is not one of intent, but one of fact and law; of fact, as whether the charge is made for the use of a wharf, or for entering the port; of law, as whether, according as the fact is shown to exist, it is wharfage or a duty of tonnage. And on page 587, it is said: When the Constitution declares that "No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay and duty of tonnage;" and when Congress, in section 4220 of the Revised Statutes, declares that "No vessel belonging

to any citizen of the United States, trading from one port within the United States to another port within the Unites States, or employed in the bank, whale or other fisheries, shall be subject to tonnage, tax or duty, if such vessel be licensed, registered or enrolled;" they mean by the phrases, "duty of tonnage," and "tonnage tax or duty," a charge, tax or duty on a vessel for the privilege of entering a port; and although usually levied according to tonnage, and so acquiring its name, it is not confined to that method of rating the charge. It has nothing to do with wharfage, which is a charge against a vessel for using or lying at a wharf or landing. And on page 588, it is said: Now wharves, levees and landing places are essential to commerce by water, no less than a navigable channel and a clear river. But they are attached to the land; they are private property, real estate; and they are primarily, at least, subject to the local states loss. Congress has never yet interposed to supervise their administration; it has hitherto left this exclusively to the States. There is little doubt, however, that Congress, if it saw fit, in case of prevailing abuses in the management of wharf property, abuses materially interfering with the prosecution of commerce, might interpose and make regulations to prevent such abuses. When it shall have done so, it will be time enough for the courts to carry its regulations into effect by judicial proceedings properly instituted. But until Congress has acted, the courts of the United States cannot assume control over the subject as a matter of federal cognizance. It is the Congress, and not the judicial department, to which the Constitution has given the power to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. The courts can never take the initiative on this subject. That is to say, it is the law of the land that even a municipality has the legal right to pass and enforce an ordinance requiring a vessel to pay wharfage tax for the use of a wharf on a navigable stream within the city limits, and such reasonable charge is not a duty or charge on Untied States commerce. But in the instant case, we have an Act of Congress which specifically authorizes the levying of the duty in question "as a charge for wharfage." In construing the meaning of those words as used in that law, we must take into consideration the relative situation and the conditions existing at the time the law was enacted. That is to say, it is the law of the land that even a municipality on a navigable river in a State of the United States has the legal right to pass and enforce an ordinance to require a vessel to pay wharfage tax for the use of a wharf within the city limits, and that a tax even by a city for such a purpose does not interfere with, and is not a charge on, United States commerce.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is also the law of the land that the United States Congress in its discretion has the power to levy and collect a tonnage tax ever though it would interfere with the United States commerce. But in the instant case, we have an Act of Congress which specifically

authorizes the Government of the Philippine Islands to levy and collect the duty in question "as a charge for wharfage." chanrobles virtual law library It is vigorously contended that by reason of the fact that the sugar in question was loaded from a private wharf and not from a Government wharf, that the Government has no legal right to levy and collect the duty "as a charge for wharfage." In construing the law now in question, we should take into consideration its history, relative situation and the conditions existing at the time it was enacted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As stated, the original Customs Tariff of 1901 was enacted by the Philippine Commission under the authority from the President of the United States. At the time of its enactment, it is a matter of common knowledge that the Government of the Philippine Islands did not have, own or operate a pier or wharf anywhere or at any place, a fact which must have been known to the Commission which enacted the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is stated in the brief for the Attorney-General and not denied in the brief for the appellee, that the two oldest piers of the Insular Government, Nos. 3 and 5, were first opened in the year 1910. That prior to that time, and because there was no wharves or piers, export cargoes by means of lights were brought to the sides of vessels that were anchored in Manila Bay.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Notwithstanding that the fact the wharfage tax in question has been continuously levied and collected from 1901 up to the present time. That is to say, in 1901 the Philippine Commission, which enacted the law, knew or must have known that there was not a single pier or wharf in the Philippine Islands, and yet without such wharves or piers, the Government has at all times levied and collected the tax in question, and it if fair to assume that from and out of the money derived from such sources, it has since erected and constructed piers and wharves in all of the large cities of its principal ports of entries at a cost of millions of pesos, and it is a matter of common knowledge that pier 7 recently constructed in the City of Manila cost about P12,979,824.99, and that it is reputed to b e the most modern, best and fines dock in the Orient.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It further appears from out own records and reports that during all of this time the tax in question has been paid without any protest or objection, and that the first time that the law now in question was ever presented to this court was in the case of Compaia General de Tabacos vs. Collector of Customs (46 Phil., 8), in which an attack was made on the constitutionality of the law, and its validity was sustained by this court. The question now presented was not then decided because it did not appear from the agreed statement of facts that the articles upon which the defendant collected the duty had or had not

passed through a Government wharf. That case was decided on April 7, 1924.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The instant case is the first and only case in which the question now under consideration was ever presented. Hence, we have a law which since 1901 has been construed by its officials to mean that the Government of the Philippine Islands is entitled to levy and collect a duty of $1 per gross ton "as a charge for wharfage" upon all articles, goods, wares and merchandise exported through the ports of entry of the Philippine Islands, and that construction has been acquiesced in and accepted, and the money paid without any protest or objection for twenty-six years, for many years of which the Government never even owned or operated a wharf.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It also appears that Pulupandan, the place from which the sugar was shipped, was made a port of entry of the Philippine Islands on March 17, 1923, and that on January 19, 1925, the Legislature appropriated P750,000 for improvements made and to be made in that port, which were to consist not only of the building of a wharf, but the construction of breakwaters, sea walls and the dredging of the harbor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library When we consider that the tax in question has at all times for twenty-six years been levied and collected by the Government both before it owned or operated any wharf, and that is has spent millions of pesos in the construction of wharves in its principal ports of entries, and that from the recent port of Pulupandan and for sugar that was shipped from that port on the steamship Hannover in the year 1926 only the tax in question amount to P10,284.84, the importance of the instant case and its far reaching effect upon the finances of the Government of the Philippine Islands stands out in bold relief and becomes very apparent, and this court is now called upon to overthrow that long continued constructions, and in legal effect to hold that, because the sugar was shipped through a private owned wharf, the government is not entitled to collect the money in question "as a charge for wharfage." The long acquiescence in its construction and the far reaching effect of such a decision makes it imperative for this court to sustain the law, if there are any reasonable grounds upon which it can be done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This rule is well stated in Sutherland on Statutory Construction, volume 2, page 889, where it is said: chanrobles virtual law library "The practical construction given to a doubtful statute by the department or officers whose duty it is to carry it into execution is entitled to great weight and will not be disregarded or overturned except for cogent reasons, and unless it is clear that such construction is erroneous." Citing numerous

decisions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Kelly vs. Multnomah County (18 Ore., 356, 359; 22 Pac., 1110), the Supreme Court of Oregon said: In all cases where those persons whose duty it is to executed a law have uniformly given it a particularly construction, and that construction has been acquiesced in and acted upon for a long time, it is a contemporary exposition of the statute, which always commands the attention of the courts, and will be followed unless it clearly and manifestly appears to be wrong. Following which, on page 890, Sutherland says: The legislature is presumed to be cognizant of such construction, and after long continuance, without any legislation evincing its dissent, court will consider themselves warranted in adopting that construction. The same author, on page 883, says: Surrounding facts and conditions. - Mischief to be remedied. - In order to ascertain the purpose or intentions, if it is not clearly expressed in a statute, or that such purpose or intention may be carried into effect, the court will take notice of the history of its terms when it was enacted. It is needful in the construction of all instruments to read them in view of the surrounding facts. To understand their purport and intended application, one should, as far as possible, be placed in a situation to see the subject from the maker's standpoints and study his language with that outlook. Statutes are no exception. The court may look to the surrounding circumstances. And on pages 885 and 886, he says: The mischief intended to be removed or suppressed or the cause of necessity of any kind which induced the enactment of a law are important factors to be considered in its construction. "The purpose for which the law was enacted is a matter of prime importance in arriving at a correct interpretation of its terms." In the case of Cameron vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. (63 Minnesota, 384), on page 387 of the opinion that court said: This statute has been in force for nearly 20 years, and attorney's fees have been repeatedly allowed to the plaintiff in actions brought under it. Two such cases have been heard on appeal in this court (see Coleman vs. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 38 Minn., 260; 36 N. W., 638; Scott vs. Minneapolis, St. P. & Ste. M. R. Co., 42 Minn., 179; 43 N. W., 966); and, so far as we are advised, this is the first time any question as to the constitutionality of the provisions of this statute allowing reasonable attorney's fees has ever been suggested. This acquiescence, without question, of bench and bar, in the validity of the statute, is significant; and it is entitled to controlling weight if the question as to the validity of the statute is doubtful. The same principle is laid down in Molina vs. Rafferty (38 Phil., 167), on page 169 in which this court makes the following quotation from Cooley on Taxation, volume 1, 3d ed., p. 450:

The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that when found it should be made to govern, . . . if the words of the law seem to be doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; . . . And where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive. And on page 173 of the opinion, it is said: During the many years that the statute before us has been in existence, since it first appeared, substantially in its present form, in section 142 of Act No. 1189, passed in 1904, no attempt has been made, until this case arose, to construe it as not applying to fish grown in ponds, and much weight should be given to this long continued administrative interpretation. See also In re Allen (2 Phil., 630), where it is held that: Courts will give weight to the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is so enforce it, and, unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous, will ordinarily be controlled thereby. The purpose of the law was to authorize the Government of the Philippine Islands to levy a duty of $1 per gross ton "as a charge for wharfage." Being an Act of Congress, the law would be valid if it did not specify the purpose for which the duty was to be levied and collected. Without such a provision it would then be construed as a duty on tonnage, and Congress would have a right to enact that kind of a law. The omission from the Act of 1909 of the words "and for harbor dues" in the previous law is very significant and would clearly indicate that it was not the intent of Congress under the Act of 1909 that duty should be levied on tonnage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In view of the fact that in 1901 there were no wharves or piers in the Philippine Islands, and of the conditions then existing and the enactment of the law in 1901 under the same conditions, and its reenactment by Congress in 1905 under similar conditions, and of the present law of 1909 and of the continuous construction of the law placed upon it by the Government officials, and the further fact that the duty in question has been paid without any protest or objection for twenty-six-years, during which time the Government has expanded millions of pesos in the construction of wharves, and that it now owns and operates large an extensive wharves in all of its principal ports of entry and that Congress has never seen fit to repeal the law of 1909, we are forced to the

conclusion that it was the purpose and intent of the act in question to give the Government of the Philippine Islands authority to levy and collect such a duty of $1 per gross ton, and that the money derived from such sources should be used, deemed and treated as a trust fund, for the purpose of acquiring and constructing wharves by the Government of the Philippine Islands. In truth and in fact, that is what has been done in all of its principal ports of entry.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Pulupandan was made a port of entry of March 17, 1923. It further appears that in line with its policy, the Legislature on January 19, 1925, made an appropriation of P750,000 for improvements made and to be made in that port, which were to consist not only of the building of a wharf, but the construction of breakwaters, sea walls and the dredging of the harbor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Based on the conditions existing in 1901 and as they exist now, we have a legal right to assume that the money derived from such sources has been appropriated and used by the Government for the erection and construction of wharves and the improvement of its harbors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The construction for which plaintiff contends would overthrow and destroy the whole system of the Government, in and by which millions of pesos have been levied and collected an expanded in the construction of Government wharves, and it would have defeated the construction of the Government wharf at Pulupandan. The law in question could have been repealed or changed at any time by an Act of Congress. In view of the long continuous construction which has been placed upon it by the government officials, and for which they now contend, the very fact that Congress has not seen fit to repeal or change the law is a very potent argument in favor of sustaining that construction. The language of the Act could have been made more specific and certain, but in view of its history, its long continuous construction, and what has been done and accomplished by and under it, we are clearly of the opinion that the Government is entitled to have and receive the money in question, even though the sugar was shipped from a private wharf.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The judgment of the lower court is reversed, with costs. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Avancea, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library Separate Opinions chanrobles virtual law library

chanrobles virtual law library JOHNSON, J., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library I regret that the facts in this case and the law applicable to them will not permit my conformity with the conclusions of my associates. The facts in this case are not in dispute. They were stipulated in the court below. The important facts for consideration in this appeal are as follows: (1) That in the month of May, 1926, the plaintiff loaded on the steamship Hannover at Pulupandan, Occidental Negros, 5,124,416 gross kilos of sugar, on which there was collected by the collector of customs, as a charge for wharfage, P2 per thousand gross kilos, amounting to P10,248.84; chanrobles virtual law library (2) That said sugar was loaded from a wharf built, owned and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Company, a domestic corporation;chanrobles virtual law library (3) That at the time of payment of said sum a formal protest was made, upon the ground that said collection, as "a charge for wharfage," was illegal and not authorized by law. On the 8th day of May, 1926, the acting collector of customs of Iloilo overruled and denied said protest. On May 14, 1926, an appeal was taken by the plaintiff to the Insular Collector of Customs. On May 20, 1926, the Insular Collector of Customs confirmed the decision of the acting collector of customs of Iloilo and denied said protest. From the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs an appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, where the same was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After a consideration of the admitted facts the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, in a very carefully prepared opinion, decided that the law did not permit the Government to collect wharfage dues on products loaded from private wharves, and revoked the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs, and ordered the return of the money collected, without any finding as to costs. From that decision the Insular Collector of Customs appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The only question presented by the appellant, as stated by himself, is "Whether or not the Government of the Philippine Islands can legally collect a duty of P2 per gross ton of one thousand kilos as a charge for wharfage, . . . when the wharf used for loading said goods does not belong to the Philippine Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The provisions of law upon which the Government insists that it has the right to charge the wharfage in question is found in section 14 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 as amended by the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913. Said section reads:

That there shall be levied and collected upon all articles, goods, wares, or merchandise, except coal, timber and cement, the product of the Philippine Islands exported through ports of entry of the Philippine Islands, or shipped therefrom to the United States or any of its possessions, a duty of one dollar per gross ton of one thousand kilos, as a charge for wharfage, whatever be the port of destination or nationality of the exporting vessel. The important questions to decide under said statute are: (a) What are wharfage charges, and (b) may the Government collect wharfage from the owner of a wharf on his own merchandise loaded therefrom? chanrobles virtual law library WHARFAGE DEFINEDchanrobles virtual law library The majority opinion contains some definitions of "wharfage" as "a charge or rent for the temporary use of a wharf; the fee paid for tying vessels to a wharf, or for loading goods from a wharf or shipping them therefrom; money due or money actually paid for the privilege of landing goods upon, or loading vessels while moored, from a wharf." It will be noted from said definitions that "wharfage charges" are charges made for the use of a wharf.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library From said definitions it appears that "wharfage charges" are made by the owner of a wharf against another person who uses the wharf. Applying said definitions to the facts in the present case, we find that the plaintiff is the owner of the wharf and that the Government has charged him P10,248.84 for the use of his own wharf. It is difficult to understand how the definitions given in the majority opinion can be applied to the facts in the present case. The definitions given in the majority opinion, however, are in harmony with the definitions given by lexicographers. Many other definitions might be given similar to the ones quoted, under both the common law and civil law. Said definitions are as old as the custom of transporting freight from one point to another upon the high seas or navigable waters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Taking into consideration the fact that said definitions of "wharfage charges" are charges by the owners of the wharf against the person who uses it, it is difficult to understand upon what theory the legislature at the time of the adoption of the law in question intended that it should be applied to a case like the present, where the owner of the wharf paid to the appellant the sum of P10,248.84 for the use of his own wharf. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that the lawmaking body intended that any such application of the law should be made. But we find in the majority opinion the statement that simply because a similar law has not been questioned that of course, the legislature intended to collect wharfage dues from people who use their own wharf. There is not a word in the record justifying that assertion. We also find in the majority opinion the statement that "at the time of its

enactment it is a matter of common knowledge that the Government of the Philippine Islands did not have, own or operate a pier or wharf anywhere or at any place, a fact which must have been known to the Commission which enacted the law." In the first place there is nothing in the record from which any such inference can be drawn, and in the second place we confidently assert that no such statement would have been made by the writer of the majority opinion had his knowledge of the conditions in the Philippine Islands in 1901 been more intimate. Even in 1898, at the beginning of the American occupation of the Philippine Islands there were miles of wharves which had been constructed by the former sovereign.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A considerable portion of the majority opinion is devoted to making a distinction between wharfage charges and tonnage dues. Again we assert that there is nothing in the record which raises any question concerning tonnage dues. That discussion therefore has no place in the decision of the question presented to this court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The majority opinion asserts that the "wharfage tax in question has been continuously levied and collected from 1901 up to the present time." There is not a sentence, a phrase, a word nor a syllable in the record which justifies that statement. There is nothing to show that a tax, like the present one, has ever been collected by the Government. It is asserted in the majority opinion that "out of the money derived from such sources it has since erected and constructed piers and wharves in all of the large cities." Again there is not a word in the record justifying that statement. Neither is there anything in the record which justifies the statement that the City of Manila has recently constructed a pier at a large cost; and even though it were, it could have no bearing on the present case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We agree that whenever the Government has for a number of years given a particular interpretation of a particular statute, the courts should follow that interpretation. But in the present case there is nothing in the record which justifies the statement that the Government has for "many years given the law the interpretation contended for in the majority opinion." The majority opinion contains no cited authority in support of the legality of the statute under discussion. The fact that no authorities have been cited in the majority opinion in support of the conclusion is no proof, however, that no authorities exist upon the question. We find many decisions holding that no "wharfage charges" can be collected where the person or entity attempting to collect the same furnishes no "artificial facilities whatever in the nature of wharf." (Sweeny vs. Lizzie E., 30 Fed., Rep., 876; Shreveport vs. Red River & Coast Line, 37 La. Ann., 562; [55 Am. Rep., 504]; New Orleans vs. Wilmot, 31 La. Ann., 65; Dubuque vs. Stout, 32 Iowa, 47 Cape

Girardue vs. Campbell, 26 Mo. Ap., 12; [70 L. R. A., 194].) chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Sweeny vs. Lizzie E. the Federal court held that the City of New Orleans could not collect wharfage from vessels it furnished "no facilities whatever." chanrobles virtual law library In the case of the City of Shreveport vs. Red River & Coast Line (37 La Ann., 562) the Supreme Court of Louisiana said that the right to collect wharfage depends upon the "facilities for landing, for receiving and discharging merchandise, furnished by the plaintiff for the use or advantage of the ships or vessels sought to be made liable for such duties." (Wharfage is a charge or claim for services rendered. Cannon vs. New Orleans, 20 Wallace [U. S.], 577; Packet Co. vs. Keokuk, 95 U. S., 88.) chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Packet Co. vs. Keokuk the Supreme Court of the United States said that a city cannot, by ordinance or otherwise, charge or collect wharfage for merely entering its port or stopping therein, or for the use of that "which is not a wharf" but merely the natural or unimprovement shore of navigable river. (Cannon vs. New Orleans, 87 U. S., 577; Transportation Company vs. Parkersburg, 107 U. S., 691.) chanrobles virtual law library In the case of New Orleans vs. Wilmot (31 La. Ann., 65) the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the City of New Orleans is not entitled to impose wharfage and levy duties upon vessels moored in the river at a point where the city has "constructed no wharves, made no landing place and expended no money." chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Dubuque vs. Stout (32 Iowa, 47) the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a city which has provided no wharf or designated places for use, is not entitled to recover of "one who uses his own premises for the reception of merchandise," although it has authority by charter to establish wharves and regulate their use and fix the rate of wharfage. (Cape, etc., Co. vs. Campbell, 26 Mo. Ap., 12.) chanrobles virtual law library The rule announced in the foregoing cases has been the rule for eight hundred years. (See English cases: Hasborn vs. Willis, 2 Keble, 624; 1 Vent, 71 1 Modern Reporter, 47.) chanrobles virtual law library The law providing that the harbor master of a port may demand for every vessel that may enter the port, to load or unload or make fast to any wharf, certain fees, whether earned by services rendered or not, is a tax on the regulation of commerce in violation of the Constitution of the United States. (Webb vs. Dunn, 18 Fla., 721; St. Louis vs. Consolidate Coal Co., 158 Mo., 342; Davison, 102 Fed. Rep., 1006 [70 L. R. A., 193].) chanrobles virtual law library Many other cases, in additions to the above, might be cited, to the effect that "wharfage cannot be collected where the party charging and collecting the same is not the owner of the wharf." Wharfage is a payment for services rendered by a wharf. It must follow therefor that where there is no wharf belonging to the party collecting the wharfage, he is collecting without

rendering service. Such a charge, in our judgment, is not authorized by law and amounts, in effect, when goods are to be exported, "to an export tax, which is prohibited by the Jones Law." chanrobles virtual law library The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.