Decision reversed. ABERCA v VER April 15, 1988 FACTS: Geb.

. Fabian Ver ordered various intelligence units of the AFP, known as Task Force Makabansa, toconduct pre-emptive strikes againstknown communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view ofincreasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in MM. Pursuant to said order, elements of the TFM were alleged to have done the ff.: 1.raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants 2.confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs 3.plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts 4.while in detention, plaintiffs were denied visits of relatives and lawyers 5.plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel 6.military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain indiscriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them. 7.all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted plan to terrorize them, and that said plans are known to and sanctioned by defendants. Plaintiffs filed a civil action for actual/compensatory, moral, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants (thru counsel Estelito Mendoza) on the ff. grounds: 1.plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended 2.assuming that courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties 3.complaint states no cause of action. Upon motion, RTC Judge Fortun dismissed the case, adopting lock, stock and barrel the arguments of the defendants. Plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the order. Later, Judge Fortun inhibited himself from the proceeding; Judge Lising took over and, without acting on the motion to set aside Fortuns order, declared the Order as final. Because their prayer went unheeded, they filed this instant petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution

WHO can be held liable: military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well HELD: No; their superiors may be held liable as well Repsondents invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. Concededly, it may be true that they were merely responding to their duty, say in accordance withMarcos Proclamation No. 2054, but this cannot be construed as a blanket license or roving commissionto disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizens. Article 32 of the CC which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable indamages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another does not exempt therespondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. There is no merit in respondents suggestion that plaintiffs cause of action is barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The suspension of the privilege does nor render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What issuspended is merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeascorpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. Moreover, their rights and cause of action for damages are even explicitly recognized in PD 1755 (re: right of action for injury arising from acts of public officer connected to Martial Law). Doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable in the instant case. The doctrine has been generallylimited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee)relationship. NO such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. Be that as it may, the decisive factor in this case is the language of Article 32, where it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages. Hence, it was erroneous on the TC for holding that defendants cannot be held responsible for the wrongful acts of their subordinates because: 1.It is wrong to limit the plaintiffs action for damages to acts of alleged physical violence whichconstituted delict or wrong. Art. 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in anymanner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated in said Article. 2.Neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated directly should be held liable. Art. 32 encompasses those directly, as well as indirectly responsible for its violation. Petition granted.