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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT EN BANC G. R. No.

L-17958 February 27, 1922 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versusLOL-LO AND SARAW, Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION MALCOLM, J : The days when pirates roamed the seas, when the picturesque buccaneers - Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts - gripped the imagination, when grotesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder. On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 942 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs. A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this Court by the attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of. The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lower court and as is gain done in this Court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U. S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184). The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Articles 153 to 156 of the Penal Code read as follows: "Art. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. "If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty or presidio mayor. "Art. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:

"1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same. "2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen. "3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of the book. "4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves. "5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates. "Art. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title as well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory. "Art. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such." The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. [Chicago, Rock Island, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn (1885), 114 U.S., 542]. These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19,1889, to General Wesley Merritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said: "Thought the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in

force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion." [Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 71. 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt's Proclamation of August 14, 1898]. It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos. The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion. The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. [U.S Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10]. The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. [U.S. Crim. Code, Sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368]. The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations. It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States. By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." Somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith [(1919); 39 Phil., 533] to give to the word "authority" as found in the penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands. Under the construction above indicated, Article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows: "The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. "If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor." We hold those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably Articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines. The crime falls under the first paragraph of Article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to Article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into

consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment. The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lol-lo [the accused who raped one of the women] but is not unanimous with regard to the defendant and appellant Saraw, since one member of the Court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the Judge of First Instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the cost of both instances. So ordered. Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 95939. June 17, 1996] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENTINO BRACAMONTE y ABELLAR, MANUEL REGINALDO y SAPON, and ERNIE LAPAN y CABRAL alias ERNING BULAG, defendants-appellants. DECISION HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But, to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused's presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water. Appellant Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon, and Ernie Lapan y Cabral alias Erning Bulag, stand charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide under the following Information, dated October 6, 1987: "The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Fiscal for the City of Cavite accuses Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon and Ernie Lapan y Cabral alias Erning Bulag of the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide, committed as follows: That on or about September 23, 1987, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of one Violeta Sayaman Parnala, and once inside, by means of violence and intimidation, rob, take and carry away a necklace worth P600.00 and ring worth P440.00 belonging to one Jay Vee

Parnala Custodio, son of Violeta Sayaman Parnala, without the consent of the said owner and to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of P1,100.00, Philippine Currency and that on the occasion of the said robbery, and in pursuance of their conspiracy, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, scald and stab Jay Vee Parnala inflicting upon Jay Vee Parnala Custodio 3 incised and 15 stab wounds and upon Teresita Minorca Rosalinas 1 incised and 6 stab wounds on the different parts of their body, which ultimately caused their deaths. Contrary to law.''[1] Ernie Lapan y Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in a Decision of the court a quo, dated February 13, 1989, and his case is on appeal with this Court. Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon is at large. Appellant Bracamonte had been at large until his arrest on October 27, 1989. He had been in hiding for more than two years. The present appeal deals solely with the conviction by the court a quo of herein appellant Bracamonte. Arraigned on November 13, 1989, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch XVII, rendered judgment on September 21, 1990 finding appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads: "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide and he is hereby sentenced toRECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of Jay Vee Parnala and Teresita Rosalinas the amount of P30,000 each and to pay unto Violeta Parnala P1,100.00 corresponding to the value of the articles lost without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost."[2] Hence, appellant interposed the present appeal, assigning the following errors: I "x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION WITNESS' DECLARATION CONCERNING THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS ONE OF THE THREE (3) MEN WHO ALLEGEDLY EMERGED FROM THE GARAGE DOOR OF THE VICTIM'S HOUSE AND SPRINTED AWAY THEREFROM ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. II x x x IN APPRECIATING THE THEN EXTANT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCES AS INDICATIVE OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT'S GUILT. III x x x IN ITS PRONOUNCEMENT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT EVADED ARREST BY HIDING AFTER HIS ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE HEINOUS CRIME IMPUTED AGAINST HIM. IV x x x IN DISREGARDING COMPLETELY THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI PUT UP BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT." [3] At the trial in the court a quo, the following facts appear to have been proven: On September 23, 1987, at about 8:30 in the evening, Violeta Parnala and her common-law husband, Clark Din, arrived home from the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. She rang their doorbell and when she got no response, she pounded on the garage door while her husband went to the back of their house and stoned the window of their son's room. Then, she heard somebody trying to remove the padlock of the garage door and saw a man, prompting her to shout, "magnanakaw, magnanakaw." After the door was opened, three (3) men rushed out, one after the other, whom she recognized as appellant Bracamonte, Ernie Lapan and Manuel Reginaldo. Upon hearing his wife shouting, Clark Din rushed to her and saw a man about to turn at the other street. He ran after him but could not catch up. He thus proceeded back to their house. By this time, some of their neighbors, roused by the shouting of Violeta, came out of their houses, among whom were Pat. Sahagun and Pat. Punzal. The two (2) policemen went with Clark Din inside the house and saw the

television set on. Din turned on the lights and started to look for his son. He tried the bathroom but it was locked. He then went to their room, got the keys and opened the bathroom where he saw their maid, Teresita M. Rosalinas, hands tied with her mouth gagged, and bathed in her own blood. Thereafter, he saw their son, Jay Vee Parnala, in the dirty kitchen, his head and body immersed in a pail of water, dead. Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer of Cavite City, conducted an autopsy on the cadavers of Jay Vee and Rosalina. His findings disclosed that Rosalina sustained six (6) stab wounds and one (1) incised wound, while Jay Vee sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds and three (3) incised wounds on different parts of the body.[4] In the case of Rosalina, the most fatal wounds were wounds Nos. 6 and 7 while in the case of Jay Vee, almost all of the wounds were fatal due to his age.[5] Jay Vee was only six years old at the time of his death. Appellant Florentino Bracamonte denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. According to him, he was not in Cavite City at the time the crime was committed, but was then in the premises of the RM Motor Works located in Paraaque, Metro Manila. This shop is owned by Rafael Diaz. Appellant worked as an all around employee, alternating as a mechanic and shopkeeper of Rafael Diaz. We affirm the conviction of the herein appellant. The defense of alibi is a handy but shabby excuse which indictees never seem to tire of.[6] At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we reiterate once more the oft-repeated rule that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification. [7] In the case at bench, Violeta Parnala, witness for the prosecution and mother of one of the victims, positively testified that she saw appellant Bracamonte, together with Manuel Reginaldo and Ernie Lapan, come out of their garage door, obviously immediately after the incident in question. The situation was that the accused were still inside the Parnala residence when the spouses Parnala arrived thereat. This circumstance and the fact that the three accused left Violeta in a hurried manner and without paying their respects to the house owner as would have been the case if their presence in the Parnala house were legitimate, constitute circumstantial evidence of their culpability. Violeta clearly saw the three (3) men because they were only about an arm's length from where she was when they scampered out of the garage door. As they came out, they were practically facing her. Moreover, although the light coming from the electric post, admittedly, was dim, there was additional illumination coming from the houses nearby sufficient to enable her to identify the malefactors: Thus: "Q: Following your testimony, you were outside the small door knocking, then these three persons came out from the garage? A: They were still in the garage when suddenly they opened the door of the garage. I thought he is our maid and I told him that I was knocking here for a long time already why did you wake up just now. Q: And the distance between you and the place where they came out was very short distance? A: Yes, Ma'am. Q: What is the distance? A: About an arm (sic) length. Q: And you said they walked very fast? A: Not so fast. When they were already outside they ran so fast. Q: Mrs. Witness, is there a lighting facilities (sic) in your door? A: There is an electric post that has a light. Q: And would it be 8 to 10 meters from the door of your garage? A: It could be not so far (sic) because our house is at the corner. Q: Page 35 of your transcript of stenographic notes shows it is about 8 to 10 meters. What is the kind of light? A: Electric bulb. Q: Not the fluorescent? A: Bulb. Q: And it was about how high? A: The height of an electric post. Q: It could be about 20 feet? A: I am not sure. Q: And you will agree with me that that light was not sufficient enough to be able to clearly see the faces of the persons going out of the garage? A: The house nearby have also light. The place was also lighted by the houses of the neighbor which has a light."[8]

Violeta Parnala was unswerving in her identification in open court of appellant Bracamonte as one of the felons who emerged from their house, considering that the latter used to drive her son to school. As further recounted by Violeta, viz: Q: In your direct testimony when you were asked this question. Q: Why do you know the accused? A: Because my son used to ride in his jeepney on his way to school. How young was your son Jay Vee Parnala Custodio when the incident happened? A: He was six years old? xxx xxx xxx Q: And during those times when this Teresita Rosalinas and your son Jay Vee Parnala Custodio were going to school, you do not mind who the driver was of the jeepney they were taking? A: I also looked at him. Q: But your concern was merely to reach their destination, not to identify the driver of the jeepney? A: Of course when my child leaves the house, I used to see who was the driver because I have much concern about my son in case something might happen. xxx xxx xxx Q: What is in the driver taking your son to school (sic) or the distinguishing feature that made you say that you came to know the accused because he used to ride in the jeepney of his? A: Of course the feature of his face and the built of his body. Q: Was there any distinguishing feature in his face or in his body, what is it? A: His face a little bit round. Q: If that accused is in the courtroom today, will you be able to identify him? A: Yes, Ma'am (He is there, witness pointing to the accused.) Q: How many times more or less did your son Jay Vee and Teresita Rosalinas ride in this jeepney being driven by this Bracamonte? A: I cannot remember already how many times but I could see them very often riding in the jeepney. Q: And this accused Bracamonte is not living in your neighborhood? A: He is also living in that place but a little bit far from our place."[9] Appellant countered, however, that witness Violeta could not have known him personally since her son and maid rode coincidentally on appellant's jeepney only on occasions whenever he passed by the witness' house in the course of regular work. Their relationship was impersonal, not conducive to close and regular relationship thereby ruling out intimate knowledge of each other. [10]The implication is that Violeta could not have positively identified him as one of those who emerged from the garage door of the victims' house, they being complete strangers to each other. This averment is of no consequence, because nowhere in the testimony of Violeta did she claim that she knows the appellant personally. What she testified to was that she used to see her son and maid ride in appellant's jeepney very often,[11] which is the reason why she became familiar with appellant's physical appearance. There is nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that in order for there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must first know the latter personally. If this were the case, the prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in most instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the victim. No further requirement is imposed by law on the prosecution than that the identification made by its witness be direct, firm, unequivocal, and, most importantly, credible. The witness' degree of closeness or familiarity with the accused, although may be helpful, is by no means an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive identification. To corroborate his defense of alibi, appellant presented Rafael Diaz, owner of RM Motor Works in Paraaque, where appellant used to work as an all around employee and where he allegedly spent the night on September 23, 1987, the time when the crime was committed. Diaz' testimony contributed very little, if at all, to his defense. The direct examination of Diaz reveals the following: "Q: Please recall the specific date of September 23, 1987, have you gone to your shop? A: As far as I know, I cannot remember. At that date because of too long to recall (sic) but what can say is that I know that he stayed in the shop. He sleep (sic) in the shop. xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, you said that you used to visit, inspect your shop usually in the morning. Now, tell us Mr. Witness have you done that in September 1987? A: Yes, sir. Q: In your doing such inspection, where was Florentino Bracamonte? A: He was in the shop. Q: For the whole month of September 1987? A: Yes, sir.[12] However, on cross-examination, Diaz became more ambivalent: "Q: And you are definite that on September 23, 1987 as you mentioned earlier you did not know if the accused left your shop or not? A: In the afternoon. Q: On September 23, 1987? A: I am not sure. COURT: Q: A: You are not sure he did not leave? Yes, Your Honor, I am not sure.[13]

The above testimony, whose purpose is to corroborate appellant's defense of alibi, failed to serve its purpose for it was hardly clear and convincing. Thus, the trial court did not commit any error in refusing to give probative value to this piece of evidence. Settled is the doctrine that the trial court's evaluation of the credit-worthiness of the testimony given before it by witnesses must be accorded great respect.[14] It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very easy to concoct. In order that this defense may prosper, it must be established clearly and convincingly not only that the accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but that likewise it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof.[15] In the instant case, appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the victims' house at the time the crime was committed, apart from his self-serving declaration that he was at RM Motors Works in Paraaque on the fateful night of September 23, 1987, seconded by the discredited testimony of his alleged employer, Rafael Diaz. With marked relevance is the fact that there appears to be no motive on the part of Violeta Parnala to falsely accuse appellant, other than her sincere desire to seek justice for the deaths of her son and maid. Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of any reason or motive why Violeta should testify falsely against him. [16] Positive identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of the accused.[17] Appellant insists that, as proof of his innocence, he did not escape nor evade arrest after the commission of the crime imputed against him. He contends that he stayed in his place of employment in Paraaque, Metro Manila, from 1986 to 1989, regularly performing his job, when he was apprehended on the strength of a warrant of arrest. This is contrary to the finding of the court a quo which held that: "Accused Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar also stayed at large until his arrest on October 27, 1989 after more than two years of hiding to evade the scales of justice. xxx xxx xxx Accused chose to flee from the scene of the crime and to stay beyond the clutches of the law x x x, thus spotlighting the legal maxim 'the guilty fleeth while the innocent stands fast, bold as a lion."'[18] The evidence on record does not warrant reversal of this finding by the trial court. It is this Court's bounden duty to refrain from reviewing findings of fact by the lower court, considering that it has all the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and to determine by their demeanor on the stand the probative value of their testimonies. [19]

In any case, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that appellant's claim of non-flight is true, there is no law or principle which guarantees that non-flight per se is proof, let alone conclusive proof, of one's innocence and, as in the case of alibi, such a defense is unavailing when placed astride the undisputed fact that there is positive identification of the felon.[20] Finally, appellant claims that the evidence against him is purely circumstantial which is insufficient to sustain his conviction. He submits that there is no solitary piece of evidence directly linking him to the commission of the crime imputed against him, hence he should be acquitted. This argument is specious. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which indirectly proves a fact in issue. [21] In this jurisdiction, direct evidence is not only the basis upon which the guilt of an accused may be proved; it may also be established through circumstantial evidence. [22] Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence will support and justify a conviction if the following requisites concur: (1) There is more than one circumstance; (2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[23] In the case at bench, the circumstances pointing to accused-appellant's guilt are as follows: (1) He was not an inmate of private complainant's house and so, his presence therein at a late hour in the evening indicate his and his companions' evil designs. (2) He and his cohorts were seen coming out of the victims' house immediately after the crime of robbery with homicide was perpetrated. (3) After coming out, the culprits immediately fled. (4) He and Sapon went into hiding for more than two (2) years. Bracamonte was arrested on October 27, 1989. The above circumstances, highlighted by the testimony of Violeta Parnala which was straightforward and clear as to the identity of the appellant as one of the malefactors, clearly point to appellant Bracamonte's guilt. Thus was overcome, by proof beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence in appellant's favor. In contrast, appellant merely relies on denial and alibi, weak defenses, to support his claim of innocence, which defenses were overthrown by the prosecution. The Court notes that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused, were charged and convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with homicide only although two persons were killed. [24] In this complex crime, the penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of killings accompanying the robbery.[25] The multiplicity of the victims slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.[26] Although Republic Act No. 7659 reimposed the death penalty for certain heinous crimes, including robbery with homicide, [27] the capital punishment could not be imposed in the case at bench. The crime here was committed way back in September 23, 1987, while R.A. No. 7659 took effect only on December 31, 1993. [28] To impose upon appellant the death penalty would violate the basic rule in criminal law that, if the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense shall be applied,[29] which in this case is Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code sans the death penalty clause by virtue of Section 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz: Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua." WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the conviction is for robbery with homicide, and the indemnity for the heirs of the two victims is hereby increased from P30,000 to P50,000[30] each. SO ORDERED. Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, vs. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee. Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant. ANTONIO, J.:p Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa. 1 The complaint filed against the accused reads: That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same. At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads: Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of your duties.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE Provincial Governor FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY: Kind: ROHM-Revolver Make: German SN: 64 Cal: .22 On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties. The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent. Let us advert to our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground: The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,

provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.) The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. ... . It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment. Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang andLucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio. Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. Fernando, J., took no part.

CESARIO URSUA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents FACTS OF THE CASE: Mr. Cesario Ursua petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violating Sec.1 C.A. 142as amended by R.A. 6085 otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. Ursua was asked by Atty. Palmones to take his letterrequest to the office of the Ombudsman because his Law firm messenger Oscar Perez has to attend to some personal matters. Ursua was advised by Oscar Perez that if acknowledgement receipt is required he can use his name to sign the said receipt. Upon entry to the Office of the Ombudsman at Davao city, he wrote Oscar Perez at the visitors logbook, then went to the Administrative Division where he gave the letter-request of Atty. Palmones to Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida who gave him the copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledge by writing the name Oscar Perez. Before leaving the premises, Ursua was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked for the same office. When Ursua left, Ms. Loida found out the person who introduce himself as Oscar Perez was not himself but was Cesario Ursua. She then reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman. The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec.1 C.A.142 as amended by R.A. 6085.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. He now files a petition to review his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. That he did not violated the Sec.1 CA 142 as amended as R.A. 6085. That he has never use nay alias name; neither Oscar Perez is his alias. According to him an Alias is a term that uses another name habitually by which the person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as Oscar Perez and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law. ISSUE: Whether Cesario Urusa should not be really charge of the Sec.1 CA 142 as amended by R.A. 6085 otherwise known as An Act of Regulating the Use of Aliases RULING OF THE COURT: Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. There is no question then that Oscar Perez is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right The act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law; such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. SO ORDERED

August 7, 1985 G.R. No. L-63408 DECISION GAUDIOSO C. LLAMOSO, HILARIO A. GUIGUE PROTACIO U. JUMAMOY, JR., NICANOR ANINIPO and ALFREDO CAGAIS petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Enrico B. Aumentado for petitioner in 63408. Prospers A. Crescini for petitioner in 64026. , J.: This case is about a false entry in the payroll for March 16 to 31, 1981 of 12 laborers who worked in the improvement of Sta. Rosa Street, municipality of E. Villanueva, Siquijor. The anomaly involves the sum of P 130 as the wages for two weeks of one laborer at P 13 a day. The entries for the 11 laborers were not falsified. Gaudioso C. Llamoso was the assistant highway engineer and officer-in-charge of the district engineers office. Hilario A. Guigue, 56, a senior civil engineer, was assigned to Project CRI-80-0704 which undertook the repair of drainage canals and sidewalks at Sta. Rosa Street E. Villanueva. Protacio U. Jumamoy, Jr., 33, was also a civil engineer who had been in the service since 1974. Llamoso, now 57, was assigned as district engineer on February 10, 1981. Alfredo Cagais, 25, worked as caretaker of the district engineers cottage and acted as utility man and messenger. On March 10, 1981 Cagais complained that he had not been paid his wages at thirteen pesos a day or P 130 for the quincena of February 16 to 27, 1981, a period of ten working days. He was on the verge of crying because he was the sole breadwinner of vs. family. His mother was sickly. Llamoso called Guigue and Jumamoy to explain why Cagais had not been paid his wages. They said that Cagais was listed in the payroll of the Pisong Bridge project. Apparently, he could not be included in the payroll for personnel of the district engineers office. Llamoso asked Guigue and Jumamoy to find a legitimate way by which Cagais could be paid his wages as caretaker (11 tsn November 17, 1982). Jumamoy intended to consult the auditor as to how Cagais could be paid vs. wages. He was not able to see the auditor. Instead, he talked with Gertrudes Quilat an auditing aide who suggested that a person acting as a stand-in or substitute for Cagais, might be included in the payroll but Jumamoy should consult a lawyer about that arrangement (14). Jumamoy discussed the matter with Mayor Alfredo Orquillas, Sr. of the municipality of E. Villanueva who used to be a municipal judge. Orquillas advised that a stand-in was permissible provided it was done in good faith and without the slightest intention of defrauding the government (15). Jumamoy then asked Cagais who could act as his stand-in. Cagais suggested Nicanor Aninipo, 18, who was allegedly jobless (17). So, on March 12, 1981, Jumamoy instructed his clerk to include the name of Aninipo in the form or document known as Authority to Hire Casual Employees and Order to Work for the project on Sta. Rosa Street, municipality of E. Villanueva for the quincena of March 16 to 31, 1981 (Exh. A and A-2). Jumamoy initialed the inclusion of Aninipos name in that form and gave it to his immediate superior, Guigue, for approval (19). Guigue approved it. Aninipo was also included in the Time Book and Payroll (Exh. A) for that quincena of March 16 to 31, 1981 which listed 12 laborers, 11 of whom worked for 12 days. In the case of Aninipo, the twelfth in the list, it was indicated that he worked for 10 days only to correspond with the ten-day period for the quincena of February 12 to 27, 1981 for which, as already noted, Cagais worked in the district engineers cottage (2122). Aninipo was able to collect P 130 under that payroll for the project on Sta. Rosa Street, E. Villanueva. He gave the amount to Cagais because, as previously arranged, Aninipo was only a stand-in for Cagais (2223).

The pay master the sole prosecution witness, testified that at nine oclock in the morning of April 13, 1981 he paid Aninipo P 130 for his supposed work in the Sta. Rosa Street project. Two hours later, Aninipo wanted to collect P 156 for his actual work in the Bogo-Licuan road, another project (Exh. B). The paymaster refused to pay him again. That was how the false entry was discovered. It should be clarified that before March 16, Aninipo was really jobless. His first job was in the Bogo-Licuan project. But he was not able to apprise Cagais before March 16 that he started working in that project (6263). Jumamoy declared that the government was not defrauded because Aninipo gave the P130 to Cagais for his work of ten days in the district engineers cottage but Aninipo was not able to collect P156 for his actual work in the Bogo-Licuan Road project (31-2). The Sandiganbayan convicted Llamoso Guigue, Jumamoy, Cagais and Aninipo as conspirators in the crime of falsification of public documents by allegedly having made it appear in the time book, payroll and authority to hire employees (Exh. A to A-2) that Aninipo worker in the Sta. Rosa Street project when in fact he did not work therein. I t sentenced each of them to an indeterminate penalty of two years, four months and one day ofprision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of P2,000. They appealed. We hold that the accused are not criminally liable because they had no criminal intent. Making no concealment or evasion, they admitted that there was a false entry. They acted in good faith (12-13 tsn Nov. 16, 1982). They may be disciplined administratively for the irregularity but their inclusion of ninipo in the payroll is outside the pale of criminal law. Apparently, the case was an isolated instance. It should not be equated with the systematic and rampant practice in some engineering districts of fabricating payrolls with fictitious laborers working on fictitious projects resulting in the defraudation of the government of considerable sums of money, There is a ruling that the accused is not guilty of falsification in the absence of proof that he maliciously perverted the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some third person (U.S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341, 343). The instant case is similar to U.S. vs. Arceo, 17 Phil. 592, where the accused was the foreman of carpenters hired by the City of Manila to reconstruct the houses torn down for reasons of sanitation and removed to the San Lazaro Estate. The city had bound itself to reconstruct gratis said houses. The wife of the accused had purchased from Severino Pelagio one of these houses, including the right to have the house rebuilt at the citys expense. The accused foreman reported that a carpenter named Castro worked for the city when in truth he worked on the reconstruction of the house which the accused had purchased. He was charged with falsification, It was held that he was not criminally liable. He believed in good faith that the city was duty-bound to rebuild the house which his wife had purchased from Pelagio and that there was nothing wrong in charging against the city the time spent by Castro in rebuilding that house, just as there was nothing wrong in charging against the city and time spent by the other carpenters in rebuilding the other houses removed under the same circumstances. In the instant case, as in the Arceo case, it cannot be said that the accused perverted the truth in including Aninipo in the payroll in order to attain any felonious objective. Their honest motive was to enable Cagais to receive his compensation which he needed very badly. The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside. The accused are acquitted with costs de oficio. A copy of this decision should be furnished the Minister of Public Works and Highways for the purpose of taking administrative action against the accused should the facts warrant such action, SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992 ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. PARAS, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision* of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to the respondent appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889. The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged, have been clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel for the public respondent, thus: Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did not have complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another problem, and that while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 4041) Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41) The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41) The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads: 1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT Before or upon delivery of each item of Equipment, the Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful performance of its obligations. This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of the entire period of Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17) As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.

To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43). Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43) After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-petitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows: . . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts reflected in subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27) Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a quo, this Court is intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were intended by the parties, the petitioner on the one hand and the private complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty deposit" equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng is one of the officers of Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement subject of the high financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair service equipment, which was arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the transaction. By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It would have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the termination of the leasepurchase agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner. To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral per se, hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty deposit". It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who "accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the "warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off business clients.

This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree. This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above in the lease agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere accommodationarrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund of said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated. For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society. Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11) Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31). Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner. While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused, however, by the open admission of the appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below: Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the accused to complainant had been extinguished by the termination of the leasing agreement by the terms of which the warranty deposit advanced by complainant was refundable to the accused as lessee and that as the lessor L.S. Finance neither made any liquidation of said amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may he assumed that the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these allegations, even if true, do not change the fact, admitted by appellant and established by the evidence, that the four checks were originally issued on account or for value. And as We have already observed, in order that there may be a conviction under the from paragraph of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 with respect to the element of said offense that the check should have been made and issued on account or for value it is sufficient, all the other elements of the offense being present, that the check must have been drawn and issued in payment of an obligation.

Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of the checks, of the obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued, would have resulted in placing the case at bar beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof that there was such an extinguishment in the present case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not adduced any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the complainant to cover the warranty deposit must already have been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30) It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same court even expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime charged. But how can be produce documents showing that the warranty deposit has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest in the transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may have gotten back the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the petitioner since she had in her possession the checks that "bounced". That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of the warranty deposit is evident from the following pronouncement: And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP Blg. 22, which is a special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated, proof of criminal intent not being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of public policy and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26) The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the petitioner, i.e.,whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the more, the alleged crime could not have been committed by petitioner: a) Warranty A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain facts are truly as they are represented to be and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423) A cross-reference to the following term shows: Fitness for Particular Purpose: Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573) b) Deposit: Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the performance of some contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment and to that extent may constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate. To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping or as a pledge to intrust to the care of another. The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the credit which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly accepted and generally understood among bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits payable on demand and for which certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable on demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395) Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner

never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance Management. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. SO ORDERED Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur. Narvasa, C.J.,, concurs in the result. Nocon, J., is on leave.

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