Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume's Metaethics Author(s): Elizabeth S. Radcliffe Reviewed work(s): Source: Synthese, Vol.

152, No. 3, Hume's Naturalism (Oct., 2006), pp. 353-370 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27653401 . Accessed: 29/06/2012 00:11
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Synthese (2006) 152:353-370

DOI 10.1007/sll229-006-9003-6

ORIGINAL

PAPER

and moral Moral internalism in Hume's metaethics

Elizabeth S. Radcliffe

cognitivism

Published ? Springer

online:

29 September 2006 B.V. 2006 Media Science+Business

Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best Abstract framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cogni tive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if amoral by itself. So, it looks as though judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral Hume and Humeans (moral internalism). My chief claim is that the cognitivism) and internally motivating details of Hume's naturalistic philosophy of mind actually allow for a conjunction of these allegedly incompatible views. This thesis is significant, since readers typically is not produced by representations, have thought that Hume's view that motivation with his view that moral judgments motivate on their own, imply that moral coupled
judgments could never take the form of beliefs about, or representations of, the moral

(virtue and vice). Keywords Cognitivism Hume Internalism Metaethics Morality Motivation

1 Introduction That moral

dox has thesis as

internalism
view

is incompatible
in ethics that when

with moral
and motivational judges

cognitivism
psychology. she ought

has become
Moral to do an

an ortho
internalism action, she

among the its core

naturalists

someone

is necessarily has a motive to behave according to her judgment. Moral cognitivism their objects, the view that moral judgments impart information of some sort?about so are true or false. Smith (1994) has labeled their subjects, or their causes ?and "The Moral Problem", since many find moral cognitiv this alleged incompatibility ism and moral internalism plausible on grounds independent of each other, but have
not adequately reconciled the views in the context of a naturalist's model of motiva

tion. I prefer

to use Sayre-McCord's

(1997) more

apt title for the dilemma,

namely,

E. S. Radcliffe (KI) Santa Clara University, of Philosophy, Department USA Santa Clara, CA 95053-0310, e-mail: eradcliffe@scu.edu

500 El Camino

Real,

<?} Springer

354

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370

"The Metaethical Problem". The Metaethical Problem emerges when naturalists af to the Humean firm their commitment of motivation. theory On the Humean derived from Hume, a belief and a desire theory of motivation,
are separate desire psychological is a state theory of mind says that states, and both are necessary to motivation. A belief is a

cognition;
A Humean

it is a representation

of how the world

one a motive

is to the person who has the belief.

in some she has So, the way. a desire for a

that presses a person has

to change the world to action when

goal and a belief about how to achieve that goal. Given that the cognitive state and the conative state are separate, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be conative, or motivating, by itself. In other words, ifmoral judgments are cognitive, then internalism is false, given the Humean theory of motivation. Of course, if one gives up the Humean and identifies motives theory of motivation with certain beliefs, as some rationalist theories of motivation do, there is no incom think the belief/desire model from Hume patibility problem. But many philosophers is the best framework within which to make sense of motivation. It is the theory that allows us to discuss human motivation without resorting to explanations of actions that go beyond the theoretically observable and situates discussions of motives (and reasons) in the arena of natural science. There are also many logically compelling reasons to adopt the Humean theory of motivation, which I cannot go into here.1 Smith tries to work out a reconciliation of the two plausible positions?internalism a Humean and cognitivism?preserving theory of motivation. However, he pairs the Humean of motivation with a supposedly non-Humean moral cognitivism.2 theory His view is that a thoroughly Humean position?one that includes both the theory of motivation and the theory of value or virtue derived from Hume?must deny the existence of moral knowledge and treat judgments, not as cognitions, but as expres sions of feelings. It follows that Hume's theory certainly could not by itself offer a solution to The Metaethical Problem. Indeed, interpreters of Hume have mostly or as an externalist and opted for reading him as an internalist and a noncognitivist,
a cognitivist.3 come I have to two conclusions, on grounds independent of each other, namely:

of morality as practical and motivating is (1) that Hume's persistent characterization best read as an affirmation of moral internalism, and (2) that Hume's depiction of moral judgments and our use of them is best read as a version of moral cognitivism. My main thesis in this paper is that Hume is not inconsistent in this regard, but that the details of his empiricist philosophy of mind actually allow for a conjunction of the two allegedly incompatible views. This thesis, if supportable, is significant, since it has typically been thought that Hume's putative internalism is exactly what precludes his being a cognitivist and generates the very puzzle to which Smith devotes a book.
My 1 discussion here is based entirely on Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, since it is

See Smith (1994, pp 92-129). See also Blackburn (1998); Williams (1979). There is no logical incompatibility between externalism and non-cognitivism, but a theory combin of ing the two seems to me to opt for the worst of possible worlds, given both the intuitive plausibility internalism and given non-cognitivism's natural fit with it over externalism. 3 Foot see him as an internalist non-cognitivist. Darwall (1978, pp 74-80) and Mackie (1980, pp 52-53) Brown but doesn't (1993) sees him as an externalist cognitivist. (1988) argues that he's an externalist, address the issue of cognitivism. Cohon in some contexts, but (1997) thinks he might be a cognitivist does not address the internalism issue directly. In "The Reality of Moral Distinctions" (forthcoming), Cohon that Hume could consistently be a cognitivist and an anti-realist. Her concerns there argues are largely with the metaphysical of cognitivism. implications ^ Springer

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370 there in which Hume

and systematic way. and moral internalism

355 of mind to moral in a clear

applies his philosophy

psychology

2 Hume,

motivation,

to three claims: (1) that Problem arises out of a commitment So, The Metaethical there ismoral knowledge; and (3) that (2) that "morality" is intrinsically motivating; belief and desire are required to produce motivation. It is important to mention at the differs inwhat appears to be a slight way beginning that Hume's theory of motivation from the Humean in contemporary of motivation theory philosophy. The Humean action, but Hume's view is that theory talks of the necessity of desire to motivate
certain conative passions states. or affections, passions which he Among may sees or may as motives not be are desires, desire, are aversion, the necessary grief, joy,

hope, fear, despair, and security (Hume 1739-1740, 1978, 2002; T 2.1.1.4; SBN 277 and T 2.3.1.1; SBN 399).4 Although this difference between the Humean theory and
Hume's theory seems minor, itmight have some significance in certain contexts, since

desires seem to require specific objects, but some passions may not.5 (That is not an issue I can deal with here.) To start, then, with Hume's theory of motivation in place: say it's true that all motivation depends on passion regarded as distinct from belief. //
it is also the case that when one makes a moral judgment, one necessarily has a motive

to behave according to it (internalism), then making a moral judgment necessarily entails having a passion. So, it looks as though the moral judgment must be neces
sarily connected to the passion. Since necessary connections are relations of ideas,

not discernible among distinct existences in the world, for Hume, the moral judgment must be conceptually the same as the passion. It follows that the psychological state of moral judging must be the affection or passion. Since a passion or an affection is separate from the cognitive state of belief, it looks as though Hume has to be amoral if he is an internalist. non-cognitivist As I have said, what makes The Metaethical Problem more pointed for the purposes of this discussion is that the alleged incompatibility among the trio of propositions involved seems to find its defense inHume himself, who unambiguously argues that reason alone does not produce motives 2.3.3.2; SBN 413-414, T 3.1.1.9-1.10; SBN (T 458). If cognitive states of mind are products of reason by itself, and moral judgments are a class of cognitive judgments, then they could not motivate. But Hume of course takes it as a given that "morality" (a vague term that at the least refers to the system
of moral judgments So and practices make in which we participate) does indeed motivate, and

uses this fact to argue against

from are reason. conative, it would non-cognitive

the purported
sense to see his

derivation
view as one However,

of our moral
in which this is what

system wholly
judgments I will deny.

moral

psychological

states.

First, I want to address briefly here the issue of Hume's moral internalism. Then will deal with the more contentious matter of his purported moral non-cognitivism,
or cognitivism, as the case may be.

4 Hume The Norton edition of the Treatise is cited by "T" with (1739-1740). (Hume 2002) The Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition of the Treatise part, section, and paragraph. (Hume 1978) by "SBN" with page number. 5 Imay say that I feel fear or anxiety, but that I do not know what I'm afraid of. For instance, be odd to say that I desire other hand, it would I desire. but I do not know what something, is criticized to anything for calling passions existences" that "make no reference "original but in fact some passions themselves", could, I think, have no particular objects.

book, is cited On the Hume beyond

4u Springer

356 Iwould

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370

like to take it as settled that Hume's view is internalist.6 Until very recently until only the last 10 years or so), it was standard to understand him this (perhaps way. With a contemporary push to regard Hume's theory of justice as primary, there has been a recent shift on the part of some to thinking of his view of moral motivation as externalist.7 This is so because the theory of justice (and artificial virtue) indicates that there are moral rules, generated by some kind of agreement and sanctioned
somehow by moral approval, which our moral judgments concern. So, not only does

the cognitive nature of these moral judgments imply externalism in light of the incom patibility between cognitivism and internalism, but also incentives to rule-following behavior are typically external incentives (external to the content of morality itself) ?
for example, fear of punishment for this view Book or concern for reputation. But in fact there are very

good countervailing
detailed Hume argument argues

reasons for reading Hume's

elsewhere, III, Part and I, sect.

position
I can only I, against

as internalist.
summarize the moral

I have offered
it here.8 rationalists that

in Treatise

(1) "Morals" have an influence on the actions and affections; (2) Judgments of reason alone have no such influence; (3) Therefore, the rules of morality are not judgments of
reason alone. In order to make this argument valid, the first premise has to be under

stood as some form of internalism. Premise (2) says only that judgments of reason alone cannot motivate, so it follows from (2) only that beliefs of reason might contrib ute tomotivation by joining with a passion. Ifmorality only contributes tomotivation by joining with a passion (an externalist reading of (1)), then there is no feature of morality that justifies the conclusion that it cannot be derived from reason alone. For then we get: (1) moral distinctions influence us by joining with other passions?for with the desire to avoid the condemnation of others; (2) judgments of reason example, can also influence us by joining with passions of ours. Now there is no way to derive
the conclusion next Hume uses that morality cannot be a matter the conclusion that morality of reason derived alone. from reason to argue in is not

Treatise III.I.II. that itmust be derived from sense or sentiment. So, by the end of Part I of Book III of the Treatise (which consists of only those two sections), Hume creates the expectation that he will offer a psychological explanation of how the moral sense I think he does just that at the beginning of Part II, which is exactly what motivates. his internalist perspective demands, but this is the point at which some readers con tend that his account supports the externalist reading. Considering three individuals with the same types of belief and different motivations will help in understanding the internalist view I attribute to Hume. (1) The first believes that act <pis virtuous or to do it.9 (2) The second believes that act (p is vir right, and has natural dispositions tuous or right, lacks the dispositions to the virtue it exemplifies, but is still motivated a kind of self-condemnation to do <p.(3) The third believes that act ? is virtuous by
or start no motivation and feels right of Treatise "When III.II, one any way virtuous or the other.10 or Now Hume is common writes at the motive principle in human

nature, a person, who

6 For an

feels his heart devoid of that principle, may hate himself upon
(1978, p 79); Mackie (1980, pp 52-53); Darwall, before he

changed 7 Brown

see Foot internalist reading, his view (1983, pp 51-61). (1988); Darwall (1995).

8 Radcliffe
9

(1996).

This is the virtuous for Hume. (and morally best) person 10 I will later argue that case (3) is not actually a case in which a person exercises moral judgment, since I will argue for an essential connection between moral of a motive for judging and possession Hume. ?) Springer

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370

that account, and may the action without the motive, from a certain sense

357

perform

of

duty, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least to disguise to himself, as much as possible, his want of it" (T 3.2.1.8; SBN 479). Here I take Hume
to refer to the second actor described above. On one interpretation of this scenario,

a person who lacks virtue ismotivated to do the right action by the desire to avoid the unpleasant feeling of self-hatred that comes from the realization that she lacks such virtue. Since that person's motivation has nothing to do with morality itself or
its content, this looks like a case of an externalist motivation. Furthermore, because

Hume
bear

notes

that it is an important component

review of our own conduct"

of human happiness
(Hume 1751,1998,

that we be able to
Sect. 9, parag. 23;

"a satisfactory sense of goes.

Hume

1751, 1975, p283)

duty"

it would make
is a species of

sense for Hume

self-interested

to think that motivation

so the externalist

by

"a certain interpretation

motivation,

feel But I argue that there is very good reason to think that the self-hatred refers is a justifying feeling of the moral sense ?a type of ing to which Hume
self-disapprobation one feels when one considers one's own character as a subject

of moral
approval relationships

appraisal. His moral

toward characters, are when the to others,

theory has it that our feelings

corrected for certain biases source of our moral distinctions.

of approval
due This to our faculty

and dis
particular of moral

can be turned on ourselves as well. The feeling of self-hatred to which discernment the passage refers certainly cannot be a species of genuine hatred as that emotion is described in his discussion of the passions in Book II of the Treatise. There he writes that love and hatred are "always directed to some sensible being external to us", so
that when the we sensations or self-hatred, it is an improper of self-love speak we in common feel about ourselves have nothing way with of the speaking, sensations and of

love or of hatred of others (T 2.2.1.2; SBN 329-330). It follows that the self-hatred of which Hume speaks in the passage about the sense of duty is not the indirect passion and as a of hatred itself. It makes sense to see this feeling as moral disapprobation us. in which case, a feature of morality itself motivates sentiment; motivating
On Hume's view, not all passions motivate, so it is not sound just to assume that

he thought moral approbation and disapprobation were motives. But I think there is evidence that he considered them so. In his discussion, "Of the influencing motives the will" of the will", he notes that passions, both calm and violent, "determine the calm passions he mentions there (calm because (T 2.3.3.9; SBN 417-418). Among in the mind) are certain implanted instincts, such as little emotion they produce
benevolence and resentment, and "the general and appetite to good, as examples of the calm and aversion to evil"

(T 2.3.3.8; SBN 417). When Hume

and violent, he offers the senses

first introduces
of morality senses. The

the division of the passions

beauty of the

into calm
former, over so

there is good reason

are identical to or

to think that the general

these

appetite

to good and aversion

passions

to evil
the

include

prevalence

violent in the disposition SBN 418).

If moral disapprobation

of a person he says we call "strength of mind"

directed toward the self?the person who

(T 2.3.3.10;
of

is spectator

then this means that the feeling of pain itself is a her own character?is motivating, is a distinctive sort of pain, for Hume. The view that we motive, since disapprobation
are motivated by pain, itself was apart an from any particular and desire, is a view with currency desire among

the Early Moderns:

uneasiness

both Locke
impetus

and Hobbes,
to change,

for instance, thought that discomfort

Locke in fact defined as

or

"The

uneasiness

aMan finds in himself upon the absence of any thing, whose

present

enjoy

<? Springer

358 ment

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370

carries the Idea of delight with it ..." (1690,1979, Book II, Chap. XX, parag. is VI). So, on my interpretation of Hume, the painful feeling of self-disapprobation a motivating because it prompts the person to perform the action a virtuous passion
actor would do in that situation, either, as Hume says, to acquire a certain motive

insofar as one can. The by practice, or to hide from oneself the lack of that motive to do an act the virtuous person would do naturally derives from the moral motivation sentiment, which is the source of justification. Since that sentiment is both justifying and motivating, this is an internalist account of morality. If readers reject this interpretation and maintains that Hume's view is externalist, the fol their externalist Hume does not have The Metaethical Problem. Nonetheless, discussion concerning the implications of Hume's theory for moral cognitivism lowing is still of interest; as I say later, I think there are other elements inHume that make it plausible to think he thought of moral judgments as representations?that is, as
cognitive.

3 Hume
Worries

and moral
about moral

cognitivism
cognitivism versus non-cognitivism are not among the concerns

of 18th-century moral philosophy discussed inHume's Treatise. Hume opens his dis cussion of morality by saying that we can get some precision on the matter of morality by asking "Whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue" (T 3.1.1.3; SBN 456). He proceeds immediately to start a critique of the rationalists view that "virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being to reject rationalism about that considers them" (T 3.1.1.4; SBN 456). Obviously, is not to reject the notion that there is something to believe or know about morality morality, or that there is a way to make a true moral judgment and a way to make a false one. So, the focus of Hume's concern in Book III of the Treatise is to answer a question that by itself has no implications one way or the other for the issue of moral cognitivism. One sometimes hears the suggestion that the theories of classic should not be expected to answer questions that their theories were not philosophers to deal with. While I am sympathetic with this view, I think we have some designed thing to learn from asking the question whether an empiricist, naturalistic account of like Hume's could countenance a cognitivist line. Furthermore, even though morality
"cognitivism" is not a term Hume and his contemporaries use, the question of whether

Hume's
his own

theory is consistent with,

vocabulary.

implies, or denies impressions

that include

this position

can be translated impressions

whereas, on

into are
ideas

Hume's
vivid and

distinction
forceful

between

and ideas is familiar:

sensations and passions;

experiences of

are their less lively copies

Passions are impressions

present
reflection,

in reasoning
arising, as

and thinking
they do, upon

(T 1.1.1.1; SBN
reflection certain

1).

previous sensations, namely, pleasures and pains (T 1.1.2.1; SBN 8). For instance, I may develop a fear of something when I reflect upon features that make it unpleasant tome. Beliefs, Hume says, are the liveliest of ideas: belief is produced, Hume contends,
when a present impression enlivens a (complex) idea. He writes, '"Tis certain, that the

belief superadds nothing to the idea, but only changes our manner of conceiving of it, and renders itmore strong and lively" (T 1.3.8.7; SBN 101). For example, Descartes' belief that he is sitting at the writing table is (to him) an idea of myself-at-the-table,
4y Springer

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370

359

can conceive of which is enlivened by his impressions in the moment. Descartes himself at the table and not believe he is there, or he can conceive of himself at the table and believe it to be so; either way, the idea of myself-at-the table has the same
content, Thus, Hume ideas the "manner says, but are representational of states conceiving" of mind, in the according two cases to Hume, is different.11 and impres

sions are not. Hume's official line is that ideas represent the impressions from which they come, but he sometimes he says they "represent their objects or impressions" but as soon as we take (T 1.3.14.6; SBN 157). Impressions are not representational,12
the contents of our minds to stand for something, we are engaged in reflection, and

so the subjects of our thoughts are now the less vivacious ideas that come from the impressions. Hume forcefully makes the point that passions, a subset of impressions, are non-representational when he calls them "original existences" which contain no "representative quality": "When I am angry I am actually possest with the passion,
and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am

thirsty, sick, or more than five foot high" (T 2.3.3.5; SBN 415). Consequently, Humean ideas have cognitive content and Humean impressions lack this.13 To ask whether Hume has a cognitivist theory of moral judgment is obviously to ask whether there are moral beliefs, on his theory. Since beliefs are ideas, or represen tations, that we affirm, the question is really whether a moral judgment is a vivacious it is the livelier non idea, which represents something to be the case, or whether itself. That his representative mental state, perhaps the experience of approbation answer to the question with which he opens the discussion of morality, "Whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue", is clearly that we distinguish virtue from vice by impressions does not settle the matter. Since this question is immediately followed by a discussion of moral rationalism, there is is distinguished by impressions good reason to think that Hume's view that morality rather than by ideas is a rejection of the rationalist theory that moral judgments consist in relations of ideas. However, it does not address the further question whether our moral judgments use ideas or representations of our moral distinctions. Furthermore, are beliefs would not settle the question. that some classes of Humean judgments Hume talks about "judgments" concerning causes and effects (e.g., T 1.3.8.13; SBN 103, T 1.3.13.8; SBN 147, T 1.3.13.20; SBN 154), which are "judgments of the under standing" (T 3.1.1.5; SBN 457), and these, of course, are beliefs or representational states. But he also writes about "judgments by which we distinguish good and evil", and these may be of a different nature. His term "judgment" seems to encompass any
pronouncement that is not a relation of ideas, or a necessary truth.

I have suggested that one of the main reasons to think Hume a non-cognitivist is The Metaethical Problem itself. Other considerations, however, perhaps have to do with the nature of moral judgment as opposed to factual judgments and Hume's of mind. On Hume's philosophy theory, our moral distinctions must be based on sentiments (of approval or disapproval), which are impressions of reflection, and this
11 Descartes would also contain the same conception, but say that the state of belief and non-belief that in the state of belief, the will affirms the conception. 12 for a different See Owen and perhaps contentious view, see Don Garrett's (1999, p 72). However, article in this volume. 13 This as many since emotions do have objects, critics are point is actually not so straightforward, I feel anger, I am angry at someone. Still my anger in itself is not taken to apt to point out; when in the world to me a cup of in the way that my idea of a cup of coffee represents represent something coffee. ?} Springer

360

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370

is entirely different from the way in which other ideas of the world are acquired, namely, by impressions of sensation. Sentiments have no content for ideas to copy in the way that sensations do. For example, impressions of sunlight and warmth give
one a basis for an idea of the sun, and impressions of whiteness and coldness give

one the basis for an idea of snow. Feelings of approbation and disapprobation, how rather ever, seem to give one the basis for ideas of approbation and disapprobation, one of two views seems to follow than for ideas of virtue and vice. Consequently, from these considerations for Hume. (1) We do use ideas of virtue and vice in our moral judgments, but those ideas are Humean fictions?ideas like that of necessity are invented by the imagination and have no source in experi and the self?which to ence.14 We conjure up something that we do not find in experience, analogously the way in which the idea of necessary connection is conjured by the imagination in
causal reasoning. Furthermore, if, when we make such judgments regarding morality,

we project these ideas' confused content back onto the world as though we found it there, then these judgments are beliefs about virtue and vice, but these beliefs are false. They purport to represent something they cannot.15 (2) The second possible is that Hume thinks our moral judgments reading based on the above considerations are not attempts to represent anything about the world. They do not employ ideas at all; the judgments really are feelings. In the times when we think about or discuss
we use morality, that is, evaluation. ideas, In of course, those cases, but the in those ideas instances, are acquired we are not from our engaged experience in judging, of how

we use moral notions in interactions with others. Judging, on the other hand, is a matter of feeling the approbation and disapprobation inside of oneself. It is this second line which constitutes the most plausible non-cognitivist reading. The first is actually a familiar cognitivist position of a sort, which we have come to recognize as an error theory, since it implies we have moral beliefs, but they all turn out to be false. After all, Hume allows that we hold beliefs about causality, even though those beliefs employ fictions. Unless one is willing to attribute to Hume an emotivist analysis of causation, which is to deny that we have causal beliefs, I see no reason for treating moral beliefs employing fictions as a denial of moral beliefs. But, I also think that any interpretation of Hume that gives morality an analysis parallel to causality is suspect, for the following reason. Hume is not skeptical about morality in the way inwhich he is skeptical about causality. Even if one argues that he is a nat uralist about causality, describing the way the mind works in causal belief formation, rather than a skeptic, his analysis of causality still has it that something is hidden from the ordinary person in the process of belief formation; that is, we are not aware that
our idea of necessary from the connection was conjured makes by moral our mind's feeling of expectation.

I am convinced
hidden

that his view

ordinary person

is that nothing
who

in the process
judgments.

of moral
We

evaluation
realize that we

is

do not find virtue and vice in the world, but that we instead find it when we look inside ourselves (T 3.1.1.26; SBN 468-469). This is something we do not realize about
necessary connection in causation, even though we do not find it either, until we look

inside ourselves. So, the second reading, which treats moral judgments differently from causal judgments, is the best challenge to a cognitivist reading of Hume, and I want to ask whether we have good reason to accept it on the basis of the nature of
moral 14 judgment.

See Traiger (1987, pp 381-399). 15 Mackie (1980, pp 71-72).

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Synthese (2006) 152:353-370

361

Iwill distinguish in this discussion a cognitivist theory of judging (the process) from a cognitivist theory of judgment (the product). The process of judging in general is on Hume's in theory of ideas; that is, it always culminates inevitably non-cognitive the experience of a sentiment, or in the intensifying of the force and vivacity of an
idea. Humean ideas dimension, have a the phenomenal, representative and "force dimension vivacity", with and which a non-representative, the mind, strike they or

In the formation of causal judg and it is the latter that changes in belief-formation. that one event will for instance, we are overcome by a feeling of expectation ments,
happen after another because we have been conditioned by a constant conjunction of

that the feeling of expectation the two types of events in our past experience. Without intensifies our idea of the connection, we have not accepted a judgment of their causal that judging that an object exists connection. As I earlier noted, Hume acknowledges world is not an attribution of a quality, but a change in the manner of in the external conceiving of an object. There is no change in idea, no cognitive change, but a change in attitude, which alters the quality of the idea and the intensity with which it is felt. In both causal judgments and judgments concerning the existence of objects, we start with ideas and end up with more vivacious ideas. In the case of causation, there is also a change in content, since the idea of necessity has been added to the complex of ideas that we believe. That moral judging is similarly a non-cognitive process is no surprise. Also, as in
causal judging, when we judge morally, we start with ideas, namely, ideas of a per

son's character traits. We do not, however, end up with more vivid and lively ideas of those traits. Instead we end up with a judgment of their value. Judgments of cau sality and existence, which we would classify as theoretical judgments, are produced
by are inference beyond in the present same experience but via a sentiment or an affective experience.

I think it is plausible
produced

to think that moral

way,

judgments,

a species of practical
sentiments. There

judgments,
is nothing in

via motivating

its outcome from being an idea (and the process of moral judging that precludes as well, given that the other types of judgment involve a non therefore, cognitive) cognitive mental change that leads to a cognitive result.16 Furthermore, causal beliefs and beliefs in continuing objects outside the mind involve fictions, that is, ideas that we mistakenly take to depend on impressions produced by something outside of us (impressions of sensation), but that are actually produced by feelings (impressions of reflection). So, a mental process that produces an idea that is not traceable to an impression of sensation does not by that fact guarantee that the outcome must be
non-cognitive.

I have already
error when is involved we pronounce and

suggested
when one stable we object

that Hume
pronounce the cause or when

does not believe

a character of another, we think trait

that some sort of fiction or

or vicious, we self as pronounce the as there is an object sub continuing

virtuous

or when of the

a continuing

existence,

ject of experiences.

Yet

in all of these cases, we have a resultant

judgment

employing

16 I I find Hume's discus into this discussion, aesthetic have not brought judgments partly because seems to make to moral them analogous sion of them puzzling. His account of them in the Treatise one wonder of Taste", makes but his essay "Of the Standard open for all to undertake, judgments, is whether of taste must be left to a handful of experts. Another thinks matter whether Hume question I can react with of the object; that we start with an idea or a concept aesthetic judgment requires or displeasure to a taste without knowing what I am tasting. But can I judge the quality of a pleasure in order to pronounce taste without knowing what I taste? Surely, I do need to know that this is wine to a fine broth. on its being a fine wine as opposed <?) Springer

362

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370

an idea that did not come from an impression of sensation. So, why ismoral judging treated differently? I think the answer is this: Hume believes that we're aware that our moral judgments are ultimately dependent on our affections; whereas, in the other
judgments discussed here, we have no awareness of the role of our feelings. We do not

take our judgments of virtue and vice to be derived entirely from something outside of us in the way we think our judgments of connections between objects in the world
or the continued and independent existence of such objects are.

My conclusion thus far is that there is nothing in the nature of moral judging itself for Hume that precludes its product from being a representation or a belief. However, this still leaves The Metaethical Problem as the looming obstacle to the cognitivist on their own, If moral judgments are beliefs, how can they be motivating reading. when beliefs do not provide motives on their own?

4 Hume

and the metaethical

problem judgments
theory

The distinction
discussion.

in the above section between

that a non-cognitivist

and judging is crucial in this

motivation can be con

It allows

of moral

judgment. Thus, it is a possible reading of is produced judging permits that moral motivation his theory of moral judgment permits that we form judge. The crucial question, however, iswhether this internalism for Hume, since the sentiment-based interpretation actually preserves motivation for moral judging is only contingently to a moral connected necessary judgment on this reading. If the moral belief (judgment) can be detached from the sentiment, then it appears one can have the belief without the sentiment and hence, the belief without any motivation to act according to it. (The term "motivation" in this context should be understood in the sense of constituting amotive to action, although not necessarily the motive on which one infact acts; all sorts of concerns urge us to act sistent Hume by the beliefs of moral
and so are motives in this sense, but we do not?and cannot?act on all of them.) Moral

with a cognitivist theory that his theory of moral sentiment involved, and about morality when we

judgments are then causally connected to the sentiments of moral approbation and that is, to the motivating disapprobation, impressions. But then the term "motivating force of morality" would refer to the power of these impressions, rather than to the power of the beliefs these impressions produce. It looks like such an interpretation cannot solve The Metaethical Problem, since a solution to it requires that moral beliefs themselves be motivating. But I think the unique feature of Hume's view that allows it to succeed here is that moral beliefs sentiments, rather than the other way around. Conventional depend on motivating
cognitivist and so, motive), open theories in order treat to have argue the presence internalism that of moral beliefs connection are identical the as (a necessary the moral beliefs But psychologically between to motives sentiment judgment ?a move primary; and only is essen

they must to non-Humeans

about

motivation.

if having

(motive)

tial to sincere moral judging (to the formation of amoral judgment) on Hume's view, with belief following sentiment contingently, then Hume's theory can be internalist and cognitivist. The resulting belief in this process qualifies as amoral judgment only if the believer has experienced the prior sentiment. So, while it is true that one may have amoral sentiment without the belief/judgment (say, if one's process of judgment formation is interrupted), a belief about morality only counts as amoral judgment if it
is based 4y Springer on the proper experienced sentiment. In other words, the concept of a moral

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370

363

judgment is connected to the concept of amoral sentiment, even though the judgment the process of itself is contingently connected to the sentiment itself. Consequently,
moral judgment formation necessarily involves a sentiment, which serves as a motive.

This

interpretation implies that voicing moral judgments that others make, without the sentiments oneself, does not qualify as making a moral judgment experiencing oneself. When a person knows the difference between virtue and vice because she the requisite has acquired that knowledge from others, but she has never experienced sentiments herself, she has not acquired that information by the process I am describ is not internal to that person. The moral judgment must be a product of ing.Morality a genuine and appropriate affective state on the part of the judge, and so motivation
is essential to moral evaluation.

There is a powerful objection to this interpretation, however, and answering it is to a judgment, then if a sentiment is causally connected crucial to this discussion:
the two are separable, be necessarily and separate existences cannot be necessarily connected in

Hume's
ments

theory
cannot

(T 2.3.3.5; SBN 415). If moral

connected,

beliefs

(judgments)
is not essentially

and moral
part

senti

then motivation

of moral

judgment, Hume for identifying

for thinking perceptions in this

and Hume
that Hume

in could not be an internalist. There is, however, precedence a psychological state by its causal origin?that is, there is ground
does see certain as one perceptions perception's insofar as necessarily to other connected to another is connection causal

sense:

are necessar part of a complex by which a third perception is defined, the perceptions sort of necessity we find with definitions based on practice ily connected. This is the
and empirical considerations.

Take writing:

the indirect passions. Hume

begins his discussion

of pride and humility

by

'tis The passions of pride and humility being simple and uniform impressions, we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, impossible or indeed of any of the passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a description
of them, by pride an enumeration and humility, are of such circumstances, use, and the as attend impressions them: But they as these words, of general represent

the most common of any, every one, of himself, will be able to form a just idea of them, without any danger of mistake. For which reason, not to lose time upon I shall immediately enter upon the examination of these passions preliminaries, SBN 277). (T 2.1.2.1;
Then namely, Hume the self. analyzes "When and humility, pride not the self enters saying into the that they have the there same is no consideration, object, room

either for pride or humility" (T 2.1.2.2; SBN 277). Further, he remarks that it is impos sible that a person can at the same time be both proud and humble, and notes that we must therefore, make a distinction between the object and the cause of a passion:
Pride and humility, being once rais'd, immediately turn our attention to ourself,

and regard that as their ultimate and final object; but there is something far ther requisite in order to raise them: Something, which is peculiar to one of the same degree. The first idea, that is passions, and produces not both in the very
presented the passion, to the mind, connected is that with of the cause that it; and productive when passion, or principle. excited, This turns our excites view

to another idea, which is that of self. Here then is a passion plac'd betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produc'd by it.The first idea,
^ Springer

364 the cause, the second

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370 the object of the passion (T 2.1.2.4;

therefore, represents SBN 278).

He makes a finer distinction within the cause between the quality "which operates" and the subject "on which it is place'd" and offers the example of a man's beautiful
house:

The quality
or contrivance. merical.

is the beauty, and the subject is the house, consider'd

Both these parts merely pride or are essential, as such, vanity; nor unless and the is the distinction plac'd strongest upon

as his property
vain and chi

consider'd Beauty, to us, never any produces

related something with relation alone,

out beauty, or something (T 2.1.2.6; SBN 279).

else in its place, has as little influence on that passion

So, Hume claims that both the quality and subject are essential to the production of pride, because without them we would not feel the passion. He ends the paragraph
by writing: "Since, therefore, these two particulars and infix are easily separated an exact and there is a

necessity
them

for their conjunction,

parts of the

in order to produce
cause;

the passion, we ought to consider

idea of this dis

as component their

in our minds

tinction". Here, we find the view that while

be separated, conjunction is necessary

the ideas of beauty and of my house could

to the production of pride in this instance.

For Hume, all of the indirect passions are produced by double relations of impres sions and ideas, and the passions are distinguished from each other, not by how they feel, but by the impressions and ideas that enter into the production of each. This means that the feeling we identify as pride must be caused by a quality that pleases, connected to an object that is related to the self, all of which produce a separate plea sure at the contemplation. Humility has the same object, but with different qualities and objects composing its causes, all producing an impression of displeasure. Love is analogous to pride and hatred to humility, but with another person as the object. My point is not to detail Hume's account of the indirect passions, but to show that Hume identifies our passions based on their causal origin and attributes a kind of necessity to the causes in light of the effects. This is not to say that the effect had to
be this effect when these causes were present, but rather, that, given this effect, we

identify it as we do because it came about in the way it did. A particular instance of pride is not pride because of the distinctive feel of its pleasure, but because it is caused by a pleasing quality attributed to an object related to oneself. It's possible that Imay not feel pride when I think of my child's colorful paintings, but if I do feel some kind of pleasure when I think of them as painted by my child, then that impression is one we identify as pride. I am not the first to point out this necessary relation between in his well-known 1976 article, "Hume's Cognitive pride and its causes; Davidson of Pride", discussed its implications and the possible criticisms made of Hume Theory in light of it.17 The point I want to apply to the discussion of moral belief is this. It's possible that I may not have a belief (a judgment) following upon a sentiment of
Davidson writes,

... standard The is that the relation between belief that argument [against Hume] [my belief an object has a pleasing to me] and pride cannot be causal because and is related quality are contingent, causal relations but the relation between belief and pride is necessary. At for he surely held that causal relations are least, it is said, this may be argued against Hume, The historical is too large for us now; I do not myself think it can be contingent. argument ... But whatever cleared we decide about Hume, there is not a good argu up definitively to show that causal relations ment rule out necessary to my dictionary, connections. According <?) Spriiij ger

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370 moral

365

approval (and so the connection between the sentiment and the judgment is contingent in that sense); but if I do have a belief (namely, an idea of virtue or vice of a character) that was caused by an impression of moral approval, then that belief is a moral judgment. Moral beliefs (judgments) are essentially connected to moral sentiments in the same sense that the indirect passions are essentially connected to
the complex So, despite of impressions that the moral and ideas that cause them. is the moral motive when we are moti sentiment, which

vated by considerations of morality, is detachable from the moral belief, this analysis addresses The Metaethical Problem in Hume. While one might be motivated by a moral sentiment without having the belief, moral belief will never occur absent the sentiment, since its identity as a moral belief is dependent on the senti motivating
ment's presence as its cause. The consequence is that we do not have moral beliefs that

result from moral evaluation without moral motivation. My allegation is not that the belief motivates, but that the sentiment, which is essential to the belief, provides the
motivation. This interpretation accounts for Hume's moral internalism (that moti

vation is a necessary motivation (in which

there are Humean

part of making a moral beliefs without passions

beliefs, without

judgment) and for Hume's model of do not motivate), while allowing that

moral

inconsistency.

I realize that this discussion raises questions about whether Hume must be commit ted to a conceptual connection between amoral judgment and amotivating sentiment, or whether a connection of natural necessity between the two will do. That is, perhaps he only need say the following. Human nature being what it is,we never judge mor sentiment. This suggestion supposes, however, ally without the distinctive motivating that we can identify moral judgments (or instances of moral judging) apart from the
motivating sentiments that cause them. Doing human so at least seems problematic, one unless

moral
us

judgments
upon

and moral
which

sentiments
that

somehow

feel a specific way to us that allows

never experience without

a basis

to conclude

beings

the other. This issue also raises a large question about the status of the thesis of moral as an a priori claim or as one internalism itself and whether it is to be understood derived from experience. While I cannot explore that question here, it surely is the
case that if Hume can countenance an a priori version of internalism, he would have

no problem with
that way.

an a posteriori

form, if itmakes

sense to understand

the thesis in

My ments

argument has been so far that, on Hume's view, it is possible that moral judg are beliefs, and they are defined in terms of their causal origin in motivating
If it turns out that Hume is a moral cognitivist, at least one question lin

sentiments.

is a virtue gers: what are moral judgments about? What do they represent? Hume theorist of a sort, and virtue ethics is concerned with the traits we identify as virtues and those we identify as vices, contending that the morally best people act out of those
traits, which are traits character dispositions are only moral or motives. virtues Whereas when Aristotle's virtue ethics allows that Hume acquired purposefully by practice,

includ is happy to allow that features of a person possessed naturally or biologically, identification of the natural talents, are moral virtues. This follows from Hume's ing virtues and vices by the approbation and disapprobation, respectively, of a normal
spectator who has taken up a general point of view, and who would admire many

17 continued Footnote is a white snowblink from a snow surface. p755).

on the underside of clouds caused by the reflection of light luminosity This is a necessary truth, though a truth about a causal relation (1976, <? Springer

366 natural

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370

abilities. So, the possible moral beliefs in a virtue ethics like Hume's are the following: (1) belief that some set of actions habitually performed are indicative of a particular trait (e.g., knowing what a particular trait like kindness or malice involves); (2) belief that a particular trait is a virtue or a vice (e.g., believing that kindness is a virtue and malice is a vice); (3) belief that another person is virtuous or vicious; in which I lack (4) belief that I am virtuous or vicious (e.g., under the circumstances kindness, I believe that I lack a virtue, something that I ought to have). I want to say that the first has nothing distinctively moral about it, although there is a sense in which for one typical version of cognitive moral naturalism, there is
nothing distinctively moral about any claims: on reductionist views, moral claims can

be reduced to claims about the natural world. But there is a point to distinguishing the beliefs in (1) from those in (2) through (4). If there are such things as beliefs about
what traits are virtues or vices or beliefs about whether my character has virtues or

vices, on Hume's theory, they would originate somehow with moral sentiments in a beliefs of the sort in (1) would not. For beliefs about what actions are typical way
manifestations of a trait like, say, benevolence, or perfect pitch in music, are matter

of-fact beliefs arrived at by experience of behavior and the way we use words. So, beliefs of the sort in (1) are not moral beliefs at all in this discussion. The sorts of beliefs we find in categories (2)~(4) are surely moral beliefs, and when acquired by feelings of approval or disapproval, are also moral judgments. There is some reason to doubt, however, that the sentiments upon which the judgments in (2) and (3) depend are motivating, although they may appear to motivate because they are often associated with motivating sentiments. If I think that generosity is a virtue I have amotive to behave generously if I also judge that / lack generosity (category 2), (category 4). If I already have a developed disposition for generosity, then my acting ismotivated by my own virtue. Likewise, if I judge that a local politician is generously a spiteful person (category 3), I do so in light of my disapproval of steady dispositions of his character, but I only have a motive to change myself when I disapprove of my to help this politician's victims, sharing his dispositions (category 4). Any motivation in light of my believing that he is spiteful, ismotivated by other traits of mine, such as benevolence, rather than directly by my disapproval of him. In other words, I am arguing that it is only in the case of making judgments about myself (4), when my
moral sense is turned inward and I experience disapprobation of my own character,

do I have moral judgments necessarily connected to motivation. This is all and only what internalism requires: when I judge that / ought to do something, I necessarily have a motive to do the thing I think I ought to do. My argument has the implication that whether a Humean moral sentiment is a motive or not depends on its object. When I am the object of my disapprobation, I have a motive to change my behavior; if someone else is the object of that feeling,
I may have occasion to help the victims of that person's actions out of concern for

is not motivation them, but such motivation itself, but through virtue. by morality of an object is cognitive, and so this view makes moral motivation Conceptualization dependent on the cognitive features of feeling, which seems prima facie inconsistent with Hume's But this ismistaken: it is not the motivation here theory of motivation. that is so dependent; rather it is the classification of the motive as moral motivation that depends on the object. My motivation to change my character and my motivation to help the victims of unfair discrimination are both prompted by passions of a sort, and their cognitive features have no bearing on the fact that they are motives. But
the one is moral motivation in the sense relevant to internalism (motivation by the 4y Springer

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370 judging that I ought to be a certain way), and the other is not, because
the passions. As we have seen, Hume classifies passions according

367 of the objects of

objects, but

to their

their motivating force seems attributable to some other feature, like their proximity and pain. (He never makes this explicit.) The four indirect passions?pride, pleasure
humility, and love, and hatred?he maintains are not motives. Other direct passions, direct

to

in that they proceed

Envy benevolence

immediately
are

upon the feelings of pleasure

But in order to make

and pain, are motives.

any distinctions among

examples.

passions What
vicious,

at all, he must do the beliefs

or that I have

rely on their objects. that a trait is virtuous

virtues or vices represent,

or vicious,
if the

that a person
ideas of virtue

is virtuous
and vice

or
are

traced to feelings rather than to sensations? I have argued that ideas of virtue and vice are not Humean fictions, created in our imaginations and imposed on the world; so they must represent something in the world. Hume makes it clear that what we approve from the general point of view, the point of view we assume inmoral judg ment, are qualities useful and agreeable to the self and to others (T 3.3.1.30; SBN are factual matters understood in the 590-591). Now if usefulness and agreeableness same way inwhich we learn other facts about the world, then moral sentiment would have no special role to play in our coming to our ideas of these qualities. In that case, there would be no reason to think that moral sentiments have any role to play in our the useful and coming to the ideas that represent the useful and agreeable. However, agreeable qualities about which Hume writes when he writes of the virtues and vices are those that fit this description because they are approved by us from the general or moral point of view through sympathy. This makes such judgments of usefulness
and from agreeableness a personal normative or self-interested in the way perspective that judgments are not. The of way the useful to come or agreeable to an accurate

judgment of what qualities are useful or agreeable to others is to sympathize with those affected by such qualities and to do so without regard to one's own personal interest or bias, and this is to create the conditions we regard as definitive of moral in order to understand what is normatively useful and agreeable judgment. Likewise, to myself (i.e., what I ought to find so), I describe what I approve when I assume a general perspective on myself. Itmakes sense in this way to see the ideas of virtue as depicting the useful and agreeable Hume identifies as the classes under which indi vidual virtues fall. Likewise, ideas of vice represent to us those classes of the useless under which the individual vices fall. This understanding and disagreeable of Hume in which the moral is depicted in terms of the is consistent with moral naturalism,
natural, and still preserves the crucial motivating force of morality by sentiment.18

18 case against my arguments here. What do I say about the following Michael has pressed Ridge someone at one time experienced the disapproving sentiments of her own behavior and so who a moral to retain and claims about herself, but them later loses the motivation, belief acquired of myself, then I have a hard time accepting the belief? the claim that if I no longer disapprove of disapproval to reform my behavior. When I still believe the sentiment that I ought fades, then seem hollow and insincere. of my character of belief So about the moral deficiencies expressions so goes answer the a straightforward to this question is this: If the motivation fades completely, belief. one. We do, it seems, inHume and complicated is an interesting I think the issue of belief retention the beliefs are no that caused retain beliefs about all sorts of things in the world after the impressions these beliefs are actually memories?faded ideas, which are longer present. But we might ask whether we have innumerable beliefs from the original more vivacious beliefs. From one perspective, different ^ Springer

368 5 The of this interpretation

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370 importance

I have dealt with the logic of the view I find inHume,

combination tion. But what of moral reasons cognitivism, are there moral for thinking internalism, Hume

arguing that it allows a consistent

and Hume's cared to countenance of motiva theory moral beliefs

in the first place?19 Hume's is a theory that depicts the practical force of morality as its most salient feature. If the motivating quality of morality were accounted for by our experience of the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, then for what reason would Hume be interested in accounting for moral beliefs that arise upon these sentiments? What role, if any, do they play in other aspects of his metaethics? I think there is reason to believe that Hume's view of practical reasoning requires the existence of moral beliefs. Since it isHume's notion that reason, technically speak states of mind are true ing, is the discovery of truth and falsity, and only representative or false, reason, as such, applies to and deals only with beliefs. Hume is standardly interpreted as an instrumentalist about practical reasoning, that is, as holding that
practical reasoning concerns the means to our ends, but not the ends themselves. The

following schema is supposedly representative of the belief/desire model within which Humean practical reasoning takes place: I desire x; doing y is ameans to x\ therefore, I desire to do y. But, first, the conclusion simply does not follow; and second, this
schema does not represent a reasoning process, but a causal one. In normal individu

als, if they desire x, and believe y is ameans to x, they will desire y. The only reasoning represented here is the matter-of-fact (or inductive) reasoning that one uses to figure out the means to what one wants. Thus, that reasoning culminates in concluding that doing the thing in question will yield the end, but my desires for certain ends are not
part of the reasoning and are not subjects of evaluation. Such an approach leaves

Hume open to the question in what sense there is any practical reasoning going on here at all. If I am left with no directives for action, but only the information that doing y is ameans to achieving x, without any assessment of whether I ought to pursue x in the first place, I seem to have reached no practical conclusion. But if Hume's theory allows that there are moral beliefs, then those beliefs can
serve as premises in an argument to a conclusion about what I ought to do, morally

speaking. In that case, he does have a theory of practical reasoning in the traditional sense, the sense in which the conclusion of such an inference yields a directive. If I believe that I ought to be a kind person, or that I ought to be like someone I admire morally, I can reason about what sorts of behavior a kind person or the person I admire
Footnote 18 continued over a lifetime of which we are not aware in a From another perspective, acquired given moment. one might of belief as a forceful and vivacious argue that it is not clear, given Hume's description idea related to a present that we believe all of these ideas all of the time. It might make impression, sense to say that we are disposed better to believe them and that when the proper stimulus brings them to mind, such as someone I believe, then I do believe them (see also Garrett asking whether is that Hume

beliefs in his theory in the way that a simply does not need moral internalist like Smith does. Smith has moral to sentiment belief as precedent to give a point and necessary to moral as primary, Hume has sentiment and his theory argument. a mechanism we regulate our sentiments describes standards, namely, by whereby by intersubjective our taking up a general or shared point of view from which we these feelings. Presumably, experience Hume could argue that certain sentiments are proper and improper in the way that certain beliefs are in moral theories and achieve in the way of moral all that he needs justified or unjustified cognitivist and However, "objectivity". in his theory. belief ?} Springer I explain here why I think Hume does have a need and a place for moral

1997, pp 208-215). 9 One objection moral objectivist

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370

369

in certain situations and conclude that I ought to behave in those might undertake under the proper circumstances. ways (Of course, I would only do this if I were not a naturally kind person, since a naturally kind person would simply act from already of the virtue itself, rather than from a line of thinking that begins with disapprobation myself for lacking certain moral features.) I cannot here offer a thorough defense of this interpretation of Hume on practical reasoning.20 I only want to state that there are good reasons internal to Hume's theory for taking seriously the view that moral beliefs arise from sentiments. That there are moral beliefs is not a fifth wheel in his
theory.

the expressivist view, claiming their critics who have developed Contemporary from Hume, will suggest that moral judgments can be sentiments and inspiration nonetheless function in all the ways we need for the purposes of moral argumenta tion and moral inter-subjectivity, if not for moral objectivity.21 They contend that we can have disagreements of feeling just as we have disagreements of belief. On their
view, the expression of feelings can be a form of persuasion. Thus, Hume need not

be committed to the existence of moral beliefs in order to account for the function of moral considerations in argument. I think, however, that this treatment of mental states is simply not open toHume. Since he is doing an empiricist philosophy of mind, he has one of two ways in which to distinguish mental states from each other: on the basis of their phenomenal feeling, or on the grounds of their functions. Impressions, ideas, and beliefs have different degrees of force and vivacity, for sure, but impressions of sensation and impressions of reflexion need not differ in this way. The difference between ideas and beliefs, on the one hand, and impressions of sensation and reflex
ion, on the impressions in arguments one. and is a functional Ideas other, are not, and of reflexion impressions beliefs are are motivating representative in a way states; that the

others are not. Beliefs

because

fall under
of their

the purview

of reason, and can be logically related

content. Maintaining the functional

representational

in expressivism, distinction between beliefs and sentiments, which is undermined is crucial to Hume's philosophy of mind. I have argued that Hume's theory has it that the sentiment of self-disapproba to change my behavior, and it produces inme a cognitive judgment tion is a motive to the motive, but the concept of myself. The judgment is contingently connected of moral judging is conceptually connected to the idea of having a certain affective state, which is also motive to behave according to the judgment. In other words, even though Imight have the belief that I ought to reform my behavior, based on causal
factors other than my feeling of disapprobation, we cannot identify my acquisition of

that belief as moral judging. If others tell me often enough that I need to reform, I may believe them, but whether I have made a judgment myself depends on whether I come to feel the sentiment of disapproval that Hume loosely calls "self-hatred". on this interpretation of Hume, moral judgments of myself (which Consequently,
are cognitive) are necessarily causally preceded by the proper sentiment?namely,

motivation is inherent in judging morally that I ought moral disapprobation?since of to be better than I am (internalism). This account preserves the independence
belief-states other direct or and desire passion-states on no and relies passions) framework. Thus, Hume's (which, necessary theory for Hume, connections of motivation are that and joy, hunger, sense in only make is also intact. fear,

a rationalistic

20 See Radcliffe 21 See Blackburn

(1997). (1993a, b). ?) Springer

370

Synthese (2006) 152:353-370

This

Wake at the Hester Seminar on Hume's Naturalism, paper was presented 2005. I thank an excellent audience, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, April especially I also thank an audience Michael for many helpful comments. Ridge, Louis Loeb, and Alex Rosenberg, at the 32nd International Hume of Toronto, Conference, July 2005, for useful discussion University on a slightly different to Rick McCarty for talking with me over version of this paper. I am grateful Acknowledgements Forest University, the course of at least six years about the ideas in this paper.

References S. (Ed.) University S. (Ed.) How to be a moral anti-realist. in Quasi-Realism. New York:

Blackburn, Oxford Blackburn,

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