Medieval

Theories of Causal Powers

Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham JT Paasch
ABSTRACT: Powers and dispositions seem to be perfectly real features of things. For instance, wine glasses are fragile, sugar is soluble, dry twigs are combustible, and so on. But what exactly are powers and dispositions like fragility or solubility? Are they things? Do they have parts and take up space? Where are they located? And how are they connected to the other features of their possessors? In this paper, I examine the scholastic debate about this, and I find three separate theories. First, Aquinas proposes a two-category theory: there are categorical entities, and there are dispositional entities in the world. Second, Henry of Ghent proposes a two-aspects theory: there are just categorical entities in the world, but they can have both a categorical aspect and a dispositional aspect. Third, Duns Scotus and William Ockham propose a one-category theory: there are just categorical entities and no dispositional entities in the world, and powers or dispositions are nothing more than the categorical parts and materials of things that cause the various effects we see around us.

The subject of this paper is powers and dispositions. Powers and dispositions are roughly just the capabilities and capacities that things have to act in certain ways. For instance, I am capable of doing a number of different things. I can raise my arm, I can stand up and sit down, I can think through complex issues, I can make choices, and so on. These, we might say, are all things that are within my power; they are all things I have the power to do. Furthermore, powers or dispositions are not just for doing things. Most objects can have various things done to them as well. For instance, wine glasses can be shattered, sugar can be dissolved, my arm can be raised (by me, or by a pulley system), and so on. The capacities to undergo such things are, in one way or another, capacities to behave in certain ways, so they count as powers or dispositions too.1

1 Some might want to say that the term powers most naturally refers to abilities to do

things, whereas the term dispositions most naturally refers to capacities to undergo things, but I will not draw any sharp distinction between powers and dispositions here. Instead, I will use the terms interchangeably.

But what exactly are powers or dispositions? Are they discrete physical items, for instance? Supposing we had the right laboratory equipment, could we (at least in principle) cut a power off its possessor and study it under a microscope? Do powers take up space, or have parts? On the other hand, maybe these are the wrong sorts of questions, for maybe powers are not physical items at all. Well, if that is so, then what are they, precisely? Analytic philosophers have spent a good deal of time discussing these matters, and there is a substantial body of literature on the subject. But analytic philosophers are not the only ones who debated these issues. The scholastics did too. Anyone who has spent even a small amount of time reading scholastic philosophy will recognize a word that crops up quite often in the texts: namely potentia, the scholastic term for power. It shows up in scholastic discussions about change, material substances, mind and cognition, and even theology. Yet despite this pervasiveness, there was no standard medieval view about powers. On the contrary, there were a number of competing theories about the nature of powers, much as there is today. So, what were some of those theories? That is the question I want to address in this paper. As we shall see, there were (at least) three basic positions the scholastics could take. One was reductive: there is no need to postulate special entities called powers, for powers can be reduced to or explained in terms of other, more readily understandable things. Another option was non-reductive: powers cannot be reduced to or explained in terms of other things; on the contrary, they are unique sorts of entities all to their own. And there was a third option that tried to take the middle road. Preliminary Questions: Powers and Their Exercise One of the more distinctive marks of powers is that they only get exercised sometimes. I may have the ability to raise my arm, but I am not always doing so. I do not walk around with my arm in the air, nor do I sleep with my arm in the air, for instance. I only raise my arm sometimes. To say that I have the power to raise my arm does not describe some static state of me and the position of my arm. Rather, it seems to say something about the possibility of me raising my arm. Of course, it is possible that my arm be raised independently of my power to raise my own arm. You could lift my arm up, my arm could be raised by a pulley system, and so on. But that would not be the direct result of my power to raise my arm. It would be the result of your power to lift things (like my arm), the pulley systems power to hoist things up, etc. Still, you are not constantly lifting things (like my arm), and pulley systems are not constantly hoisting things up either. Again then, to say that you have the power to lift things seems to say something about the

possibility of you lifting things, and the same goes for a pulley systems power to hoist things up. To say that something has a power means it has a capability that could get exercised maybe not now, but perhaps at some other time. This makes powers somewhat perplexing. For one thing, if powers are only exercised sometimes, then what explains how and when that happens? Why does any given power get exercised at this time rather than that time? And how does it get exercised anyway? What, so to speak, draws that activity out of it?2 For some powers, the answer seems to be our own will power, for some powers only get exercised when we choose to exercise them. My ability to raise my arm, stand up or sit down, and so on would all be powers that we might class as voluntary powers. But not all powers and dispositions are voluntary. There are plenty of other powers that seem to get exercised involuntarily. Much of the behavior that we observe between, say, particles or cells might be chalked up as involuntary powers and dispositions. So what explains when and why they get exercised? One relevant factor seems to be the circumstances that are present when such powers do get exercised, for many such powers seem to get exercised only in certain circumstances. For instance, wine glasses tend to shatter not at random, but rather when you drop them. So, we might think, part of what explains how and why powers get exercised is the presence of the right set of circumstances. And we might even try to define powers by appealing to those circumstances: to say that something has a power or disposition for X means that X will occur when it is in circumstances Y.3 However, it is notoriously difficult to identify the right set of circumstances in a precise way. One problem is that there are often too many alternative sets of relevant circumstances. Wine glasses tend to shatter when I drop them, but they also tend to shatter when I swing baseball bats at them, when I drive over them with big trucks, and so on. The full list of circumstances for shattering wine glasses is thus a very long one: wine glasses shatter if they are dropped, or if they are struck by fast moving baseball bats, and so on and so forth. In addition, there are also circumstances that block powers. For instance, wine glasses tend to shatter when I drop them, but not if the floors are covered with pillows, if I am in space where there is no gravity, and so forth. The list of relevant circumstances now becomes even longer and more

2 And if there is something, call it X, that draws that activity out, then wouldnt we have to

say X has a special power all its own namely, the power to excite other powers into action? But then what would draw Xs power into action? Something else? We could go on ad infinitum here. 3 And we might be tempted to think that, if properly modified, this could apply to voluntary powers too, for surely even voluntary powers require amenable circumstances before they can be exercised. After all, no matter how badly I might want to raise my arm, I could not do so if it were tied down.

complicated: wine glasses shatter if they are dropped (but not if they are dropped on pillows, if there is no gravity, etc.), and so on and so forth. A complete and precise list of circumstances just seems impossible to formulate. Another perplexing factor is this: if powers are only exercised sometimes, what about the times when they are not being exercised? What is their status then? Are they even there? If so, where, exactly? Consider my ability to raise my arm. I am not at this moment raising my arm, so that is a power I am not currently exercising. But where then is this power of mine? Is it in my arm? Somewhere else? And what kind of thing is it, anyway? Moreover, what if I never raised my arm? Suppose I live my entire life without ever raising my arm perhaps it just never occurs to me. Would it make sense to say I have the power to raise my arm, even though I never exercise that power? Alternatively, suppose I was born into captivity and my arm is bound to my side so that I cannot raise it, even if I want to. Would I have the power to raise my arm then? What exactly is the connection between a power and its exercise? There does seem to be a strong conceptual link here, for we often conceptualize powers in terms of their exercise. After all, we do not say that Jane has power without specifying (or at least implying) what Jane has the power for. And indeed, just try to imagine a power that is not a power for something or other. It seems impossible (or at least I cant do it). Whenever we think of a power, we also seem to think (however vaguely) of its exercise as well, and that suggests that the one is somehow intimately connected to the other. Further, powers seem to be defined by their exercise. For what would a power be if not a power for something X or Y? How could we define my power to raise my arm without saying it is for raising my arm? After all, if it werent for raising my arm, it would be a power for something else (and if it werent for any activity whatsoever, it wouldnt be a power in the first place). Accordingly, we often differentiate and categorize powers by their exercise too. What is the difference between a power for X and a power for Y? Well, the one is a power for X and the other is a power for Y. So, it seems, there is a very strong conceptual link between powers and their exercise. But that is just a conceptual link something that happens in our minds. Does it apply outside our minds too? Do powers really have such an intimate connection with their exercise? Consider a power that is not being exercised: my power to raise my arm, for instance. How could that be connected to the activity of raising my arm when there is no arm raising going on? Surely a connection with a non-existent activity is no real connection at all. Is the connection thus supposed to be with some future arm raising, or perhaps with someone else raising their arm in another world?

Perhaps the connection isnt one between particular powers and events, but rather one between types of powers and events, where such-and-such types of powers are connected with such-and-such types of events. But then what are types? Are they just groupings we make in our minds, or are they real universals? (Ones theory of universals does not have to make a difference here, but it certainly could.4) More Preliminary Questions: Powers and Their Bases Another important question has to do with why things have the powers that they have. Why do I have certain kinds of capacities, whereas a wine glass has a fairly different set of capacities? Is there any sort of reason or explanation for the fact that certain kinds of things have certain kinds of powers but not others? One possibility is to say that a things powers are based on the parts and materials it is made from. For instance, the fact that a wine glass can shatter is based on the fact that it is made from glass. The glass it is made from is, in a certain sense, the basis or source of its fragility. After all, if it were made from steel, it would not be so fragile. This also seems to apply more generally: powers can be based not just on the physical parts and materials a thing is made from, but on certain other kinds of constituents as well. A favorite example of the scholastics is heat, for heat not only makes things hot, it gives them the ability to heat other things too. If you add enough heat to a branding iron, a pot of water, or any other heatable thing, it will then be able to burn and scald other things as well. Nevertheless, to say that a things powers are based on its parts and constituents raises more questions than it perhaps answers. For if powers are always based on certain parts, materials, and other constituents, then what exactly is the difference between powers and their bases? If certain kinds of powers always come along with certain kinds of parts or materials, then what is the difference between having that particular kind of power and having that particular kind of part or constituent? Why not assume that powers just are those parts or constituents? One might respond that, however tempting it may be to think that powers just are their bases, this cannot be so, for if any two things are identical, anything true of the one must also be true of the other, and that is not the case for powers and their bases. Wine glasses only shatter some of the time (like when I drop them), but they are not made of glass only some

4 One very straightforward way to make sense of the connection between powers and their

exercise would be to claim that the connection holds between universals. Unfortunately, this strategy is not available to most scholastics, because most do not believe in extramental universals (except, perhaps, in the Godhead). Most scholastics are more like trope theorists.

of the time. Rather, they are made of glass for the duration of their life spans. Additionally, there are other things that are fragile but not made of glass (a stack of cards, a spider web, etc.). So, one might think, surely powers cannot be the same as the parts and materials they are based on. Glass may be fragile, but fragility is not glass. However, if powers are something over and above their bases, then that leaves us with the original question: what exactly are they? What is the fragility of a wine glass, if not the glass itself? One of the advantages of pointing to the parts and materials that things are made from is that we understand parts and materials better than powers (or at least we think we do). Parts and materials have dimensions, take up space, and often have mass. Powers, on the other hand, are much more mysterious, especially when they are not being exercised. We can point to a piece of glass, but can we point to its fragility? Some philosophers have even used this insight to draw a distinction: powers and dispositions are of course dispositional in nature, but the parts and materials things are made from are not, so they are categorical in nature. On the other hand, is it really true that bases are as un-power-like as I am making it seem? Are categorical parts and materials really so non- dispositional in nature? Consider a wine glasss fragility again. That fragility is allegedly based on the glass it is made from, but what is it about glass that makes it a suitable basis for fragility? Well, its molecular structure seems like a good candidate: glass has an unstable molecular structure, and that explains why glass is fragile. But what does it mean to be unstable? Isnt it just a tendency or capacity to come apart under certain conditions? Surely that is just as much a disposition as fragility is. And we could say something similar about mass, the spin of particles, electrical charge, and so on: these basic physical properties seem to be dispositional in nature too. If that is so, then is there really such a strong distinction between powers and their bases, between categorical and dispositional entities? Maybe powers and their bases are one and the same thing after all. Or maybe the parts and materials that things are made from can have aspects of both: maybe they can have a categorical aspect, and a dispositional aspect. The Context of the Scholastic Discussion When writing about medieval theories of X, one of the first tasks is to figure out where it is in their writings that the scholastics talk about X. This is not entirely straightforward, for as is well known, the scholastics worked with a debate-style format. University professors typically began their lectures with a yes/no question, such as is it permissible to lie? They would then offer a series of arguments for and against, and then they would

extrapolate their own answer to the question, which they of course would back up with more arguments to boot. Many of these yes/no questions, not to mention the arguments and solutions that were offered for them, became canonized to the point that, if you were a university professor in the 13th or 14th century, you would have been expected to discuss them, both in your lectures and your writings. Everything became so structured around these canonized yes/no questions that if you wanted to discuss some particular philosophical topic that interested you, you would have had to fit it in under one of the established questions. Part of what this means is that a host of philosophical discussions got filed under question headings that may not seem entirely relevant to the modern researcher. Worse, many of these discussions ended up getting couched in the questions terminology. So, although some particular discussion may really have been about a general philosophical topic X, it might very well have been phrased in terms of Y, because the question heading asked about Y. And again, it is not always obvious to the modern researcher that such discussions were really about X rather than Y. This may apply to the case at hand, at least to some extent. Where exactly in their writings do the scholastics discuss powers? I believe they did it under the heading of this question: is the soul the same as its powers? The nice thing here is that the question does actually mention powers (not all scholastic questions are so forthcoming). Nevertheless, it is not entirely obvious that the question is about the ontology of powers. The texts make it clear that, in the context of this particular question, we can think of the soul as the human mind, and its powers as our cognitive abilities. Given that, the question may seem equivalent to something like this: is the human mind anything more than its cognitive abilities? And that of course is a perfectly sensible question. We talk about the mind as if it were some sort of thing, some sort of invisible entity that sits inside our heads, in roughly the same spot as our brain. But is that really true? Or is the mind just our capability to perform certain cognitive functions? That would be one very straight forward way of reading the question. I think the question is indeed about that, but I do not think it is merely about that. I believe the scholastics meant their answers to this question to apply more generally to apply not just to the mind and its powers, but to anything and its powers. The question they were answering was not just is the mind the same as its powers? They were also answering the more general question: is a power the same as its basis? or is a power anything over and above its basis?5 To keep things focused, I will restrict my

5 It is not entirely unwarranted to discuss powers and dispositions in the context of

philosophy of mind. Gilbert Ryle said some rather influential things about dispositions in The Concept of Mind, as did David Armstrong in A Materialist Theory of Mind. And of course,

discussion to these more general questions about the ontology of powers, and I will avoid questions about the nature of the mind. Fascinating as that may be, it is a topic for another paper. Thomas Aquinas Throughout his career, Aquinas maintained that the mind cannot be identical to its powers. He discussed the issue in a number of places, and he offered a number of different arguments to support this view. A few of those arguments strike me as incomprehensible, and I admit that I cannot, for the life of me, seem to figure them out. Fortunately for me, Aquinas offered a few arguments that do make good sense, and they seem to boil down to the same basic point: I always have a mind (so long as I exist), but I am not always exercising my cognitive powers, so those powers must be different from my mind.6 This is, of course, a simple argument from identity (or rather, the lack thereof), and we could rephrase it as follows. If any A and B are identical, then anything true of the one must be true of the other. But since this is not the case with my mind and its powers, they must not be identical. As I discussed earlier, one might say the same thing about the fragility of wine

whether you think the mind is anything more than its powers could easily depend on your ontology of powers and dispositions. 6 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.77.1.resp.: Nam anima secundum suam essentiam est actus. Si ergo ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operationis principium, semper habens animam actu haberet opera vitae; sicut semper habens animam actu est vivum . . . Unde quod sit in potentia adhuc ad alium actum, hoc non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, inquantum est forma; sed secundum suam potentiam. Et sic ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus, ordinatus ad actum secundum. Invenitur autem habens animam non semper esse in actu operum vitae. Unde etiam in definitione animae dicitur quod est actus corporis potentia vitam habentis, quae tamen potentia non abiicit animam. Relinquitur ergo quod essentia animae non est eius potentia. Nihil enim est in potentia secundum actum, inquantum est actus. See also Summa Theologica, 1.54.3.resp.: Respondeo dicendum quod nec in Angelo nec in aliqua creatura, virtus vel potentia operativa est idem quod sua essentia. Quod sic patet. Cum enim potentia dicatur ad actum, oportet quod secundum diversitatem actuum sit diversitas potentiarum, propter quod dicitur quod proprius actus respondet propriae potentiae. In omni autem creato essentia differt a suo esse, et comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Actus autem ad quem comparatur potentia operativa, est operatio. In Angelo autem non est idem intelligere et esse, nec aliqua alia operatio aut in ipso aut in quocumque alio creato, est idem quod eius esse. Unde essentia Angeli non est eius potentia intellectiva, nec alicuius creati essentia est eius operativa potentia. And Summa Theologica, 1.79.1.resp.: necesse est dicere, secundum praemissa, quod intellectus sit aliqua potentia animae, et non ipsa animae essentia. Tunc enim solum immediatum principium operationis est ipsa essentia rei operantis, quando ipsa operatio est eius esse, sicut enim potentia se habet ad operationem ut ad suum actum, ita se habet essentia ad esse. In solo Deo autem idem est intelligere quod suum esse. Unde in solo Deo intellectus est eius essentia, in aliis autem creaturis intellectualibus intellectus est quaedam potentia intelligentis.

glasses: fragility just cannot be the same as the glass it is based on, for glasses shatter only sometimes (like when I drop them). We could take this argument even further. For we might recall the point that one of the characteristics of powers is that they can often be exercised only in certain circumstances like how wine glasses break not at random, but when they are dropped, struck by a fast moving baseball bat, and so on. We might then point out that each type of cognitive power is no different: each requires a different set of circumstances for its exercise too. For example, compare my power of sight with my ability to remember things I have already seen. So far as Aquinas is concerned, both of these are powers rooted in my mind: they are cognitive capacities in some sense or other. However, it would seem that while the former power can be exercised in one set of circumstances (I must have my eyes open, there must be sufficient light, and so forth), the latter power requires an entirely different set of circumstances (e.g., that what I saw before was adequately stored in memory, and so forth). Given that, we might then make the following inference: since each type of cognitive power requires a different set of circumstances for its exercise, it follows that each type of cognitive power must be distinct from every other type of cognitive power, and from the mind it is rooted in. Otherwise, I could not exercise one of my cognitive powers without exercising all of them at the same time (it would be like hooking all the lights in your house up to one light switch: you couldnt flip the switch without turning all the lights on at the same time). So, one might say, surely it follows that my mind, and each of its powers, must each be distinct one from the other.7 If we generalize these claims so that they apply to all powers, the following picture emerges: powers must be distinct from the things they are based on, for powers and their bases have different identity conditions. Again, wine glasses are always made of glass, but they are not always shattering, so glass and fragility cannot be one and the same thing. Whatever else we might want to say about fragility, considerations of identity push us to conclude that it must be a distinct thing over and above the glass it is

7 And Aquinas would certainly agree that the minds powers are different. Summa Theologiae,

1.77.3.resp.: Respondeo dicendum quod potentia, secundum illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad actum. Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex actu ad quem ordinatur, et per consequens oportet quod ratio potentiae diversificetur, ut diversificatur ratio actus. Ratio autem actus diversificatur secundum diversam rationem obiecti. See also the Disputed Questions on the Soul, 12.resp. (ed. Robb, 182): Deinde hoc apparet ex ipsa diversitate actionum animae, quae sunt genere diversae, et non possunt reduci ad unum principium immediatum; cum quaedam earum sint actiones et quaedam passiones, et aliis huiusmodi differentiis differant, quae oportet attribui diversis principiis. Et ita, cum essentia animae sit unum principium, non potest esse immediatum principium omnium suarum actionum; sed oportet quod habeat plures et diversas potentias correspondentes diversitati suarum actionum. Potentia enim ad actum dicitur correlative, unde secundum diversitatem actionum oportet esse diversitatem potentiarum.

rooted in it must be a unique kind of entity all to its own that, in a manner of speaking, is attached to or at least hovers around the glass. What this suggests is that Aquinas has what we might call a two- category ontology: he believes not just in categorical entities like glass, flames, and heat; he also believes there is another type of entity in the world, namely powers and dispositions, which are distinct entities all to their own. Nevertheless, even if we grant that powers and dispositions are distinct things that belong in their own class, we still might wonder: what sorts of things are they? With regard to this question, Aquinas explains that every category has its potential versions and its actual versions: there are actual humans and potential humans; actual tans and potential tans; actual thoughts and potential thoughts; and so on.8 Powers, however, are really just the potential versions of their actualizations.9 And that means that if we want to figure out what kind of thing a power is, we only have to figure out what kind of thing its actualization is, because the power for it is just going to be the potential version of it. So what about mental powers my ability to think, for instance? According to Aquinas, thoughts are qualities of the mind.10 Consequently, my power to think must therefore just be the potential version of a thought. That is to say, my power to have a thought is really just a potential thought, and when I think that thought, it goes from being a potential thought to being an actual thought.11

8 Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Soul, 12.resp. (ed. Robb, 181): Quia unumquodque genus

dividitur per potentiam et actum. Unde potentia homo est in genere substantiae, et potentia album est in genere qualitatis. Summa Theologiae, 1.77.1.resp. (Marietti 1952, 1: 369b): Primo quia, cum potentia et actus dividant ens et quodlibet genus entis, oportet quod ad idem genus referatur potentia et actus. Et ideo, si actus non est in genere substantiae, potentia quae dicitur ad illum actum, non potest esse in genere substantiae. 9 Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Soul, 12.resp. (ed. Robb, 181): De potentia vero passiva manifestum est quod potentia passiva quae est ad actum substantialem, est in genere substantiae; et quae est ad actum accidentalem, est in genere accidentis per reductionem, sicut principium, et non sicut species completa. 10 In fact, Aquinas thinks all mental operations are accidents of some sort or other. Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum, 1.3.4.2.resp. (edited by R. P. Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929): 1: 116; Opera Omnia, edited by S. Frette and Paul Mare (Paris: Vives, 1873), 7: 63a)): effectus proprius et immediatus oportet quod proportionetur suae causae; unde oportet quod in omnibus illis, in quibus principium operationis proximum est de genere substantiae, quod operatio sua sit substantia; et hoc solum in Deo est: et ideo ipse solus est qui non agit per potentiam mediam differentem a sua substantia. In omnibus autem aliis operatio est accidens: et ideo oportet quod proximum principium operationis sit accidens, sicut videmus in corporibus quod forma substantialis ignis nullam operationem habet, nisi mediantibus qualitatibus activis et passivis, quae sunt quasi virtutes et potentiae ipsius. Similiter dico, quod ab anima, cum sit substantia, nulla operatio egreditur, nisi mediante potentia. 11 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1.77.1.ad.5: si accidens accipiatur secundum quod dividitur contra substantiam, sic nihil potest esse medium inter substantiam et accidens, quia dividuntur secundum affirmationem et negationem, scilicet secundum esse in subiecto et non esse in subiecto. Et hoc modo, cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet quod sit

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Now, to say that powers are qualities of the mind might suggest that they are properties or tropes that characterize the mind perhaps similar to the way that a pale skin color is one of the qualities that characterizes Socrates. And that, in turn, might suggest that the minds powers can be gained and lost, just like the color of Socrates skin. After all, Socrates skin color can change as would happen, say, if he went to the beach and got himself a nice tan. And if our cognitive powers are qualities that characterize our minds, surely they can change too. But Aquinas rejects this, insisting instead that although the minds powers are qualities of the mind, they cannot be gained and lost in the way that Socrates skin color can. On the contrary, cognitive powers are not the sorts of features that can come and go. Rather, they are permanently attached, so to speak, to the mind itself.12 Be that as it may, there is a deep problem here, for it is far from clear just what a potential thought or a potential anything is really supposed to be. If a power is really just a potential version of its actualization, what exactly does the potential version look like? Is it a ghostly version of the real thing? Where exactly is it located? Could we ever detect it with laboratory equipment? Is a potential thought some other thought that someone has in another world? Aquinas may feel that considerations of identity force him to postulate powers as a distinct class of entities all to their own, but the

accidens, et est in secunda specie qualitatis. See also the Disputed Questions on the Soul, 12.resp. (ed. Robb, 181): De potentia vero passiva manifestum est quod potentia passiva quae est ad actum substantialem, est in genere substantiae; et quae est ad actum accidentalem, est in genere accidentis per reductionem, sicut principium, et non sicut species complete . . . Manifestum est autem quod potentiae animae, sive sint activae sive passivae, non dicuntur directe per respectum ad aliquid substantiale, sed ad aliquid accidentale. Et similiter esse intelligens vel sentiens actu non est esse substantiale, sed accidentale, ad quod ordinatur intellectus et sensus. 12 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1.77.1.ad.5: Si vero accipiatur accidens secundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium, sic aliquid est medium inter substantiam et accidens. Quia ad substantiam pertinet quidquid est essentiale rei, non autem quidquid est extra essentiam, potest sic dici accidens, sed solum id quod non causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei. Proprium enim non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus speciei causatur, unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens sic dictum. Et hoc modo potentiae animae possunt dici mediae inter substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales. Cf. Aquinass Disputed Questions on the Soul, 12.resp. (ed. Robb, 181-182): Manifestum est ergo quod ipsa essentia animae non est principium immediatum suarum operationum, sed operatur mediantibus principiis accidentalibus; unde potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae, sed proprietates eius. Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum, 1.3.4.2.resp.: Hae autem potentiae fluunt ab essentia ipsius animae, quaedam ut perfectiones partium corporis, quarum operatio efficitur mediante corpore, ut sensus, imaginatio et hujusmodi; et quaedam ut existentes in ipsa anima, quarum operatio non indiget corpore, ut intellectus, voluntas et hujusmodi; et ideo dico, quod sunt accidentia: non quod sint communia accidentia, quae non fluunt ex principiis speciei, sed consequuntur principia individui; sed sicut propria accidentia, quae consequuntur speciem, originata ex principiis ipsius: simul tamen sunt de integritate ipsius animae, inquantum est totum potentiale, habens quamdam perfectionem potentiae, quae conficitur ex diversis viribus.

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downside is that this distinct class of entities remains completely mysterious. Henry of Ghent Henry of Ghent rejects Aquinass theory for the simple reason that it cannot be generalized. As Henry sees it, it just cannot be the case that every power or disposition is distinct from its basis, for if that were so, we would end up with an infinite regress. Suppose that a power or disposition were distinct from its basis. What would dispose the basis to be disposed in that way? A further power or disposition? And if that further power or disposition were also distinct, what would dispose the basis to it? Yet another power or disposition? We cannot keep saying that one disposition is explained by another disposition, for that would never explain anything. It would be like paying a bounced check with another bounced check: you would never actually pay anything. So, Henry concludes, there must be at least some powers and dispositions that are the same as their bases.13 Henry offers a number of different examples to buttress this point. For instance, consider the basic matter that makes up the universe. At the most fundamental level of decomposition, the basic matter of the universe is capable of being formed and organized into various other kinds of stuff. As we might put it today: under the right conditions, you can get amino acids and proteins, helium and hydrogen, and lots of other sorts of things out of the universes matter, so surely the basic matter of the universe is capable of being formed and organized into these various kinds of substances. Of course, the scholastics did not know about amino acids and proteins, helium and hydrogen, but they did think matter could be formed into other primitive kinds of stuff like fire, air, water, and dirt, so the general idea is still the same. And the salient point here is this: when it comes to the capacity of matter to be formed and organized into various kinds of substances that capacity is a disposition or power. Matter is disposed, we might say, to be formed and organized in certain ways under certain conditions, much like how a wine glass is disposed to shatter under a different set of conditions. Furthermore, one might think, surely that disposition must be based on other, more fundamental, characteristics of matter. Perhaps there are sub-

13 To pull just two quotations from Henrys Quodlibet 3.14 that run to this effect (Bad. I, f.

67rR): Si enim esset potentia illa alia re ab ipsa essentia, illa accidens esset in illa essentia quae eius esset receptiva, et hoc non nisi per potentiam passivam quae est ipsa essentia, vel esset abire in infinitum, ut dictum est; and (Bad. I, f. 66vQ): Similiter si aliquid sit natum agere ex se et secundum se, sed non sine adminiculo alterius, vel eius in quod agit, vel eius quo agit, non oportet quod aliud sit essentia eius, et aliud potentia qua agit. Et tamen actio non est ipsa substantia, nec oportet quod semper sit in sua actione. Exemplum de primo est in calore . . . Exemplum de secundo est in operibus animae intellectivae, ut iam patebit.

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atomic characteristics of matter that dispose it to being formed and organized in the various ways that it gets formed and organized, but whatever the case, surely there is something about the intrinsic make-up of matter that disposes it to being formed and organized in so many different ways. Even still, the question is whether or not the disposition to be formed in so many ways is distinct from the basis for it. Is the disposition a distinct entity in its own right, some sort of distinct thing that is somehow attached, so to speak, to matter? If Aquinass general theory were applied to this case, the answer would have to be yes: the disposition to be formed in so many ways must be distinct from the basis for it, and again, the reason would be that if they were the same, then anything true of the one would have to be true of the other, but that is not the case. After all, matter is always matter, and so for the duration of its lifespan it has the very sub-atomic characteristics that dispose it to be formed and organized in different ways (and that, presumably, is precisely what makes it the most fundamental kind of matter). Nevertheless, matter is not always being formed and organized in this way or that way, and so it would seem that the disposition to be formed in a variety of ways simply cannot be identical to the sub-atomic basis for it. But Henry would ask: if the disposition in question were a distinct thing in its own right some sort of external entity hovering about what would dispose matter to it? If it were truly distinct, and hence external to matter, then why should it hang around matter, perhaps in the way that electrons hang around protons and neutrons? What is it about matter that would attract it, so to speak? Wouldnt it have to be a further, perhaps more fundamental, disposition of matter? But then that disposition would be distinct too, so what would dispose the matter to it? Yet another, even more fundamental disposition?14 We cannot go on forever, says Henry, so we might as well just assume from the start that matters capability to be

14 One might think that Aquinass theory cannot be applied to this case (namely, to the most

basic kind of matter in the universe), for Aquinas explicitly claims that when it comes to this fundamental or basic sort of matter, its disposition to be formed into various kinds of substances is not distinct from its basis. As he puts it in ST 1.77.1.ad.2 (Marietti 1952, 1: 370a): Ad secundum dicendum quod actus ad quem est in potentia material prima, est substantialis forma. Et ideo potentia materiae non est aliud quam eius essentia. However, Aquinas only says this because he believes that, at the most fundamental level, matter is really just this disposition to be transformed into various kinds of substances. To use the old Thomistic tagline: for Aquinas matter is the pure or better mere potentiality to be formed and organized into various other kinds of substances. Consequently, Henrys argument still applies it just applies to things that have this matter-like disposition: for we could still ask, what makes them disposed in this matter-like way? Is it a further disposition? Again, Henry would say that we cannot go on ad infinitum.

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formed into other kinds of stuff is not some distinct thing over and above the basis for that capability.15 Another example Henry mentions concerns flames. Flames can of course heat other things, and according to most medieval accounts, this power or ability of flames is based on their heat: it is the heat in a flame that makes it capable of heating other things. But is a flames ability to heat other things distinct from its heat? If Aquinass general theory were applied here, the answer would again have to be yes: the ability to heat would have to be something distinct from the heat itself, for flames are always hot even if they are not always heating other things. But again Henry asks: if a flames ability to heat other things were genuinely distinct from the heat in the flame, if it were truly some external entity that hung around heat, then what would attract it to heat? A further power or disposition of heat? We cannot go on ad infinitum.16 Henry does not explicitly apply this line of argument to the powers of the mind, but he must have thought it so obvious that there was no need to spell it out. He clearly intended his reasoning to be taken as a refutation of Aquinass position.17 So, for instance, Henry could argue like this: if the minds capacity for a thought were a distinct thing attached, so to speak, to the mind itself (as Aquinas claims), then what would explain the minds capacity for that capacity? A further, perhaps more fundamental, capacity of the mind? But then what would explain the minds capacity for that further capacity? Yet another capacity of the mind? We cannot go on forever, so we might as well assume from the start that the minds capabilities are not distinct from whatever aspect of the mind they are based on or rooted in.

15 Henry of Ghent, Quod., 3.14 (Bad. I, f. 66vR-66rR): Potentia vero passiva primo et per se

invenitur in prima materia, in qua sua potentia passiva ita est pura quod est ipsa essentia materiae sub sola ratione respectus ad formam, qui nullum rem apponit, neque compositionem aliquam in re, quia si in aliqua re absoluta differret potentia ab essentia materiae, esset accidens et forma in materia, cuius proculdubio materia esset receptiva, et in potentia ad eam, et de illa potentia esset eadem quaestio. Et procederet in infinitum, nisi pura essentia materiae assumpto quodam respectu esset ipsa sua potentia passiva, non aliquod accidens eius. Aliter enim materia non esset potentia per se, sed per aliquid sui. 16 Henry, Quod., 3.14, (Bad. I, f. 66vP): Quia tamen aliqua natura creata sit ex sua essentia potentia calefaciendi, ibi non est aliud essentia ipsius caloris, quae est passibilis qualitas, et aliud ipsa potentia, immo ipsa essentia caloris est ipsa potentia calefaciendi in igne. Non aliquid additum ei naturalitur, aliter enim esset abire in infinitum, nisi esset stare in aliquo quo aliud agit quod in essentia sua est ipsa potentia. Quia si potentia non esset re essentia ipsa, esset re aliquid additum ei. Et de illa re esset quaestio eadem: utrum esset potentia qua aliud ageret. Quod si negaretur, quaestio illa procederet in infinitum, ut patet. 17 I should note that in this context (Quodlibet 3.14), Henry quotes extensively from Aquinass Disputed Questions on the Soul, article 12, but not from any of Aquinass other writings. In fact, Henrys quotations from this text by Aquinas are so lengthy and exact that I think we can assume Henry had a transcript of the text before him when he composed Quodlibet 3.14 or, at the very least, Henry must have memorized Aquinass text at some point prior to composing Quod., 3.14.

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I should note that so far in his argument, Henry is only talking about the extension of the concept of power. That is to say, he is not yet talking about the essence or definition of power. Rather, he is simply talking about which items in the world our notion of power refers to or picks out. And his point here is that, contra Aquinas, the notion of power or disposition does not pick out some distinct thing over and above the basis itself. Rather, our talk about powers and dispositions picks out the bases themselves that is to say, whatever parts, materials, or other constituents the powers in question are based upon. So, whereas Aquinass theory postulates powers as distinct items that really exist out there in the world, Henry refuses that. For Henry, there are no distinct items out there over and above the parts, materials, and other constituents that make up the thing in question. Still, what about the essence or definition of powers? With regard to this, Henry insists that the notion of a power is different from that of its basis. In particular, the notion of a power or a disposition involves some reference to the activity it is a power or disposition for.18 And indeed, as I mentioned earlier, there does seem to be a close conceptual link between powers and their exercise. When we think about fragility, we think about shattering, and for good reason: shattering seems essential to the concept. It wouldnt be a concept of fragility without it, for fragility is a disposition to shatter under certain conditions. By contrast, the bases of powers and dispositions the parts and materials things are made from do not seem to require this kind of close connection with the activities in question. For instance, it seems entirely possible to conceive of (and perhaps even define) glass simply in terms of, say, its molecular structure, without any need to reference shattering. But it it seems impossible to define fragility without some reference to shattering. Henry thinks this is important, for it suggests that the link between powers and their exercise is not just a conceptual link. Rather, it is a defining mark that rests at the very heart of what it is to be a power.19 For Henry, the

18 Henry, Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum, 35.4 (Opera, 28: 37.7677): Et quia omnis

potentia, in quantum potentia, fundatur in aliquo ut respectus ad aliud. And more generally, Henry maintains that being a source implies a connection with that for which it is the source, ibid., (Opera, 28: 37.6769): quia principium ut principium non dicitur secundum substantiam, sed solum secundum relationem, et relationem importat ad aliud, ut ad principiatum. 19 Henry, Quod., 3.14 (Bad. I, f. 68rY): Potentia enim non definitur nisi ex relatione ad actum; ibid., (Bad. I f. 70rB): Potentia enim id quod est dicitur ex relatione ad actum, quae ex obiectis sumit species; Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum, 35.8 (Opera, 28: 78.57): potentia significat ad aliquid [viz. ad actum], et a ratione respectus imponitur. And as Henry also says of the mind, Quod., 3.14 (Bad. I, f. 70rB): Potentia enim id quod est dicitur ex relatione ad actum, quae ex obiectis sumit species: anima autem ex natura substantiae suae absolutae, ut substantia est, non determinat sibi actum, sicut neque materia formam, quare neque rationem potentiae. Oportet igitur ad determinationem potentiae in ea eam aliquo determinari, ut determinate ad actum determinatum habeat respectum, et per hoc rationem potentiae.

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essence of a power consists precisely in its connection with the activities for which it is a power.20 As he puts it: Regarding the nature of a power (insofar as it is a power), it is something that is spoken of with respect to some activity, so it is not some absolute thing, but rather just this connection with activity that is based on the absolute thing.21 Consequently, Henry believes that when we talk about powers, we are referring to or picking out the parts, materials, and other constituents of things only insofar as they are linked to the activities for which they are the basis. Again, I can talk about glass, or I can talk about the fact that it is fragile, but these are different in a certain respect. For considered in and of itself, glass is just glass: it is a certain kind of material, with a certain kind of molecular structure. But glass is fragile only insofar as it shatters.22 Nevertheless, I am still referring to the glass when I talk about its fragility. Again, contra Aquinas, Henry maintains that our talk about powers does not refer to some extra entity over and above the basis itself.23 So when

20 Another way to put this point of Henrys is to say that we speak about powers with two-

place predicates: X has the power to Y, X is disposed to Y, and so on. But for Henry, this is not just a linguistic or conceptual peculiarity; it is not just a feature of the way that we talk about powers or the way that we think about powers. On the contrary, Henry thinks this tells us about the very nature of powers. By Henrys reckoning, we have to speak about powers with two-place predicates precisely because powers essentially involve a connection with the activities for which they are powers. 21 Henry, Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum, 35.2 (Opera Omnia, 28: 15.62-64): de ratione potentiae in quantum potentia, est quod dicatur ad actum, ita quod nihil absolutum sit, sed solus respectus fundatus in re super aliquo absoluto. 22 Or, to use Henrys example, heat is just heat when we consider it in and of itself. It is the basis for heating other things only insofar as it actually does so. Quod., 3.14 (Bad. I, f. 81rF): Sicut caliditas separata si esset calefactiva in se, non esset nisi qualitas per essentiam, et non esset potentia quaedam nisi ex naturali determinatione et respectu ad actum calidi: ita quod iret in actum quandocumque approximaretur calefactibili, et cessaret ab actu absente calefactibili. And he goes on to make the same point about mental powers. Ibid. (Bad. I, f. 81rF): dicendum quod voluntas est potentia naturalis in anima, et non est nisi substantia animae, sed ex naturali determinatione et respectu ad actum volendi bonum . . . cum ei praesentetur in cognition . . . et cum bonum ut obiectum et materia ei non praesentetur, velle secundum actum omnino non potest. Similiter intellectus agens potentia naturalis est in anima, et non est nisi substantia animae: sed ex naturali determinatione et respectu ad actum abstrahendi species intelligibiles a phantasmate, cum ei praeponuntur, ita quod non potest illas non abstrahere. 23 As Henry says of the mind in Quod., 3.14 (Bad. I, f. 68rY), the mind is all we need to refer to when we talk about mental powers: Sic ergo dicitur substantia animae eius potentia: quia sine omni alterius adminiculo habeat in sua essentia determinate rationem potentiae qua prosiliat in actionem, immo ut ipsa essentia eius determinate habeat rationem alicuius potentiae et determinati respectus ad aliquam actionem, oportet quod hoc habeat ab aliqua ipsius essentiae determinatione qua ad actum determinatum inclinetur.

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I talk about fragility, I am still referring to the glass its just that I am referring to the glass insofar as it is connected to shattering.24 Moreover, it is precisely that connection that makes or constitutes the glass as the basis for shattering.25 It is almost as if Henry is saying that of course glass is just glass (in and of itself), but when you add in that connection with shattering, it then becomes fragile. In fact, Henry even goes so far to say that we can think of powers in terms of matter and form, where the basis plays the role of matter and the connection with activity plays the role of the form. Hence, the connection with shattering is like a form that makes the glass fragile, much like how a statue shape is the form that makes a lump of bronze a statue.26 In the end then, Henry seems to propose that the parts and materials that things are made from can serve both as categorical constituents and as dispositional constituents. For taken in themselves, glass is just glass, and heat is just heat. But taken as they are connected with shattering and heating, they are dispositions and powers.27 Thus, while Aquinas has a two-

24 I am not, Henry would say, referring to some connection that somehow stretches between

the basis and the activity in question. This is because Henry does not believe that relationships are things that stretch between other things. For Henry, when we talk about relationships we are referring to or picking out their bases too. For more on Henrys ontology of relations, see Mark Henninger, Relations: Medieval Theories 12501325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 4058. 25 This point comes out clearly when Henry distinguishes between the minds mental and sentient powers: the mind is one thing, but it is determined to mental or sentient activities by its connections with those activities. Quod., 3.14 (Bad.I, f. 67rS): Aut etiam accidet ei quod fiat agens in actu, quia indiget ut determinetur aliquo quo fiat in eo potentia ad eliciendum actionem determinatam circa determinatum obiectum. Sicut contingit in actionibus animae intellectivis vel sensitivis ad quas non habet anima ex nuda essentia sua aliquas potentias determinatas nisi aliquo alio determinetur quo respiciat determinatum obiectum et determinatam actionem. Ita quod eius substantia quae una est secundum rem, secundum diversa esse, et secundum diversas determinationes, sortitur rationes diversarum potentiarum intellectivarum et sensitivarum, cum in radice nihil sit potentia in eadem nisi eius simplex substantia, quae in se considerata, essentia sive substantia est et forma animati, considerata vero secundum diversa esse per diversas determinationes et operationes ad diversas actiones, et ad diversa obiecta, dicitur potentiae diversae quae non ponunt super essentiam eius nisi solum respectum ad diversos actus specie. 26 Henry, Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum, 35.8 (Opera, 28: 78.66-70): Potentia vero significat ut proprietas ad aliquid respiciens, quod in suo significato includit essentiam sub ratione illius proprietatis, ut suum significatum sit quasi compositum ex duobus, scilicet ex ipso subsistenti, quod significat quasi materialiter, et illa proprietate, quam significat quasi formaliter. Actually, Henry suggests that we can think of any categorical entity that has a connection with something else like this. Ibid., 32.5 (Opera, 27: 81.5760): Intentio ergo praedicamenti constituitur ex re naturae subiecta, quae est res praedicamenti, quasi materiale in ipso, et modo quo esse ei convenit . . . quae est ratio praedicamenti circa rem ipsam, quasi formale in ipso. 27 Again, as Henry says of the minds powers, Quod., 3.14 (Bad. I, f. 68vZ): Sic ergo quod tanta est diversitas et distinctio potentiarum animae, hoc non est propter aliquam diversitatem realem quam habent ipsae ex parte animae, sed propter diversitatem de terminationum substantiae animae solummodo diversos actus respicit, et ex hoc nomina diversarum

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category ontology, Henry has what we might call a two-aspects ontology: there arent two entirely separate classes of things, theres just one class of things, but nevertheless, the parts, materials, and other constituents that fall into that one class can have both a categorical aspect and a dispositional aspect.28

John Duns Scotus Like Henry, Scotus rejects Aquinass view that powers are distinct things over and above their bases, for much the same reason: if every power were distinct from its basis, we would end up with an infinite regress, and we would not be able to explain what ultimately disposes bases to their powers.29 But Scotus also rejects Henrys claim that bases essentially include a connection with their activities. It is important to be clear on what Scotus is objecting to here. He is not denying that there are connections between bases and their activities. On the contrary, Scotus is happy to admit that there are such connections. If I

potentiarum sortitur: ut dicatur potentia intellectiva ex comparatione quam habet ad operationem quam secundum se habet elicere; ibid., (Bad. I, f. 69rZ): Sed in eodem in quo tantum est una anima secundum substantiam, ut dictum est supra, re sunt idem omnes partes [viz., potentiae animae], et non addit pars super identitatem rei in toto nisi respectum quemdam, et in hoc solummodo pars una dicitur alia ab alia, quod alium et alium notat respectum, ut dictum est; ibid., (Bad. I, f. 81rE): Et sic omnes [diversae potentiae] accidunt essentiae eius, non quia sunt re aliquid ab ea, sed quia est respectus ei additus extra intentionem essentiae suae, sicut primae materiae accidunt potentiae ad formas. 28 For more on a two-aspects ontology, see (for instance) the classic paper by D. H. Mellor, In Defense of Dispositions, The Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 157-181. For further discussion on Henrys theory of powers, as well as Aquinass and Scotuss, see Richard Cross, Accidents, Substantial Forms, and Causal Powers in the Late Thirteenth Century: Some Reflections on the Axiom actiones sunt suppositorum, in Complments de substance: Etudes sur les proprits accidentelles offertes Alain de Libera (Paris: Vrin, 2008), 13346. For more on Henrys ontology of powers specifically, see my Divine Production in Late Medieval Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ch. 9. 29 Scotus, Ord., 2.16, n. 46 (ed. Garcia, 2: 580): Praeterea, aliquis actus vel aliqua forma inferior anima potest esse principium immediatum agendi. Patet de calore et qualitatibus activis; aliter esset processus in infinitum. I should also note that Scotus seems to be dealing with Aquinas through the eyes of Henry of Ghent. That is to say, in Quodlibet 3.14, Henry quotes Aquinass Disputed Questions on the Soul, article 12 directly. But Scotus then seems to quote from Henry directly, and Ockham seems to quote either from Scotus or Henry. It would seem then, that Aquinass theory of powers comes to Scotus and Ockham entirely through Henry, who was looking only at Aquinass Disputed Questions on the Soul, article 12. I do not think the scholarship has appreciated this point. For instance, the editors of both Scotuss and Ockhams critical editions try to locate the quotations from Aquinas in the Summa, but that isnt right (which is clear from the fact that what Scotus and Ockham quote doesnt match the texts cited by the editors in the ad fontes). The quotations we find in Scotus and Ockham come verbatim from Aquinass Disputed Questions on the Soul, article 12, so it seems highly likely that Scotus and Ockham are getting those quotations straight from Henrys Quodlibet 3.14.

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dropped my wine glass and it shattered, Scotus would be perfectly happy to point out that there is a real connection there between the glass and the shattering: the glass really does shatter. Scotus does not have a problem with the connection itself.30 What Scotus has a problem with is the notion that these sorts of connections could be essential to bases, that they could play some kind of constitutive role in bases. And the reason Scotus gives is this: connections presuppose the things they connect, not the other way around, and so no connection could ever be an essential part of whatever it connects. That would be like saying that having children makes parents fertile, which is clearly false because parents must be fertile in order to have children. Having children may be a sign of their fertility, but it cannot be the cause. Likewise, the connection between glass and shattering may be a sign of glasss fragility, but it cannot be part of the cause.31 To make this point, Scotus employs some technical terminology: connections, he says, are naturally posterior to the things they relate, not natural prior to them, and for Scotus one thing is naturally prior to another if the first can exist without the second, but not vice versa.32 This applies to

30 That Scotus is happy to admit these connections is clear from the following. Meta., 9.5, n. 12

(OPh 4: 562.1922): Ideo dicitur aliter ad quaestionem quod cum relatio, quam importat hoc nomen potentia . . . simul sit natura cum relatione principiati actu, actu, et potentia, potentia; ibid., 9.34, n. 19 (OPh 4: 542.1314): Patet itaque quod principium importat essentialiter relationem principiationis; ibid., n. 20 (OPh 543.910): Consimiliter omnino dicendum est de potentialitate, potentia et potente, quod eandem relationem important; ibid., n. 25 (OPh 4: 545.35): Sciendum tamen, secundo, quantum ad istum articulum, quod principium non tantum habet relationem ad principiatum, et tale principium ad tale principiatum . . . See also ibid., n. 19 (OPh 4: 542.1543.8). 31 Scotus, Meta., 9.5, n. 12 (OPh, 4: 562.19-23): Ideo dicitur aliter ad quaestionem quod cum relatio, quam importat hoc nomen potentia (sicut patet ex solutione tertiae quaestionis), simul sit natura cum relatione principiati actu, actu, et potentia, potentia; ac per hoc illa relatio nullo modo sit prior naturaliter principiato; Scotus, Meta., 9.5, n. 15 (OPh, 4: 564.22- 24): Sic numquam aliquid est activum nisi naturam sit habere ordinem ad aliquid extra se; nec tamen ille ordo essentialis est activo (ut modo loquimur), hoc est, in quantum est prius naturaliter acto; Scotus, Meta., 9.5, n. 17 (OPh, 4: 565.9-14): Ad illud quod additur de potentiis animae, dicitur quod si potentia intelligatur aggregatum ex absoluto et respectu, isto modo distinguitur per respectus formaliter. Sed sic non sunt priores naturaliter actibus, proportionaliter accipiendo respectus principii in anima et in actibus respectus principiati, scilicet si actu, actu; si potentia, potential. 32 Scotus, De Primo, 1.8 (Wolter, 5): Secundo modo prius dicitur, a quo aliquid dependet, et posterius, quod dependet. Huius prioris hanc intelligo rationem, quam etiam Aristoteles 5 Metaphysicae testimonio Platonis ostendit: Prius secundum naturam et essentiam est quod contingit esse sine posteriori, non e converso. Quod ita intelligo, quod, licet prius necessario causet posterius et ideo sine ipso esse non possit, hoc tamen non est quia ad esse suum egeat posteriori, sed e converso; quia si ponatur posterius non esse, nihilominus prius erit sine inclusione contradictionis. Non sic e converso, quia posterius eget priore, quam indigentiam possumus depen- dentiam appellare, ut dicamus omne posterius essentialiter a priore necessario de- pendere; non e converso, licet quandoque necessario posterius consequatur istud; Ord., 2.1.45, n. 262 (Vat. 7: 129.1217): quia impossibilitas quod a sit sine b aut est propter identitatem b ad a, aut propter prioritatem, aut simultatem in natura; igitur si b non

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the case at hand, for Scotus wants to insist that the basis for activity can exist without that activity. And indeed, there are plenty of wine glasses that do not shatter.33 There are two points of clarifications to make here. The idea that connections presuppose the things they connect means first of all that, in order for some A and B to be connected, A and B must exist. There cannot be a connection between A and B if either of A or B are not there. Plato could not be the pupil of Socrates if there were no Socrates. And likewise for wine glasses and fragility: although there are times when glasses do shatter (like when I drop them), what about the times when they do not shatter? What about, say, when I hold a wine glass firmly in my hand, or when it sits undisturbed in the cupboard? Isnt the glass fragile then? As Scotus sees it, Henry would have to say no, because Henry believes that a connection with shattering is essential to fragility, in which case the glass could not be fragile without that connection. But how could there be a connection with shattering if there is no shattering going on? Surely a connection with a non-existent activity is not a real connection. It would seem, then, that when there is no shattering going on, the glass would not be able to satisfy the essential conditions that Henry thinks are required for it to be fragile, in which case Henry would have to admit that the glass is not fragile when it is not shattering. But that, Scotus thinks, is absurd, for surely the glass is still fragile, even when it is not shattering. A follower of Henry might respond by saying something like this: Well, of course the glass is not connected to an actual event of shattering, but it is connected to a potential event of shattering, for if it could not shatter, it would not be fragile. But what exactly is a potential event of shattering? Is it like a ghostly version of the real thing? Is it some other glass shattering in another world? Where are these potential shatterings located? Somewhere in the glass? Do they have parts or take up space? All of this pushes Henry to clarify exactly what it is that bases must be so essentially connected to.

sit prius naturaliter quam a, nec necessario simul natura, et a non potest esse absque b, sequitur quod a sit idem b: si enim sit aliud et posterius eo, non est verisimile quod naturaliter non possit esse sine eo absque contradictione. Note, however, that some as being able to exist without some b but not vice versa is only a sufficient condition (not a necessary condition) for as being naturally prior to b. This is important, because for Scotus, some entities in the Godhead are naturally prior to others, even though everything in the Godhead is necessary. 33 Scotus, Meta., 9.5, n. 10 (OPh 4: 562.26): nam illa [viz. relatio principii principiantis in actu] simul natura est cum principiato in quantum principiatum, cum sint correlativa, et posterior est natura eo quod est principiatum, hoc est, illo in quo fundatur relatio principiati; quia relatio principiati, quae simul est cum relatione principiantis in actu, posterior est eodem, quod scilicet est principiatum; ibid., n. 13 (OPh 4: 563.1114): Sed ab absoluto [principio], sine omni respectu praecedente, est effectus absolutus; quo posito, posterius natura sequitur relatio actualis mutual principiati ad principium, quae in neutro esse potuit, altero extremo non posito; ibid., n. 12 (OPh 4: 562.2223): ac per hoc illa relatio nullo modo sit prior naturaliter principiato.

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Furthermore and this is the second point of clarification I wanted to make the idea that connections presuppose the things they connect means not only that A and B must exist in order to be connected, it also means they must be constituted in all the right ways too. If some A and B are connected, then they must already have all the parts and constituents that are required to be connected in that way. The connection itself cannot be one of those required parts or constituents.34 That is why if parents have children, we can safely assume that they must have been fertile. Having children did not make them fertile, it did not add some essential ingredient that they needed beforehand in order to be fertile. On the contrary, they must have already been fertile in order to have children in the first place. Likewise, if I drop a wine glass and it shatters, surely it was already fragile. Shattering it did not make it fragile. Whatever the ingredients are that glass needs to be fragile, it already had them prior to being shattered.35 It is also worth noting that connections do not explain very much, for the very same reasons that were just mentioned. For as Scotus points out, if you asked me why two white things are similar, it wouldnt help me much if you told me because they are similar. But it would help me if you said because they are both white, for then you would be appealing to the basis of similarity.36 And the same goes for powers. To recall the famous quip by Molire, if I asked you why opium makes me sleepy, it would not help me much if you said because it makes you sleepy.37 But it would help if you

34 Scotus, Meta., 9.5, n. 9 (OPh 4: 561.2224): Manet autem in principio quando principiat

quidquid est de ratione eius in quantum est prius naturaliter principiato; ibid., n. 10 (OPh 4: 562.68): Oporteret autem relationem intrinsecam potentiae activae esse priorem natura illo quod est principiatum [si relatio determinaret poten- tiam activam, sed tale est impossibile]. Ergo omnino nulla relatio invenitur talis [in principio priore naturaliter principiato]; ibid., n. 13 (OPh 4: 563.711): Hoc modo intelligendo quaestionem, dicitur quod nihil est de ratione potentiae nisi absoluta aliqua essentia, in qua immediate fundatur aliquis respectus ad principiatum, ita quod nullus respectus praecedit in actu ipsam principiationem per quam quasi determinetur ad principiandum. 35 And the sense of already here does not have to temporal, as Scotus makes clear, Meta., 9.5, n. 14 (OPh 4: 564.16): Nec potest dici quod una tantum praecedat aliam tempore, quia patet quod agens, habens actionem coaevam sibi, ita determinatur ad agendum et habet quidquid requiritur ad talem determinationem sicut agens praecedens tempore suam actionem. Ergo relatio determinanssi qua estnon oportet quod praecedat tempore, sed tantum natura. 36 Scotus, Lect., 1.7.un., n. 35 (Vat. 16: 485.921): Unde, quando quaerimus in quo sunt aliqui similes, non quaerimus in quo sunt similes per se primo modo, quia sic similitudine sunt similes, sed quaerimus in quo sunt similes secundo modo per se, utrum sint similes albedine vel alia forma; unde quaerimus de fundamento similitu- dinis. Similiter quando quaeritur quid sit potentia animae, non quaeritur de respectu quem potentia importat, sed quaeritur de fundamento (on this, see also Meta., 9.34, n. 19 (OPh 4: 543.18)). 37 Molire, Le Malade Imaginaire (in The Dramatic Works of Molire, 3 volumes, translated by Henri van Laun (Philadelphia: Gebbie & Barrie, Publishers, 1879), 3: 567): Mihi docto doctore. Domandatur causam et rationem quare Opium facit domire. A quoi respondeo; Quia est in eo Virtus dormitiva, Cujus est natura Sensus assoupire.

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pointed to, say, chemical and physiological factors that are the basis for opiums ability to make me sleepy. For Scotus then, the connection between bases and their activities just cannot be an essential ingredient in making those bases the bases that they are. Connections show up on the explanatory seen too late, as it were, to play any constitutive role. The basis for any activity must already be capable of empowering activity in and of itself, without the need for any connection with activity. So, Scotus concludes, powers are just the parts, materials, and other constituents that activities directly spring forth from.38 And that, I take it, means Scotus has a one-category ontology. Unlike Aquinass two-category ontology, which postulates categorical and dispositional entities as distinct classes of things, and unlike Henrys two- aspects ontology, which holds that things can have both a categorical and a dispotional aspect, Scotus thinks there are just categorical things: there are just the parts, materials, and other constituents that things are made from, and that is all there is to it. Powers or dispositions are nothing more than the particular parts, materials, or other (categorical) constituents that cause the effects in question.39 William Ockham Like Scotus, Ockham rejects Henrys claim that bases essentially include a connection with their activities, and his reasons for this are very close to Scotuss. Ockham begins by pointing out that if bases did, in fact, require some sort of connection with their activities, then those connections would either have to be mere conceptual connections that we draw in our minds, or they would have to be real connections.40 Unfortunately, neither option is any good. As for conceptual connections, the problem with them is that nature rarely cares what you or I may think about it. I may be able to draw all sorts of connections between things in my mind, but the natural world is going to

38 Scotus, Meta., 9.5, n. 13 (OPh, 4: 563.7-12): Hoc modo intelligendo quaestionem, dicitur

quod nihil est de ratione potentiae nisi absoluta aliqua essentia, in qua immediate fundatur aliquis respectus ad principiatum, ita quod nullus respectus praecedit in actu ipsam principiationem per quam quasi determinetur ad principiandum. Sed ab absoluto, sine absoluto, sine omni respectu praecedente, est effectus absolutus. 39 This is, I think, significant for Scotuss theory of causation. For it becomes clear in this context that Scotus thinks the parts, materials, and constituents that we refer to as powers are really nothing more than the efficient causes of the effects in question. Whereas someone like Aquinas would say a power is that through which an agent causes an effect, Scotus would say the power just is the agent that causes the effect. Ockham too holds this view, and it is likely that Henry does too. 40 As Ockham explains about the minds powers, Quaest. in Sent., 2.20 (OTh, 5: 432.5-6): Si in anima esset talis respectus [ad actum], aut est respectus realis aut rationis.

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do what the natural world is going to do, irrespective of whatever sorts of conceptual connections I might make. Of course, the connections we draw in our minds can affect our behavior. For instance, if I mistakenly identify the person entering the room as a horrible monster, my screaming and tripping out the back door would certainly be the result of the misidentification I made in my mind. But the point here is that even though connections drawn in our minds can affect our behavior, they do not affect the behavior of other things like glass, flames, and the like. Moreover, glass, flames, and the like do not have minds anyway, so they cannot have anything in mind that might affect their behavior either. Consequently, any connection I might draw in my mind between, say, glass and shattering is not going to have any affect on the fragility of the glass. Whether I think the glass can shatter or not makes no difference. Either it can, or it cant, but that has nothing to do with my thoughts about it. And of course, my thoughts and ideas could never become essential parts of the glasss fragility, for thoughts and ideas just cannot leap out of my head and jump into the glass.41 So, if bases essentially require some sort of connection with their activities (as Henry claims), those connections will therefore have to be real connections. But Ockham thinks real connections fare no better here either, and the reason is that, as Scotus already pointed out, connections presuppose the things they connect, not the other way around.42 To highlight this point, Ockham asks us to imagine what would happen if God created you in a world all by yourself. There would be nothing else in that world except for you; you would just be floating there, so to speak. Now, since there would be nothing else in the world to think about, you would presumably not be able to think about things like trees or stop signs. Nevertheless, Ockham wonders, wouldnt you still be capable of thinking about trees or stop signs, if for some reason you were ever to come in contact with them? Ockham thinks the answer would have to be yes, and he thinks it goes to show that whatever it is that makes you capable of thinking about trees and stop signs does not depend on you actually doing so.43 But suppose someone were to object here and say that you couldnt think about trees and stop signs while floating in the world all by yourself. At this

41 Ockham, Quaest. in Sent., 2.20 (OTh, 5: 432.6-8): Non [est respectus] rationis, quia ille est

per actum intellectus comparantis. Sed ante omnem actum intellectus sunt potentiae in essentia animae perfecte. 42 Ockham, Quaest. in Sent., 2.20 (OTh, 5: 432.8-10): Nec est respectus realis, quia nunquam est respectus realis sine termino realiter exsistente, secundum eum etiam [viz., secundum Henricum]. 43 Ockham, Quaest. in Sent., 2.20 (OTh, 5: 432.10-12): Sed potentiae animae possunt esse perfectae et nullum obiectum [esse], quia Deus potest facere animam intellectivam non faciendo aliquod obiectum in mundo. Et tunc erunt potentiae animae perfectae, et tamen nullus terminus in actu, quia nullum obiectum.

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point, we could respond: why not? In Ockhams defense, we might press for an explanation. Suppose we compare your mind in the floating world to your mind in the regular world, where there are trees and stop signs. Suppose also that there is no qualitative difference in composition or constitution between your mind in the floating world vs. your mind in the regular world. The only qualitative difference between the two is that in the regular world you actually think about trees and stop signs, whereas in the floating world you do not. Given that, could we reasonably say that you are really incapable of thinking about trees and stop signs in the floating world? Would it really be plausible to insist that the mere connection our minds have with trees and stops signs in the regular world is enough to make them capable of thinking about trees and stop signs? Surely not. Surely your mind would be just as capable of thinking about trees and stop signs in the floating world as it would be in the regular world, especially given the fact that the two are in all other respects the same. In the end then, Ockham agrees with Scotus, for like Scotus, he would be happy to say: of course there are connections between bases and their activities when those bases are actually causing the activities in question. But those connections cannot play any role in the constitution of those bases. The parts, materials, and other constituents that cause the activities in question must be able to cause those activities prior to actually doing so, and that is all that powers are. Conclusion In all of this, I think we can identify three separate ontologies of powers here. Aquinas is what we might call a two-category theorist. That is, he thinks there are categorical entities in the world, and there are dispositional entities. Hence, Aquinas would insist that there are substances, quantities, and qualities, which are categorical in nature, but there are also powers, which are special kinds of qualities that are dispositional in nature. The key is that Aquinas is not willing to reduce powers to categorical entities. As he sees it, considerations about identity (or rather, the lack thereof) are just too strong. However tempting it may be to think of categorical and dispositional entities as the same, they just cannot be identical, because there are some things that are true of the one that are not true of the other. Henry, by contrast, refuses to admit that powers are distinct entities over and above their bases, for otherwise we would have an infinite regress. Hence, when we talk about powers and dispositions, Henry insists that we are not referring to or picking out some special kind of entity over and above the parts, materials, and other constituents that activities are based on.

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Rather, we are referring to or picking out just those categorical parts, materials, and other constituents that the activities in question are based on. Nevertheless, Henry thinks those categorical entities have their own identities and natures when considered in and of themselves. They serve as powers only insofar as they are connected to the activities for which they are the basis. In and of itself, glass is just glass, but insofar as it is connected to shattering, it is the basis for fragility. And this, I take it, tells us that Henry is what we might call a two-aspects theorist, for Henry thinks that the various parts, materials, and other constituents in the world can be both categorical and dispositional in nature. Scotus and Ockham, however, are what we might call one-category theorists, for they reduce powers to categorical entities entirely. When we talk about powers, we are referring only to the categorical parts, materials, and other constituents of things. We are not referring to some special kind of entity as Aquinas would say, nor are we referring to those parts and materials under some special mode or respect. Rather, we are simply referring to those categorical parts and materials, and that is all we mean by powers and dispositions.

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