Aristotle: Politics - Bks.

2, 3

[1]

Our purpose: which is the best community? - (best for those most able to realize their ideal of life) [note the word their - or does he mean the...?] A. will examine both actual and theoretical states among the latter, notably Platos Republic should citizens have all things in common, no things in common, or some yes and some no? - nothing in common is clearly impossible for the constitution is a community, and must at any rate have a common place [does that count? For politics, yes!...]

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[2]

Platos state: (1) difficulties with Platos community of women (2) Platos arguments arent strong enough (3) The idea is thoroughly impractical Platos claim: the more unity the better Aristotle replies: Not so! for the state is inherently a plurality (for the family may be said to be more than the state, and the individual than the family.) - Interesting, considering his earlier statements - - the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest! - this greatest unity (sas A.) would destroy the state!

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[3]

and the state has different kinds of men not like a military alliance Wherefore the principle of compensation ... is the salvation of states.
[compensation: in effect, benefiting from the division of labor. The idea: Each does better by sometimes foregoing options, at least temporarily] they cannot all rule together, but must change at the end of a year or some other period of time or in some order of succession. The result is that upon this plan they all govern [interesting!] the one party rule and the others are ruled in turn [Aristotle is evidently denying Platos major criticism of democracy here: all citizens, he evidently thinks, are fit to share in ruling...] the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater.

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[Platos common ownership, continued ...) A. says that Plato may be have fallen afoul of an ambiguity: the word 'all' is ambiguous:

[4]

(sense 1): each man will call the same person his own son and the same person his wife, and so of his property and of all that falls to his lot. This, however, is not the way in which people would speak who have their wives and children in common; they would say 'all' but not 'each.' In like manner their property would be described as belonging to them, not severally but collectively. [note: this is the same fallacy I accused Aristotle of at the outset of the Ethics: difference between (Ex)(y)(Fx,y) and (y)(Ex)(Fx,y) The first says that all y are related to the same x The second that for each y there is an x (but possibly different - as in this case)

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Another big problem with common ownership:

[5]

that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. on Platos scheme, Each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not be his sons individually but anybody will be equally the son of anybody .... - and will therefore be neglected by all alike. [this anticipates public goods theory of modern times] Practical point: if we try to put Platos scheme into effect, particular parents and children, etc., will recognize each other, and then what?
This makes his scheme impracticable [To put it mildly!]

[I]n a state having women and children in common, love will be watery

Of the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection - that a thing is your own and that it is your only one - neither can exist in such a state as this.

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[6]

Similar points about property

When the husbandmen are not the owners, the case will be different and easier to deal with; but when they till the ground for themselves the question of ownership will give a world of trouble. If they do not share equally enjoyments and toils, those who labor much and get little will necessarily complain of those who labor little and receive or consume much. consider the partnerships of fellow-travelers, and servants we are most able to take offense at those with whom we most frequently come into contact in daily life. So: common ownership is most impractical Thus property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private; for, when everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another and will make more progress, because every one will be attending to his own business And yet by reason of goodness, and in respect of use, Friends, as the proverb says, will have all things common.

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[7]

This principle already exists in well-ordered states - thus showing that it is not impracticable, - and it may be carried further. For, although every man has his own property, some things he will place at the disposal of his friends, while of others he shares the use with them. The Lacedaemonians, for example, use one anothers slaves, and horses, and dogs, as if they were their own; It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it common; and the special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition. [interesting! - - and how is he to do this?]

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[8]

Advantages of mostly-private ownership: how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a thing to be his own; [Lets hear it for the bourgeoisie!] for surely the love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured this is not the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess, like the miser's love of money.. further, there is the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to friends or guests or companions, which can only be rendered when a man has private property. These advantages are lost by excessive unification of the state.

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[9]

Advantages of mostly-private ownership (continued) The exhibition of two virtues, besides, is visibly annihilated in such a state: first, temperance towards women (for it is an honorable action to abstain from another's wife for temperance' sake); secondly, liberality in the matter of property. No one, when men have all things in common, will any longer set an example of liberality or do any liberal action; for liberality consists in the use which is made of property. [the point being that this use is impossible when property is common from the start...]

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[10]

Platos (communist) legislation further critiqued: It may have a specious appearance of benevolence men readily listen to it, and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody's friend ... The fact of disagreements and lawsuits etc is due to the wickedness in human nature and not in the institution of property Besides, theres even more quarreling among those who have things in common [I add: disputes are turned into political disputes]

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[11]

Platos (communist) legislation further critiqued: And what about the commoners? If they have a different system we will have two states in one ... Plato says nothing about the laws for the lower orders... But the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy happiness. ... And if the guardians are not happy, who are? Surely not the artisans, or the common people. [... hmmm - well, why not? They might be lucky enough to be left out of the communist arrangements...]

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[12]

The property system is the point on which all revolutions turn We should aim at the middle, to avoid those troubles but having the souls of citizens do so is whats really necessary [JN adds: how about having all internalize the legitimacy of property...] tyrants are a worse problem than petty thieves... The beginning of reform is not so much to equalize property as to train the nobler sort of natures not to desire more, and to prevent the lower from getting more in those states in which the condition of the women is bad, half the city may be regarded as having no laws...

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[13]

- that the Carthaginians have a good constitution is shown by the fact that the common people have never rebelled... the best legislators should be (1) chosen, and (2) well enough paid so that they can devote themselves to their offices [end of Bk II]

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[14]

Book three: What is a State?

First, what is a Citizen? - not just someone who lives in a certain place - nor are resident aliens, despite having some rights A citizen in the strictest sense: shares in (1) the administration of justice (2) in civic offices differs under each form of government [As suits best a democracy] a

state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life. [?? not clear how that squares with the definition of citizen]

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[15]

In practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom both the parents are citizens; others insist on going further back; say to two or three or more ancestors.
[note: this is not a definition In any case, as Aristotle notes, it logically requires some different criterion for the original set of citizens...] And some who hold office, shouldnt!

one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all.

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Good citizen and Good man - how compared

inasmuch as all the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the citizen and of the good man cannot coincide. the two kinds of virtue cannot be absolutely and always the same [JN comment: this is profound!] It has been well said that he who has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander. The two are not the same, but the good citizen ought to be capable of both he should know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman- these are the virtues of a citizen. We cannot consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to the existence of the state for example, children are not citizens equally with grown-up men Adult males are citizens absolutely children, not being grown up, are only citizens on a certain assumption. - [presumably, that they will in fact grow up]

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[17]

The Forms of Government -- or is there only one? Constitution: arrangement of magistracies in a state Constitution is in fact the government. [?? this doesnt sound right....We need to make distinctions... [government is a here-and-now, particular instantiation of what the constitution calls for (and possibly a very imperfect one) constitution is the general underlying structure of the whole.... Confusing the two is potentially fatal....]

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[18]

Man is by nature a political animal so, they live together even when they dont need each other... they are also brought together by their common interests The conclusion is evident: that governments which have a regard to the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but those which regard only the interest of the rulers are defective and perverted forms - for they are despotic, whereas a state is a community of freemen.

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[19]

Typology: Government of one, or of a few, or of the many.

The true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one or of the few, or of the many, are perversions.

Ideal Type:: perversions :

The perversions rule in the interest of:

royalty: tyranny -the monarch only aristocracy: oligarchy -the wealthy constitutional government: democracy -- the needy

none rule in the interest of the common good of all [the ideal types, on the other hand, all rule in the interest of all]

Complications: suppose the many are rich? - Then democracy = oligarchy

For the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth

Aristotle: Politics.3 [20] If people have nothing in common but exchange, alliance, and the like, that would not constitute a state. Why? Not because they are at a distance from one another: for even supposing that such a community were to meet in one place, but that each man had a house of his own, which was in a manner his state, and that they made alliance with one another, but only against evildoers; -- Still, an accurate thinker would not deem this to be a state, if their intercourse with one another was of the same character after as before their union. the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and selfsufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable life. [note: this must be an ideal, not a working definition...] Then ought the good to rule and have supreme power? - But in that case everybody else, being excluded from power, will be dishonored. [is that true? Why?]

[21] that the many ought to be supreme seems to contain an element of truth - many together: each individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence, and when they meet together, they become in a manner one man
[In what manner is this so?? -- maybe this: The mind of one man rules over all his various parts; in a meeting together, each rules over each other ... (?)] [Is this something we want to have happen??]

Aristotle: Politics.3

a right election can only be made by those who have knowledge; Yet persons of any age, and having but a small property qualification, sit in the assembly and deliberate and judge, although for the great officers of state, such as treasurers and generals, a high qualification is required. the many may claim to have a higher authority than the few

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[22]

justice = the common interest All men think justice to be a sort of equality; and to a certain extent they agree in the philosophical distinctions which have been laid down by us about Ethics. equals ought to have equality. - But there still remains a question: equality or inequality of what?
[Recall Platos critique of democracy: meeting out a strange sort of equality to equals and unequals alike ....]

For they admit that justice is a thing and has a relation to persons, and that

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[23]

- equality or inequality of what? (continued) some persons will say that offices of state ought to be unequally distributed according to superior excellence, in whatever respect, of the citizen, although there is no other difference between him and the rest of the community; for that those who differ in any one respect have different rights and claims. But, surely, if this is true, the complexion or height of a man, or any other advantage, will be a reason for his obtaining a greater share of political rights. Whereas the rival claims of candidates for office can only be based on the possession of elements which enter into the composition of a state. But if wealth and freedom are necessary elements, justice and valor are equally so; for without the former qualities a state cannot exist at all, without the latter not well. but, if we take into account a good life, then, as I have already said, education and virtue have superior claims.

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[24]

All these considerations appear to show that none of the principles on which men claim to rule and to hold all other men in subjection to them are strictly right. in the best state he is one who is able and willing to be governed and to govern with a view to the life of virtue. Monarchy: If someone were really of super-superior virtue, he or they can no longer be regarded as part of a state The only alternative is that all should joyfully obey such a ruler, according to what seems to be the order of nature, and that men like him should be kings in their state for life. Types of royalties: a) a kind of generalship, irresponsible and perpetual b) despotic governments over people who are by nature slaves c) dictatorship: elective tyranny d) heroic e) household management of a city or nation...

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[25]

Which is more advantageous: rule by the best man or by the best laws? individual judgment is needed - the laws cannot provide that but general principle cant be dispensed with - law is dispassionate; individuals are always passionate the best man must legislate - BUT the assembly, made up of many, is superior taken together it is hardly to be supposed that a great number of persons would all get into a passion and go wrong at the same moment. -> [is this so?? What about mob psychology?]

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[26]

even if we had a good king, how about his descendants? ....

Law: reason unaffected by desire. in seeking for justice men seek for the mean or neutral, for the law is the mean. [question: really??] customary laws have more weight, and relate to more important matters, than written laws a man may be a safer ruler than the written law, but not safer than the customary law.

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[27]

where men are alike and equal, it is neither expedient nor just that one man should be lord of all, whether there are laws, or whether there are no laws, but he himself is in the place of law. But when a whole family or some individual, happens to be so preeminent in virtue as to surpass all others, then it is just that they should be the royal family and supreme over all, or that this one citizen should be king of the whole nation. ... the true forms of government are three [viz., the one, the few, the many] - and the best must be that which is administered by the best, and in which there is one man excelling all the others he will frame a state that is to be ruled by an aristocracy or by a king, and the same education and the same habits will be found to make a good man and a man fit to be a statesman or a king. [But, does Aristotle think this at all likely? It seems not...] [End, Book Three]