Documente Academic
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Documente Cultură
June 2005
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Basel basics
Executive Summary Basel I overview Basel II overview Timing Scope of application Capital components Types of Banks IRB Transition Period
7 8 9 10 13 14 16 18 21 24 27 30 33 34
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35 37 39 45
- Ratings based approach - Most senior exposures; second loss positions or better - Liquidity facilities - Overlapping exposures IRB banks - Ratings based approach - Internal assessments approach - Supervisory formula approach - Liquidity facilities - Top-down approach
51 52 53 55 57 58 61 63 64
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66 71 84
87 89
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92 93
95 96 97 98 99
Contact Details
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Executive Summary
In effect since 1988; very
simple in application
Basel I
management systems
sensitive
Basel II
First Pillar Minimum capital Second Pillar Supervisory review Third Pillar Market discipline
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RWA
Capital charge: 8 million
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Basel II Timing
Basel II
Published June 2004 End 2006 for standardised and foundation
However
New rules will alter banks behaviour right away Some countries will adopt prior to expected
IRB banks ( 2)
End 2007 for advanced IRB banks ( 2) End 2009 (at earliest) before full IRB benefits
countries
Reaction of US regulators to QIS 4 results
change CRM rules and rules for trading book exposures Capital Requirements Directive (CRD)
Will implement Basel II within EU Same adoption timing sought May vary from Basel II (and thus from rules in
Insurance entities
Generally, deduct banks equity and other capital
weighting treatment (100% for standardised banks) for competitiveness reasons ( 31)
Supervisors may permit recognition by bank of excess
capital invested in insurance subsidiary over required amount ( 33) Commercial entities
generally deducted significant investments in
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deduct any excess EL amount over eligible provisions (excess of provisions over EL amount may be added to tier 2 capital up to maximum of 0.6% of risk-weighted assets ( 43, 374-386) Scaling Factor
Scaling factor of 1.06 (subject to recalibration following QIS 4 and QIS 5) introduced to ensure
same aggregate amount of capital remains in banking system following Basel II adoption ( 44, fn. 11)
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First Pillar
Second Pillar
Supervisory Review: Qualitative supervision by regulators of internal bank risk control and capital assessment process ( 719-807), including supervisory power to require banks to hold more capital than required under the First Pillar
Third Pillar
Market Discipline: New public disclosure requirements to compel improved bank risk management ( 808-822)
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Standardised
Measure credit risk pursuant to fixed risk weights based on external credit assessments (ratings) Least sophisticated capital calculations; generally highest capital burdens Most Japanese banks will start Basel II as standardised banks Most US banks will stay under Basel I (or, more likely, will move to Basel 1) Measure credit risk using sophisticated formulas using internally determined inputs of probability of default (PD) and inputs fixed by regulators of loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD) and maturity (M). More risk sensitive capital requirements Most European banks will likely qualify for Foundation IRB status at start of Basel II Measure credit risk using sophisticated formulas and internally determined inputs of PD, LGD, EAD and M Most risk-sensitive (although not always lowest) capital requirements Transition to Advanced IRB status only with robust internal risk management systems and data Top 10 US banks expected to implement Advanced IRB at start of Basel II
Foundation IRB
Advanced IRB
Under Basel II, banks have strong incentive to move to IRB status and reduce capital charges by improving risk management systems
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Multiple ratings
Assessment
CRM
Credit risk mitigation (CRM) not recognised if taken into account in rating ( 101)
Solicited
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2008
2009
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Losers OECD rated below AA Examples: Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Mexico, Turkey
Inputs: average rating agency values for PD, LGD of 45%, supervisory value for EAD and M of 2.5. (Moodys rating applied if different from S&P)
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AAA to AA0%
Risk weights may also be based on ECA risk scores Claims on non-central government public sector entities based on corporate exposure risk
weights
Claims on multilateral development banks have 0% risk weight if conditions are met,
including: (i) majority of MDBs ratings are AAA, (ii) significant portion of shareholders are AA- or better rated sovereigns, (iii) funding is in form of paid-in equity with little or no leverage, and (iv) conservative lending criteria
At national discretion, lower risk weight for banks exposures to their sovereign (or central
bank) in domestic currency; if adopted, other regulators may permit same risk weight
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Capital requirement for defaulted exposure equals greater of zero and difference between exposures
LGD and banks best estimate of loss Input characteristics (applicable to all types of exposures) ( 285-325): PD: internally determined one-year probability of default LGD: - FIRB: 45% (senior)/75% (subordinated); adjusted (LGD* = LGD x (E* / E) for CRM recognition - AIRB: own estimates; adjusted for CRM recognition EAD: not less than sum of (a) amount by which bank capital would reduce if exposure written-off fully and (b) specific provisions and partial write-offs M: 2.5 years for FIRB (6 months for repos); own est. for AIRB for each exposure; max. 5 years
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Winners non-OECD rated above BB+ under Option 2 Examples: May Bank, Public Bank Berhad
Losers OECD rated A or below under either option Examples: Commerzbank, HVB, SEB, Mizuho, Bradesco
Using inputs of average rating agency values for PD, LGD of 45%, supervisory value for EAD and M of 2.5.
** Using inputs of rating agency values for PD, LGD of 10%, supervisory value for EAD and M of 2.5. *** Internal PD estimate to be applied.
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AAA to AA20%
Option 2: At national discretion, banks risk weighted on basis of own external ratings (plus
AAA to AA20%
Local currency reduction: National regulators may reduce by one notch risk weight of local
currency bank debt having maturity of less than 3 months, subject to floor of 20%
Exposures to securities firms treated as bank claims if regulatory arrangements
comparable
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assumption) under Advanced IRB Generally, PD for high-quality bank debt will be below 0.03% floor (so floor must be used)
More realistic 10% LGD for Advanced IRB bank (rather than 45% supervisor-imposed LGD
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Using inputs of rating agency values for PD, LGD of 45%, supervisory value for EAD and M of 2.5.
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increase 100% risk weight for unrated corporates where warranted by higher default rates):
AAA to AA20%
Below BB150%
Unrated 100%
Option 2: At national discretion, all corporates risk weighted at 100% without regard to
external ratings
SME Adjustment: 75% risk weight for unrated SME if exposure under 1 million and either
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Subject to national discretion, supervisors may allow banks to substitute total assets for total
sales
SME adjustment generates approx. 20% reduction in risk weights (depending upon original
creditworthiness)
Effective floor of 14% risk weighting for foundation IRB banks due to minimum PD of 0.03%
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** Using PD of 3% and LGD of 80% and PD of 5% and LGD of 90%, respectively *** Using PD of 5% and LGDs of 40% and 60%, respectively
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business facility (mortgage loan excluded to extent otherwise covered (see below))
Portfolio diversified (granular); Basel II accord suggests no aggregate exposure to any one
Past Due Unsecured portion of exposure past due for more than 90 days, net of specific provisions, risk weighted as follows: 150% when specific provisions less than 20% of outstanding amount of exposure
100% when specific provisions 20% or more of outstanding amount of exposure 100% when the specific provisions 50% or more of outstanding amount of exposure, with
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When only drawn balances securitised, bank must hold required capital against unfunded
commitment
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Commercial Real Estate ( 74) Generally 100% risk weight, given experience in numerous countries with troubled credits over the past few decades However, 50% risk weight possible in certain markets if (among other conditions): (i) tranche not greater than lower of 50% of market value and 60% of mortgage lending value, (ii) losses on tranche do not exceed 0.3% in any year, and (iii) overall losses from commercial real estate in relevant market do not exceed 0.5% in any year
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Strong 95%
Good 120%
Satisfactory 140%
Weak 250% 0%
Default
At national discretion, banks may assign preferential risk weights of 70% to strong and
95% to good where maturity is less than 2.5 years or supervisor determines banks underwriting criteria and other risk characteristics are substantially stronger
Treated differently under CRD
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*** LGD of 12.5% required in CRD with PD floor of 0.03%. Using inputs PD as noted, LGD of 12.5%, supervisory value for EAD and M of 2.5.
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Generally: For exposures other than HVCRE, banks that do not meet requirements for estimation of PD will map internal grades to five supervisory categories (70% for strong, 90% for good, 115% for satisfactory, 250% for weak and 0% for default) ( 275) At national discretion, supervisors may allow 50% for strong and 70% for good if remaining maturity less than 2.5 years or supervisor determines underwriting or other risk characteristics are substantially stronger ( 277)
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Basel II Simple Model* 290% 290% 290% 290% 290% 290% 290% PD/LGD Model** 92%*** 81%*** 264% 32%*** 82%*** 195%*** 120%*** Rating A3/BBB Aa3/AABa1/BB+ Aaa/AAA A1/A Baa3/BBBBaa1/BBB+
For banking book exposures. National supervisors may exempt from IRB treatment for up to ten years particular equity exposures held at publication date of Basel II accord ( 267) CRD has preferential treatment vs. Basel II Accord; supervisors may increase to 150% for venture capital and private equity investments ( 80)
Vivendi Universal Bertlesmann ** Inputs: average rating agency PDs, LGD of 90%, supervisory value for EAD and M of 5. *** Under Basel II ( 353) a floor risk weight of 200% applies to listed equities
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Basel II/CRD Standardised bank risk weights ( 75-78) Generally: Unsecured portion of exposure past due for more than 90 days, net of specific provisions, risk weighted as follows:
150% when specific provisions less than 20%
IRB bank risk weights Generally: capital requirement for defaulted exposure is equal to greater of zero and difference between LGD (described in para. 468) and banks best estimate of expected loss ( 272) Under IRB approach, for asset classes other than securitisation, bank must compare (i) total amount of eligible provisions with (ii) total expected losses and deduct excess (if any) of expected losses over provisions ( 43, 380-383) For securitisation exposures or the PD/LGD approach for equity exposures, bank must first deduct EL amounts under paras. 563 and 386, respectively ( 43)
outstanding amount of exposure, with supervisory discretion to reduce risk weight to 50% in such case Residential Mortgages: risk weighted at 100% net of specific provisions; at national discretion risk weight reduced to 50% of specific provisions 20% or greater Commercial Mortgages: weighted at 100% unexpected loss risk-
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supervisory discretion to reduce risk weight to 50% in such case Secured non-performing loan:
Qualifying residential mortgage loans risk weighted at 100%, net of specific provisions. If
such loans are past due but specific provisions are no less than 20% of their outstanding amount, the risk weight applicable to the remainder of the loan can be reduced to 50% at national discretion
Commercial mortgages: unexpected loss risk weighted at 100% Non-performing loans fully secured by forms of collateral not recognized under Basel II (eligible
financial collateral) risk weighted at 100% when provisions reach 15% of outstanding amount of loan
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Consequences: Fixed LGD at 45% for non-retail assets and senior exposures may result in risk weights as follows: 565% when no specific provisions of outstanding amount of exposures
400% when specific provisions 20% of outstanding amount of exposure 0% when the specific provisions 50% or more of outstanding amount of exposure
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0% 100 70
30% <50
>50% 20
80%
100% 50% 0% 0%
100% 50% 0% 0%
380%
Supervisory discretion allows use of 50% risk weight if exposure has specific provision of 50% or better LGD in Advanced IRB Approach is 30% IRB Approach and Advanced IRB Approach are approximated
43
18.2.2005)
German NPL market development to increase to estimated 20 billion this year and possible
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Same as simple approach under Basel II for standardised banks (i.e., substitution)
Subject to considerable change due to Basel/IOSCO review, including introduction of double default recognition for certain exposures rather than substitution approach
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Protection Buyer
Protection Seller
size of haircut depends on type of instrument, type of transaction and frequency of mark-to-market and remargining ( 135)
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Standardised Banks
IRB Banks
Cash and gold Rated debt securities (sovereign BB- or higher; other BBB- or higher) Senior, unrated debt securities issued by bank if listed on recognised
exchange and all other bank issues are BBB- or higher Equities included in main index or listed on recognised exchange UCITS/mutual funds where price quoted daily and UCITS/fund only invests in above instruments For IRB banks only: receivables, real estate and other collateral meeting minimum requirements ( 289) All items recognised as collateral in banking book can also be recognised in trading book
No correlation
Collateral must not have material positive correlation with underlying exposure ( 124)
First-to-default:
First-to-Default Second-to-Default
recognised if bank obtains protection for entire basket, credit event triggers contract, and notional of underlying less than contract ( 207-208); regulatory capital relief for asset with lowest risk-weight in the basket Second-to-default: recognised if bank obtains first-to-default protection as above or if one asset already defaulted ( 209-210)
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formula approach (SFA) if can determine inputs (including using top down methodology)
If unrated exposure and RBA, IAA and SFA
unavailable, may use exceptional look through approach with regulator consent on temporary basis for liquidity facilities
Otherwise, must deduct unrated exposure from
capital
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Short Term Ratings Standardised bank risk weights ( 567) A-1/P-1 External Rating A-2/P-2 A-3/P-3 All other ratings/ unrated 20% External Rating 50% 100% Deduct
Long Term Ratings Standardised bank risk weights ( 567) AA- or above A BBB BB+ to BBB+ or below unrated * 20% 50% 100% 350%* Deduct Deduct
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Eligible liquidity facilities ( 576) Banks may apply risk weight to eligible liquidity facilities equal to highest risk weight assigned to any exposure in underlying pool
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Increase from 0% under Basel I Regulators believe liquidity absorbs more than just liquidity risks Credit conversion factor of 0% theoretically possible if: Commitment qualifies as eligible liquidity
Commitment can only be drawn if general market disruption (i.e., where more than
one SPE across different transactions is unable to roll over maturing commercial paper i.e., not as result of impairment in credit quality of specific SPE or its pool)
Commitment must be secured by underlying assets and rank pari passu with conduits
securities
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must be limited to amount likely to be repaid from underlying assets and sellerprovided credit enhancement
No incurred losses should be covered and draw should not be automatic Asset quality test should not cover defaulted assets as defined in paragraphs 452-459
(including receivables more than 90 days past due unless extended up to 180 days by national regulators); if funding based on rating of underlying asset, it must be rated at least investment grade at time of draw
Facility cannot be drawn after all applicable credit enhancement to which liquidity
holder
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been securitised, bank may use IRB capital requirement for underlying exposures ( 610) Hierarchy ( 609) IRB bank must use ratings based approach (RBA) to calculate capital if external rating or inferred rating available Where RBA not available, bank may use SF or IAA if available
Where neither RBA nor SF or IAA are available, bank may use look-through approach (see
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Long Term Ratings IRB bank ratings-based risk weights ( 615) Most senior 7% 8% 10% 12% 20% 35% 60% 100% 250% 425% 650% Deduct Base case 12% 15% 18% 20% 35% 50% 75% 100% 250% 425% 650% Deduct Non-granular 20% 25% 35% 35% 35% 50% 75% 100% 250% 425% 650% Deduct
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specified by supervisor)
Credit analysis of sellers risk profile must be performed ABCP programme must have minimum asset eligibility criteria that exclude defaulted assets,
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eligible receivables and minimum operational requirements Intended mainly for asset-backed securitisation exposures, but may also be used for appropriate on-balance sheet exposures
approach: Bank has not directly or indirectly originated receivables (and has purchased them from unrelated third parties) Receivables generated on arms length basis (and not subject to inter-company contra accounts) Purchasing bank must have claim on all proceeds from pool or a ratable interest National supervisors to develop concentration limits Recourse to seller does not automatically disqualify transaction as long as cash flows from assets are primary source of repayment (plus certain other requirements)
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exposure:
Reference rated exposure must be subordinate in all respects to unrated exposure Credit enhancements must be taken into account in determining subordination (for
example, if reference position benefits from third party guarantee but unrated position does not, then latter may not be assigned inferred rating)
Maturity of reference position must be equal to or longer than that of unrated
position
Inferred rating must be updated continuously to reflect changes in external rating of
reference position
External rating must satisfy general requirements for recognition of external ratings
in securitisation transactions
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Basel II (MRA; Accord 864-718) Essentially unchanged, except for revisions to:
Definition of trading book:
excluding debt and equity securities in trading book and all positions in commodities, but including credit counterparty risk in trading book or banking book, plus
Capital charges for specific risk and general market risk
positions in financial instruments and commodities held either with trading intent or in order to hedge other elements of the trading book documented trading strategy; positions actively monitored and managed on trading desk; position limits set and monitored; positions marked to market at least daily; positions reported to senior management
under either standardised measurement method or internal models method (or combination thereof)
Paragraph references in materials below on trading book are to 1996 Market Risk Amendment (MRA) unless otherwise noted
counterparty credit risk charges for OTC derivatives, repo-style and other transactions booked in trading book, and adjusted add-on factors for single name credit derivatives (see below)
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if payment would cause bank to fall below minimum capital requirements Calculation of Capital (MRA Intro., II.3 I.4) Bank must first calculate capital for credit risk, and only afterwards calculate market risk requirement Capital requirement to be met on continuous basis at close each business day (MRA Intro., I.14)
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0.00% 0.25% (residual term to final maturity 6 months or less) 1.00% (residual term to final maturity between 6 and 24 months) 1.60% (residual term to final maturity exceeding 6 months) 0.25% (residual term to final maturity 6 months or less) 1.00% (residual term to final maturity between 6 and 24 months) 1.60% (residual term to final maturity exceeding 6 months) 8.00%
Other:
offsetting if issuer same but not same issue Government category includes all forms of government paper Qualifying category includes securities rated investment grade by at least two recognised rating agencies or (subject to supervisory approval) unrated but either of comparable investment quality (standardised banks) or rated equivalent by banks internal systems and exchange listed (IRB banks) (Accord 712) National regulatory may impose higher specific risk charge on other category and/or disallow offsetting
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opposite direction and generally to the same extent (e.g., identical instruments; long cash position hedged by total rate of return swap with exact match between reference obligation and underlying)
80% specific offset recognised when value of two legs always moves in opposite direction but not
broadly to same extent (e.g., long cash position hedged by credit default swap or credit-linked note with exact match between reference obligation and underlying); to extent that transaction transfers risk, 80% risk offset for side with higher capital charge and zero specific risk requirement on other side
Partial allowance where value of two legs usually moves in opposite direction (e.g., asset mismatch
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market-by-market basis
8%
Equity derivatives (MRA Part A.2.II) Convert derivatives into positions in relevant underlying
Matched positions may be fully offset Index risk: Further capital charge of 2% against net long or short position in index contract
applied only to one index with opposite position exempt from capital charge
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Measuring positions in single currency (MRA Part A.3.I) Measured by summing: net spot position (including interest earned but not received, expenses accrued, and expenses not yet accrued but certain); net forward position; guaranties certain to be called and likely to be irrevocable; net future income/expenses not yet accrued but already fully hedged (at bank discretion); net delta-based equivalent of total book of foreign currency options Positions taken to hedge capital ratio may be excluded if structural (non-dealing) nature, applied consistency, does no more than protect bank capital ratio Measuring foreign exchange risk (MRA Part A.3.II) Two alternatives:
shorthand method treating all currencies equally capital charge is 8% times overall net
open position determined by converting nominal amount (or net present value) of net position in each currency into reporting currency
internal models approach (see below)
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Advanced Measurement Approach ( 655-659, 664-679) Calculated on basis of internal operational risk management system approved by national regulator
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to risk profile and strategy for maintaining capital levels. Five main features of rigorous process: Board and senior management oversight
Sound capital assessment Comprehensive risk analysis (credit risk, operational risk, market risk, interest rate
Supervisors should review and evaluate banks internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies, as well as ability to monitor and ensure compliance with ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate action if not satisfied. Supervisors should expect banks to operate above minimum ratios and should have ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of minimum Supervisors should seek to intervene at early stage and require rapid remedial action
Principle 3:
Principle 4:
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of supervisory review (rather than First Pillar of regulatory capital) due to differences in methods banks use to handle risk
Credit risk:
Supervisory review is appropriate to regulate stress tests under IRB approach, definition of default used to determine PD and/or LGD and EAD, residual risk, credit concentration risk and operational risk
Supervisors should make publicly available criteria used in review of banks internal capital assessments pragmatic provision of close and continuous dialogue between industry participants and supervisors, as well as between supervisors (without changing legal responsibilities of national regulators).
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First Pillar if would not adequately and sufficiently reflect risks of exposure
Maturity: Supervisors will review documentation to ensure that maturity mismatches not
assets in pools and how that is reflected in capital calculation; with ability to increase capital if correlation not appropriately reflected
Significant risk transfer: Although securitisation may occur for reasons other than risk
transfer (i.e., funding), where risk transfer is insufficient or non-existent supervisors can deny capital relief
Market innovations: Supervisors can take account of new features either through First
require disclosure and may apply one or more of (a) refusing further capital relief for securitised assets, for period of time or permanently, (b) applying conversion factor to all securitised assets so as to hold capital against them, or (c) requiring banks to hold capital in excess of minimum requirements
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and manage risks associated with securitisations of revolving facilities; following factors should be considered when analysing excess spread triggers:
interest payments by borrowers on underlying receivables other fees and charges to be paid gross charge-offs principal payments recoveries on charged-off loans interchange income interest paid on investors certificates relevant macro-economic factors
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exposure type):
Amount of impaired/past due assets Losses recognised by bank during current period Aggregate amount of securitisation exposures retained or purchased by bank, broken
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Basel II Observations
Open Issues
Will banks cope (implementing systems)? Will regulators cope (monitoring systems and data)? Will inconsistencies be minimised? Inconsistent rules in Basel II itself (e.g. corporate risk weights vs. securitisation risk
weights)
Inconsistent national rules finally adopted by regulators Inconsistent application by supervisors (including different supervision of banks, vs.
with substitution?
Will impractical operational requirements for IAA be addressed? Will the definition of defaulted assets be extended beyond 90 days?
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Basel II Observations
Impact on financial markets
Spread tightening as capital costs of holding winners drops: ABS tranches rated BBB and higher Corporates rated BBB or higher Non-OECD sovereigns rated above BB+ Spread widening/credit tightening as capital costs of holding losers increases: Lower rated banks, corporates and ABS OECD sovereigns rated below AA- (but banks may hold for liquidity purposes anyway) Non-bank equities; non-core high operating cost activities (asset management)
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Basel II Observations
Impact on banks
Banks with more Basel II winners in portfolio benefit Banks with more Basel II losers in portfolio suffer Possible divestitures of capital-heavy businesses Insurance Asset management Non-bank equities Impact on corporate lending activities Return of high-quality corporates to banks as borrowers Credit less available to lower-quality borrowers Tiering of SME market local banks for relationship lending, larger banks for credit-
based lending
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Basel II Observations
Impact on securitisation markets Will motivate banks to securitise higher risk weighted assets and keep lower risk weighted assets Will cost more to securitise, due to higher capital for lower rated tranches and unfunded commitments (motivating banks to seek non-regulated investor base and lower cost liquidity alternatives) Higher costs may slow growth of securitisation generally, reducing banks ability to disperse credit risks throughout the financial system Securitisation volumes may rise in certain products to remove them from banks balance sheets: Credit cards due to capital held against unfunded commitments Commercial mortgages due to higher capital charges against lower quality exposures Loans due to higher capital charges against lower quality exposures Covered bonds If cheaper to hold mortgages on balance sheet under Basel II, then covered bonds advantages over securitisation But will regulators limit quantity of covered bond issuances? (FSAs 4% suggestion)
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Basel II Observations
Impact on ABCP conduits
Motivation to hold assets in ABCP conduit (rather than on-balance sheet for risk-based
commitments
Less liquidity Liquidity provided in new forms: e.g., market value swaps, trading book positions Funding provided in new forms: e.g., repos
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