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Introduction
SIRAJ (October 2010 April 2012) is a project funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework program.
Main objective: to evaluate the opportunities for EGNOS service extension to the areas covered by the ACAC and ASECNA, in the Civil Aviation domain.
APV/SBAS approach
Definition APV SBAS (Satellite Based Augmentation System) is an extension of RNAV (GNSS) system. It provides more specific information, more accurate guidance than non-precision systems and the major benefit compared to non-precision: final approach vertical guidance. EGNOS System In Europe, it is supported by EGNOS system (European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service). It consists of three geostationary satellites and a network of ground stations. EGNOS achieves its aim by transmitting a signal containing information on the reliability and accuracy of the positioning signals sent out by GPS. It allows users to determine their position to within 1.5 meters.
European SBAS system has the following advantages: Optimized approach routing from various arrival directions Improved track keeping Use of more flexible route and procedure designs Limited need for ground infrastructure Can be implemented in areas where ILS cannot be sited for terrain or obstacle reasons Can provide approaches to more runways without additional infrastructure costs Increase usability of many airports
Description
According to the European Commission regulation N 2096/2005, any change in ATM system needs safety analysis. In this context, the implementation of an APV SBAS procedure requires a safety assessment.
A Safety Case consists of providing the demonstrable evidences that the APV SBAS approach procedure implemented at the airport is sufficiently safe in normal conditions and under failure conditions. The level of safety maintained from introduction to service and during the procedure is operational.
Methodology
EUROCONTROL has developed a generic safety assessment for the use of APV SBAS operations in Europe. The methodology used within this safety assessment is derived from the process specifications defined within the EUROCONTROL Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM). The approach is based on the development of a Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA), a Preliminary System Safety Analysis (PSSA) and a System Safety Analysis (SSA).
Safety Objectives
Safety Requirements
Implementation
Migration
On-going operations
FHA
PSSA
Fault trees analysis Hazard identification
PSSA
FHA
Event trees analysis Risk Trees analysis
SSA
SAM Tie-bow:
Hazard
Barrier
Success Failure
Barrier
Success Failure Success Failure
TLS
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
SAFETY OBJECTIVES
Each RNAV/GNSS approach chart includes a LNAV minima line (a RNAV/GNSS approach chart encompasses at least a LNAV procedure)
Aircraft wrongly flying towards FAWP at a lower altitude than the approach procedure minima The conditions leading to this hazard are either failure to laterally intercept the final approach track or aircraft at too high altitude prior to FAWP. In both cases aircrew fails to intercept the glide slope and, instead of launching a MA, decides to intercept it from above, in violation of the normal procedure. The aircraft is not on the correct final approach path due to an incorrect path, incorrect position estimation, incorrect guidance, or incorrect maneuvering The aircraft descends below DA while aircrew has no visual contact because they might have selected a wrong approach, obtained a wrong QNH, used the wrong DA, etc. Failure to follow the expected/instructed flight profile during a missed approach
OH3. Failure to follow the correct final approach path OH4. Descending below DA without visual OH5. Failure to execute correct Missed Approach
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External Mitigations
EMM1 EMM2 EMM3 EMM4 EMM5 EMM6 EMM7 EMM8
Description
Deviation is not towards obstacles Deviation is not towards another aircraft Recovery via ATC detection-radar Recovery with visual cues Approach is stabilizing Missed approach is initiated External conditions (dry or long runway) Recovery via aircrew detection on board
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Severity 3
Severity 4 Severity 5
Major Incidents
Significant Incidents No effect on safety
OCCASIONAL
LIKELY NUMEROUS
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Always
Null Null
Highly Probable
Success
Null
Null
Null
CFIT
Null
Improbable
CFIT
Improbable
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Qualitative frequency
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SR.10
ANSP (ASECNA)
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1. Continuous monitoring. 2. Safety performance improvement. To check, analyze and solve any new hazard and improve current safety requirements. 3. Upgrades. Study ESSP status reports and check for upgrades within the EGNOS satellites signal. APV SBAS operations must only be used when enough EGNOS signal is available for this kind of approaches. 4. Monitoring system in place, operation and maintenance. Air navigation service provider and aerodrome operator are required to clearly demonstrate that the monitoring system is in place. Operation and maintenance of this system have to be managed by trained staff. 5. Airspace modifications. Safety Requirements and Safety Objectives have to be revised and changed if necessary for this procedure. 6. Correct procedures. 7. Incidents records and analysis.
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Dakar
Al-Hoceima
Najran
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Al-Hoceima SC
Safety Case characteristics: - Runway: 17/35 (2500 x 45m) - Radar: No radar available. - Approach lights: Threshold and edge lights. - Obstacles: No significant obstacles. - Navigation aids: VOR/DME available for RWY17.
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Al-Hoceima SC
Safety Case characteristics: - Does it satisfy the CONOPS Document?: Some statements that are not completely valid have been added to the Safety Requirements of the APV/SBAS procedure.
- Does it satisfy the Functional Model Document?: All statements are valid for this airport.
- Other aspects: this Safety Case includes an additional possible hazard: Interference of the trajectory with Al-Hoceima town, Spanish prohibited area and British airspace.
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Dakar SC
Safety Case characteristics: - Runway: Two runways. The one chosen for APV/SBAS approaches is Runway 18/36 (3490 x 45m) - Radar: Radar is available. No radar vectoring is provided. - Approach lights: Threshold and edge lights. - Obstacles: Few obstacles on both thresholds. - Navigation aids: VOR/DME, ALD/DME and NDB . ILS is available for RWY36. - Does it satisfy the CONOPS Document?: All statements are valid for this airport. - Does it satisfy the Functional Document?: All statements are valid. Model
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Najran SC
Safety Case characteristics: - Runway: 06/24 (3045 x 45m) - Radar: No radar available. AFIS in charge of TWR. - Approach lights: Threshold and edge lights. No approach lights available. - Obstacles: Few obstacles on both thresholds. - Navigation aids: VOR/DME for both thresholds and ILS/DME available for RWY06. - Does it satisfy the CONOPS Document?: All statements are valid for this airport. - Does it satisfy the Functional Model Document?: All statements are valid for this airport. - Other aspects: None.
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Thank you
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