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Equipo de LOPA
Identificacin Escenario y Desarrollo Documentacin
Eventos iniciadores y modificadores frecuencia
Escenarios, eventos de iniciacin, y modificadores de frecuencia
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Proceso LOPA
S TEP 5:
E VALUATING
F URTHER R ISK
R EDUCTION
S UGGESTIONS
PASO 1:
S TEP 6:
PASO TEP 2 :
S TEP 3:
S
TEP
4:
IDENTIFICAR
ESCENARIO DE
INTERES
IDENTIFY
CONSEQUENCES
& TARGET
FACTOR
IDENTIFICAR
EVENTOS`INICIADO
RES
IDENTIFY
NON-SIS
IPLS
MAKE RISK
DECISIONS &
DOCUMENT
SELECT
THE NEXT
INITIATING
EVENT
ADD SIF IF
NEEDED
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Qu es un Escenario de LOPA?
Evento o secuencia de eventos que
desencadenan una consecuencia no
deseada.





Diferentes Consecuencias Escenarios
Diferentes Eventos Inicadores con las mismas
Consecuencias Casos
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Cualquier Escenario LOPA debe tener
CLARAMENTE definidas sus partes
4. Consecuencias (nube txica, VCE, fuego, etc.)
2. Material afectado (etileno,cloro, etc.)
1. Equipamiento afectado(reactor, caera, etc.)
5. Evento iniciador (error operativo, falla de
instrumento,falla de control, etc.)
Ocasionalmente
6. Requisitos especiales (probabilidad de ignicin.
rea normalmente desocupada, etc.)
3. Punto de Salida (PSV, caera, sello bomba, etc)
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Desarrollo del Escenario
HAZOP
OSS (hUCC)
Experiencia (incidentes pasados)
Qu Pasa Si
FMEA
Listas de Verificacn


Al desarrollar un escenario , es un buen punto de
arranque una evaluacin cualitativa del peligro.
Algunas de las siguientes metodologas son utilizadas
en la industria para estas evaluaciones de peligros
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Desarrollo de un Escenario Tpico (Caso)
explicado
Comenzar con informacin sobre la identificacin del
peligro
Identificar las consecuencias (escenarios) que sern
estuudiados (daos personales, al medio ambiente , a la
propiedad)
Confirmar que el escenario ha sido desarrollado con el
alcance necesario
Si hay algo que no est seguro, incluirlo tambin
Identificar todas las causas listadas y encontrar el evento
incial que domina el riesgo
Identificar otros eventos inciadores que pueden conducir a
la misma consecuencia
Identificar otros factores que afectan al reisgo (probabilidad
de incendio o de presencia de una persona en el rea)
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El valor de una correcta
escritura de los escenarios
no se reconoce
adecuadamente
Se puede perder mucho
tiempo si el texto no es el
correcto
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Desarrollo de Escenarios para LOPA
LOPA no es una herramienta para identificar escenarios
El Escenario, junto con la cupla Causa-Consecuencia
son entradas para LOPA y deben desarrollarse antes
que pueda empezar el LOPA
LOPA comienza con la identificacin del Factor
Objetivo de LOPA
La identificacin del escenario y el Valor objetivo del
LOPA son iterativos y efectuarn varios ciclos antes de
completarse
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Haga participar al personal adecuado
Que conozca el Procesoe
Personal de Ingeniera de Procesos y Control
Otros recursos tcnicos
Personal de Operacin de Planta
El facilitador LOPA y quien administra los
tiempos
Lder de Tecnologa de Seguridad de Procesos
Coach de SIS
Experto de Business LOPA del Negocio
Cmo comenzar con los Escenarios

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Matriz de Habilidades del Equipo LOPA
LOPA Team Skills Matrix

Learning Objective
(Description of Knowledge or Training Needed)
LOPA
Facilitator
Process
Operations
Expert
Process
Technology
Expert
Plant
Process
Control
Expert
Process
Safety
Expert
100 LOPA Work Process

LOPA/SIS Work Process and requirements Expert Aware Competent
Aware -
Competent
Expert
200 LOPA Fundamentals

Has introductory understanding of LOPA concepts,
methodology, terminology, rules
Expert Aware Competent Aware Expert

Thorough understanding of LOPA Guidelines and
Workbook
Expert Competent
Aware -
Competent
Expert
Understands LOPA documentation requirements
(as defined by other sub-team)
Expert Aware Aware Aware Expert
300 Scenario Development
Experience in multiple plants and processes Competent Aware Competent

Thorough knowledge of important process safety
considerations for the plant
Competent Expert Competent Expert


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Conseguir la informacin correcta
Experiencias de Planta
HAZOPS anteriores, listas Qu Pasa Si ( What-if) o
cualquier otro tipo de evaluacin cualitativa.
Revisiones y auditoras de Productos Qumicos
Reactivos
Experiencia de la Industria
Invetigacin de Causa Raz (RCI)

Cmo comenzar con los Escenarios

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Evaluacin de la posibilidad de peligro del
proceso
CEI, F&EI, US EPA RMP Comp program, other triggers that
you may invent
Identificacin de un tema de Peligro Potencial
Por ejemplo, un tanque, bomba o reactor que exceden los
criterios de screening
Desarrollo del Escenario
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Eleccin del Nodo de la Unidad
D-1
R-1B
D-8
R-2B
P-2A/B
P-5A/B P-23A/B
E-1 E-2
Temp Controlled
Water from E-11B
Temperature
Controlled Water
from E- 24B
To EO Recovery
Acrylic Acid
River
Water
Atm
Vent
Ditch
To D-14
N
2
Recycle EO
Ethylene Oxide Storage
Reaction System
Sugerencia: HAZOP o
What if las reas de ms
riesgos de manera
sistemtica
Sugerencia: Use
brainstorming en reas
menos peligrosas
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Enfoque en la Unidad Elegida
Tail Reactor
R-1B
D-8
P-5A/B
E-1
Temperature
Controlled Water
from E- 24B
River
Water
Atm
Vent
Ditch
Acrylic Acid
Ethylene Oxide
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Uso de Brainstorming :
Get the right people in the room
HAZOP, What if, Check list of events, Whatevers effective
Describe the scenario (whats going to happen) and
the amount of material involved.
Can it really happen?
Are the conditions necessary and sufficient?
Does it pass a sanity check? (Challenging since you need to
mentally turn the existing protection layers off )
Is it clearly understood? The cause must be readily visible.
If its not, develop further

Desarrollo del Escenario
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Desarrollo del Escenario
Estimate the consequence of the scenario.
Whats the bad stuff?
consequence analysis or hazard look up tables based on
material hazard and quantity involved
Is this a consequence of concern?
If YES, continue. Otherwise stop, identify another
scenario or go to the next item of concern
Identify the Initiating Events (causes) that can lead
to the consequences
There may be several
A check list of typical initiating events is useful
Ask what else can happen?
Repeat the above as needed


continuacin
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Scenario Development
Identify special requirements or conditions
Probability of ignition, time at risk, presence factor...
Now repeat until you get it right.
First write it so you understand it
then write it so they understand it
finally, write it so EVERYONE understand it
Identify next item of concern and repeat the
brainstorming
continued
And Finally, Youre done
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Scenario Development
Check for Clarity
Write a sentence using LOPA Workbook
inputs to uncover unintended implications.

Initiating Event
happens which causes...
Description of Undesired Consequence
resulting in
LOPA Target Factor
.
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Es Probabilidad o Frecuencia?
Probabilidad Posibilidad de ocurrencia de un
evento o secuencia de eventos. Es adimensional, y
se califica entre 0 y 1.
Frecuencia Nmero de ocurencias de un evento
por unidad de tiempo. Es un nmero entre 0 y 1, y
sus unidades son ocurrencias por hora o ao.
Por ejemplo, fallas por ao.
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Based on Dow & Industry Experience
Initiating Event Factor (IEF) Table
DOW RESTRICTED
Initiating Event Factors for Layers of Protection Analysis
Initiating Event
Initiating Event
Frequency (per year)
Initiating Event
Factor
BPCS Instrument Loop Failure 1.E-01 1
Regulator failure 1.E-01 1
Operator Failure Action more than once per quarter 1.E-01 1
Operator Failure Action once per quarter or less 1.E-02 2
Pump Failure Loss of Flow 1.E-01 1
Single Mechanical Pump Seal Failure 1.E-01 1
Double Mechanical Pump Seal Failure with announcement
1.E-02 2
Canned/Magnetic Drive Pump Failure
1.E-02 2
Cooling Water Failure 1.E-01 1
Loss of electrical power 1.E-01 1
General Utility Failure 1.E-01 1
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Based on Dow & Industry Experience
Initiating Event Factor (IEF) Table
(contd)
DOW RESTRICTED
Initiating Event Factors for Layers of Protection Analysis
Initiating Event
Initiating Event
Frequency (per year)
Initiating Event
Factor
3rd Party Intervention 1.E-02 2
Lightning Strike as an Initiating Event 1.E-03 3
Unloading/Loading Hose Failure 1.E-01 1
Expansion Joint Fails 1.E-02 2
Heat Exch. tube leak <100 tube 1.E-02 2
Heat Exch. tube leak >100 tubes 1.E-01 1
IEF=0 as determined by Tech Center & Process Safety 1.E+00 0
IEF=1 as determined by Tech Center & Process Safety 1.E-01 1
IEF=2 as determined by Tech Center & Process Safety 1.E-02 2
IEF=3 as determined by Tech Center & Process Safety 1.E-03 3
IEF=4 as determined by Tech Center & Process Safety 1.E-04 4
IEF=5 as determined by Tech Center & Process Safety 1.E-05 5
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Gut Check on Initiating Event
Factors
Does the Initiating Event occur more
frequently than the IEF table indicates?

If so you may not be able to justify any credit!
Example: Im assuming my pressure transmitter fails only
once/10 yrs as the IEF table indicates but in reality we
have to unplug the impulse line every year
FACTOR IS ZERO!

(Reverse argument does not apply)
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When are you finished identifying
Scenarios?
There is no single answer to this issue since
there are multiple ways to ID cause-
consequence pairs.
Use a proven effective method
Involve the right people
Complete the process
Query the experts
Have you missed something?

If the answer is No, you are finished!
for now
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Should you evaluate the scenario
IF?
The initiating event has never occurred in the
plant? Dow history? Industry history?
The initiating event has occurred but some
safeguard has always stopped the scenario?

If you remove all protection layers and one failure will lead to
the consequence then yes it should be considered.
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Modificadores y Condiciones especiales
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LOPA - Step Three (modifiers)
Modifiers
S TEP 5:
E VALUATING
F URTHER R ISK
R EDUCTION
S UGGESTIONS
S TEP 1:
S TEP 6:
S TEP 2:
S TEP 3:
S
TEP
4:
IDENTIFY
SCENARIO OF
INTEREST
IDENTIFY
CONSEQUECES
& TARGET
FACTOR
IDENTIFY
NON-SIS
IPLS
MAKE RISK
DECISIONS &
DOCUMENT
SELECT
THE NEXT
INITIATING
EVENT
IDENTIFY
INITIATING
EVENT(S)
ADD SIF IF
NEEDED
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A LOPA Workbook
DOW RESTRICTED
Layer of Protection Analysis Worksheet
Protection Scenario Definition Independent Protection Layers
Gap
Description of Undesired Consequence LOPA Target Factor Initiating Event Factor Enabling Factor Probability of Exposure
Each independent instrument layer must have separate sensors, logic solvers and final
elements.
Target is
0 or less
Scenario
And Case
Number
Give a complete Description of the undesired
consequence
List chemicals and
quantity involved
Describe the initiating event
Record the Probability of
Ignition or Toxic
Enabling Factor.
Describe the condition
of probability of
exposure
Safety Analysis
Business Analysis
HELP For Consequence HELP For TF HELP For Initiating Event HELP For Enabling Factor
HELP For POE
Layer of Protection Analysis Worksheet
Independent Protection Layers
Notes
Each independent instrument layer must have separate sensors, logic solvers and final
elements.
Other safety related protection systems
Plant Integrity
Design
(Mechanical
Integrity Issues)
BPCS Control
Action
Operator
responds to
alarms and
written
procedures
SIS Function A SIS Function B
Pressure
Relief
Device
SRPS 1 SRPS 2 SRPS 3
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Enabling Event
Enabling event or condition - An event or
condition that makes possible another event.
does not cause scenario
must be present for the scenario to develop
usually expressed as a probability
Example
Probability of ignition - a gas release ignites becoming
a fire or explosion.
Toxic enabling factor people are present and not
protected before they can become exposed to a toxic
gas cloud.

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Probability of Ignition
What is the probability of ignition if the release
occurs outdoors?
POI based on quantity in vapor cloud (vaporized in
15 minutes)
In building Ignition?
A. Class 1, Division 2 Electrical Classification with 6
or more air exchanges / per hour POI = .1, Credit =1
B. For all others, POI =1, Credit = 0

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DOW RESTRICTED
Enabling Factors for Layers of Protection Analysis
Enabling Factor
Probability of
Ignition
Enabling
Factor
POI <100# vaporized 1.E-02 2
POI <1,000# vaporized Elevated Ignition Probability Material 1.E-01 1
POI >1,000# vaporized Elevated Ignition Probability Material 1.E+00 0
POI <1,000# vaporized Normal Ignition Probability Material 1.E-02 2
POI <10,000# vaporized Normal Ignition Probability Material 1.E-01 1
POI >10,000# vaporized 1.E+00 0
POI due to static in closed ungrounded vessel ordinary hydrocarbon 1.E-01 1
TEF = -1 -1
TEF = 0 0
TEF = 1 1
TEF = 2 2
None 0
POI=Probability Of Ignition
Use for outdoor releases only. Indoor releases will generally be further evaluations.
Probability of Ignition
Workbook Tab
The amount vaporized, is the
amount flashed or otherwise
contributes to the flammable
cloud (i.e. droplets)
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Low (<1%): ammonia, methylene chloride, trichloroethylene, etc

Normal (1-10%): n-butane, propylene, acetone, methane, methanol, etc

Elevated (10-90%): hydrogen, acetylene, propylene oxide, ethylene, HCN,
acetaldehyde, acrolein, 1,3-butadiene, carbon disulfide, diethyl
ether, propadiene, etc...


High (>90%): silane and various alkyl aluminum compounds (normally
described as pyrophoric).

Full list found at


Ignition Categories
NOTE: Items in red have changed categories
updated
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Toxic Enabling Factor
Old Concepts With a New
Application
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Example #1






Outcome:
2000 - 6000 fatalities offsite
100,000+ injuries
Just after midnight on December 3, 1984, a
Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India
accidentally released approximately 40 metric
tons (88,000 lbs) of methyl isocyanate into
the atmosphere.
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Example #2
Outcome:
No fatalities
63 medical evaluations
On August 14, 2002, a chlorine
transfer hose ruptured during a rail
car unloading operation at the DPC
Enterprises chlorine repackaging
facility near Festus, Missouri, USA.
The hose rupture ultimately led to
the release of 48,000 pounds of
chlorine.
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What Differentiates the Outcome of
Similar Toxic Release Incidents?
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Comparison
Both are B Chemicals in LOPA



Airborne quantities are similar
MIC released as vapor due to hot reaction
Chlorine vaporizes due to low BP

Something was VERY different
Chlorine
ERPG3 20 ppm
Boiling Point -34 degC
Methylisocyanate
ERPG3 5 ppm
Boiling Point 38 degC
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Differences
1. Number of people near the plant
2. Distance between people and the release
3. Shelters or lack thereof
4. Warning

There may be others but these are the ones
we plan to study
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Basis for Chemical Target Factors
The Chemical Specific Target Factor Table
was originally developed using
TYPICAL conditions affecting the
probable impact of a toxic release to the
surrounding community.
Population density of 3885 people/sq. mi.
Greenbelt distance of 1500 ft.
Dispersion modeling used to adjust for
situations significantly different than these.
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What is the Toxic Enabling Factor?
Can impact LOPA
analysis by factor
of 2,1,0,or -1
Rules:
Applies to toxics using Chemical Table
Looks at all of these parameters,
Geographic PSTL will provide these
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Consider these New Concepts
Population has not been used in LOPA
but it is used in SVA audits and RMP
submission (and QRA, with greater precision)
Greenbelt distance not previously used
fenceline has been the Level 2 sensitivity
Distance to non-company plant or business
recorded in CEI (Level 1)


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Other New Concepts
Shelter Quality new to LOPA
but is counted in QRA
real issue in Bhopal
Community Emergency Response not
previously credited in any risk
assessment
Wind direction ignored (use circles)

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Applying the TEF
RULES

1. Applies only where Chemical Specific TF
Table used to determine Target Factor
2. Weighting is as follows
1. Population 40%
2. Greenbelt 30%
3. Shelter Quality 15%
4. Community Emergency Response 15%
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Toxic Enabling Factor Database
Site Plant or Building
Toxic
Enabling
Factor
Distance
Qualifier
Toxic
Enabling
Factor
Distance
Qualifier
Midland ONE 1 none 1
Midland 244 1 none 1
Midland 297 1 none 1
Midland 304 1 none 1
Midland 353 1 none 1
Midland 433 1 none 1
Midland 458 1 none 1
Midland 477 1 < 18 miles 0 > 18 miles
Midland 489 1 none 1
Midland 564 1 < 1 mile 0 > 1 miles
Midland 588 1 none 1
Midland 590 1 none 1
This only represents a portion of the information in the workbook
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Applying the TEF
Implementation
Process Safety Technology Leaders will do
much of the population work for you on a site
basis.
You will need to look up TEF on a spreadsheet
for your plant (possibly depending on HD-2
distance)
If TF is 7 may only apply TEF of <= 1, if TF is
<=6 may not apply TEF
Suggest reviewing results with site Responsible
Care Leader and Site Leader to gain buy-in
(PSTL will do this).

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Probability of Exposure
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Probability of Exposure
(2-types)
Time at Risk - The fraction of time per year a
potential hazard can exist.
Applies to all risk
A specialty batch plant makes a hazardous product
5 weeks a year (0.1)
A loading / unloading operation occurs 100 hours
per year or less
Does not apply to startup or shutdown
Apply at plant capacity



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Probability of Exposure
(continued)
Potential for exposure - The fraction of time
per year a person can be exposed to a hazard.
Generally applies to personal injury / fatality
The hazardous area is remote from normal work
areas. A few visits per year for a short time.
The hazard is there all the time but the people are not.
Eg., Salt Dome
The hazardous area is barricaded or chained
preventing access.
A sulfuric acid drying tower in a chained off area



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Probability of Exposure
Workbook Tab
Probability of Exposure for Layers of Protection Analysis
Probability of Exposure
Frequency Range
from Literature
(/yr.)
Enabling
Factor
Probability
Enabling
Factor
Probability of Exposure allowed for processes in operation for
less than 5 weeks/yr or when personnel are seldom present in
area.
1x10
-1
1
Probability of Exposure for rare processing events (occurs less
than 1% of the time) or in remote locations. Tech. Center and
Process Safety concurrance required to use this factor.
1x10
-2
2
Probability of Exposure credits allowed for Start-up and Shut
Down events.
0
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Layer of Protection Analysis Worksheet
Protection
Gap Scenario Definition Independent Protection Layers
Target is 0
or less
Scenario and
Case Number
Description of Undesired
Consequence
LOPA Target Factor
Initiating Event
Factor
Enabling
Factor
Probability of
Exposure
Plant
Design
BPCS
Control
Action
Operator
responds to
alarms and
written
procedures
SIS
Function A
SIS
Function B
Give a complete description of the
undesired consequence
List chemicals and
quantity involved.
Describe the
initiating Event .
Record the
Probability of
Ignition.
Describe the
condition of
probability of
exposure.
Each independent instrument layer must have
separate sensors, logic solvers and final elements.
3.1
Reactor vessel failure due to
polyol decomposition reaction
Vessel fragmentation
causes multiple
fatalities,
Consequence Specific
Target Factor
No or Very Little
catalyst present
due to acid
leaking into
reactor and
neutralizing
catalyst
At least two
people present on
the plant at all
times.
6 Safety Analysis 7 1 0
0
Business
Analysis
DOW RESTRICTED
Layer of Protection Analysis Worksheet
Protection Scenario Definition Independent Protection Layers
Gap
Description of Undesired
Consequence
LOPA Target Factor Initiating Event Factor Enabling Factor Probability of Exposure
Each independent instrument layer must have separate sensors, logic solvers and final
elements.
Target is
0 or less
Scenario
And Case
Number
Give a complete Description
of the undesired
consequence
List chemicals and
quantity involved
Describe the initiating event
Record the Probability of
Ignition or Toxic
Enabling Factor.
Describe the condition
of probability of
exposure
3.1
Reactor vessel
failure due to
polyol
decomposition
reaction
Vessel
fragmentation
causes
multiple
fatalities,
consequence
specific
Target Factor
No or very little
catalyst present due
to acid leaking into
reactor and
neutralizing catalyst
At least two
people present
on the plant at
all times.
HELP For Consequence HELP For TF HELP For Initiating Event HELP For Enabling Factor
HELP For POE
LOPA Workbook Example