Dr.

Bhavani Thuraisingham
The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD)

October 2011
Cloud-based
Assured Information Sharing
and
Identity Management


Team Members
Sponsor: Air Force Office of Scientific Research
The University of Texas at Dallas
Faculty: Dr. Murat Kantarcioglu; Dr. Latifur Khan; Dr. Kevin
Hamlen; Dr. Zhiqiang Lin
Sub-contractors
Prof. Elisa Bertino (Purdue)
Ms. Anita Miller, Dr. Bob Johnson (North Texas Fusion Center)
Collaborators
Dr. Steve Barker, Kings College, U of London (EOARD)
Dr. Barbara Carminati; Dr. Elena Ferrari, U of Insubria (EOARD)
Prof. Peng Liu, Penn State
Prof. Ting Yu, NC State
Outline
Objectives
Layered Framework
Data Security Issues for Clouds
Our Research
FY11
Cloud-based Assured Information Sharing Demonstration
RDF-based Policy Engine on the Cloud
Secure Query Processing in Hybrid Cloud
CloudMask: Purdue University
Stream-based Malware Detection on the Cloud
Hypervisor (e.g., Xen) Integrity Issues and Forensics in the Cloud
Preliminary Investigation of Identity Management
FY10
Secure Querying and Storing Relational Data with HIVE
Secure Querying and Storing RDF in Hadoop with SPARQL
XACML Implementation for Hadoop
Amazon.com Web Services and Security
Accountability and Access Control (Joint with Purdue)
Acknowledgement: Research Funded by Air Force Office of Scientific Research
Objectives
Cloud computing is an example of computing in which dynamically scalable
and often virtualized resources are provided as a service over the Internet.
Users need not have knowledge of, expertise in, or control over the
technology infrastructure in the "cloud" that supports them.
Our research on Cloud Computing is based on Hadoop, MapReduce, Xen
Apache Hadoop is a Java software framework that supports data intensive
distributed applications under a free license. It enables applications to work
with thousands of nodes and petabytes of data. Hadoop was inspired by
Google's MapReduce and Google File System (GFS) papers.
XEN is a Virtual Machine Monitor developed at the University of Cambridge,
England
Our goal is to build a secure cloud infrastructure to assured information
sharing applications


7/23/2014 5
Layered Framework
User Interface
Hadoop/MapReduc/Storage

HIVE/SPARQL/Query

XEN/Linux/VMM
Secure Virtual
Network Monitor

Policies
XACML

Risks/
Costs
QoS
Resource
Allocation
Cloud
Monitors
Figure2. Layered Framework for Assured Cloud
Secure Query Processing with
Hadoop/MapReduce
We have studied clouds based on Hadoop
Query rewriting and optimization techniques designed and
implemented for two types of data
(i) Relational data: Secure query processing with HIVE
(ii) RDF data: Secure query processing with SPARQL
Demonstrated with XACML policies
Joint demonstration with Kings College and University of Insubria
First demo (2011): Each party submits their data and policies
Our cloud will manage the data and policies
Second demo (2012): Multiple clouds
Fine-grained Access Control with Hive
System Architecture
Table/View definition and loading,
Users can create tables as well as
load data into tables. Further, they
can also upload XACML policies
for the table they are creating.
Users can also create XACML
policies for tables/views.
Users can define views only if
they have permissions for all
tables specified in the query used
to create the view. They can also
either specify or create XACML
policies for the views they are
defining.
CollaborateCom 2010
Server
Backend
SPARQL Query Optimizer for Secure
RDF Data Processing
Web Interface
Data Preprocessor
N-Triples Converter
Prefix Generator
Predicate Based
Splitter
Predicate Object
Based Splitter
MapReduce Framework
Parser
Query Validator &
Rewriter
XACML PDP
Plan Generator
Plan Executor
Query Rewriter By
Policy
New Data
Query
Answer
To build an
efficient storage
mechanism using
Hadoop for large
amounts of data
(e.g. a billion
triples); build an
efficient query
mechanism for
data stored in
Hadoop; Integrate
with Jena

Developed a query
optimizer and
query rewriting
techniques for
RDF Data with
XACML policies
and implemented
on top of JENA

IEEE Transactions
on Knowledge and
Data Engineering,
2011
Demonstration: Concept of Operation

User Interface Layer
Fine-grained Access Control
with Hive
SPARQL Query Optimizer
for Secure RDF Data
Processing
Relational Data RDF Data
Agency 1 Agency 2 Agency n

RDF-based Policy Engine on the Cloud

Policy
Transformation
Layer
Result Query

DB

DB

RDF
Policy Parser Layer
Regular Expression-Query
Translator
Data Controller Provenance Controller
. . .

RDF
XML
Policy / Graph
Transformation Rules
Access Control/ Redaction
Policy (Traditional Mechanism)
User Interface Layer
High Level Specification
Policy
Translator
A testbed for evaluating different policy sets over
different data representation. Also supporting
provenance as directed graph and viewing policy
outcomes graphically
Determine how access is granted to a resource as
well as how a document is shared

User specify policy: e.g., Access Control, Redaction,
Released Policy

Parse a high-level policy to a low-level
representation

Support Graph operations and visualization. Policy
executed as graph operations

Execute policies as SPARQL queries over large
RDF graphs on Hadoop

Support for policies over Traditional data and its
provenance

IFIP Data and Applications Security, 2010, ACM
SACMAT 2011
Integration with
Assured Information Sharing:
User Interface Layer
RDF Data Preprocessor
Policy Translation and
Transformation Layer
MapReduce Framework for
Query Processing
Hadoop HDFS
Agency 1 Agency 2 Agency n

RDF Data
and Policies
SPARQL Query
Result
Secure Storage and Query Processing in a
Hybrid Cloud: Problem Motivation
The use of hybrid clouds is an emerging trend in cloud computing
Ability to exploit public resources for high throughput
Yet, better able to control costs and data privacy
Several key challenges
Data Design: how to store data in a hybrid cloud?
Solution must account for data representation used
(unencrypted/encrypted), public cloud monetary costs and
query workload characteristics
Query Processing: how to execute a query over a hybrid cloud?
Solution must provide query rewrite rules that ensure the
correctness of a generated query plan over the hybrid cloud
Research Results
Data Design: A user submits data, a query workload, monetary and confidentiality
constraints
Solve the data partitioning problem in four phases
Partition the data into several public (P
pu
) and private (P
pr
) components
For each partition, P
pu
& P
pr
, obtain their associated statistics
Estimate the execution cost of given query workload based on a users choice of
confidentiality level as well as the statistics associated with the partition
Select the best partition as the one that minimizes query workload execution cost without
violating monetary and confidentiality constraints
Query Processing: A user submits a query Q
Solve the query processing problem in four phases
Query Rearrangement: Use query rewrite rules to transform an original query Q into public
(Q
pu
) and private (Q
pr
) query(ies)
Public Cloud Execution: Execute Q
pu
on public cloud
Private Cloud Execution: Execute Q
pr
on private cloud
Post-Processing: Combine the results of the execution of Q
pu
and Q
pr
into the final result
Hypervisor integrity and forensics
in the Cloud


Cloud integrity &
forensics
Hardware Layer
Virtualization Layer (Xen, vSphere)
Linux Solaris XP
MacOS
Secure control flow of hypervisor code
Integrity via in-lined reference monitor
Forensics data extraction in the cloud
Multiple VMs
De-mapping (isolate) each VM memory from physical memory


Hypervisor
OS
Applications
integrity
forensics
Cloud-based Malware Detection
Dr. Mehedy
Benign
Buffer
Feature
extraction and
selection using
Cloud
Training &
Model update
Unknown
executable
Feature
extraction
Classify
Class
Malware
Remove Keep
Stream of known malware or
benign executables

Ensemble of
Classification
models
Cloud-based Malware Detection
ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems
Binary feature extraction involves
Enumerating binary n-grams from the binaries and selecting the best n-grams
based on information gain
For a training data with 3,500 executables, number of distinct 6-grams can
exceed 200 millions
In a single machine, this may take hours, depending on available computing
resources not acceptable for training from a stream of binaries
We use Cloud to overcome this bottleneck
A Cloud Map-reduce framework is used
to extract and select features from each chunk
A 10-node cloud cluster is 10 times faster than a single node
Very effective in a dynamic framework, where malware characteristics
change rapidly

Fine-grained attribute-based privacy-preserving access control

Fine-grained access control: different parts of the data can
be covered by different access control policies
Attribute-based access control: access control policies are
expressed in terms of identity attributes of subjects
accessing the data
Privacy-preserving: the cloud does not learn anything about
the contents of the data and the values of the identity
attributes of users
System Developed is CloudMask
Joint Paper at CollobarateCom 2011



Key Features of CloudMask System:
Elisa Bertino Purdue University and
Murat Kantarcioglu, UT Dallas
Directions
Secure VMM (Virtual Machine Monitor) and VNM (Virtual
Network Monitor)
Exploring XEN VMM and examining security issues
Developing automated techniques for VMM
introspection
Will examine VNM issues January 2012
Integrate Secure Storage Algorithms into Hadoop (FY
2012)
Identity Management (FY 2012)
Technology Transfer through Knowledge and Security
Analytics, LLC













October 2011
Identity Management
for the Cloud

Kevin Hamlen, Peng Liu, Murat Kantarcioglu,
Bhavani Thuraisingham, Ting Yu



Identity Management Considerations in a
Cloud
Trust model that handles
(i) Various trust relationships, (ii) access control policies based on roles and
attributes, iii) real-time provisioning, (iv) authorization, and (v) auditing and
accountability.
Several technologies have to be examined to develop the trust
model
Service-oriented technologies; standards such as SAML and XACML; and
identity management technologies such as OpenID.
Does one size fit all?
Can we develop a trust model that will be applicable to all types of clouds
such as private clouds, public clouds and hybrid clouds Identity architecture
has to be integrated into the cloud architecture.