FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

TRANSPORT AIRPLANE AND ENGINE

SAFETY REQUIREMENTS


A GENERAL OVERVIEW
Certification Process Study Team Meeting #6
Museum of Flight, Seattle WA
June 26-27, 2001
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introductory Remarks (D. Cheney)
Flight: Airplane Performance, Stability and
Control, Related Support (T. Archer/J. Neff)
Structures: Loads, Design and Construction
(H. Offerman)
Equipment: Mechanical (R. Jones)
Equipment: General, Electrical, Avionics
(S. Boyd)
Propulsion: Engine/APU (M. Fulmer)
Propulsion: Engine Installation (K. Rask)
Cabin Safety (F. Tiangsing)
Human Factors (S. Boyd)
CERTIFICATION FLIGHT TEST
Tom Archer - FAA Flight Test Pilot
John Neff - FAA Flight Test Engineer
Flight Test Branch

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office
CERTIFICATION FLIGHT TEST
Overview
Flying Qualities
Systems and Equipment
Aero. Performance
Airplane Flight Manual
CDL
Operations Manual / MMEL



CERTIFICATION FLIGHT TEST
Flying Qualities (FAR 25, Subpart B)

Aircraft Systems (FAR 25, Subparts D, E, & F)
Aircraft Systems
Installed Equipment

Performance (FAR 25, Subpart B)

Airplane Flight Manual (FAR 25 Subpart G)



FLIGHT TEST - GOAL
Ensure aircraft meets minimum standards
Fully operational aircraft or
with any foreseeable failures (more probable
than 1x10E-9)
with a pilot of average skills
throughout the operational envelope:
Speed
Altitude
Gross Weight / Center of Gravity
Temperature
Limit head/tail/cross winds

FLYING QUALITIES (FQ)
General Requirements-
The airplane must:
Be safely controllable and maneuverable
Not require exceptional piloting skill,
alertness or strength
Be capable of continued safe flight and
landing following any single failure or
combination of failures not shown to be
extremely improbable.
The flying qualities requirements must be
demonstrated throughout the flight envelope
FLYING QUALITIES (FQ) (contd)
Stability
Static
Dynamic
Controllability
Maneuverability
Stall Characteristics
High Speed Characteristics
Degraded Modes
FLIGHT ENVELOPE
The airplane must exhibit acceptable flying
qualities at the most critical loading within
the ranges of speed and altitude for which
certification is requested.
The airline pilot is provided with a safe
operational flight envelope (bounded by
certificated limits) that has been thoroughly
explored during flight testing.
The airplane is test flown outside of its
operational envelope to account for inadvertent
excursions beyond the certificated limits.
C.G./GROSS WEIGHT ENVELOPE
G
r
o
s
s

W
e
i
g
h
t

(
P
o
u
n
d
s
)

Center of Gravity (%MAC)
FLIGHT ENVELOPE



P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

A
l
t
i
t
u
d
e

(
F
e
e
t
)

Airspeed (KCAS)
V-N DIAGRAM



SPECIFIC FQ FLIGHT TESTS
General (25.101-.143)
Maneuvering stability
(25.143, .251, .255)
Longitudinal control
(25.145)
Directional and lateral
control (25.147)

Minimum control speed
(25.149)
Trim (25.161)
Static longitudinal
stability (25.173-.175)
Static lateral-directional
stability (25.177)

SPECIFIC FQ FLIGHT TESTS (Cont)
Dynamic stability
(25.181)
Stall characteristics
(25.203)
Ground handling
(25.231-.235)
Cross wind (25.237)
Vibration and buffeting
(25.251)
High-speed
characteristics (25.253)
Out-of-trim
characteristics (25.255)
TEST CONDITIONS
TEST LOADING
(wt/cg)
DATA
General Full range Qual, forces
Man stab Fs/g
Long control Heavy/fwd, aft Qual, forces
Lat-dir control Heavy/fwd, aft
TEST CONDITIONS (Cont)
TEST LOADING DATA
Min cont spd Light/aft Hdg, grd track
Trim Full range Control forces
Stat long stab Light/aft Fe/V
Stat lat/dir stab Light/aft
Fa/, Fr/
TEST CONDITIONS (Cont)
TEST LOADING DATA
Dyn stability Light/aft Oscillations
Grd handling Full range Qualitative
Stall char Light/aft
, response
Vib/buffet Heavy/aft Fs/g, Vc, Mach
TEST CONDITIONS (Cont)
TEST LOADING DATA
High spd char Full range Fs/g, Vc, Mach
Out-of-trim
characteristics
Full range Fs/g, Vc, Mach
ADDITIONAL APPROVALS
Human Factors- continuous evaluations
conducted concurrently with other tests

Operating Limitations (FAR 25, Subpart G)-
sufficient to define the envelope
demonstrated during flight tests

Airplane Flight Manual (FAR 25, Subpart G)-
information validated during flight testing
SYSTEMS
Systems and equipment evaluated by
Flight Test
All Systems
Virtually every piece of equipment on the A/C
Three categories of equipment
> Equip. required by FAR Part 25
> Equip. NOT required by FAR 25, but IS by FAR 91,
121, 125, or 135,
> Equip. not required by any FAR


SYSTEMS
ALL equip. MUST meet the following rules
Perform its intended function/function
properly
Not provide any misleading information to
crew
Not interfere with any other equipment
Specifically applicable rules (if any)
No failure condition may preclude continued
safe flight and landing


AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
Flight Controls
Landing Gear
Powerplant
Fuel
Auto Flight
Flight Director
Auto Pilot
Auto Throttle
HUD
Hydraulics


Electrical
Pressurization/Environ.
Fire Protection
Flight Deck
Controls
Displays
Lights
Safety
Comm/Nav
De-ice/Anti-ice

FLIGHT TEST - FIRE/SMOKE
WATER IMPINGEMENT
COLD / HOT ENVIRONMENT
WINDOWS / DOORS
INSTALLED EQUIPMENT
Operational
Requirement
TCAS
GPWS/EGPWS
RWS/PWS
CVR
FDR
HF
3rd Comm/Nav
Standby Instruments

Optional
ACARS
GPS
IFE
Telephones
SAT Comm
Lavatories
Prayer Rooms
PERFORMANCE
Phase of Flight
Takeoff (FAR 25.105 - .107)
Accelerate - Go
Accelerate - Stop (FAR 25.109)
Climb (FAR 25.113 - .117, .121)
First / Second / Third / Final segment
En Route (FAR 25.123)
Descent
Approach
Approach climb (FAR 25.121)
Landing (FAR 25.125)
Landing climb (FAR 25.119)

T.O. PERFORMANCE
Takeoff Speed Schedule Development
(FAR 25.107)

Takeoff Field Length Requirements
(FAR 25.113)

HIGH ALTITUDE TAKEOFF PERF.
LaPaz, Bolivia, field elevation 13,100 ft. MSL
TAKEOFF SPEEDS
Definitions for speed schedule
development
V1 Takeoff decision speed
Min. speed, following critical engine failure, from which
T.O. can continue and achieve 35 within T.O. distance
Max speed to initiate the first action in an abort and
stop within accel-stop distance
less than V1MBE

Brake Release Vef Vr
>V2
Vlof V1
35 feet Vmcg Vmca
Vmu
Max. tire
speed
Vmbe
(15 if wet)
TAKEOFF SPEEDS (contd)
Definitions for speed schedule development
Vr Rotation speed
Equal to, or greater than, V1, and 1.05 Vmca
result in a minimum Vlof of 1.05 OEI Vmu & 1.1 AEO Vmu
Allow reaching V2min by 35, OEI
5 knot abuse (OEI) will not significantly extend the
takeoff distance

Brake Release Vef Vr
>V2
Vlof V1
35 feet
Vmca Vmu
TAKEOFF SPEEDS (contd)
Definitions for speed schedule
development
V2 Takeoff Safety Speed
Meet minimum EO climb gradient
Greater than V2min
V2min
1.1Vmca
1.13Vs



Brake Release Vr
V2
V1
35 feet
Vmca Vs
ADDITIONAL SAFETY MARGINS
T.O. Tests @ each flap setting
Light / mid / heavy weights
All engine / one engine inoperative
Several T/W at each flap setting
Fuel cut conditions
Overspeed
Abuses
Rapid rotations (rate)
Over rotations
5 knot Vr abuse
Mis-trim
Over 60 Takeoffs


FAR TAKEOFF FIELD LENGTH
AFM Takeoff Distance Required
Vr Vlof
35 feet
Demonstrated All Engine Distance
Takeoff Distance = 1.15 X All Eng. Dist. To 35 feet
>V2

All engine, full up airplane
FAR TAKEOFF FIELD LENGTH
(contd)
Critical Engine Fails at Vef
Balanced field length
GO
V2
Vlof Vr
35 feet
Vef
V1
RTO
Throttles / max. brakes, speed brakes
AFM expansion, incl. 2 sec. At V1
Dry Runway - NO credit for thrust reversers
Wet Runway - Credit given for thrust reversers
FAR TAKEOFF FIELD LENGTH
(contd)
RTO
Vlof Vr
35 feet
Vef
V1
GO
Throttles / max. brakes, speed brakes
Vr Vlof
35 feet
Takeoff Distance = 1.15 X All Eng. Dist.
Vef
Dispatch Runway Requirement, the longest distance of:
REFUSED TAKEOFF - STOPPING
100% MBE RTO
Demonstrated performance with:
90% (min.) worn brakes (accident
investigation)
> FAR 25.109
Pre-heated, 3 mile taxi w/ three stops
full stop - 5 minutes

ANTI SKID - INOPERATIVE
CLIMB PERFORMANCE
Takeoff Path Segments (FAR 25.115)
1st = Liftoff to gear up
2nd = gear up to 400 ft.
3rd = 400 ft. to 1500 ft. (accel/cleanup)
Enroute = Greater of: 1500 ft. or clean, MCT &
at final climb speed

Min. climb requirements based on:
Weight
Altitude
Temperature
Most unfavorable CG

TAKEOFF PATH
Minimum Climb Gradient (FAR 25.117)
Based on total number of engines
Takeoff segment
All engine / OEI, and two EI for quads

Operational Requirements (FAR 121,
Subpart I)
ENROUTE PERFORMANCE
Enroute (FAR 25.123)
Following data must be determined and
published
Climb performance, all engine and OEI
Drift down
Procedures associated with the above

APPROACH PERFORMANCE
Approach Climb (FAR 25.121)
Min. climb gradient, based on:
Approach configuration
Total number of engines
Critical engine inoperative
Max. landing weight


FAR LANDING FIELD LENGTH
Vref landing threshold speed
Vref min = 1.23Vsr

FAR 121 FACTORED Landing Distance (121.195)
Touch down
FAR 121 Landing Distance = demonstrated
0.6
50 feet
transition deceleration in full braking config.
Full stop
FAR 25 Landing Field Length
landing flare
Vref
FAR 25.125
AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL
AFM (FAR 25.1581)
Four sections
Limitations
Normal procedures
Non-normal procedures
Performance
Appendices
Configuration Deviation List
Derated thrust operations
Engine intermix
Alternate Weight

AFM / CDL
CDL contains additional limitations
required for operations with missing
secondary parts
PIC notified and provided a list of all parts
Each limitation listed by placard in flight deck
Logbook entry
Cumulative performance decrements via
weight penalty




OPERATIONS MANUAL / MMEL
Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM)
(FAR 121.141)
Permits OM in lieu of the FAR Part 25 AFM
Must contain Limitations from AFM
Perf. data / procedures can be modified from
AFM
NOT FAA Approved, Accepted by POI

Master Minimum Equipment List (FAR
121.627)
Permits operation of the aircraft in a non-
standard configuration
owned by AEG
FLIGHT TEST - CONCLUSION
Huge improvements in recent years
Analytical Methods
Dynamometer Testing
Simulation

Only Flight Test
Total Integrated Package
Real World Environment
Human Factors

Questions?




PART 25 STRUCTURES RULES
Hank Offerman
Airframe Branch

Transport Airplane Directorate




CERTIFICATION OF STRUCTURE
CFR 14, Part 25 - Airworthiness Standards
Subpart C, Structure
Loads, design conditions, proof of structure
Subpart D - Design & Construction (Structure)
Material & process specifications, special
factors, design criteria, special considerations
Subpart G - Operating Limitations & Information
Airspeed, weight, center of gravity
> Limits can not exceed values used for design in
Subpart C
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
> Inspection requirements
Locations, intervals, methods, acceptance criteria

DESIGN LOADS
Flight Maneuver & Gust (25.331 - 25.351)
Ground Loads (25.471 - 25.519)
Landing loads
Ground handling loads
Taxi & ground maneuver
Towing loads
Jacking & tie-down loads
Control Surface & System Lds (25.391 -
25.459)
Emergency Landing Conditions (25.561 -
25.563)
Supplementary Conditions (25.361 - 25.373)
Fatigue Evaluation (25.571)
Lightning Protection (25.581)
MANEUVER LOADS
Response to Control Input or Command
Pilot
Automatic flight control system

Symmetric
Balanced maneuvers
Steady state
> Zero pitching acceleration
Checked maneuvers
Rational pitch vs. time profile
Unchecked maneuvers
Maximum control deflection
MANEUVER LOADS
Asymmetric
Rolling conditions
Sudden deflection of controls
Steady state roll maximum control deflection
Yaw maneuver conditions
Sudden deflection of controls
Overswing yaw maximum control deflection
Steady sideslip maximum control deflection
Sudden return to neutral
MANEUVER LOADS
Airplane Flight Configuration
Cruise configuration
With and without in-flight lift and drag
devices
Takeoff, approach & landing
Airplane Weight Configuration
All critical weight & center of gravity
combinations on or within the C.G. envelope
All critical fuel load combinations
Airplane Speed & Load Factor
All critical speed & load factor combinations
on or within the maneuver envelope
MANEUVER LOADS
Load Factor - n
The inertial or acceleration forces acting on a
body (f) is the load factor times the weight (w)
of the body
f = n x w

Sign Convention - Airplane Axis System
Positive - push you into your seat
Negative - lift you out of your seat
DESIGN V-N ENVELOPES
Defined by Experience
Based upon extensive flight measurement
60 year history - on-going programs
Values selected such that probability of
exceedance is small
Relationships defined to ensure safe operation
in usage environment
Does not constrain airplane usage in the
operational environment
Enables minimum weight design

MANEUVER LOADS
Maneuver Design Load Factors
V-n diagram
GUST LOADS
Gust is an Atmospheric Disturbance
Direction - change in angle of attack
Velocity - change in local airspeed

Result of Gust is Change in Aerodynamic
Force Acting on Airplane
Acceleration - change in load factor

Two Structural Load Components
Rigid body response
Dynamic response due to airplane flexibility
and gust velocity profile
GUST LOADS
Present Evaluation Requirements
Discrete gust
Excites rigid body response
> Provides a dynamic component
Single encounter - defined gust profile
Includes airplane dynamic response
Continuous gust
Atmosphere model - power spectral density
> Atmospheric energy vs. frequency
Excites dynamic components
> Provides a rigid body component
Envelope design - high loads
Mission analysis - fatigue spectrum


GUST ENVELOPE
Gust Design Load Factors
V-n diagram
GROUND LOADS
Ground Loads are Computed using
Weights and Centers of Gravity Which
Result in Maximum Design Loads in Each
Landing Gear Element
Forward, aft, vertical and lateral centers of
gravity locations must be considered
GROUND LOADS
Landing Loads
Applied to landing gear and airplane

Landing Parameters
Descent velocity
Maximum landing weight - 10 feet per
second
Maximum takeoff weight - 6 feet per second
Landing load factors
Function of landing gear energy absorption
characteristics
Must be validated by tests
GROUND LOADS
Landing Conditions
Level landing (nose landing gear arrangement)
Main gear in contact, nose gear clear
All three gear in contact
Tail down landing
One-gear landing
Drift landing
Rebound landing

GROUND LOADS
Ground Handling Loads
Taxi, takeoff and landing roll
Roughest ground reasonably expected
Braked roll
Main gear in contact, nose gear clear
All three gear in contact
Turning
Side load due to centrifugal load factor
Nose wheel yaw & steering
Side load on nose gear
Pivoting
Landing gear torque
Reversed braking
GROUND LOADS
Towing Loads
Defines loads to be applied to the towing
fittings
30% of the towed weight for airplanes
weighing less than 30,000 pounds
15% of the towed weight for airplanes
weighing more than 100,000 pounds
Linearly varying between 30,000 and 100,000
pounds
GROUND LOADS
Jacking & Tie-Down Loads
Airplanes must have jacking provisions
Loads computed at maximum ramp weight
Airplane
Loads resulting from a vertical load factor of
1.33 plus a horizontal load factor of 0.33 in any
direction
Fittings & local structure
Loads resulting from a vertical load factor of
2.00 plus a horizontal load factor of 0.33 in any
direction
Tie-down fittings and local structure (IF provided)
Loads resulting from a 65 knot horizontal
wind in any direction
CONTROL SURFACE & SYSTEM
LOADS
Control Surfaces Must be Designed for
Loads Resulting From
Flight conditions
Loads need not exceed those resulting from
the application of maximum pilot effort loads
Ground gust conditions
Loads parallel to hinge line
Load factor of 12 for horizontal surfaces and
24 for vertical surfaces
Must Consider
Pilot effort effects
Trim tab effects
Unsymmetrical loading

CONTROL SURFACE & SYSTEM
LOADS
Control System Must be Designed for
Maximum Pilot Effort Loads
Aileron, wheel
80 x wheel diameter pound-inches
Elevator, wheel
300 pounds
Rudder
300 pounds
Criteria for Dual Control Systems
Pilots acting together
Pilots acting in opposition
EMERGENCY LANDING
CONDITIONS
Protection of Occupants
Protection of Systems Which Could Cause
Fire or Explosion
Design Load Factors
Up - 3.0
Forward - 9.0
Sideward - 3.0 for airframe, 4.0 for seats
Downward - 6.0
Aft - 1.5
Dynamic Conditions for Seats
16 g seats

SUPPLEMENTARY CONDITIONS
Engine Torque
Operating torque
Engine acceleration
Sudden engine stoppage
Side Loads on Engine Mounts
Pressurized Compartments
Unsymmetrical Loads Due to Engine
Failure
Gyroscopic Loads
Speed Control Devices
DAMAGE TOLERANCE & FATIGUE
EVALUATION OF STRUCTURE
An evaluation of the strength, detail
design, and fabrication must show that
catastrophic failure due to fatigue,
corrosion, manufacturing defects, or
accidental damage, will be avoided
throughout the operational life of the
airplane FAR 25.571(a)

DAMAGE TOLERANCE & FATIGUE
EVALUATION OF STRUCTURE
Damage Tolerance Evaluation
Address catastrophic failures due to fatigue,
corrosion & accidental damage
Crack growth analysis and/or tests
Residual strength evaluation
Inspection & maintenance procedures
Applied to single load path structure
Applied to multiple load path and crack arrest
fail safe structure where it cannot be
demonstrated that failure will be detected
during normal maintenance


DAMAGE TOLERANCE & FATIGUE
EVALUATION OF STRUCTURE
Damage Tolerance Evaluation (Contd)
Wide spread fatigue damage will not occur
during the design service life of the airplane
Supported by full scale fatigue test evidence
Damage Tolerance (Discrete Source)
Bird impact
Uncontained fan blade impact
Uncontained engine failure
Uncontained high energy rotating machinery
failure
DAMAGE TOLERANCE & FATIGUE
EVALUATION OF STRUCTURE
Fatigue (Safe Life) Evaluation
May be used when the application of the damage
tolerance requirements is impractical
Sonic Fatigue Strength
Sonic fatigue cracks are are not probable in
flight structure subject to sonic excitation, or
Catastrophic failure is not probable if sonic
fatigue cracking occurs
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
The data developed to demonstrate compliance
with this requirement forms the basis for the
airframe instructions for continued airworthiness
LIGHTNING PROTECTION
The Airplane Must be Protected Against
Catastrophic Effects of Lightning
Electrical bonding
Design of components to preclude the effect of
a strike
Diverting electrical current
PROOF OF STRUCTURE
25.303 through 25.307
Computed Loads - Limit Loads
Limit Loads Times Factor of Safety -
Ultimate Loads
Factor of safety - 1.5
Very low number - commercial machine
design applications use 6 and up
Usage is justified by material and process
controls imposed by Subpart D and
maintenance programs required by
operating rules
> Part 91, 121, 125, 135
PROOF OF STRUCTURE
Requirement
Limit load
No detrimental permanent deformation
Deflections may not interfere with safe
operation
Ultimate load
Structure must be able to support the load
for 3 seconds
Dynamic testing may be used
PROOF OF STRUCTURE
Compliance Demonstration
Static tests to limit load
May require ultimate load testing where limit
load testing is determined to be inadequate
Structural analysis
May only be used if the structure conforms
to that for which this method has been
shown to be reliable
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
Material & Process Specifications
25.603, 25.605, 25.613
Special Factors
25.619 - 25.625
Design Criteria
25.607 - 25.611, 25.651 - 25.735
Special Considerations
25.629 - 25.631, 25.843(a)
MATERIAL & PROCESS
SPECIFICATIONS
The Suitability and Durability of Materials
Must -
Be established on the basis of experience or
tests
Conform to approved specifications
Ensure having the strength and other
properties assumed in the design data
Take into account environmental conditions
expected in service
> Temperature
> Humidity
MATERIAL & PROCESS
SPECIFICATIONS
Manufacturing Processes
The method of fabrication used must produce
a consistently sound structure
If a fabrication process requires close control
to produce consistently sound results it must
be performed under an approved process
specification
Each new fabrication method must be
substantiated by tests
MATERIAL & PROCESS
SPECIFICATIONS
Material Specifications
Material strength properties must be based on
enough tests of material meeting approved
specifications to establish design values on a
statistical basis
A-basis 99% probability, 90% confidence
B-basis 90% probability, 90% confidence
Effects of temperature must be considered
where thermal effects are significant under
normal operating conditions
SPECIAL FACTORS
The Factor of Safety of 1.5 Must be
Multiplied by the Highest Pertinent Special
Factor of Safety for Each Part of the
Structure Whose Strength is
Uncertain
Likely to deteriorate in service
Subject to appreciable variability
Uncertainties in manufacturing process
Uncertainties in inspection methods
SPECIAL FACTORS
Casting Factor Process Variables
Critical castings
Failure would preclude continued safe flight
and landing or cause injury
1.25 to 1.5
> Based upon testing and inspection
Noncritical castings
All others
1.0 to 2.0
> Based upon testing and inspection

SPECIAL FACTORS
Fitting Factor Uncertainties in Stress
Analysis
Applied to fittings whose strength has not been
proven by limit and ultimate load tests
1.15
Fitting Factor Wear and Deterioration
Seats, seatbelt fittings
1.33
Bearing Factor Wear and Deterioration
Control surface hinges
6.67
SPECIAL FACTORS
Bearing Factor Clearance Fits Subject to
Vibration
Judgment
Joints Subject to Angular Motion Wear
3.33
Not applicable to ball or roller bearings

DESIGN CRITERIA
Fasteners
Locking devices
Protection of Structure
Protection against loss of strength in service
due to any cause, including
Weathering
Corrosion
Abrasion
Provisions for ventilation and drainage
DESIGN CRITERIA
Control Surfaces
Limit load tests required
Compliance with special factor requirements
must be shown by analysis or test
Control System Stops
Must be able to withstand any load
corresponding to design conditions for the
control system
Control system Limit Load Static Tests
Testing required in which
Each fitting, pulley and bracket is loaded
Compliance with special factors may be by
analysis
DESIGN CRITERIA
Landing Gear
Shock absorption tests
Limit drop tests
> Landing load factors
Reserve energy absorption drop tests
> 12 foot per second descent velocity
Landing Gear Retracting Mechanisms
Loads from flight conditions, gear retracted
Loads from flight conditions in landing
configuration, gear retraction operating
DESIGN CRITERIA
Landing Gear Doors
Design for yawing conditions
Wheels and Tires
Requirements for load ratings

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Aeroelastic Stability Requirements
Flutter, divergence, control reversal
Loss of stability and control as a result of
structural deformation
Must be shown by
Analysis
Wind tunnel tests
Ground vibration tests
Flight tests
Other means found necessary by the
Administrator
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Aeroelastic Stability Requirements
(Contd)
Aeroelastic stability envelope
Normal conditions
> VD + 15%
Failure, malfunction & adverse conditions
> VC + 15%
> Failures, malfunctions & adverse conditions
defined
Flight test requirements
Bird Strike
Empennage
8 pound bird at VC

Robert C. Jones
Mechanical Systems Branch

Transport Airplane Directorate
MECHANICAL SYSTEMS



MECHANICAL SYSTEMS
Flight Controls

Hydraulic Systems

Landing Gear Systems

Cabin Environmental Systems

Cargo Fire Protection Systems

Ice Protection Systems



FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS
Flight Control Systems (25.629, .671, .672, .1309 et al)
Ensure airplane controllability for
All flight and load conditions in flight envelope
Environmental conditions (temp, precip, salt, deice contamination, etc)
In the presence of failures (including A/P)
All single failures & combinations of
failures Pf > 10^-9 and certain dual failures
Jams Pj > 10^-9
Ensure availability of functions that rely on FC
Stability: Flutter, speed, mach, dutch roll; load
allev.
Safe pilot interface (feel systems, disconnects,
indications, warnings, motions, procedures)
Methods: Test, analysis redundancy, separation, monitoring,
maintenance
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS
Safety Objectives
Provide control system capable of safely maneuvering airplane
through all phases of flight within the flight envelope and that
has effective residual control for safe flight and landing after
failures and jams.
The system must be designed to allow to control airplane
without exceptional piloting skill or strength even after failures.
System design must account for human factors to ensure pilot
has suitable warnings, can disconnect or override interfacing
systems, and that movement of controls in the normal sense
results in normal airplane response.
Where automated functions (A/P, SAS, LAS) implemented thru
flight controls ensure system has acceptable reliability,
annunciation, disconnects, and that procedures are available to
permit CSF&L.
Ensure the airplane without engines remains controllable
down to certain landing speeds.
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS
Upcoming Improvements

Harmonized flight control rule (25.671/672)
Addresses NTSB recommendation for reliable
redundancy
Ensure that failures of dual redundant control
paths do not fail latent without meeting specific
guidelines



HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS
Hydraulic Systems (25.1309, 1435, 1438, 1461)
Ensure hydraulics for critical & essential
services
Equipment reqd to meet specific pressure
loads in combination with limit structural loads
and to withstand 1.5 X design operating
pressure load
Fire safety requirements
Integrity of pressure vessels
Containment of failed rotors

Methods: Test, analysis, separation, redundancy,
monitoring, maintenance
HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS
Safety Objective

Ensure hydraulics for critical & essential
services, as required, to allow continued safe
flight and landing even after hydraulic failures
LANDING GEAR SYSTEMS
Landing Gear Systems (25.721, 729, 735, 1309,
JAR 25.745)

Provide capability for airplane ground
maneuvering,
Braking/stopping,
Gear retraction and gear extension in the
air.




LANDING GEAR SYSTEMS
Safety Objective

Provide capability for airplane ground
maneuvering, braking/stopping, plus gear
retraction and gear extension in the air
Landing gear systems include nose and main
gear retraction/extension mechanisms
including doors, wheels, tires, brakes and
brake controls (antiskid), steering, brake wear
& temperature monitoring, and tire pressure
indication systems



LANDING GEAR SYSTEMS
Note

Worn Brake Rejected Take-Off (RTO)
A DC-10 went off the runway. Brakes had been
tested in a new condition for RTO in accordance
with the certification rules in effect at that time.
AD required airplanes over 75,000 pounds to
perform a worn brake demonstration
(dynamometer)
Latest rule requires airplane demonstration for
all gross weights




Cabin Environment (25.831, 25.832, 25.841,
25.1438, 25.1441, 25.1443, 25.1445, 25.1447,
25.1450, 25.1309)
Ensure passengers and crewmembers have:
an acceptable environment during normal
operating conditions
adequate protection to enable survival
without permanent physiological damage
after any system failure

Methods: Test, analysis, redundancy, maintenance
CABIN ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS



Safety Objective

Provide the means to keep the occupants
of the aircraft alive and comfortable

Oxygen, pressurization, pneumatic, heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning systems


CABIN ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS



CABIN ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS
The pressurization and temperature
controlled environments protect the
occupants from the cold temperatures at
high altitudes and provides an atmosphere
with enough oxygen to maintain life

The high operating altitudes of modern
aircraft necessitate oxygen systems that
can sustain life for a limited period of time
should cabin pressurization fail



Cargo Fire Protection (25.851(b), 25.855,
25.857, 25.858, 1309)

Ensure that -
Detection systems detect a fire before it
damages airplane structure & provides visual
indication within 1 minute
Built-in fire extinguishing system does not
introduce a hazard to occupants or the
airplane structure & is adequate to control any
fire likely to occur

Methods: Test, analysis, redundancy, maintenance
CARGO FIRE PROTECTION
SYSTEMS



Safety Objectives

Provide safety features to detect/combat fires

Minimize the impact of fire and extinguishing
agent on occupants


CARGO FIRE PROTECTION
SYSTEMS



Cargo Compartments
Requirements to keep hazardous quantities of
smoke/flame from entering into crew/passenger
compartments
Most are required to have smoke/fire detectors and
an annunciator in the flightdeck

Fire Suppression
Cargo compartment fires are not extinguished,
they are suppressed and controlled
The suppressing agent is Halon

CARGO FIRE PROTECTION
SYSTEMS
CARGO FIRE PROTECTION
SYSTEMS
Information on Class D to C Cargo Compartments

FAA eliminated Class D cargo compartments for future type
certification from commercial transport airplanes
March 19, 2001

Class D cargo compartments must meet the standards for
Class C or Class E compartments

These changes came about because of a number of
accidents, including Valujet

ICE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Ice Protection (25.1419, 1403, 1309)

Ensure Airplane Safety by:
Detection ice or icing conditions
Anti-ice or deice capability
Windshield and probes heating
Provide acceptable flight characteristics for
intercycle ice and ice accreted on
unprotected surfaces

Methods: Test, analysis, redundancy, separations
ICE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Safety Objectives
For airplanes that intend to operate in icing
conditions the ice detection and protections
systems must be designed to ensure timely
activation and capability of ice protection system,
the airplane must be shown to safely operate with
ice accreted on unprotected surfaces and
intercycle ice on protected surfaces, and the
airplane must be shown safe for trajectories of
shed ice to ensure they do not negatively impact
propulsion, instruments, or structures
Clear windshield in icing conditions
Instruments operable in icing conditions
ICE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Developments
Definition of SLD conditions for certification.
Current FAR/JAR do not cover this condition.
(rule in development)
Detection of ice formations aft of the protected
surfaces. Current FAR/JAR do not require
this. (OPS rule in development)
Ensuring stall margins met with intercycle ice
and ice on unprotected surfaces (SFAR in
work)



PART 25 EQUIPMENT RULES

Steve Boyd
Systems & Flight Crew Interface Branch

Transport Airplane Directorate





OVERVIEW

General Remarks
Equipment Installation Requirements
Safety Standards and Objectives
Operational Environment
Instruments
Electrical Systems
Lighting
Recording Systems







GENERAL REMARKS



Subpart F addresses most systems
installed in the airplane
Examples include
avionics
flight and navigational equipment
environmental control
lighting
power generation






EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION
REQUIREMENTS

Overall Purposes
Establish safety standards for installed
equipment
Equipment must perform its intended
functions
Regulate frequency of failures based on their
severity
Protect aircraft and persons against effects of
environmental and operational hazards
Provide means to alert the crew
Standardize certain flight deck display
information
Provide airworthiness standards for certain
equipment required by operating rules

SAFETY STANDARDS: PERFORM
INTENDED FUNCTION
The equipments functionality, capability,
and limitation must be deliberately
incorporated, i.e. no hidden functionality
(25.1301)
Certain levels of reliability for safety-
critical systems are required,
However, equipment is not expected to
always work
Therefore, the effects of failures are also
regulated (25.1309)
SAFETY OBJECTIVES
Catastrophic
Effect
Minor Effect
Extremely
Improbable
More
Frequent
Reduced Crew
Ability to Cope
with Adversity
Improbable
Failure effects are regulated by requiring
an inverse relationship between the
severity of the failures and their frequency
of occurrence
SAFETY OBJECTIVES (continued)
In addition
Fail Safe Design = No single failure
can result in a catastrophic condition
(AC25.1309-1A)



SAFETY OBJECTIVES (continued)
The regulations governing system safety
are based on the fail-safe design
concepts which typically include:
Design integrity and quality (design practices)
System redundancy (protect from first failure)
Proven reliability (service experience)
Error tolerance (designer, maintainer,
operator)
Flight/maintenance crew procedures (mitigate
failure effects)
Others (not listed for brevity)



SAFETY OBJECTIVES (continued)
The safety objectives are defined at the
airplane level, not at the components
themselves [a component failure does not
always result in a hazard to the airplane,
crew, or occupants]
To meet these objectives, the methods of
compliance routinely involve qualifying
components by rigorous industry-wide
guidelines:
Hardware RTCA/DO-160D
Software RTCA/DO-178B



Alerting is necessary to meet the overall
safety objectives (25.1309 (c))
When flight crews are expected in intervene to
mitigate the effects of failures
Alerting can be by design (warnings/cautions)
or by intrinsic characteristics (e.g. deterrent
buffet)
Lighted messages are standardized by
color coding: red or Amber, depending on
the hazard level and urgency (25.1322)
SAFETY OBJECTIVES (continued)
SAFETY OBJECTIVES (end)
Certification Maintenance Requirements
(CMR) are established during certification
as an operating limitation of the Type
Certificate (AC25-19)
CMR is failure finding task to detect safety-
significant latent system failures that, in
combination with other failures, result in a
hazardous or catastrophic condition
CMR is not MSG-3 which are tasks that prevent
failures
CMR is not structural inspection required by
25.571, 25.1529, Appendix H25.4


THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
Effects due to operational and
environmental conditions (internal and
external) are considered
Specific rules for:
lightning protection (25.1316)
ice detection and protection (25.1403, 1419)
life support systems (25.1438-1453)
Other conditions (altitude, temperature, rain,
wind, vibration, glare, etc) are considered in
specific methods of compliance which
typically involve testing



INSTRUMENTS

The regulations provide the minimum
standards for displaying safety-critical
information in the flight deck (25.1303,
1305)
Certain instruments must be installed
Safety-critical flight and navigation
instruments (specific navigation systems are
required by operating rules)
Powerplant instruments
The basic T arrangement (25.1321)
INSTRUMENTS
Specific regulations levied against flight
critical system to ensure:
Safety of design (under failure conditions, for
flammability, system status indications, etc.)
Human factors issues (control accessibility,
consistency of operation, consistent use of
color, etc.) have been addressed
Adequate means to detect system failures
Adequate system capacity (for electrical
power)
INSTRUMENTS
General requirements levied against flight
critical instruments ensure:
Means are provided to connect required
instruments to opposite side of cockpit
Display of information essential to safety of
flight will remain available to pilots after single
failure
Other systems may not be connected to these
flight critical systems, unless provisions are
made to ensure correct operation after failure

AIRSPEED INDICATING (25.1323)
STATIC PRESSURE (25.1325)
Other specific instrumentation
requirements intended to deal with past
problem areas:
System arrangement to prevent malfunction
due to entry of moisture, dirt, or other
substances
Heated to prevent malfunction due to icing
Redundant systems separated to prevent
single event (e.g., birdstrike) from disabling
multiple systems
Positive drainage to avoid corrosion, correct
use of materials, correct installation to avoid
chafing
AUTOPILOT/FLIGHT DIRECTOR
SYSTEMS (25.1329)
Must be able to be disengaged quickly and
positively to prevent interference with pilot
control of airplane
Must be designed to prevent hazardous loads
on airframe or hazardous flight path deviations
during normal flight or failure condition
Must be designed to provide positive and
unambiguous annunciation of current operating
mode
Human factors issues (operation of controls,
location of displays and controls, etc.)


POWERPLANT INSTRUMENTS
(25.1337)
Provides installation requirements for the
instruments required by other sections
Minimize hazards from escape of flammable
fluids
Ensure proper calibration of fuel quantity
indication systems
Minimize affects of fuel flowmeter
malfunctions
Other specific issues associated with oil
quantity, propeller position, and fuel pressure
indication systems
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS
General Requirements

Generating Systems

Distribution System

Circuit Breakers




GENERAL REQUIREMENTS


The airplane must be capable of operation
without normal electrical power sources at
maximum altitude for at least 5 minutes
(25.1351d)
Electrical equipment, controls and wiring
must be installed to ensure non-interference
with other electrical units and systems
essential to safe operations (25.1353a)
Electrical cables must be grouped, spaced
and routed to minimize damage to essential
systems due to faults in heavy current-
carrying cables (25.1353b)


GENERAL REQUIREMENTS


Electrical Systems Laboratory Tests
(25.1363)
system should have a high degree of fidelity
with actual equipment installed on the airplane
for flight conditions not simulated adequately
in the laboratory, flight tests must be made
example: effect of zero g and negative gs on
generator function







GENERATING SYSTEMS (25.1351)

Electrical Loads analysis determines the
generating capacity and number and kind
of power sources
No failure of a power source can create a
hazard or impair the ability of remaining
sources to supply essential loads
There must be a means to disconnect
power sources from the system and
indicate power available

BATTERIES (25.1353C)

Most aircraft need a battery to power critical
systems or start the auxiliary power unit in
case normal generator power is lost in flight
Battery requirements include:
temperature and pressure safeguards
protection from explosion and toxic gas
emissions
meet 5 minute loss of primary power requirement
charge rate, temperature monitored with
associated warning to crew and ability to
disconnect


CIRCUIT PROTECTION (25.1357)

Circuit breakers or fuses are required to
protect wiring and airplane power busses
automatic devices required to minimize hazard
to airplane in event of wiring faults
protective devices necessary for generating
system
if resetting is required for safety of flight,
circuit breaker must be located and identified
so it can be easily reset in flight


LIGHTING REQUIREMENTS

External requirements include:
Position lights (red, green, white on tail)
(25.1385, 1387, 1389)
Anti-collision lights (25.1401)
Wing ice detection lights (25.1403)
Landing lights (25.1383)
Specific requirements for coverage, color,
position and intensity (25.1389, 1391,
1393, 1395, 1397)

LIGHTING REQUIREMENTS

Internal lighting requirements include:
means provided to control intensity (25.1381)
meet intended function (25.1301)
emergency lightning for evacuation (25.812)
Cockpit lighting evaluation by pilots for all
operational conditions
No requirements for cabin lights, except
for emergency lighting

RECORDING SYSTEMS
Recording systems must not impact the
safe operation of the airplane and are
mandated by the operating rules (91.609
c,e)
Design and installation requirements
addressed in Part 25, subsection F
Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)
Flight Data Recorder (FDR)
Additional requirements in operating rules
(121.359, 121.343)

MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT
REQUIRED BY OPERATING RULES
Airworthiness standards for certain
equipment required by operating rules are
provided
Windshear systems (121.358, AC25-12)
Protective breathing equipment (25.1439)
Oxygen equipment (25.1441-1453)
Terrain Awareness & Warning (TAWS)
(121.354, AC25-23)
Traffic Alert & Collision Avoidance System
(TCAS) (121.356)




ENGINES AND APUS
Mark Fulmer
Manager, Engine Certification Office

Engine and Propeller Directorate







FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION CONCEPTS
ENGINES AND APUS
Safety is defined at the Aircraft level
Engine and APU Contributors
Burst
Fire
Loads
Loss of Thrust Control
Toxic Products in Bleeds
In-flight Shutdown
Propeller Release


Typical average
by PAH type
Wide variation
subjective criteria
Priority
Resource
Expenditure
(degree of
attention
paid)
THE OLD WAY
Resources Expended on Initial & Ongoing Evaluation (Type & Production)
No Distinction for Same Production Approval
Holder (PAH) types PMA/TSO/PC)
THE NEW WAY
Resources Expended on Initial & Ongoing Evaluation
(Type & Production)
Smaller variation
defined by resource
targeting
Resource
Expenditure
(degree of
safety based
attention
paid)
Priority
Old Avg.
Non-Priority
Non-Critical

Designees &
Self Audit
Priority
Non-Critical

PI/PE
Evaluations
Priority
Critical

ACSEP & Product
Specific Evaluations
Focus
Eval. Method
System Adequacy
Criteria
{
{
{
Determined by: - SVC Exper Safety Data
- Product Safety Assessment
Causal Factors of Disk Fractures
Accident (level 4)
Part Fractures
Hazardous events:
~ 16 per 100 M flights
All uncontained:
~ 32 per 100 M flights
low cycle
fatigue
high cycle
fatigue
manufact.
defect
material
defect
maint. &
overhaul
fretting/
rubbing
erosion/
corrosion
bearing
failure
overspeed
overtemp FOD
Forging
Machining
Peening
Titanium
Inconel
Steel
Other
Assembly error
Inspection
Repair
troubleshooting
Loss of disk
cooling,
Limitation
exceeded
Shaft failure
Fuel Control
Closed VSVs
Examples
Opportunities
~ 5 per 100 Million Flights
Opportunities
Design
Prod.
Maint.
Birds
A/C ice shed
Blue ice
BMOD



FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION CONCEPTS
ENGINES AND APUS
Some common considerations

Likely single and multiple failures
Likely improper operation
Likely improper maintenance
Likely inservice damage
Minimize and cover latent failures
Human factors assessed



FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION CONCEPTS
ENGINES AND APUS
Burst
Minimize failures that can release debris,
particularly high energy debris
Contain failures where possible
Uncontainable failures are predictable
Effects on aircraft minimized (redundancy,
isolation, shielding)




FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION CONCEPTS
ENGINES AND APUS
Fire
Minimize occurrence and spread
Contain flammable fluids
> Assess structural integrity and materials of
components and fire wall
Isolate ignition sources
Control usage of flammable materials such
as Titanium and Magnesium
Coordination with aircraft installation to
minimize effects



FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION CONCEPTS
ENGINES AND APUS
Loads
Ultimate and limit capability defined
Mounts
Major load carrying structure
Vibratory (internal and external effects)
Component criticals and induced
Failure conditions
Instantaneous, rundown, windmilling
Engine induced loads coordinated with aircraft
installation



FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION CONCEPTS
ENGINES AND APUS
Loss of Thrust Control
Control system reliability and safety
assessment (hardware and software)
Redundancy
channels, mode, models, hydro-mechanical
backup
Auto-shutdown for APUs
Limiting
topping, overspeed, overtemp
Fail safe options



FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION CONCEPTS
ENGINES AND APUS
Toxic Products in Bleeds
Bleed air quality testing
HazMats and VOC assessment
Minimize ingress for likely failures
Aircraft level isolation



FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION CONCEPTS
ENGINES AND APUS
In-flight Shutdown
Reliability and durability
Random independent vs. common cause threat
Damage tolerance
ETOPS
Control system time limited dispatch
Environmental
Weather, birds, HIRF, lightning
Stability
Fan and compressor stall
Combustor stability
Human factors in operations and maintenance



FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION CONCEPTS
ENGINES AND APUS
Propeller Release
Propeller mount flange and shaft loads
Propeller installation and flight strain
survey evaluated for suitability



FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION CONCEPTS
ENGINES AND APUS
Outcomes of Certification
Ratings and Operating Limitations
Power
Rotor speeds
Temperatures and pressures (gas path, fuel,
oil, etc.)
Installation Requirements
Component temperatures
Loads (steady & vibratory)
Inputs/Outputs



FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION CONCEPTS
ENGINES AND APUS
Outcomes of Certification
Operating instructions
Altitude, attitude, speed, temperature
Procedures (in-flight relight, environmental,
ground handling, etc.)
Airworthiness Limits
Component life, inspections, maintenance
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
On-wing preventative maintenance and
off-wing overhaul



FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION CONCEPTS
ENGINES AND APUS
Production Certification
Production process definition, process
controls, defect characterization, inspectability,
surveillance
Operational and Maintenance Certifications
Based on ability to adhere to type certification
data, limitations, and conditions
Ongoing Management of Production,
Operability and Maintainability
FA ACT SECTION 603
To be eligible for an airworthiness
certificate, an aircraft must:
Conform to its type certificate, and
Be in a condition for safe operation
Type Certificate (FAR 21.41) includes the
type design (FAR 21.31) plus operating
limitations, TCDS, and applicable FAR
compliance conditions and limitations
Repair Stations must perform work in accordance with
the manufacturers ICA (FAR 43.13a), an aircarrier's
manuals (FAR 145.2) or other FAA approved data.
Maintenance may be conducted using other methods,
techniques and practices acceptable to the
Administrator that accomplish the same end result
with respect to airworthiness i.e.; conformity to the
type design and safe for operation
Repairs, alterations, or deviations from the
Manufacturers ICA which are major require FAA
approved data
Maintenance must return the product to either its
original or properly altered configuration
(FAR 43.13b)
PERFORMANCE OF MAINTENANCE
AND ALTERATION
In Closing:
Dont confuse compliance with safe nor
non-compliance with unsafe
There is no such thing as an isolated event
FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION CONCEPTS
ENGINES AND APUS



POWERPLANT INSTALLATIONS
Kathrine Rask
Senior Engineer, Propulsion Branch

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office







PROPULSION SYSTEM
Overview
System Definitions
Fundamental Certification Concepts
Fuel Systems
Engine Ice Protection
Thrust Reverser
Engine Operating Characteristics
Fire Protection
Uncontained Engine Failure
Powerplant Instruments


SYSTEM DEFINITIONS
Multi-Engine Installation
Engines are Part 33 certified
Objective is stand alone type certificate;
generally not airframe specific
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Installation
APUs qualified to technical standard order
Also stand alone certification objective
Fuel System
Tanks, pumps, plumbing, wiring, etc.
25.901(a), 25.903
FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION
CONCEPTS
No Single Failure or Probable
Combination of Failures will Jeopardize
Safe Operation
A single failure is assumed without
consideration as to its probability of failing
If a failure event cannot be readily detected, it
is counted as a latent existing failure in
addition to the first failure
Probable - expected or foreseeable
Term often confused with 25.1309
terminology; quantitatively means not
extremely improbable
25.901(c)
FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION
CONCEPTS
Jeopardize safe operation
Continued safe flight and landing from brake
release through ground deceleration to stop
Safe flight is determined by both qualitative
and quantitative analysis
Consider service experience of similar failures
25.901(c)
FUNDAMENTAL CERTIFICATION
CONCEPTS
No Single Failure or Probable Combination
of Failures will Jeopardize Safe Operation
Accomplished By
Isolation
Independence
Redundancy
Reliability
Four Exceptions To Rule
Uncontained Engine Failures
Combustor Case Burn Through
Propeller Failure
Certain Structural Failures
25.901(c), 25.903(b), 25.903(d)(1), 25.905(d)
FUEL SYSTEMS
Fuel System Independence/Redundancy
Fuel Flow
Normal operation
Hot/cold weather, negative G, gravity feed
Lightning Protection
Crashworthiness
Failure Modes
Ignition sources/flammability
Function of automated fuel system
25.943, 25.951-25.1001
FUEL SYSTEM
New Outlook on Fuel System Safety
Part 21 Special Federal Aviation Regulation
Retroactive design review of in-service
airplanes
New Part 25 Regulation Changes
Improved safety analysis
Minimized fuel tank flammability
Operating Rule Changes
Mandate improved maintenance

SFAR No. 88; 25.981, 91.410, 121.370, 125.248, 129.32
ENGINE ICE PROTECTION
Engine Installation Shall Continue to
Operate in Severe Environmental
Conditions
Review ice accumulations on engine, inlet, and
other airframe surfaces that could be ingested
Freezing fog on ground
Falling and blowing snow on ground
Late activation of ice protection by crew in
flight
Fan ice shedding and procedures
No engine icing limitations
Engine power/thrust always required to exit
inadvertent icing conditions
25.1093
THRUST REVERSER
Demonstrate compatibility with engine
Demonstrate compatibility with airplane
Significant change in philosophy since the
Lauda 767 accident
Exposed vulnerability to certain aircraft
during high speed flight
Long Strut/Low Mount Short Strut/High Mount
T/R pattern under wing - no stall T/R pattern over wing - stall
THRUST REVERSER
Two Options to Meet Part 25 Safety Intent:
To demonstrate that the airplane must be
controllable under any possible position of the
thrust reverser
Thorough flight test controllability
demonstration
Demonstrate operable reverser can be
restored to the forward thrust position
Minimize potential for in-flight deployment
25.933
THRUST REVERSER
Two Options to Meet Part 25 Safety Intent
(continued):
To demonstrate the possibility of an inflight
thrust reverser deployment will not occur
within the life of the airplane fleet
Rigorous qualitative and quantitative
analysis with more conservative
assumptions
Typically results in three independent
thrust reverser restraints
Review minimum dispatch configurations


THRUST REVERSER
Maintenance has played a significant role in
the majority of inflight thrust reverser
incidents
Review safety analysis assumptions to ensure
they are tolerant to human error
Review general thrust reverser maintenance
procedures
In depth review of thrust reverser lock-out
configuration and procedures
Vast majority of in-service thrust reverser
uncommanded deployments resulted from
improperly de-activating system
associated with MEL activity


ENGINE OPERATING
CHARACTERISTICS
Engines should continue to safely operate
throughout the airplane flight envelope
Engine operation demonstrated at
airplanes limits of :
Ambient temperature
Altitude/airspeed/angle of attack
Tailwind/crosswind
Rapid and slow power lever movements
Mechanical/electrical loading
25.939, 25.931
POWERPLANT FIRE PROTECTION
General intent is to provide redundant
design:
Minimize potential for fire
Ventilation required to minimize potential of
flammable vapor
Managing zone temperatures and sources
of ignition
Minimize effects/duration if a fire should occur
Fire walls
Quick acting detectors
Flammable fluid shut off provisions
Drainage provisions
Extinguishing
25.863-25.869, 25.1181-25.1207
UNCONTAINED ENGINE FAILURE
DC-10; 1973
B-747; 2000
UNCONTAINED ENGINE FAILURE
Uncontained engine failure threat too
great to be completely addressed by
failsafe philosophy
Some of the threat addressed by prescriptive
requirements
Differential compartment loads
Damage tolerant structure
Decompression

25.365(e)(1), 25.571(e)(2)-(3), 25.841(a)(3), 25.903(d)(1)
UNCONTAINED ENGINE FAILURE
Remainder of airplane threat minimized in the
event of an uncontained engine or APU failure
Isolation
> hydraulic check valves
> flammable fluid shut-off provisions & dry bays
Redundancy & Separation
> hydraulic line, flight control wires/cables & electric
power
> flammable fluid shut-off valves
Shielding
> critical structure & systems
> auxiliary fuel tanks
> APU containment devices



POWERPLANT INSTRUMENTS
Intent is to provide indication of engine
parameters, limits, and failures to enable
the crew to always maintain control of
engine
Limit exceedances (protect rotor integrity)
Fault enunciation - critical failures
Messaging system consistent with flight
deck philosophy
Minimize flight crew workload
Pop-up displays
Standby indication
Trend monitoring

25.1305
OTHER SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Propeller installation
Oil system
Thrust augmentation
Starting
Component cooling


Controls
APU
Performance
Powerplant accessories
Inlets/Exhaust
All follow the fundamental concept
of fail-safe and isolation
Part 25 also addresses:
CABIN SAFETY
Frank Tiangsing
Manager, Airframe/Cabin Safety Branch

Transport Airplane Directorate




DEFINITION
Cabin Safety, the discipline that deals
with:
Occupant protection/survival
Escape from crashes or other emergency
events
Mechanical
Systems
Cabin Safety
Airframe
Electrical
Systems
Operations
(Flight Standards)
MAIN ELEMENTS
Occupant protection
Evacuation
Fire protection
Emergency equipment
OCCUPANT PROTECTION
Occupant protection is provided by
having:
Seats approved to static and dynamic loads
( 25.561, 25.562, 25.785)
Items of mass retained ( 25.789)
Padding on projecting objects ( 25.785(k))
Handholds along aisles ( 25.785(j))
Slip resistant floors ( 25.793)
Access to oxygen during a decompression event
( 25.1447)
OCCUPANT PROTECTION
Static testing of seats
Seats are tested to loads in the forward, aft,
sideward, up and down directions
Maximum loads from the ground, flight and
emergency landing conditions are applied


OCCUPANT PROTECTION
Dynamic testing of seats
Two test conditions
16g forward load
14g downward load
Includes occupant injury criteria
Head Injury Criteria (HIC)
Lumbar load
Femur load
TSO-C127 prescribes minimum performance
standards for dynamically tested seats
MAIN ELEMENTS
Occupant protection
EVACUATION
Fire protection
Emergency equipment

EVACUATION
Evacuation addresses the means for
occupants to safely travel from their seats
to the ground or water
EVACUATION
Effective evacuation is accomplished by
providing:
Appropriate type and number of exits ( 25.807)
Access to exits ( 25.813)
Assist means from the aircraft to ground or water
( 25.810, TSO C69c)

EVACUATION
Effective evacuation is accomplished by
providing:
Emergency lighting ( 25.812)
Emergency evacuation demonstration ( 25.803, App. J)
Ditching capability ( 25.801)
MAIN ELEMENTS
Occupant protection
Evacuation
FIRE PROTECTION
Emergency equipment

FIRE PROTECTION
Interior fire protection is accomplished
by addressing the following areas:
Interior materials ( 25.853, App. F)
Bunsen burner test (Part I)
Seat cushion test (Part II)
Heat release test (Part IV)
Smoke emission test (Part V)
Cargo compartments ( 25.855, App. F)
Bunsen burner test
Oil burner test for Class C compartment liners
(Part III)
FIRE PROTECTION
Lavatories ( 25.853(h), 25.854)
Waste receptacles
> Must have built-in fire extinguishers
> Must be capable of containing fire
Smoke detectors are required
Portable fire extinguishers must be distributed
throughout the aircraft ( 25.851)
MAIN ELEMENTS
Occupant protection
Evacuation
Fire protection
EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT
Emergency Equipment Required by
Part 25
Fire extinguishers, oxygen bottles, floatation seat
cushions or life vests ( 25.851, 25.1415, 25.1447,
121.333(e))
Overwater operation: life rafts, life vests, survival
kits, emergency transmitters, life lines ( 25.1415)
Emergency Equipment Required by
Part 121
Megaphones, first aid kits, smoke hoods, crash ax,
flashlights ( 121.309, 121.337, 121.549)

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT
Emergency equipment must be:
Readily accessible ( 25.1411(a))
Reasonably distributed and arranged so that
its location is obvious, well identified and
appropriate for its intended use
( 25.851(a), 25.1411)
Protected from inadvertent damage
(25.1411(b))




HUMAN FACTORS IN PART 25
Steve Boyd
Airplane & Flight Crew Interface Branch

Transport Airplane Directorate




Definition (unofficial) - Human Factors, as it
applies to aircraft certification:
The application of scientific theory, principles,
data and methods...
about human abilities, limitations, and other
characteristics...
to the establishment of minimum safety-related
design requirements for flight crew interfaces,
tasks, and procedures,...
and then ensuring that those requirements are
met,
in order to promote overall system performance
and safety
HUMAN FACTORS IN PART 25
We base the requirements on knowledge
and/or assumptions about:
The human capabilities and limitations of the
people who will fly the airplanes
Their level of training
Their roles and responsibilities
The demands of the mission
Note: Requirements for items 2 and 3 are
contained in the operating rules
UNDERPINNING FOR THE CREW
INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
PRIMARY HF AREAS
Human factors issues are integrated into
the rules in various subparts
Main areas include:
The controls and displays that the pilots use
The physical geometry of the flight deck
Integrated aspects of the flight crew interfaces
The evaluation of performance and handling
qualities
COMPETING REQUIREMENTS
All controls
reachable,
displays readable
Space necessary
for controls and
displays
Situation
Awareness
Information
Overload
Commonality
Additional
functionality
16g seats
External vision
Short Pilots
Weight. Panel
space
Comfortable
seats
Tall Pilots
CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS
Specific controls and displays are called
out for certain functions
Some are based on assumed pilot
responsibilities
Some are required to deal with failures
Driven by failure modes and effects
Pilot actions are intended to mitigate the
failure effects
CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS
Design to support pilot performance and
reduce errors in the use of controls/displays
Arrangement - convenient accessibility and use,
no confusion, standardization
Direction of movement - matches the function
Control shape - standardization for certain
controls
Control labeling - except when function is
obvious
Preventing inadvertent activation - location,
guarding
Color coding - standardization for alerts/limits

FLIGHT DISPLAY
ARRANGEMENT
The technology and formats change,
but.
Airspeed
Heading
Altitude
Attitude
FLIGHT DECK GEOMETRY
Accommodate a range of pilot sizes
Short pilots can reach everything they need
Tall pilots can fit in the flight deck
Pilots can see what they need to see
Installation location of the displays/controls
Windows provide adequate visibility
Reflections and glare
Emergency egress

INTEGRATION ASPECTS OF THE
FLIGHT DECK
Workload
Workload must be acceptable for the minimum
flight crew
No unreasonable concentration or fatigue
Crew response to failures
Environmental conditions
Noise and vibration
Lighting
Intended function - assessed in context
EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE
AND HANDLING QUALITIES
HF considerations are embedded in
numerous requirements related to
performance and handling qualities.
Examples:
...can be consistently executed in service by
crews of average skill.
may not require exceptional piloting or
alertness.
Reasonably expected variations in service
from the established takeoff procedures may
not result in unsafe flight characteristics
Requirements are based on experience
Human performance margins are usually in
guidance material
Test pilots are the key players in
evaluating performance/HQ
Subjective assessment (including
consideration of line pilot capabilities and line
operations)
Performance data - measuring airplane
performance with pilots in the loop
Close coordination between Certification and
Flight Standards (Aircraft Evaluation Group)
pilots
EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE
AND HANDLING QUALITIES