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Caringal, Elaine A.

1. Original Jurisdiction
2. Appellate Jurisdiction
3. Temporary Assignment of Judges
4. Change of Venue or Place of Trial
5. Rule-making Power
6. Appointment of Court Personnel
7. Administrative Supervision of Courts

(Art. VIII Section 5)
(4) Order to change of venue or place
of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
People vs. Gutierrez

People vs. Pilotin

(4) Order to change of venue or place
of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
People vs. Gutierrez
People vs. Pilotin
It may also be exercised in civil
cases if:

a. Sentiment of the people in a
certain community is
predominantly hostile in one
of the parties
b. The judges are suspected of
prejudice or partisanship
to prevent
miscarriage of justice
Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5)

Promulgates rules concerning:

a. Protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights
b. Pleading, practice and
procedures in all courts
c. Admissions to the practice of law
d. Integrated Bar of the Philippines
e. Legal assistance to the
underprivileged additional
subject (social justice policy)
Limitations on Rule-making

a. Provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for speedy
disposition of cases
b. Uniform for all courts in the same
c. Shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights
Amparo Rule
Promulgated on Oct. 24, 2007 in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced
An exercise for the first time of the Courts
expanded power to promulgate rules to
protect our peoples constitutional rights
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
State-organized Bar to which every lawyer
must belong
Integration of the Bar is a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear
his portion of its responsibilities
Unification of the entire lawyer population
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Requires membership and financial support of
every attorney as condition sine qua non to
the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Article I
Sec. 2 Objectives and Purposes
The following are the general objectives of
the Bar:
1. to elevate the standards of the legal
2. improve the administration of justice
3. enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively
Article III - Dues
Sec. 23 Membership Dues
On or before the 31
day of December, every member shall
pay annual dues at the National Office or at the Office of his
o P500.00 (effective Jan. 1, 1995)
Chapter share P200
General Fund - 150
Welfare Fund - 40
Legal Aid - 20
Bar Discipline - 20
IBP Journal - 70

o P1,000.00 (starting year 2000) SC approved the increase
60% or P600.00 - National Office
40% or P400.00 Chapters

Article III - Dues
o IBP Life Membership Plan
Pursuant to Supreme Court Resolution dated Aug. 20,
1996, the life membership due was increased to
P8,500.00 effective January 1, 1997.
(6) Appoint all officials and
employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service
Extends to all officials
of the judiciary
Required to be in accordance
with the Civil Service Law
Supreme Court appoints its
own officials and employees
Sec. 6 The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervisions over all
courts and the personnel thereof.
Constitutional Convention of 1971
decided to transfer the power of
administrative supervision over all
courts and their personnel to the
Supreme Court
DOJ determines:
a. payment of judges salaries
b. grant of their vacation and
sick leaves
c. appointment or transfer of
their personnel
d. purchase of equipment and
the like.
This impaired the independence of
judges who tended to defer to the
pressures and suggestions of the
executive department in exchange for
favorable action on their requests and
administrative problems.
Re: Request of Philippine
Center for Investigative
Journalism for the 2008
SALNs and Personal Data
Sheets of Court of Appeals

Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 transferred the
administrative supervision of
all courts and their personnel
from the Department of
Justice to the Supreme Court

To effectively discharge this
constitutional mandate, the
Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) was
created under Presidential Decree No.
828, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 842

principal function : supervision and
administration of the lower courts
throughout the Philippines and all their

reports and recommends to the
Supreme Court all actions that affect the
lower court management

Headed by:
a.) Court Administrator
b.) three deputy court
c.) three assistant court

Hon. Jose Midas P. Marquez
Court Administrator
Hon. Raul B. Villanueva
Deputy Court
Hon. Jenny Lind Aldecoa
Deputy Court
Hon. Thelma C. Bahia
Deputy Court
Kilosbayan Foundation v.
Maria Araullo v. Benigno
Simeon Aquino III
Chavez v. JBC
People vs. Gutierrez
A group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, province of
Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este
of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise burned by the group.

The prosecution filed a motion to transfer the trial to another venue on the following grounds:
a.) The group was composed of a hundred man, 82 was still free and unknown
(This brought fear for the witnesses to testify.)

b.)One of the accused was Vincent Crisologo, son of the Congressman of the First District of
Ilocos Sur and the lady Governor.
(The promotion of Judge Mario Gutierrez, judge who handled the case, was actively
supported by Congressman and Governor Crisologo)

Judge Mario Gutierrez declined the transfer sought. Hence, this petition was filed .

Issue: Whether or not the criminal case could be transferred?

Yes. The Supreme Court ordered the transfer of criminal case from a court of First Instance to a
circuit criminal court elsewhere because the witnesses for the prosecution were unwilling to testify for
fear of retaliation from the accused or their followers in the place where the offenses were allegedly

*It was the concensus that such conviction would not have been possible had the case been tried in the
regular venue.

People vs. Pilotin
Vincent Crisologo, charged with illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions, through his counsel filed a verified motion to
transfer Criminal Case no. 3949 on the ground that his life was in
danger. According to him, there were many enemies of the
Crisologo family within the vicinity. His father, Cong. Crisologo was
in fact shot to death while hearing mass at the Vigan Cathedral.

Issue: Whether or not the criminal case could be transferred?

Yes. Section 5(4), Art. VIII of the Constitution expressly
empowers Supreme Court to order a change of venue or place of
trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Here, what is involved is not
merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant
Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to
undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperiled.

In re Edillon

IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. 75 - 65 in
Admin Case No. MDD-1 recommending to Court the removal of
Marcial A. Edillon, respondent, from its Roll of Attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the
latters constitution notwithstanding due notice.

Issue: Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the

Yes. Sec. 5 (5) of Art. 10 of the Constitution of the Philippines
expressly provides the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar.

De Guzman vs. People
Arturo de Guzman, petitioner, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
Malversation of Public Funds. Petitioner assails the rule-making power (PD No.
1606) of the Sandiganbayan as violative of Art X, section 5 (5) of the 1973
Constitution, which vests on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.

Sec. 9 of PD 1606 Rule-making power The Sandiganbayan shall have the power to promulgate its own
rules of procedure and, pending such promulgation, the Rules of Court shall govern its proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not the provision of PD 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to
promulgate its own rules and procedure in violation of the rule making power of
the Supreme Court?

The provision was not invalid because such rules were subject to approval by
the Supreme Court. The rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Re: Request of Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism for the 2008 SALNs and Personal Data
Sheets of Court of Appeals Justices

Facts :
Several letters requesting for the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and
Networth (SALN), copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or Curriculum Vitae (CV)
of the justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan
were sent by different parties. One of the letters filed was Subpoena Decus Tecum,
dated Sept. 10, 2009 issued by Atty. E.H. Amat, Acting Director, General
Investigation Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman, directing the Office of
Administrative Services, Supreme Court to submit two (2) copies of the SALN of
Assoc. Justice Roland B. Jurado of the Sandiganbayan for the years 1997-2008, his
latest PDS, his Oath of Office, appointment papers and service records.

Issue : Whether or not SALNs and PDS of justices may be released and used in
Administrative complaints?

Held :
It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court
personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. As such, Under Section VI, Art. VIII of the Constitution, it is the SC which is
vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.

Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
GSIS from payment of legal fees

GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on
government-owned or controlled corporations under section 22, Rule 141 (Legal
Fees) of the Rules of Court. The said provision states:
Sec. 22 Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local
government corporations and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without
independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees.

The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec. 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act
of 1997).
Sec. 39 Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien It is hereby declared that the
actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times and
that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as
possible in order not to burden the members of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed
on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution
rate necessary to obtain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to
the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals thereto, and benefits paid
shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges o duties of all kinds. xxxx

GSIS argues that its exemption from the payment of legal fees would
not mean that RA 8291 is superior to the Rules of Court. It only shows
deference by the Court to the legislature as a co-equal branch.

Issue: Whether or not the Legislature may exempt the GSIS from legal fees
imposed by the Court on government-owned and controlled corporations and
local government units?

Held :
No. The Congress may not exempt the GSIS from the payment of legal
fees. The payment of legal fees is an integral part of the rules promulgated by
the Supreme court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the Constitution. As one of the safeguards of the Supreme Courts
institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. The power is no longer
shared by the Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.
Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita

Kilosbayan Foundation, petitioner, is a non-governmental organization
engaged in public and civic causes aimed at protecting the peoples right to self
governance and justice. They questioned the announcement made by Sec.
Eduardo Ermita on the appointment of Gregory Ong as the new Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court on the ground that Ong was not a natural born Filipino.
Thus, he does not meet one of the qualifications under Section 7 (1) of Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution. The vacancy was due to the retirement of Assoc. Justice
Romeo Callejo, Sr.

Issue : Whether or not Ong is a natural born Filipino citizen?

No. The alleged recognition of his natural born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that
Ong and his mother was naturalized by their father. Substantial change or
correction into an entry in a civil register cant be made without a judicial order.
Change of citizenship is a substantial change. Therefore, the change must be
effected through a petition filed in Court.

Chavez v. JBC
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the OSG in behalf of the
respondents Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr., in a prior decision declaring the current composition of Judicial Bar Council
as Unconstitutional. The decision states that only one member of the Congress
should sit in JBC.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment
when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism due to plain

No. A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions
were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. The
language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately
chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be
interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate
against disobedience and defiance. Thus, Sec. 8 Article VIII of the Constitution
should be interpreted literally. Among the 7 members of the JBC, only one
should come from the Congress.
Maria Araullo v. Benigno Simeon
Aquino III
Sen. Jinggoy Estrada delivered a privilege speech revealing that he, including
other senators received P50M as cash incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief Justice C. Corona.

Responding to Senator Estradas revelation, Sec. Florencio Abad of DBM
issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending
Acceleration Program, explaining the funds released to senators had been part of
the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending in order to
accelerate economic expansion. He further explained that the DAP were usually
taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services; (2)
unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous
year; and budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to
support faster-disbursing projects.

Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of DAP and issuances relating to
DAP were filed. One of the petitioners was Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of
the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan.

Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,

Held :
No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and
is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate
the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn
from the Treasury. Otherwise, an appropriation made by law
would have been required. Funds, which were already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via
the DAP.

2nd Issue :
Whether or not the DAP realignments can be
considered as impoundments by the executive?

Held :
No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents power
to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless
there will be an unmanageable national government
budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
theres no impoundment in the case at bar because
what is involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

Issue :
Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional?

Held :
No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional.

The requisites for a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI of
the 1987 Constitution are as follows:

a.) A law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of
the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices

b.) Funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their
respective offices

c.) purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the General Appropriations Law
for their respective offices

It is true that the President(and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however,
such transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP,
this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers within their respective
offices also contemplate realignment of
funds to an existing project in the GAA. Insofar
as the GAA is concerned, no funds were
appropriated to some of the executive
projects. As such, transfers to those projects
are unconstitutional.

On the issue of what are savings

These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what
was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition
of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other
instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or
finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as
funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since
the statutory definition of savings was not complied with,
there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings
should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from
certain projects in the middle of the year and then being
declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the

Issue : Whether or not the sourcing of
unprogrammed funds to the DAP is

Held : No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA
cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be
used if there is a certification from the National
Treasurer to the effect that the TOTAL revenue
collections have exceeded the TOTAL revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was
secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
Issue : Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative
Fact is applicable?

Held : Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which
recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the
economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the
Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. Some of
the DAPs effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on the
validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative
Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is found
by the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.