Gbor Forrai

(University of Miskolc)

Preliminaries
Project: to explain how logical knowledge can be a priori.
Even though Ill provide material for arguing that logic is a
priori, I wont argue for that.
Logical knowledge consists of sentences ascribing logical
properties to arguments (valid, invalid), sentences (logically
true, contradiction), or sets of sentences (logically
equivalent, inconsistent).
We know something a priori, if its justification does not
depend on anything empirical.
The argument on slide 24 is invalid you need experience
to understand this claim, but once you understand it, you
need no further experience to justify it.

The problem of a priori knowledge

(Realism) Sentences concerning field F are objectively
true/false, their truth depends on facts independent of the
human mind.
Denied by myself (Resnik)
(Access) In order to justify a sentence you need cognitive
access (however indirect) to the facts which make it
true/false.
Denied by moderate empiricists: Boghossian,
Peacocke, Bealer
(Empiricism) We only have cognitive access to mindindependent facts through the senses.
Denied by rationalists: Bonjour
(A priori knowledge) We have a priori knowledge of field F.

Knowledge of chess
Knowledge of chess consists of sentences ascribing
properties to moves (legal, illegal) and arrangements
(check, checmate).
Knowledge of chess is a priori.
Sentences in chess should not be construed realistically,
because the facts making these sentences true/ false are
not objective, they depend on human decisions.
Alternatively: they are objectively true and the
corresponding facts are independent of the mind only if the
decisions about rules are already assumed.
Knowledge of chess is knowledge of mind-dependent facts.
We have non-empirical knowledge of them because we
made them. It is a kind of makers knowledge.

The view to be defended

Two ways of construing sentences expressing logical
knowledge ( is valid, is logically true):
(1)they attribute system-specific logical properties (valid-inclassical-logic, valid-in-all-systems-respecting-bivalence)
(2)they attribute absolute logical properties (valid
simpliciter)
(1) Facts about system-specific properties are not objective
or mind-independent, since systems depend on human
decisions. (We may call them objective only if we take the
rules for granted.)
(2) Absolute properties do not exist, there is no fact about,
there is no knowledge of such facts.
All knowledge of logic of kind (1). Knowledge of logic is
therefore knowledge of mind-dependent facts. We have
non-empirical access to them because we made them. It is
a kind of makers knowledge.

Agenda
1.Argue that logic is an artifact, just as chess is. Deductive
logic is not extracted from lay thought, it is created.
2.Dispel intial worry about anti-realism: truth is objective, so
preservation of truth is objective, and validity is the
preservation of truth.
3.Argue for logical anti-realism. The argument in brief: there
are many systems of logic; the way we choose between
them does not indicate that there are system-independent
logical properties the various systems seek to capture.
4.Clarifications: why the artificiality thesis is necessary, why
Quines anti-conventionalist arguments do not apply, how
this account differs Boghossians.

Artifact 1.
(Subconscious cognitive mechanisms do not count.)
1. Deductive inference is extremely rare among laymen.
Lay inference is a large leap from unarticulated premises to
a distant conclusion, not a meticulous stepwise process.
Inferences can be later put into a deductive form.
2. Experimental studies of deductive reasoning show that
people often do not identify deductive tasks as deductive
ones or do not try to solve them by deductive means.
Wason selection task: which card(s) do you have to turn to
check the truth of if p is on the one side, then q is on the
other side?
p

~
p

~q

The performance crucially depends on the choice of p and

q. Indicative and deontic selection tasks are different. The
indicative task is sensitive to probability considerations.

Artifact 2.
In tasks where syllogistic or conditional inferences have to
be evaluated there is an ineliminable belief bias.
No police dogs are vicious.
Some highly trained dogs are vicious.
Some police dogs are not highly trained.
10%
No addictive things are inexpensive.
Some cigarettes are inexpensive.
Some addictive things are not cigarettes.
71%

valid:

valid:

More careful instruction merely reduces bias, but does not

eliminate it.

Artifact 3.
3. Deductive inference is of little use in practical situations
in which we only have partial information and ceteris
paribus generalizations. Deductive inference is monotonous
(remains valid if we add new premises), but reasoning in
practical situations is defeasible.
Evaluating candidates for the position of professor of logic.
Generalization: Anyone publishing in the best logic journals
should be shortlisted.
Information: X publishes in the best logic journals.
Conclusion: X should be shortlisted.
New information:
X was fired from his previous positions because of sexual
harassment.
Those were papers were jointly authored with his wife, a
noted logician, and X has no independent publications.

Artifact 4.
4. Logical properties presuppose logical form, logical form
presupposes logical constants. Hence, we cannot have
logical properties without logical constants. But the
meaning of logical constants is fairly different from that of
their natural language counterparts.
Misbehaving close relatives
Frau Merkel likes/does not like fuzzy logic.
If I have two heads, then I have three hands.
I ate the pizza and ordered it.
All politicians are liars, but there are exceptions.
More distant relatives of &
Time: after, before, when, while, since, until
Causal(?): so, because, since, for, now that, as, in order that
Opposition: although, even though, whereas, while, yet

Artifact 5.
5. Comparison with ethics. Morality is present in practice, it
is not invented by moral philosophers. Even among laymen,
we have:
(1)awareness of ethics ethical considerations show up in
deliberations, bad conscience, education
(2)basic ethical thought ethics distinguished from custom
and self-interest, ability to formulate rules
(3)terminology
Among laymen
(1)no awareness of logic: arguments and inferences are
evaluated, but that evaluation is global rather than
specifically logical, no attention to logical considerations, no
education
(2)no basic logical thought no distinction between
inductive and deductive argument, no distinction between
false moves and false premises, no ability to identify formal
rules

Initial worry about anti-realism 1.

We arent tempted to be realist about check because there
are practically no constraints on rules. But there are strong
constraints on the rules of logic. Tonk-logic (p p tonk q; p
tonk q q) wont do. How could you explain that if not by
assuming that there objective logical properties logic should
capture?
Constraints may be imposed by the description of the task.
A student support scheme or a tax system must obey very
strict constraints. Yet deserves EUR support is not an
objective property of students and owes .EUR tax is not
an objective property of citizens.
The constraints on logic derive from the task it serves:
managing epistemic risk involved in inference. Epistemic
risk consists in drawing from true premises conclusions
which are false (non-true, less true then the premises)

Initial worry about anti-realism 2.

The idea: lets develop elementary and formal rules which
never lead to falsehood from true premises. We should try
to reconstruct arguments as consisting only of moves
sanctioned by logical theory. This may have the following
results:
successful reconstruction: no risk in accepting the
conclusion
no reconstruction possible: conclusion is risky as before
reconstruction with additional premises: shows risks not
previously known
reconstruction with slightly modified premises/conclusion:
shows how risks can be avoided

Anti-realism 1.
When you devise a system of rules for a certain task you
seek how to best satisfy the various requirements.
In choosing a logic you seek the best balance of scope,
simplicity, closeness to natural language (intuitiveness),
philosophical tenability (Resnik calls this cognitive
equilibrium.)
But we do the same in choosing between scientific theories,
we just balance different considerations (empirical
adequacy, simplicity, compatibility with other theories, ).
This does not threaten realism about science! Why should
the case of logic be different?

Anti-realism 2.
1. Why is this not a rule of logic?
For all x, y, z terms and + comparative adjectives, x+y,
y+z x+z
Pros
no exception
completely formal
instances are not justified empirically
Cons
complicates syntax (need a special class of 2-place
predicates);
unlike other rules: the logical form is created by a special
class of predicates
Would the cons entitle us to reject this rule if we were in the
business of describing mind-independent facts like in
science?

Anti-realism 3.
In science we are not allowed to sacrifice scope for
familiarity and simplicity unless special conditions obtain.
(1) The would-be law does not yield new predictions.
(2) It is reasonable to hope that a more elaborate version of
the current theory will be able to explain the facts the
would-be law describes
(1) does not apply, since logic does not seek predictions.
(2) does not apply, since there is no way to capture these
inferences by the customary rules.
If logic were meant to capture the objective property of
validity, this rule should not be rejected.

Anti-realism 4.
2. How can we resolve conflicts in logic? Consider some
(apparent?) problems with classical logic.
a. inferences involving empty names
Fa x(Fx)
Pegasus is a winged horse. So there is at least one winged
horse.
We may (C) stick to the rule and ban empty names, (M)
reanalyse names as predicates or (R) develop a free logic.
b. inferences with the material conditional
~(A B) A
Its not the case that if the greens win at the next election,
theyll attack the US. The greens will win at the next
election!
We may (C) stick to the material conditional but be careful
in translation to and from natural language or (R) develop

Anti-realism 5.
c. sorites
(antecedent) My daughter is not an adult at time t.
(conditional) If my daughter is not an adult at time t, she
wont be an adult one second after t.
Instantiating (antecedent) now and iterating modus ponens,
we may conclude that my daughter wont be an adult even
when she is 90.
We may (C) simply take care when dealing with vague
predicates, (M) adopt a metaphysical view which makes
(conditional) false at one point (epistemicism), (M) adopt a
semantic view that makes the (antecedent) not true for a
range of instantiations (supervaluation), or (R) adopt fuzzy
logic which does not support modus ponens.
d. ex contradictione quodlibet
We obviously do not want to infer to all propositions from a
contradiction. So we may (C) abstain from using logic when

Anti-realism 6.
We may choose between four types of solutions:
(Conservative) Stick to classical logic but apply with care.
(Moderate) Put the blame on metaphysical views, semantic
views, etc. and not on classical logic.
(Radical) Abandon classical logic in favour of another one.
(Opportunistic) Keep classical logic and use non-classical
logic in the problem cases.
Claim: the way we decide shows that logical properties are
not objective.
If you are an opportunist, you have abandoned realism.
Classical logic and non-classical logics are compatible only
if they are taken to make claims about system-specific
properties, but are not compatible if they are taken to
capture absolute logical properties.

Anti-realism 7.
The arguments between the various options are
inconclusive, which shows that they do not concern matters
of fact.
Irresolvable conflicts do not imply that debate is not about
objective facts. It might happen that we are just ignorant of
the facts knowledge of which would be sufficient for the
decision (e.g. debates about past events). In these conflicts,
however, it is hard to see how the case could be decided if
we knew further facts.
The disagreements concern which considerations (scope,
simplicity, intuitiveness, philosophical
considerations)should be given priority. Such
disagreements are not factual in nature.
Objection: isnt there a common core between various
systems of logic which yields an objective property of
validity?

Clarification: Is the artifact thesis necessary?

Cannot we argue for a makers knowledge view simply on
the basis of anti-realism?
Suppose logic is not an artifact, but we are all natural born
classical logicians, even though logical properties are not
objective.
Then it needs to be explained why this is the case, and the
most probable answer is an evolutionary story: classical
logic leads from truths to truths in cases important for our
survival. (How else could it be explained on evolutionary
grounds?)
But then logic is not a priori in a deep sense: it comes about
through empirical learning on the level of the species.
It is also a matter of fact that certain inferences lead from
truths to truths. So validity is after all an objective property
and anti-realism cannot be sustained.

Clarification: has not Quine refuted this kind of

conventionalism?
Quines target is the view that logical truth is true by
convention. The present account holds that logical truth is
logically true by convention.
If Frankfurt is in Germany, then Frankfurt is in Germany
is true partly in virtue of the meaning of the words, partly in
virtue of the facts, as all other true sentences. It is logically
true in classical logic. It is true but not logically true in
Kleenes strong 3-valued logic. (When p is indeterminate, p
p is indeterminate and not true.)
Similarly for logical validity.
If Gbor is in Frankfurt, then Gbor is in Germany
Gbor is in Frankfurt
So, Gbor is in Germany
has true premises and a true conclusion. It is a valid

Clarification: Boghossian (2003)

Logical constants are defined implicitly in terms of the
validity of certain patterns of inference. So inferences
according to these patterns are justified by the meanings of
logical constants.
Any rules that are written into the possession conditions
for
a non-defective concept are a fortiori entitling.
1. In contrast to Boghossian, I dont want to account for lay
inferences, because I dont think they are deductive.
Standards rules of logical employ logical constants and not
their natural language counterpart. (Modus ponens may fail
with natural language conditional, McGee.)
2. Boghossian is criticized for not advancing a positive
reason for the non-defective character of our logical
concepts. I advance a positive reason: good balance
between scope, simplicity and other considerations. In