CCB 3053

Process Safety and

Loss Prevention

Timetable for May 2015

Lecture:
19 May - 22 Aug (14 weeks)
Study Week:
23 Aug - 27 Aug (5 days)
Examination Week:
28 Aug - 07 Sept (11 days)

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chemical Engineering Programme Outcomes (PO)

1. Apply knowledge of mathematics, science and engineering fundamentals and an
engineering specialisation to the solution of complex chemical engineering problems.
2. Identify, formulate, research literature and analyse complex chemical engineering
problems reaching substantiated conclusions using first principles of mathematics,
natural sciences and engineering sciences
3. Design solutions for complex chemical engineering problems and design systems,
components or processes that meet specified needs with appropriate consideration
for public health and safety, cultural, societal, and environmental considerations.
4. Investigate complex chemical engineering problems using research based knowledge
and research methods including design of experiments, analysis and interpretation of
data and synthesis of information to provide valid conclusions.
5. Use modern engineering and IT tools to evaluate complex chemical
engineering activities.
6. Apply reasoning informed by contextual knowledge to assess societal,
health, safety, legal and cultural issues and the consequent responsibilities
relevant to professional engineering practice.
7. Understand the impact of professional engineering solutions in societal and
environmental contexts and demonstrate knowledge of and need for
sustainable development.
8. Apply ethical principles and commit to professional ethics and responsibilities and
norms of chemical engineering practice
9. Communicate effectively on complex chemical engineering activities with the
engineering community and society.
10. Function effectively as an individual, and as a member or leader in diverse teams and
in multi-disciplinary settings.
11. Recognise the need for, and have the preparation and ability to engage in
Chapter
1: Introduction
3
independent and life-long learning
in the
broadest context of technological change.

Course Outcomes
At the end of the course, students should be able to:

CO 1
CO 2
CO 3
CO 4
CO 5
CO 6

COURSE OUTCOMES
Describe hazards with the standards and
regulatory requirement
Identify potential hazards using HAZOP
technique
Evaluate hazards using suitable source of
toxic release, fire, explosion and dispersion
models
Evaluate the impact of hazards to people and
structure using effect models
Assess risk due to hazards using Fault Tree
and Event Tree analysis
Propose suitable mitigation techniques to
eliminate or reduce hazards
Chapter 1: Introduction

Course Information
Course Assessment:
Test : 20%
Assignments: 15%
Laboratory: 15% (Viva + Test + Lab Report)
Final Examinations: 50%
Instructors:
Dr Dzulkarnain Zaini
Main Reference:
Crowl, D. A. and Louvar, J. F. Chemical Process
Safety: Fundamentals with Applications. 3rd Ed. Upper
Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall (2002).
Chapter 1: Introduction

Course Planning
WEEK

ACTIVITIES

Introduction
Toxicology & Industrial Hygiene

Source Models
Laboratory Work starts

3&4

Toxic Release & Dispersion Models

Hazard Identification

Standard and Regulation

Test 1
Mid-Semester Break
Chapter 1: Introduction

Course Planning

WEEK

ACTIVITIES

8&9

Fires & Explosions

10 & 11

Design to Prevent Accidents

Layers of Protection

12

Test 2

13

Risk & Reliability

14

Accident Investigation
Study Week for Final Examinations

Chapter 1: Introduction

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Instructional Learning Objectives

After completing this chapter, students should be
able to do the following:
Understand the importance of process safety
fundamental in order to prevent losses due to
industrial accidents
Understand common terms and definitions
used in process safety
Aware of major chemical accidents that
influence the acts and regulations related to
process safety to become more stringent

Chapter 1: Introduction

Significant Disaster: Flixborough, UK

June 1st, 1974

Destruction due to big

explosion
Death of 28 men on site and
extensive damage and
injuries
Cause: bypass pipe ruptured
because over flexing of the
pipe section due to internal
reactor pressures

30 tons cyclohexane
volatilized and formed a
large vapour cloud

Cloud ignited by unknown

source
Chapter 1: Introduction

10

Significant Disaster: Flixborough, UK

June 1st, 1974

20 bypass piping fabricated

on-site from shop stock. This
pipe ruptured and released
cyclohexane which exploded.
Source: UK Health and Safety Executive, Hazardous Installations Directorate

Chapter 1: Introduction

11

Significant Disaster: Bhopal, India

December 3, 1984
Methyl isocyanate (MIC): extremely reactive &
toxic
MIC contaminated with water: chemical reaction
heated MIC to temperature above the boiling
point
MIC vapours escaped via pressure relief system
into scrubber and flare system installed to
consume MIC in the event of a releasebut not
25 tons MIC vapour released
operating
Toxic cloud spread to adjacent
town: 3000 died due to
respiratory failure
Thousands more died in weeks
that followed
Photo Source: Indian state government of Madhya Pradesh

Chapter 1: Introduction

12

Significant Disaster: Piper Alpha, UK

Night of July 6, 1988
Worlds most famous oil rig
disaster in North Sea 1988
Chain reaction of gas
release, fire and explosion:
initial explosion followed by a
fierce fire which, in turn,
triggered off a further series
of explosions
Flames could be seen 100 km away
167 out of 229 people died - Jump and
try or fry and die.
Cause of death 109 out of 137
recovered bodies inhalation of smoke &
fire. Few died of burns.
Chapter 1: Introduction

13

Significant Disaster: BP Texas City Refinery

March 23, 2005

Series of explosions
occurred during the
restarting of a
hydrocarbon
isomerization unit
15 workers killed and
180 others were
injured
The explosions occurred when a distillation tower
flooded with hydrocarbons and was
overpressurized, causing a geyser-like release from
the vent stack.
Chapter 1: Introduction

14

Significant Disaster: Buncefield, U.K.

December 11, 2005

Explosions occurred at Buncefield Oil Storage Depot,

Hertfordshire.
Unleaded motor fuel was pumped into tank. Safeguards
failed and none realised its capacity had been reached - the
tank overflowed.
Over 40 people were injured; fortunately there were no
fatalities.
Significant damage occurred to both commercial and
residential properties
Chapter 1: Introduction
The fire burned for several
days, destroying most of the15site

PETRONAS Gas, Malaysia

May 10, 2012

Explosion at PETRONAS Plant in Paka Gas

Processing Plant, GPP3 area 2
2 dead 23 injured
Suspected gas leak to storm water drain
Chapter 1: Introduction

16

MISC at PETRONAS Methanol Labuan, Malaysia

July 26, 2012

Ship carrying ammonia in filling operations at

PETRONAS Methanol, Labuan
Early morning explosion (2:30 a.m.) suspected
due to lightning strike during thunderstorm
29 crews, 5 dead (1 immediately found, 2 found
dead the next day, 5th body found dead on July
30.)

Chapter 1: Introduction

17

Learning from Accidents?

These series of catastrophic releases of chemicals
leading to fires, explosions and fatalities have
occurred in chemical processing plants around the
world.
These incidents increase the importance of
process safety and lead to the passage of the
Process Safety Management Rule in 1992
specifically in the United States and generally
throughout the world.

What worries me is that I may not have seen

the past here perhaps I have seen the future.
Elie Wiesel
Chapter 1: Introduction

18

The slides are to show that even with

PSM, catastrophes are still occurring.
What shall we do about it ??
What can we do ??

We are measured not by what we are,

but by the perception of what we seem to be;
not what we say, but how we are heard,
and not what we do, but how we appear to do it.
Author unknown
Chapter 1: Introduction

19

Process Safety and Loss Prevention

Subject on how to make sure processes are

safe
To ensure safe process and operation
throughout the life of a plant by identifying all
potential hazards or incident scenarios and
minimizing all risks using loss prevention
techniques
Techniques includes
Hazard identification and risk analysis
Inherent safety concept in design
Technological advances using better
design/control
Basic of PSLP: Any potential hazards need to be
identified as early as possible so that action
Chapter 1: Introduction

20

Process Safety and Loss Prevention

Safety has developed into scientific discipline,
includes highly technical and complex theories
and practices
hydrodynamic models representing two-phase
flow through a vessel relief.

dispersion models representing the spread of

toxic vapor through a plant after a release.

mathematical techniques to determine the

various ways that processes can fail and the
probability of failure.

Chapter 1: Introduction

21

Hazard in Process Industries

There are Three Major
Hazards:
Fire, Explosion, Toxic
Release
Fire
Impacts on plant,
people and
environment
May also followed
by toxic release
Explosion
Same as fire but more severe
Toxic Release
Impacts of people and environment. e.g. Bhopal
Chapter 1: Introduction

22

Fire Pool Fire

Liquid spilled onto the ground

spreads out to form a pool.
Volatile liquid (e.g. petrol)
evaporate to atmosphere and
soon form flammable mixture
with air.
Upon ignition, a fire will burn
over the pool.
The heat vaporizes more fuel
and air is drawn in round to the
side to support combustion.
Danger to people is by direct
thermal radiation and burn.

Photo from: http://flogginnoggin.wordpress.com

Photo from: www.fire-resistance.demon.co.uk

Chapter 1: Introduction

23

Fire Jet Fire

Photo from: webwormcpt.blogspot.com

Photo from: www.trelleborg.com

High pressure release of gas from a vessel or

pipeline ignites almost immediately.
This give rises to a giant burner of flame length tens
of meters.
Danger from thermal radiation and impingement on
adjacent pressurized vessel, heating the content
followed by pressure build up causing Boiling Liquid
Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE).
Chapter 1: Introduction

24

What can go wrong ?

Pool Fire

BLEVE
LPG
Leak

Chapter 1: Introduction

Fire Flash Fire

Photo from: wellservicingmagazine.com

Fire due to vapour cloud below explosive limit

Resulting from spillage of relatively volatile (e.g.
propane, butane, LPG) material due to rapid
evaporation
Usually unexpected event and short duration
Chapter 1: Introduction

26

What can go wrong ?

Flash Fire

UEL (Upper Explosive Limit)

LEL (Lower Explosive Limit)

LPG
Leak

Chapter 1: Introduction

Explosion Unconfined Vapour Cloud

Explosion

Cloud will spread from too rich,

through flammable range to too
lean.
Edges start to burn through
deflagration (steady state
combustion).
Cloud will disperse through
natural convection.
Flame velocity will increase with
containment and turbulence.
If velocity is high enough cloud
will detonate.
If cloud is small enough with little
confinement it cannot explode
Chapter 1: Introduction

Photo from: gas-risk.blogspot.com

Photo from: www.npc-se.co.th

28

What can go wrong ?

Vapour Cloud Explosion

UEL

LEL

LPG
Leak

Chapter 1: Introduction

Toxic Release
Toxic chemicals:substances that can cause severe
illness, poisoning, birth defects, disease, or death when
ingested, inhaled, or absorbed by living organisms.
Release:any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping,
leaching, dumping or disposing into the environment(as
defined by EPCRA,U.S. Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act section, 329-8)
Environment: includes water, air and land and the
interrelationship which exists among and between
water, air, and land and all living things.
Chapter 1: Introduction

30

Common Terminology and Its Definitions

Safety/Loss Prevention
prevention of accidents through use of appropriate
technologies to identify hazards of chemical plant and
eliminate them before accident

Hazard
chemical/ physical condition that has potential to
cause damage to people, property, @ environment
Anything that cause harm

Risk
measure of human injury, economic loss, @
environmental damage in terms of both incident
likelihood and magnitude of loss or injury

Chapter 1: Introduction

31

Common Terminology and Its Definitions

(continued)
Accident:
occurrence of a sequence of events that produce
unintended injury, death, @ property damage
refers to the event, not result of event

Hazard:
chemical/physical condition that has potential for
causing damage to people, property, @ environment

Incident:
loss of containment of material @ energy
not all events propagate into incidents
not all incidents propagate into accidents

Chapter 1: Introduction

32

Common Terminology and Its Definitions

(continued)
Consequence/Severity:
measure of expected effects of results of incident

Likelihood:
measure of expected probability @ frequency of
occurrence of event
may be expressed as frequency, probability of
occurrence during some time interval or conditional
probability

Risk:
a measure of human injury, environmental damage,
or economic loss in terms of both incident likelihood
and magnitude of loss or injury
Risk = Severity x Likelihood
Chapter 1: Introduction

33

Common Terminology and Its Definitions

(continued)
Risk analysis:
development of quantitative estimate of risk based on
an engineering evaluation and mathematical
techniques for combining estimates of incident
consequences and frequencies

Risk assessment:
process by which results of risk analysis are used to
make decisions, either through relative ranking of risk
reduction strategies or through comparison with risk
targets

Scenario:
description of events that result in accident or incident
should contain information relevant to defining root
causes
Chapter 1: Introduction

34

Risk: Ranking/Rating
Risk is commonly expressed in as ranking/rating
Rating is typically
Simple to use and understand
Not require extensive knowledge to use
Have consistent likelihood ranges that cover the full
spectrum of potential scenarios

In applying risk assessment

Clear guidance on applicability is provided
Detailed descriptions of the consequences of concern
for each consequence range should be described
Have clearly defined tolerable and intolerable risk
levels
Chapter 1: Introduction

35

Example Risk Ranking Categories

Chapter 1: Introduction

36

Risk Matrix
Risk =
Probability of
occurrence
x
Consequence
of occurrence

Chapter 1: Introduction

37

Acceptable Risk
Risks cannot be eliminated entirely
Every chemical process has a certain amount of risk
associated with it.
Engineers must make every effort to minimize risks
within economic constraints of process
At some point in the design stage someone needs
to decide if the risks are tolerable".
No engineer should ever design a process that he
or she knows will result in certain human loss or
injury, despite any statistics
One tolerability criteria in the UK is "as low as
reasonable practicable" (ALARP) concept formalized
in 1974 by United Kingdom Health and Safety at
Work Act
Chapter 1: Introduction

38

Acceptable Risk - ALARP

Chapter 1: Introduction

39

Summary
Importance of process safety

Major chemical accidents

Hazards in Process Industries

Common terms and its definitions in process safety

Chapter 1: Introduction

40