Chapter No.

1
Introduction to Protective Relaying
Course Book

Power System
Relaying
By
Stanley H. Horowitz & Arun G.
Phadkey
Edition 3rd

What is Power System Relaying

(PSR)?
PSR is concerned with the Principles
of design and operation of Protective
Relays that:
Detects abnormal power system
conditions
Initiates corrective action as quickly
as possible
Returns the power system to its
normal state.

 Quickness of response
Response times of a few milliseconds is
Desired.
Human intervention in protective
relaying system is not possible.
The Type of response should be:
Automatic,
Quick
Minimum amount of Disruption to the power
system
Minimum Damage to the system Equipment
Minimum time for system Restoration

To achieve the objectives

Examine all possible types of fault
or abnormal conditions which may occur in
the power system.
Analysis of the required response to each
of these events
Design of protective equipment which will
provide such a response.
Failure of protective relaying equipment to
operate correctly,
Sophisticated equipment is needed to
accomplish these tasks.

Structure of Power
System
Three layered Structure of Power System
1. Power apparatus responsible to
a) Generate Electric Power,
b) Transform Electric Power,
c) Distribute the Electric Power to load
2. Control Equipment responsible to maintain Normal frequency and
Voltage of system
a) Generates sufficient power as per Load Demand
b) Maintains Optimum Economy and Security
c) It consist of Local & Remote Control functions
d) Control functions act continuously to adjust system variables
3. Protection Equipment, responsible to open and close Contacts of
CBS

Note
Operation of power switches or circuit
breakers is the tasks o f protective
relays
Change in operating state (e.g)
Voltages
Currents
Power flows of t he power system
without changing its structure is the
domain of control functions.

Power System Bus

Configuration
Power system Relaying depends upon the
structure of the power system
a) Radial Distribution system is;
a) Normally a single source arrangement
b) Multiple Loads
c) Normally operates below 100 KV
d) Easy to build
e) Loss of single source means loss of
service
f) Opening of Sectionalizers / Reclosers
disconnects the downstream loads.

 Less complex
Fault Current flows only in one Direction
Fault current does not vary much with
changes in generation capacity.
While
A Network has Multiple sources and multiple
loops between the sources and the loads.
Sub-transmission and transmission systems
(100 200 kV ) are network system.
Lines and the interconnections provide more
flexibility in maintaining service to customers,
Loss of a single generator or transmission line
on service reliability is minimal

Since sources of power exist on all

sides o f a fault, fault current
contributions from each direction must
be considered in designing the
protection system.
Magnitude of the fault current varies
greatly with changes i n system
configuration and installed generation
capacity.

Example
Consider the simple network shown in Figure below.
The load at bus 2 has secure service for the loss of a
single power system element.
Fault current for a fault at bus 2 is j20.0 pu when
all lines are in service.
If line 2 3 goes out of service, the fault current
changes to j10.0 pu. (significant change.)
Consider the distribution feeder with two intervening
transformers connected to bus 2.
Loads on the feeder will lose source of power if
Transformer 2 4 is lost.

Fault current:
Fault current At bus 9 on the distribution feeder
with system normal is j0.23 pu,
When one of the two generators on the
transmission system is lost is j0.229 pu.
(Insignificant change)
Reason
The impedances of the intervening transformers
and transmission network, the distribution
system sees the source as almost a constant
impedance source, regardless of the changes
taking place on the transmission network.

Substation Bus
Arrangement
Purposes of Substation Design:
Reliability of service
Flexibility in operation
Provision for equipment maintenance
Minimum interruption of service
To achieve the above objectives we need
to consider different arrangements of
Electrical Buses

Substation Bus Arrangements(cont.)

Common bus arrangements in a
substation:
(a) Single bus, single breaker,
(b) Two bus, single breaker,
(c) Two bus, two breakers,
(d) Ring bus and
(e) Breaker-and-a- half

Single bus, single breaker Arrangement

The simplest, and

The least costly to build.
The least flexible.
To do maintenance work on the bus:
a)Disconnect breaker, or a switch,
b)De-energize the transmission lines

Two bus, single Breaker,

Allows the breakers maintenance without deenergizing the associated line.
For flexibility of system; some o f the lines are
connected to bus 1 and others to bus 2 (the
transfer bus).
For breaker maintenance, lines connected to
bus 2 are transferred to bus 1,
The breaker to be maintained is
bypassed(How?)
By transferring its line to bus 2 and the bus tie
breaker becomes the line breaker.
Only one breaker can be maintained at a time.

Note
The protective relaying of buses and
the line whose breaker is being
maintained should accommodate this
new configuration

Two bus, two breakers Scheme,

A two-bus, two-breaker allows removal of any
bus or breaker from service for maintenance,
Lines can be kept in service through the
companion bus or breaker.
A line fault requires two breakers to trip t o
clear a fault.
A bus fault trips all of the breakers on the
faulted bus, but does not affect the other bus
or any of the lines.
Arrangement provides the greatest flexibility
for system maintenance and operation;
Expense: Breakers = 2*Lines in station

Ring Bus Arrangement

A ring bus arrangement is similar in
flexibility to two bus-two breaker
scheme when the ring is intact.
When one breaker is being
maintained, the ring is broken,
The remaining bus arrangement is no
longer as flexible.

Figure: Ring Bus

Breaker-and- a-half scheme

Breaker-and- a-half scheme, is most
commonly used in most extra high
voltage (EHV) transmission substations.
Provides the same flexibility as the twobus, two-breaker arrangement.
Average cost is one-and-a-half
breakers per line.
Allows future expansions in an orderly
fashion.

Figure: Breaker and a Half bus

Nature of Relaying
Relaying promptly remove from service any element of
Power system which starts to operate in an abnormal
manner.
Relays do not prevent damage to equipment: they
operate after some detectable damage has already
occurred.
Their purpose is to limit further damage to equipment ;
1. Minimize danger to people,
2. To reduce stress on other equipment
3. Remove the faulted equipment from the power
system as quickly as possible
. Maintain the integrity and stability of the remaining
system.

Reliability, dependability and

security
Reliability
Definition 1: It is the measure of degree of certainty that a piece of
equipment will perform as intended.
Relays, can be unreliable in two ways:
a) They may fail to operate when they are expected to,
b)they may operate when they are not expected to.
Definition of reliability of relaying systems:
A reliable relaying system must be dependable and secure.
Dependability:
Definition: It is measure of the certainty that the relays will operate
correctly for all the faults for which they are designed to operate.
Security:
Definition: It is defined as the measure of the certainty that the
relays will not operate incorrectly for any fault.

 Protection systems design should be to

achieve high dependability.
Or
A fault is always cleared by some relay.
If we increase dependability of Relaying
system, its tendency to become less
secure increases.
In Relaying system designs, focus is on
making them more dependable at the
expense o f some degree of security

 Mis-operations of relays are the result o f

unwanted trips caused by insecure relay
operations.
Power system provides many alternative paths
for power to flow from generators to loads.
Loss o f a power system element due to an
unnecessary trip is therefore less objectionable
than the presence of a sustained fault.
This philosophy is no longer appropriate when
the number o f alternatives for power transfer is
limited (Radial power system) , o r
Power system in an emergency operating state

Example

 Fault F should be cleared by Relays R1 and

R2 through Circuit breaker B1 and B2
If Relays R2 fails to clears the fault, it will be
unreliable due to loss of dependability
If Relay R5 operates before R2 to clear the
fault, it is unreliable due to loss of security
Relaying is a collections of several relays
making up the total protection system
A single relay of a protection system may
lose security, leaving complete relaying
system insecure, and hence unreliable.

Selectivity of relays and zones o f

protection
Security of relays, is defined in terms of regions/zones of
protection for which a given relay or protective system
is responsible.
The relay will be secure if it responds only to faults within
its zone of protection.
Relays usually have inputs from several CTs, and the
zone of protection is bounded by these CTs .
The CTs provide a window through which relays see the
power system inside the zone of protection.
While the CTs provide the ability to detect a fault inside
the zone of protection,
The circuit breakers (CBs) isolates the fault by
disconnecting all of the power equipment inside the
zone.

 A zone boundary is defined by a CT and

a CB.
When the CT is part of the CB, it is called
Natural Zone boundary.
When the CT is not an integral part of
the CB The CT still defines the zone of
protection, but communication channels
must be used to implement the tripping
function between CBs and CTs

Zones of Protection should meet these

requirements
1. All power system elements must be enclosed
by at least one zone.
2. Important elements of Power system are
included in at least two zones.
3. Zones o f protection must overlap to prevent
any system element from being unprotected.
4. Without an overlap, the boundary between two
non overlapping zones may go unprotected.
5. The region of overlap must be finite.
6. High overlap meaning disconnection of a large
part of power system by protection of more
zones

Types of Zones of protection

1. Closed Zone of Protection
2. Open Zone Of Protection

Closed Zone of Protection

When power apparatus entering the zone
is monitored at the entry points of the
zone. Such a zone of protection is also
known as closed or differential, unit
or absolutely selective

Open Zone of Protection

If the zone of protection is not clearly defined
by the CTs , i .e. the limit of the zone varies
with the fault current, the zone is called nonunit, unrestricted or relatively
selective.
There is a certain degree of Uncertainty about
the location of the boundary of an open zone
of protection.
Example:
The non-pilot protection of transmission lines
employs open zones of protection

Example

In the Above Figure

Fault F1 is Closed Zone
Fault F2 is in The two overlapping
Zones
Fault F3 is in two Open Zones
B5 provides protection for breaker B6
if it fails to operate/Clear the fault of
open zone of protection

Relay Speed
Fault should be cleared in Minimum Possible time
Relay makes the decision on the basis of voltage
and current waveforms.
Voltage and current waveforms will be distorted
due to transient phenomenon taking place after
the short circuit takes place.
For secure decision relay must extract
meaningful information contained in waveforms
To arrive at some secure decision, relay will take
some amount of time
The relationship between The relay response
time and its degree of certainty is an inverse one.

Classification of Relays
(Based on time of Operation)

1. Instantaneous Relays. operate as soon as a secure

decision is made. No intentional time delay is introduced to
slow down the relay response.
2. Time delay. An intentional time delay is inserted
between the relay decision time and the initiation of the
tripping action.
3. High speed. A relay that operates in less than a
specified time. The specified time in present practice is 50
milliseconds (3 cycles on a 60 Hz system).
4. Ultra high speed(UHS). If the operation of relay takes
place in 4 milliseconds or less.
(Note: The Term UHS not Included in Relay Standards)

Primary and backup protection

Main protection system of a zone of protection
i s called the primary protection system.
Primary Protection operates in FASTEST
POSSIBLE TIME and removes the least amount of
equipment from service.
Protection System Failure means failure in Fault
Clearing
Fault clearing by some alternative Protection
system/Systems is called:
a) Duplicate,
b) Backup or
c) Breaker-failure protection systems.

Duplicate Primary Protection:

Used on Extra High Voltage systems to Cover failure
of Primary Protection.
Duplication primary Protection is used to cover the
failure of the relays themselves.
In Duplicate primary Protection, Relays used can be
from different manufacturer than in Primary
Protection
The operating times of the primary and the
duplicate systems are the same.
On HV and EHV systems Duplication of every
element of the protection system is not Possible
Due to High cost of:
a) Transducers and
b) Circuit breakers are

On lower voltage system:

Even the Duplication of the Relays is not
Justifiable
Only backup relaying is used.
Backup relays are generally slower than
Primary relays
Remove more system elements than may
be necessary to clear a fault.
Backup relaying may be installed :
Locally (In the same substation as the primary
protection), or
Remotely.

 Remote backup relays are completely

independent Having separate,
a) Transducers,
b) Batteries and
c) Circuit breakers
of the protection system they are backing up.
No Common sources of Failure in both relaying.
Ability of Remote backup relays to see all the
faults for which backup is desired is limited.
Remote backup relays removes more loads in
the system than can be allowed.
Local backup relaying is more efficient than
remote backup relaying

Local Backup Protection shares some

Elements
such as the
Transducers,
Batteries and
Circuit breakers,
and can thus fail to operate for The same
reasons as the primary protection.

 Breaker failure relays are provided to cover a

failure of the circuit breaker (subset of local
backup relaying )
Breaker failure relay system consists of a
separate timer that is energized whenever the
breaker trip coil is energized and is de-energized
when the fault current through the breaker
disappears.
If the fault current persists for longer than the
timer setting, a trip signal is given to all local
and remote breakers that are required to clear
the fault.
Separate set of relays is installed to provide
breaker failure protection, in which case it
use(Independent transducers, and batteries)

Example:

Fault at location F (in Above fig.) is inside the zone of

protection of transmission line AB.
Primary relays R 1 and R5 will clear this fault by acting
through breakers B1 and B5.
Duplicate primary relay R2 At station B, R2 provides
Duplicate Primary Protection to trip the breaker B1 to cover the
possibility that the relay R1 may fail to trip.
Operating time of R2 and R1and is same
On EHV lines separate CTs, but the same potential device with
separate windings are used.
Local backup relay R3 is designed to operate at a s lower
speed than R1 and R2 ; it is set to see more of the system. It will
first attempt to trip breaker B1 and then its breaker failure relay
will trip breakers B5 ,B6 ,B7 and B8.
This is local backup relaying, known as breaker-failure
protection, for B1 .
Remote Backup Protection Relays R9 ,R10 and R4 form
Remote Backup Protection for the primary protection R1 .

 No element o f the protection system of

R1 is shared with Remote Back
protection,
No common modes of failure between R1
and R4 ,R9 and R10 are possible.
Remote backup protections will be slower
than R1 ,R2 or R3;
Remote backup protections Removes
additional elements of the power system
e.g. lines BC, BD and BE from service
Loads connected to these lines will deenergize.

Single & three-phase tripping and

reclosing
USA Tripping of all three phases of the faulted
power system element for all types of fault.
In European countries, it is a common
practice to trip only the faulted phase for a
phase-to-ground fault, and
Trip all three phases for all multiphase faults
on
transmission lines.

Most of the faults on a power system are o f a temporary

nature, PS can be returned to its pre fault state if the
tripped circuit breakers are reclosed as soon as possible.
Reclosing can be:
Manual with the help of an operator or
Automatic through a Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) System.
Manual reclosing is too Slow.
Automatic reclosing of circuit breakers is initiated by
dedicated relays for each switching device, or
Reclosing may be controlled from a substation or central
reclosing computer.
Reclosing operations should be supervised.

Interlocks for reclosing.

1. Voltage check.
Used for a certain piece of equipment be
energized from a specific side.
Example, Energizing a transformer from
high-voltage side. If a reclosing operation
is likely to energize that transformer, CB
on the low voltage side should be open
2. Equipment check. Used to ensure that
some piece of equipment is not energized
inadvertently.

3. Synchronizing check .
Synchronization check is used when
equipment is energized from both ends.
Two sources which would be connected by
the reclosing breaker are in synchronism and
approximately in phase with each other.
If the two systems are already i n
synchronism, Phase angle difference should
be within permissible limits
If closing of CB is going to synchronize the
two systems, Phases of voltage should
approach each other on both sides of CB
before reclosing.

Elements of a Protection System

(Has been Discussed)

For fault detection and removal we use

Relays
Transducers
CTs
PTs
Battery and DC supply
Circuit Breakers

Circuit Breakers
CB operation and performance plays key role in
protective relaying.
Fault clearing is the coordinated action of CBs and Relays
Circuit breaker isolates the fault by interrupting the
current at or near a current zero
EHV circuit breaker can interrupt fault currents of
the order o f 105 A at system voltages up to 800 kV
CB interruption Between 1-3 current zero:
1. Fault Current Interruption.
2. Establishment of the dielectric strength of medium
3. Rate of reappearance of recovery voltage across the
breaker contacts
. If the recovery voltage wins the race, the arc re-ignites,
and
the breaker waits for the next current zero

 OCB incorporates a tank of oil in which

the breaker contacts and operating
mechanism are immersed.
The oil serves as the insulation between
a) Tank, at the ground potential
b) Main contacts, at line potential.
Oil also acts as the cooling medium to
quench the arc when the contacts open
to interrupt load or fault current.
An oil circuit breaker rated for 138 kV is
shown below

With the rise in Transmission Voltages, it was not

practical to:
a) Build a tank of large size
b) Provide the required dielectric strength in
the interrupting chamber.
New Requirements of high Transmission voltages
a) Better insulating materials,
b) Better arc quenching systems
c) Faster operating requirements
d) Interrupting medium of gas, air or vacuum;
e) Insulating medium of, air, gas or solid dielectric;
f) Operating mechanisms; Using impulse coil,
solenoid, spring motor pneumatic or
hydraulic.

Interrupting medium Of CBs.

Oil does not require energy (From External source) to
extinguish the arc. (Arc energy is use).
Sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) requires additional energy
and must operate at high pressure or develop a blast
of gas or air during the interruption phase.
During interruption OCB produce
a) High noise
b) Ground shock,
c) Potential fire hazards,
d) water table pollutants.
e) Least expensive (Now a days)
SF6 CBs have essentially
a) No emission,
b) Require noise shielding mechanism during
operation

Live Tank and Dead Tank

Design
of
CBs
Live-tank Design.
Contact enclosure and Contacts are at the same potential
The need for the insulation between the Contact enclosure and
Contacts was eliminated.
since the entire equipment is at line potential, it is not possible
to incorporate CTs which have their secondary windings
essentially at the ground potential
CTs have their own insulating system, a separate free-standing
devices, Which is quite expensive
With free-standing CTs, it is no longer economical to provide CTs
on both

Dead-tank Designs
Incorporated CTs in the bushing pocket of the tank,
Provides CTs on both s ides of the contacts of CB.
Providing overlapping zones of protection on the two s ides of
the circuit breakers.

 Free-standing CT has multiple

secondaries,
Overlapping of Protection zone is
achieved by using secondary windings on
opposite sides of the zones of protection.

 The location of the primary winding

secondary winding of the CTs in dead
tank Design.

Figure: Dead-tank circuit breaker with

location of
CT for Overlapping of

 Bushing CTs are on either side of the breaker

Secondaries are connected to the bus and
line
Protection overlapping is achieved at the
breaker.
For a fault at F1
Both protective systems will operate.
The bus differential relays will trip B 1 and all
other breakers on the bus to clear the fault.
The line protection
Trips breaker B1; and
Relays at the remote station will trip their
associated breakers.

 Tripping of Line Breaker is unnecessary,

but unavoidable.
Loads on the line, will be de-energized
until the breakers reclose.
For a fault at F2
Again both protective systems will
operate.
Tripping the other bus breakers is not
necessary to clear the fault,
Tripping the two ends of the line is

For The live-tank design shown below

For a fault at F1 , only the bus
protection sees the fault and correctly trips B1
and all the other bus breakers to clear the fault.
For a fault at F2, however, tripping the bus breakers
does not clear the fault, since it is still energized
from the remote end, and the line relays do not
operate. This is a blind s pot in this configuration .
Column protection will cover this area.
For a fault at F3 and F4, the line relays will operate
and the fault will be cleared from both ends.
The fault at F3 again results in unnecessary tripping
of
the bus breakers.

Blind
Spot

Figure: The live-tank design