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Payout Policy
Does
DIVIDEND POLICY
By
2)
3)
5)
6)
DIVIDEND SMOOTHING
Fama and Babiak (1968 JASA) tested Lintner's model using annual
data on 392 major industrial firms for the 19-year period 1946 - 1964.
Their estimates were similar to those reported by Lintner.
MM proposition (1961):
Prior to their paper, most economists believed that the more dividends
a firm paid, the more valuable the firm would be .
V0
t 1
Dt
(1 rt ) t
Where: Dt = the dividends paid by the firm at the end of period t, and
rt = the investors opportunity cost of capital for period t.
Gordon (1959 RES) more dividends more value (bird in the hand
fallacy)
According to him :
retained earnings rather than current dividends made the cash flow stream
for the shareholder riskier.
increase the cost of capital.(higher rt)
Miller and Modigliani (1961) pointed out that this view of dividend
policy is incomplete and they developed a rigorous framework for
analyzing payout policy.
asymmetric information)
All agents are price takers (competitive markets).
No taxes
Individuals know with certainty the future investment
schedule and profits of the firms
For simplicity, all firms issue only common stock
d t 1 (Pt 1 Pt )
Pt
(1)
Dt 1 nt Pt 1
1 r
(2)
Using then the fact that nt+1 = nt + mt+1 and the definitions
given above, we can rewrite (2) as:
Dt 1 Vt 1 mt 1Pt 1
Vt
1 r
(3)
Dividend policy does not affect firm value at all if investment policy is
chosen to maximize firms value
(Xt+1 - It+1 = Dt+1 - mt+1Pt+1 )
They identify the siuations in which dividend policy can affect firm
value. Dividend policy could matter because one of the assumptions
underlying the result is violated:
Perfect and complete capital markets
absence of taxes,
symmetric information
no transaction costs
complete markets
the absence
of taxes,
transaction costs
and information asymmetries,
any increase (decrease) in dividends has no effect on the firm's
investment plan because it is exactly offset by the issue of new
equity (share repurchase). Therefore, the firm value is
independent of its dividend (payout) policy.
1
( X t I t )
1 (1 r )
Vt
(7)
lim
1
V 0
t
(1 r )
Asymmetric Information
Dividends as a Signal of Firm Quality
Key Points:
Insiders have better information about the firms future cash flow and
dividends convey information about the firms prospect
Good firms cannot credibly signal their quality without incurring a
cost. If the signal is costless, the bad firms will always mimic the good
ones.
Dividend payments are costly both for good and bad firms but more
for bad firms.
By increasing the dividend they promise to pay, good firms can
reveal their quality because it is prohibitively costly for bad firms
to mimic.
Good firms are willing to pay high dividends to separate themselves
because the benefit of separation (higher share price) exceeds the cost
(costly outside financing or not undertaking positive NPV projects).
Asymmetric information
Two period model with times t=1,2
One decision
No-tax
Rational expectations
Uncertainty about firms dividend/investment/financing
decision
But what if the firm were to cheat by cutting investment below the
optimal level and paying out the proceeds in higher dividend?
Were the market now to add the higher dividend to the assumed optimal
level of investment,
the market would overestimate the firm's current earnings and hence
place a higher than warranted value of the firm's shares.
A firm might fool the market at least temporarily by such tactics but
the price rise would presumably be "reversed when the unfolding of
events had made clear the true nature of the situation." ()
When raising funds for investment, a firm must either issue new shares or
retire fewer outstanding shares.
Similarly, to raise cash on personal account, current stockholders must sell
existing shares.
In either case, current stockholders suffer some dilution in their fractional
ownership of the firm. Reducing this dilution on either corporate or personal
account is clearly more valuable to current stockholders when inside
information is more favorable.
Consequently, insiders, acting in the interests of their current stockholders,
may distribute a taxable dividend if outsiders recognize this relationship, bid
up the stock price, and thereby reduce current stockholders' dilution.
In the resulting signaling equilibrium, insiders control dividends optimally,
while outsiders pay the correct price for the firm's stock.
If C<L+I and current shareholders retain some fraction of the firm, then there
exists from Riley ,a signaling equilibrium conditional on C, I, as well as L.
If C<L+I then stock must be sold to new investors, either by the corporation
for investment or by initial stockholders for personal liquidity. In either case,
initial shareholders suffer some dilution.
By signaling with dividends, insiders can then increase their firm's market
price and thereby reduce this dilution. For stockholders retaining some
fraction of their firm, the marginal benefit of reducing dilution is greater with
truly more valuable firms: Upx > 0
Thus, there exists a pricing function for the firm's stock, P, which compensates
sufficiently only stockholders of truly more valuable firms to induce their
insiders to signal with larger dividends.
For less valuable firms, the equilibrium pricing function, P, compensates
stockholders for the taxes assessed on dividends only at smaller dividends.
Consequently, only insiders in firms with larger present values, X, signal with
larger dividends, other things equal.
Dividends and
market liquidity
n a similar study, Garay & Gonzalez (2005 WP) found after studying 19 emerging
economies from 1989 to 2000, a negative empirical relation between the level of
market liquidity (measured as stock turnover) and the dividend policy of the firms in
the sample (using as a proxy the firms' dividend yield).
Dividends and repurchases are not at all related, and firms do not
repurchase shares to avoid taxes, because it is precisely the cost of
taxes that makes dividends desirable.
Shareholders in a firm have liquidity needs and they sell some of their
shares.
If the firm is undervalued, then the shareholders would be selling
theirs shares at a price below the true value.
However, suppose the firm pay a dividend, which is taxed
If outside investors take this as a good signal, then the share price will rise
and shareholders will have to sell less equity to meet their liquidity needs
maintaining a higher proportionate in the firm
Bhattacharya, S. (1979)
Imperfect information,dividend policy, and the
bird in the hand fallacy
Bhattacharya (1979):
Construction of The Model
Separating Equilibrium
(IC)B
Separating Equilibrium
0 ( pG p B ) X
dG
d
( 0 1 )(1 pG )c
0 ( pG p B ) X
d*
[ 0 (1 pG ) 1 (1 p B )]c
*
p
>p
,
d>d
Since G B
Separating Equilibrium
Some Remarks
The existence of the separating equilibrium requires that the
manager is interested in the market value of the firm at t = 0
(that is, 0> 0 ).
0 can be interpreted as the intensity of the takeover threat.
The greater the takeover pressure, the stronger the incentive for a
manager to announce a higher dividend, increase the stock price
and avoid takeover.
It can not explain why firms/manager have not found cheaper ways to
signal their inside information