Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
09/17/16
MG FSI
09/17/16
MG FSI
09/17/16
MG FSI
09/17/16
MG FSI
Year
China
India
2020
$29 trillion
$13 trillion
2030
$46 trillion
$22 trillion
2040
$71 trillion
$35 trillion
2050
$103 trillion
$55 trillion
2060
$145 trillion
$82 trillion
09/17/16
MG FSI
09/17/16
MG FSI
09/17/16
MG FSI
09/17/16
MG FSI
09/17/16
MG FSI
2010:
1,330,141,000
2020:
1,384,545,000
2030:
1,391,491,000
2040:
1,358,519,000
2050:
1,303,723,000
09/17/16
MG FSI
11
09/17/16
MG FSI
12
09/17/16
Sustained low fertility means that the number of young workers will
decline more sharply than projected. In 2010, there were 116m people
aged 20 to 24; by 2020 the number will fall by 20% to 94m.
But the actual number of workers will be considerably lower than
94m, thanks to rising participation in higher education.
Annual higher-education enrollments tripled from 2.2m to 6.6m in
2001-10, while the number of college students (mostly aged 18 to 21)
rose from 5.6m to 22.3m.
The size of the young population aged 20-24 will only be 67m by
2030, less than 60% of the figure in 2010.
MG FSI
09/17/16
An aging country.
14
As the share of young people falls and the share of elderly people rises,
Chinese society will age - rapidly.
China already has 180m people aged over 60, and this is set to reach
around 240m by 2020 and 360m by 2030. These are minimum
numbers, which will only increase with rising life expectancy. Less
certain are how fertility rates will affect the population age structure.
Should Chinas currently low fertility of 1.4 children per couple be
sustained, the population share of people aged over 60 could reach
20% by 2020 and 27% by 2030.
Using the more conservative international definition of elderly
people aged 65 plusone in five Chinese citizens will be elderly by
2030.
MG FSI
09/17/16
Workforce projections.
MG FSI
15
09/17/16
MG FSI
16
09/17/16
MG FSI
17
09/17/16
MG FSI
09/17/16
MG FSI
19
09/17/16
MG FSI
20
09/17/16
MG FSI
09/17/16
MG FSI
22
09/17/16
MG FSI
09/17/16
Economically integrated.
India is least integrated with any region.
India is the only country with a long un-demarcated land
border with China, and major territorial disputes.
MG FSI
24
09/17/16
MG FSI
25
09/17/16
MG FSI
26
09/17/16
MG FSI
27
09/17/16
MG FSI
09/17/16
MG FSI
29
09/17/16
MG FSI
30
09/17/16
incarnate.
The role of Lobsang Sangay. Increasing militancy among
youth.
A Chinese Dalai Lama. Two of them. Legitimacy battle.
Tibetan protests in Western capitals. Unrest in Tibet.
Tibetan community in India becomes militant.
MG FSI
31
09/17/16
09/17/16
MG FSI
33
09/17/16
34
MG FSI
35
09/17/16
MG FSI
36
09/17/16
37
09/17/16
MG FSI
38
09/17/16
MG FSI
39
09/17/16
40
09/17/16
US China Power
Differential
US industrial strength spurts
owing to energy exports. GDP
growth is 3.5%. US becomes
MG FSI
41
stronger. China does not
Or US industrial strength
does not increase. Chinese
growth continues at 7%.
09/17/16
Overtakes US in 2025.
42
09/17/16
43
09/17/16
Aerospace Technology
Breakthrough
China achieves breakthrough
in both military aircraft and
space technology. Deploys full
range of military aircraft and
satellites including ASAT, low
earth crisis and ELINT
satellites.
MG FSI
44
09/17/16
driver outcomes;
Strong and assertive China.
China mired in internal contradictions on account of
politico economic transition gone awry.
Steadily growing China vs. growing India.
Scenarios define outline of possible futures that impact
Indian security.
Ostensibly there are no manifest reasons for conflict.
Chinese great power ambitions could be a catalyst - if it
believes geo-strategic balance shifting against it.
Similarly Peripheral Security an important issue attempts
to undermine could result in strong Chinese reaction.
MG FSI
45
09/17/16
MG FSI
46
09/17/16
47
09/17/16
48
09/17/16
MG FSI
49
09/17/16
50
09/17/16
51
09/17/16
52
09/17/16
53
09/17/16
54
09/17/16
55
09/17/16
56
09/17/16
57
09/17/16
58
09/17/16
MG FSI
59
09/17/16
60
09/17/16
61
09/17/16
62
09/17/16
63
09/17/16
provocation, but once attacked, do not fail to return the blow. It also
implies a stress on reciprocity and symmetry in evaluating when and
how to escalate.
Do not fight decisive actions unless sure of victory. Never fight without
certainty of success, unless failing to fight would likely present a worse
outcome. This conveys the selective and political approach to the use of
force and other forms of escalation.
Be pragmatic and aware of the limited nature of objectives and
strength. With a strong power, set appropriate objectives; do not exceed
capabilities. Know when to stop, when to counter, and when to bring the
crisis to a close. Stop once the goals are attained; rethink if you cannot
obtain your objectives.
MG FSI
64
09/17/16
Deductions
A prolonged and sustained Sino-Indian war with a political
decision enforced by the military is unlikely in next 20 years.
However a short sharp conflict with limited aims and duration
is quite possible following escalation of border incidents leading to a teaching a lessonconflict.
1.Tensions arising out of Tibetan turmoil post Dalai Lama and a
messy succession.
2. A general teaching lesson conflict by a rising China against
an aspiring India, to underscore its world power status.
3.To reassert Chinese maritime power in the Indian Ocean to
protect its SLOCs.
MG FSI
65
09/17/16
Policy Recommendations
1.Make a strategic national decision to maintain an
indigenous asymmetric capability against China on the
border and the Indian ocean. Build capacity for swift,
decisive and even disproportionate escalation.
2. In pursuit of that decision create national industrial
capacity, with or without foreign collaboration, for following
urgently
medium lift aircraft
heavy lift helicopters
nuclear attack submarines
precision attack long range cruise missiles
fighter aircraft
MG FSI
66
09/17/16
Policy Recommendations.
Acquire military hardware to preserve military asymmetric
edge on Tibetan-Xinjiang border and the Indian Ocean.
Assure asymmetric response.
Strategic decision to escalate to an offensive trade war
against Chinese SLOCs in case attacked on the Tibetan
border. Obtain US acquiescence for trade war in IOR if
forced to escalate.
Preserve air superiority edge on Tibetan border by further
acquisitions.
Develop credible nuclear deterrence.
MG FSI
67
09/17/16
Jai Hind!
MG FSI
68
09/17/16