UNCLASSIFIED

SFC JOHNSON
B CO 2-127TH INF

INFORMATION BRIEF
OPERATION AL-FAJR
(PHANTOM FURY)

THIS BRIEF IS UNCLASSIFIED

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Purpose: To provide information on

operation Al-Fajr and lessons learned
from this joint operation.

Scope: Inform battle room 3 students

about the operation and some key
lessons learned as they can be applied
to our future operations and positions
as ASI 2S staff.

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Outline
Background
Battlefield
Key points of the planning
phase
Brief overview of the
operation
Aftermath
Lesson learned
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Background
March 2004 - American contractors
are ambushed and placed on display
at the North bridge of the Euphrates
River leading into Fallujah
April 2004 - Operation Vigilant
Resolve begins
May 2004 - military operations in
Fallujah handed over to Fallujah
Brigade (HNF)
August 2004 - Fallujah Brigade
completely collapses leaving
insurgents in control
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The Battlefield

Pre-operation population: 250,000-300,00(approx.

80%-90% evacuated prior to operation
commencing
Two major MSRs: Mobile and Michigan
Two bridges over the Euphrates river
Train depot on the north side of the city with
elevated train track
Estimated at over 50,000 buildings and approx.
170 Mosques
Insurgent force estimated at 3,000 to include
militia, former Iraqi military, hard core and trained
extremists and foreign fighters
Multiple fortified locations in and around city. To
include bunkers, hardened sniper positions, tunnel
system, IEDs, booby-traps, pre-positioned caches
and multiple C2 nodesUNCLASSIFIED
Credited to Matt Mathews Combat Studies UNCLASSIFIED
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Key Planning Considerations
Massive civilian populous: how to clear non-hostile civilians
from the battlefield. Resettlement considerations.
Infiltration/Exfiltration: Identified the need for strong outer
cordon to prevent enemy forces from conducting
sustainment/ redeployment operations.
Protected sites: Integrated large amounts of host nation
forces to deal with protected sites and civilians.
Needed additional capabilities and their integration: Called
for HBCT assets from the Army to support the operation and
brought them into the planning process.
Prevention of friendly fire/coordination of fires: Integrated a
large amount of control measures to combat friendly fire and
coordinate fire support. Ensured that these measures could
be understood and did not become cumbersome to the
operation.
Communications: Everyone used different equipment and
also used equipment in different ways. They had to
developed SOPs, specific to this operation on the flow of
communications up, down and laterally
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OPERATION AL-FAJR
D day(07 NOV 2004)
Blackjack BDE and British Black Watch
Regiment move to blocking positions to
the south and east of the city.
3rd LAR BN moves to blocking positions on
the west river bank at the north and south
bridges.
Iraqi 36th Commando BN seizes Fallujah
hospital and provides security for its
continued operation.
RCT-1 and RCT-7 move to ATK positions on
the north side of the city.

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 +
- +
-

M OBI
SR LE
M
RCT- RCT-
1 7
ATK ATK

PL FRAN
MSR
MICHIGAN

+
3

36
CDO 2 1
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OPERATION AL-FAJR

D+1(08 NOV 2004) RCT -1 AND RCT-7

conduct breach of railroad tracks and
push into city. Both units encounter
heavy and coordinated resistance as
they clear through their sectors. The
insurgents use coordinated small
arms, RPG and rocket attacks. All
units remain in constant contact with
the enemy. The assault only covers
about 800m in the first day.
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 +
- +
-

M OBI
SR LE
M
RCT- RCT-
1
ATK 7
ATK

PL FRAN
MSR
36
MICHIGAN
CDO
+
3

2 1
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OPERATION AL-FAJR

D+3(10 NOV 2004) After two full days

of house to house fighting the assault
reaches PL FRAN (HWY 10) that
bisects the city.

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 M OBI
SR LE
M
+
-
PL FRAN
RCT- MSR
+
- 7
MICHIGAN
36
CDO RCT-
+ 1

2 1
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OPERATION AL-FAJR

D+13 (20 NOV 2004) After nearly two weeks of continuous

combat the assault reaches the southern edge of the city.
Pockets of fighting would continue well into December as
infantry units conduct search and attack operations within
the city.

After the assault and clearing operations RCT-1 transitioned

to stability operations within the city. Three major
humanitarian aide sites where built in the city. ECPs where
established for the entire city to facilitate the zoned returned
of the civilian population.

23 DEC 2004 15 JAN 2005- A systematic phased reentry of

the city is conducted. Where citizens are allowed to return to
certain neighborhoods at certain times. This allowed RCT-1 to
identify individuals and groups of enemy forces and keep
them contained to the controlled area. All civilians entering
city are input unto BATS system.
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Credited to SGT Norwood
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AFTERMATH
U.S. forces suffer 95 KIA and 560 WIA
Iraqi forces suffer 8 KIA and 43 WIA
Enemy forces suffer* approx. 1,200
KIA and 1,000 detained

* = the actual number of KIA and

detained is difficult to ascertain due
heavy involvement of Iraqi forces and
the heavy use of CAS and indirect
fires

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Key Lessons Learned
LNO early and often: nothing replaces face to face
interaction when it comes to shared
understanding. When brought into the planning
phase additional assets can assist in with their
incorporation to maximize combat effectiveness.
Control measures are belt fed not area effect: the
use of control measures are critical in coordinating
efforts however over use creates confusion and
detract from execution. 6,000+ artillery rounds,
318 bombs, 391 rockets/missiles, 29,000 mortars
were fired during the operation no incidents of
friendly fire
Redundancy in communication plan:
communication are going to go down at some
point. The commo plan must address backups for
these sytems. Also different MOSs and services
use commo systems in different ways. (PACE)
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QUESTION
S

CPL Johnson
09 NOV 2004
Fallujah, Iraq
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