HOMICIDE

.
 Latin word homi(man) and
cide(cut)
 Meaning

Thekillingofon
ehumanbeingb
yanotherhuman
being.
 .
EarlyEnglishcommonlawdividedhomicideintotwo
Broad categories
1 .Felonious
2. Non Felonious

Historically,thedeliberateandpremeditatedkilling
ofapersonbyanotherpersonwasafelonioushomic
ideandwaclassifiedas Murder.Non felonious
homicide included
justifiablehomicideandexcusablehomicide.Althou
gh justifiable homicide was considered a crime.

Theoffenderoftenreceivedapardon.Excusableho
micidewasnot consideredacrime.
 .
Allhomicidesrequirethekillingofaliving
person.Inmoststates,thekillingofaviable
fetusisgenerallynotconsidereda
homicideunlessthefetusisfirstbornalive.
Insomestates,however,thisdistinctionisdisre
gardedandthekillingofan
unbornviablefetusisclassifiedashomicide.
inotherstates,statutesseparatelyclassifythe
killingofafetusasthecrime offeticide.
 Homicides can be divided into many overlapping types,
including:

Murder,
Manslaughter,
Justifiable homicide,
Killing inwar,
Euthanasia,
Execution,
 Homicide in English law

For a crime to be considered

homicide, it must take place
after the victim's legally
recognised birth, and before
theirlegal death.
 .
Homicide
Lawful
Unlawful

Justifiable, Excusable
Manslaughter Murder
Sec.76,77,78 80,82,83,84
299,304A 300
79,81,100,103 85,87,88&92
305, 306
 Manslaughter

All deaths which were not

murder were classified as
"manslaughter"
 Voluntary manslaughter

There are three types of

voluntary manslaughter:
That resulting from loss of self-
control;
That resulting from statutorily
defined diminished
responsibility; and
Killing in perseverance of
asuicide pact.
 Involuntary manslaughter

Involuntary manslaughter
involves the causing of the death
of another person without intent
to kill or intention to commit
grievous bodily harm.
 Culpable homicide
Homicide can be lawful or
unlawful. Lawful homicide
includes situations where a
person who has caused the
death of another cannot be
blamed for his death. Culpable
means blame worthy.
Thus,Culpable Homicide means
killing of a human being by
another human being in a
 Three degrees of Culpable
Homicide
. The first is, what may be called, 'Culpable
Homicide of the first degree'. This is the
greatest form of Culpable Homicide, which
is defined in Section 300 as 'Murder'.

The second may be termed as 'Culpable

Homicide of the second degree'. This is
punishable under the first part of Section
304.

Then, there is 'Culpable Homicide of the

third degree'. This is the lowest type of
Culpable Homicide and the punishment
 Section 299 of IPC defines Culpable Homicide as follows -

Section 299- Who ever causes death

by doing an act with the intention of
causing death, or
with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, or with the
knowledge that he is likely by such act
to cause death, commits the offence
of Culpable
Homicide
 Explanation 1- A person who causes bodily
injury to another who is labouring under a
disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and
thereby accelerates the death of that other,
shall be deemed to have caused his death.
Explanation 2- Where death is caused by
bodily injury, the person who causes such
bodily injury shall be deemed to have
caused the death, although by resorting to
proper remedies and skillful treatment the
death might have been prevented.
Explanation 3- The causing of the death of
child in the mother's womb is not homicide.
But it may amount to Culpable Homicide to
cause the death of a living child, if any part
 Illustrations
(a) A lays sticks and turf over a pit,
with the intention of thereby causing
death, or with the knowledge that
death is likely to be thereby caused.
Z, believing the ground to be firm,
treads on it,falls in and is killed. A has
committed the offence of culpable
homicide.
 (b) A knows Z to be behind a
bush. B does not know it.
A,intending to cause, or knowing
it to be likely to cause Z's
death,induces B to fire at the
bush. B fires and kills Z. Here B
may be guilty of no offence; but
A has committed the offence of
culpable homicide.
 (c) A, by shooting at a fowl with
intent to kill and steal it,kills B, who
is behind a bush; A not knowing
that he was there. Here,although A
was doing an unlawful act, he was
not guilty of culpable homicide, as
he did not intend to kill B or to
cause death by doing an act that he
knew was likely to cause death.
 Following are the essential elements of Culpable
Homicide

1.Death of a human being is

caused- It is required that the
death of a human being is
caused.However, it does not
include the death of an unborn
child unless any part of that
child is brought forth.
 2.By doing an act- Death may
be caused by any act for
example, by poisoning or by
hurting with a weapon. Here act
includes even on omission of an
act for which one is obligated by
law to do.
 3.Intention or Knowledge- There must be an
intention of any of the following
1.Intention of causing death- The doer of the act
must have intended to cause death. It is important to
note that intention of causing death does not
necessarily mean intention of causing death of the
person who actually died. If a person does an act with
an intention of killing B but A is killed instead, he is
still considered to have the intention.
2.Intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death- The intention ofthe offender may not
have been to cause death but only an injury that is
likely to cause
the death of the injured
 Or the act must have been done with the
knowledge that such an act may cause death
When a person does an act which he knows
that it has a high probability to cause death,
he is
responsible for the death which is caused as a
result of the act. InJamaluddin's case 1892,
the accused, while exorcising a spirit from the
body of a girl beat her so much that she died.
They were held guilty of Culpable Homicide
 Reg. v. Govinda
In Reg. v. Govinda the accused who was
a boy of 18 years was married to a girl of
15. The boy appeared to have been
habitually ill- treating the girl. On the
fateful day the accused knocked his wife
down, put one knee on her chest, and
struck her two or three violent blows on
the face with closed fist, producing
extravasations of blood on the brain, and
she had died in consequence either on
the spot, or very shortly afterwards
 The accused was held guilty of the offence of
murder by the Sessions Judge. The case came up
before a Bench of two Judges of the Bombay
High Court for confirmation of the death
sentence. As there was a difference of opinion
between the Judges constituting the Bench as to
whether the facts constituted an offence of
murder or an offence of culpable homicide not
amounting tomurder, the case was for opinion
to a third Judge, Melvill, J. His lordship compared
the provisions of Sections 299 and 300, I.P.C.,
viz., culpable homicide and murder thus:
 JUDGMENT Melvill, J.
1. I understand that these proceedings
have been referred to me underSection
271-Bof the Code of Criminal Procedure,
in order that I may decide whether the
offence committed by the prisoner was
murder, or culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.
2. For convenience of comparison, the
provisions ofSections 299and300of the
Indian Penal Code may be stated thus:
 3. I have underlined the words
which appear to me to mark the
differences between the two
offences.
4. (a) and (1) show that where
there is an intention to kill, the
offence is always murder.
 5. (c) and (4) appear to me intended to
apply (I do not say that they are necessarily
limited) to cases in which there is no
intention to cause death or bodily injury.
Furious driving, firing at a mark near a
public road, would be cases of this
description. Whether the offence is
culpable homicide or murder, depends upon
the degree of risk to human life. If death is
a likely result, it is culpable homicide; if it
is the most probable result, it is murder.
 6. The essence of (2) appears to
me to be found in the words
which I have underlined. The
offence is murder, if the offender
knows that the particular person
injured is likely, either from
peculiarity of constitution, or
immature age, or other special
circumstance, to be killed by an
injury which would not ordinarily
 A, knowing that Z is labouring
under such a disease that a blow
is likely to cause his death,
strikes him with intention of
causing bodily injury. Z dies in
consequence of the blow. A is
guilty of murder, although the
blow might not have been
sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause the death of a
 7. There remain to be considered (b) and (3), and it is on
a comparison of these two clauses that the decision of
doubtful cases like the present must generally depend.
The offence is culpable homicide, if the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is likely to cause death; it is
murder, if such injury is sufficient in the, ordinary course
of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine, but
appreciable. It is much the same distinction as that
between (c) and (4), already noticed. It is a question of
degree of probability. Practically, I think, it will generally
resolve itself into a consideration of the nature of the
weapon used. A blow from the fist or a stick on a vital
part may be likely to cause death; a wound from a sword
in a vital part is sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death.
 8. In the present case the prisoner, a young man of 18,
appears to have kicked his wife, (a girl of 15) and to have
struck her several times with his fist on the back. These
blows seem to have caused her no serious injury. She,
however, fell on the ground, and I think that the evidence
shows that the prisoner then put one knee on her chest,
and struck her two or three times on the face. One or two
of these blows, which, from the medical evidence, I believe
to have been violent and to have been delivered with the
closed fist, took effect on the girl's left eye, producing
contusion and discoloration. The skull was not fractured,
but the blow caused an extravasation of blood on the
brain, and the girl died in consequence either on the spot,
or very shortly afterwards. On this state of facts the
Sessions Judge and the assessors have found the prisoner
 guilty of murder, and he has been sentenced to death. I
am myself of opinion that the offence is culpable
homicide, and not murder. I do not think there was an
intention to cause death; nor do I think that the bodily
injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. Ordinarily, I. think, it would not cause
death. But a violent blow in the eye from a man's fist,
while the person struck is lying with his or her head on
the ground, is certainly likely to cause death, either by
producing concussion or extravasation of blood on the
surface or in the substance of the brain. A reference to
Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence (Fourth Edition, page
294) will show how easily life may be destroyed by a
blow on the head producing extravasation of blood.
 9. For these reasons I am of
opinion that the prisoner should
be convicted of culpable
homicide not amounting to
murder, and I would sentence
him to transportation for seven
years.
10. This order was accordingly
passed by the Court.
 Murder (When Culpable
Homicide amounts to Murder)
Murder is a type of Culpable
Homicide where culpability of
the accused is quite more than in
a mere Culpable Homicide.
Section 300, says that Culpable
Homicide is Murder if the act by
which the death is caused is
done
 1. with the intention of causing death
2. or with an intention of causing such bodily
injury as the offender knows to be likely to
cause the death of the person,
3. or with an intention of causing such bodily
injury as is sufficient in ordinary course of
nature to cause death.
4. It is also Murder if the person committing
the act knows that the act is so dangerous that
it will cause death or such injury as is likely to
cause death in all probability and he has no
valid reason for doing that act.
 Illustrations

(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in

consequence. A commits murder.
(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a
blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of
causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty
of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound
state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any
disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course
of
nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he
may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did
not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary
course of nature would cause death.
 (c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or
club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a
man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies
in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder,
although he may not have intended to cause
Z's death.

(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded

cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one
of them. A is guilty of murder, although he
may not have had a premeditated design to
kill any particular individual.
 Exception 1.-When culpable homicide
is not murder.-Culpable homicide is not
murder if the offender, whilst deprived
of the power
of self-control by grave and sudden
provocation, causes the death of
the person who gave the provocation
or causes the death of any other
person by mistake or accident
 The above exception is subject to the
following provisos:-
First.-That the provocation is not sought or
voluntarily provoked by the offender as an
excuse for killing or doing harm to any
person.
Secondly.-That the provocation is not given
by anything done in obedience to the law,
or by a public servant in the lawful exercise
of the powers of such public servant.
Thirdly.-That the provocation is not given by
anything done in the lawful exercise of the
right of private defence.
 Explanation.-Whether the
provocation was grave and
sudden enough to prevent the
offence from amounting to
murder is a question of fact.
 Illustrations
(a) A, under the influence of passion
excited by a provocation given by Z,
intentionally kills Y, Z's child. This is
murder, inasmuch as the provocation
was not given by the child, and the
death of the child was not caused by
accident or misfortune in doing an act
caused
by the provocation.
 (b) Y gives grave and sudden
provocation to A. A, on this
provocation, fires a pistol at Y,
neither intending nor knowing
himself to be likely to kill Z, who
is near him, but out of sight. A
kills Z. Here A has not committed
murder, but merely culpable
homicide.
 (c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a
bailiff. A is excited to sudden
and violent passion by the
arrest, and kills Z. This is
murder,in asmuch as the
provocation was given by a thing
done by a public servant in the
exercise of his powers.
 (d) A appears as a witness
before Z, a Magistrate. Z says
that he does not believe a word
of A's deposition, and that A has
perjured himself. A is moved to
sudden passion by these words,
and kills Z.
This is murder.
 (e) A attempts to pull Z's nose. Z, in
the exercise of the right of private
defence, lays hold of A to prevent
him from doing so. A is
moved to sudden and violent passion
in consequence, and kills Z. This is
murder, inasmuch as the provocation
was giving by a thing done in the
exercise of the right of private
defence.
 (f) Z strikes B. B is by this
provocation excited to violent rage.A,
a bystander, intending to take
advantage of B's rage, and to cause
him to kill Z, puts a knife into B's
hand for that purpose. B kills Z with
the knife. Here B may have
committed only culpable homicide,
but A is guilty of murder.
 Exception 2.-Culpable homicide is not
murder if the offender in the exercise in
good faith of the right of private
defence or person or property, exceeds
the power given to him by law and
causes the death of the person against
whom he is exercising such right of
defence without premeditation, and
without any intention of doing more
harm than is necessary for the purpose
of such defence.
 Illustration
Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in
such a manner as to cause grievous
hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z
persists in the assault. A believing in
good faith that he can by no other
means prevent himself from being
horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has
not committed murder, but only
culpable homicide.
 Exception 3.-Culpable homicide is not
murder if the offender,being a public servant
or aiding a public servant acting for the
advancement of public justice, exceeds the
powers given to him by law,and causes
death by doing an act which he, in good
faith, believes to be lawful and necessary
for the due discharge of his duty as such
public servant and without ill-will towards
the person whose death is caused.
 Exception 4.-Culpable homicide
is not murder if it is committed
without premeditation in a
sudden fight in the heat of
passion upon a
sudden quarrel and without the
offender's having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner.
 Explanation.-It is immaterial in such
cases which party offers the
provocation or commits the first
assault.
Exception 5.-Culpable homicide is not
murder when the person whose death
is caused, being above the age of
eighteen years, suffers death or
takes the risk of death with his own
consent.
 Illustration
A, by instigation, voluntarily
causes Z, a person under
eighteen years of age, to commit
suicide. Here, on account of Z's
youth, he was incapable of
giving consent to his own death;
A has therefore abetted murder.
 Distinction between s
299 and 300
Culpable homocide
A person commits Culpable
Homicide if the act by which
death is caused is done
1.With the intention of
causing death
2. with an intention to cause
such bodily injury as is likely
to cause death.
3. with the knowledge that
such an act is likely to cause
death
Murder
A person commits Murder if
the act by which death is
caused is done -
1.With the intention of
causing death
2. with an intention to cause
such bodily injury as the
offender knows to be likely to
cause death of the person to
whom the harm is caused
3. with an intention of
causing bodily injury to any
person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is
sufficient in ordinary course
of nature to cause death
All 'Murder'
are'Culpable
Homicide' but not
vice-versa
 Section 300 (3)
The section provides that, culpable homicide
is murder if the act by which death is caused:
Is done with an intention of causing bodily
injury to any person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. For
cases to fall within Clause (3), it is not
necessary that the offender intended to
cause death, so long as the death ensues
from the intentional bodily injury or injuries
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature
 Chamru Budhwa Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh
After an exchange of abuse accused
dealt a blow on the head of the deceased
with the lathi. After that 2nd appellant
dealt another blow to the deceased, the
injury inflicted proved fatal and both the
Courts below came to the conclusion that
the Appellant was guilty of the offence
under Section 302 IPC. As per the doctor
the injury inflicted on the head was
sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death.
 The Supreme Court was of the
view that it appears that the
crime was committed without
premeditation in a sudden fight
in the heat of passion upon a
sudden quarrel thus bringing the
case within Exception 4 thereto
with the result that the offence
committed was culpable
homicide not amounting to
 Willie (William) Slaney vs. The
State of Madhya Pradesh
In another case of Willie (William) Slaney vs. The State of
Madhya Pradesh , William was on terms of intimacy with
sister of deceased. The brother did not like their intimacy.
On the evening of the day of the occurrence, there was a
heated exchange of words. The accused gave one blow on
his head with a hockey stick with the result that his skull
was fractured. He died in the hospital ten days later. The
doctor thought that injury was only likely to cause death.
In the opinion of court, the appellant could hardly be
presumed to have had this special knowledge that the
blow was sufficient to cause death at the time he struck
the blow. So the offence falls under the second part of
section 304 of IPC. While it has been made clear in Virsa
Singh's case that such knowledge is not necessary.

 The approach of the court in the above mentioned cases
seems, that more reliance was placed on the nature and
seriousness of injury rather than the intention to cause
such injury. It is very evident when judge in Slaney's
case says that, All blows on the head do not necessarily
cause death. The approach has been to find out
whether the ingredient namely the intention to cause
the particular injury is present or not and it is held that
circumstances like sudden quarrel in a fight or when the
deceased intervenes in such a fight, would create a
doubt about the ingredient of intention as it cannot
definitely be said in such circumstances that the
accused aimed the blow at a particular part of the body.

 Earlier the courts first searched
the intention to kill and IN ITS
ABSENCE the act can be
murder only if that injury would
be sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death.
 The Landmark Judgment Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR
1958 SC 465

Facts: The appellant was

allegedly guilty of the murder of
one Khem Singh. There was only
one injury on his person, which
was a result of a spear thrust.
The doctor said that the injury
was sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death.
 Medical Report: The injury was a
punctured wound 2- x transverse
in direction on the left side of
the abdominal wall in the lower
part of the iliac region just above
the inguinal canal. Three coils of
intestine were also coming out.
 The appellant was convicted by
the first court under section 302
IPC and his conviction was
upheld by the High Court. He
was granted special leave to the
Supreme Court on the following:
Issue: On the finding of High
Court what offence is made out
as having been committed by the
petitioner
 Arguments advanced: It was
argued with much circumlocution
that the facts set out above do
not disclose an offence of
murder because the prosecution
has not proved that there was an
intention to inflict a bodily injury
that was sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course of
nature.
 Reasoning and decision: The court said that
actual reading of this section infers that it is not
enough to prove that the injury found to be
present is sufficient to cause death in ordinary
course of nature but it must be in addition shown
that the injury found to be present was the same
injury that was intended to be inflicted. Whether
it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature is a matter of inference or
deduction from the proved facts about the
nature of the injury and has nothing to do with
the question of intention.

 Four -point test
The court gave a four-point test
which prosecution must observe
and prove in order tobring the
case under this section:
i) First, it must establish, quite
objectively, that a bodily injury is
present;
ii) Secondly, the nature of the
injury must be proved; These are
purely objective investigations
 iii) Thirdly, it must be proved
that there was an intention to
inflict that particular bodily
injury, that is to say, that it was
not accidental or unintentional,
or that some other kind of injury
was intended. Once these three
elements are proved to be
present, the enquiry proceeds
further and,
 iv) Fourthly, it must be proved
that the injury of the type just
described made up of the three
elements set out above is
sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature. This
part of the enquiry is purely
objective and inferential and has
nothing to do with the intention
of the offender.
 Once these four elements are
established by the prosecution
(and, of course, the burden is on
the prosecution throughout) the
offence is murder under s. 300,
thirdly.
 Khuman Singh vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh (2004).
The facts were that the villagers from different villages
were assembled in connection of the flag ceremony of a
temple. The stick of Khuman Singh, appellant struck the
one who was beating the drum. An altercation took place
and parties were pacified by intervention of the
deceased. After ceremony was over, the complainant
party was chased by the appellants. The deceased was
overpowered and was assaulted with lathi blows and
stones. Some accused also trampled on his body and he
died on the spot. According to the medical report none of
the injuries was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. The death had actually resulted due
injury to the liver caused by fracture of rib bone, which
punctured the liver.

 Decision: The court observed that what
happened was not premeditated and
appellants were not prepared for the
incident. The injuries were inflicted by
lathies and stones. Medical report showed
that it was the ribs that had entered the
liver and if liver was not damaged death
would not have resulted. This injury was
not one which was intended by the court
and it was at best accidental and
therefore s. 300 (3) is not attracted.
 What needs to be proved is that the accused
had an intention to cause the same bodily injury
found to be present on the person of deceased
which was later found to be sufficient to cause
death. Such a principle is based on broad lines
of common sense because if intention is
considered to be of causing an injury which is
sufficient to cause death; then any person could
always plead that he never had an intention to
cause such a injury and it would have been very
difficult to prove him wrong.

 That is why the court observed that:
Once these four elements are established by
the prosecution the offence is murder under
s. 300, thirdly. It does not matter that there
was no intention to cause death. It does not
matter that there was no intention even to
cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of
nature. It does not even matter that there is
no knowledge that an act of that kind will be
likely to cause death.
 Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually
found to be proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely
objective and the only question is whether, as a
matter of purely objective inference, the injury is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting
injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not
guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind,
they must face the consequences; and they can only
escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced
that the injury was accidental or otherwise
unintentional.

 Dhupa Chamar vs. State
of Bihar
Dhupa Chamar vs. State of Bihardealt in great
detail on the requirement of intention and
applicability of this section. In this case,
lordships had discussed almost all apt
authorities and above-mentioned cases in this
regard. They mainly threw light on the
question that infliction of single blow, which
proved fatal should not be equated with the
intention to cause death or an injury sufficient
to cause death in ordinary course of nature.
 In this case, there was an incident of assault by fists
and slaps between Ramu Chamar and appellant No.
2-Tokha Chamar and due to this reason next day,
appellants and their men armed with bhalas, lathies
and with brickbats came near the house of Ramu
Chamar and started abusing his family members
whereupon, villagers arrived there. One of them, a
lady, made a protest whereupon appellant No. 1-
Dhupa Chamar gave a bhala blow on the left side of
her neck and the same was pulled out forcibly from
the neck as a result of which she fell down and died
instantaneously. Appellant No.2-Tokha Chamar
assaulted one other person in the abdomen with
bhala as a result of which he died in the hospital.
 Decision and reasoning: Under Clause Thirdly the intention
to cause that particular injury is a subjective inquiry and
when once such intention is established and if the
intended injury is found objectively to be sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, Clause Thirdly is
attracted and it would be murder unless one of the
exceptions to Section 300 is attracted. If on the other hand
this ingredient of 'intention' is not established or if a
reasonable doubt arises in this regard then only it would
be reasonable to infer that Clause Thirdly is not attracted
and that the accused must be attributed knowledge that in
inflicting the injury he was likely to cause death in which
case it will be culpable homicide punishable under Section
304 Part II IPC." Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles it
appearred to court that the accused persons came
 armed with deadly weapons and there was an altercation and
exchange of hot words whereafter appellant No. 1 assaulted victim
with a bhala causing injury on the chest rupturing important blood
vessels resulting in her instantaneous death. The above
circumstance would show that accused intentionally inflicted the
injury and the same would indicate such a state of mind of the
appellant-Dhupa Chamar that he aimed and inflicted the injury with
deadly weapon. In the absence of evidence or reasonable
explanation to show that this appellant did not intend to inflict injury
by bhala in the chest with that degree of force sufficient to rupture
important blood vessel and cutting of aorta and other artery, it
would be perverse to conclude that he did not intend to inflict that
injury that he did. When once the ingredient 'intention' is
established then the offence would be murder as the intended injury
was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Therefore, inevitable conclusion would be that appellant committed
the offence of murder u/s 300 (3).
 Harjindar Singh v. Delhi
Administration
Harjindar Singh v. Delhi Administration, appellant
was beating one person and the deceased
intervened to rescue. When the three were
grappling with each other appellant took out the
knife and stabbed the deceased once. Cause of
death was shock and haemorrhage from injury to
femoral vessels in the thigh. The appellant did not
use the knief when he was engaged in the fight. The
deceased came intervening in a crouching position
to separate the two. Therefore it can't be said with
any definiteness that the appellant aimed a blow at
this particular part knowing that it would cut the
artery. He was convicted under 304 I of IPC.
 Tholan v. St. of Tamil
Nadu
Tholan v. St. of Tamil Nadu, the accused and deceased
had no enimity but were remonstrating with each other
on some point. In the course, accused took out a knife
and stabbed deceased on right of side of chest.
Deceased succumbed to the injury and died. Cause of
death was stated to be shock and haemorrhage on
account of stab injury and sufficient to cause death in
ordinary course of nature. Court concluded that there
was no dispute, quarrel or malice of accused with
deceased and presence of deceased was wholly
accidental. Everything happened on the spur of the
moment and requisite intention cannot be attributed to
the accused. Thus he was held guilty for committing an
offence under 304 II of IPC.
 Jaiprakash v. State (Delhi
Administration)
Jaiprakash v. State (Delhi Administration), the
appellant was having illicit relations with wife of the
deceased and his visits to her house were resented
and objected by him. On the day of occurrence, the
accused visited the house in absence of deceased
armed with a kirpan. When deceased came and
objected to his presence there was only an
altercation and exchange of hot words and not a
fight. Thereupon, he took out the kirpan and
stabbed on the chest of the deceased resulting in
his instantaneous death. The above circumstances
would show that the accused intentionally inflicted
that injury and though it may not be premeditated
one.
 All such circumstances certainly indicated a state
of mind namely that he aimed and inflicted the
injury with a deadly weapon. As observed in Virsa
Singh's case, in the absence of evidence or
reasonable expalnation to show that he did not
intend to stab on the chest with the degree of
force sufficient to penetrate the heart, it would be
perverse to conclude that he did not intend to
inflict the injury that he did. When once ingredient
?intention? is established then the offence would
be murder if injury is found to be sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death.
 Abdul Waheed Khan and Ors. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh
Abdul Waheed Khan and Ors. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, three accused rushed to the deceased and
began stabbing him indiscriminately with their three
knives, while another accused tried to snatch the bag
containing the cash. Further knife blows were given by
the three accused persons till the deceased collapsed.
They away the cash bag and all of them fled. the three
appellants had indiscriminately stabbed the deceased,
though their object was to rob him. the doctor said that
the stab wounds as well as the head injury are
individually sufficient to cause death". The stab wounds
came first and then the possible fall. Taking into
account the totality of the circumstances the accused
was held guilty for murder.
 Where murder is caused by a single blow

Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab,

(1981), Randhir Singh v. State of
Punjab (1981),
Gurmail Singh v. State of
Punjab(1982),
Jagtar Singh v. State of
Punjab(1983),
Tholan v. State of Tamil
Nadu(1984),
What are the Ingredients of Grave and Sudden Provocation?

Exception 1
(1) That the accused received provocation;
(2) That the provocation was (a) grave,
and (b) sudden;
(3) That he was deprived by the
provocation of his power of self-control;
(4) That while thus deprived of his power
of self-control and before he could cool
down he caused the death of the person
who gave him the provocation.
 No abstract rule of
reasonableness can be laid
down. What a reasonable man,
i.e., a normal person will do in
certain circumstances depends
upon the cultural, social and
emotional background of the
society to which he belongs.
 The court must consider the
reaction not of the normal man
in the abstract but the normal
man whose impulses are
conditional by the same
environments as those of the
accused.
 In 1707 Lord Holt specified four
categories of acts that
constituted legally sufficient
provocation. These were:-
Hearing angry words followed by
a physical assault.
Seeing a friend being assaulted.
Observing a citizen detained by
force.
Seeing ones wife in bed with
 The acts legally insufficient at
common law to constitute
provocation included:-
Mere words.
Insulting gestures.
Trespass to property.
Misconduct by a child or servant.
Breach of contract.
 The accused, Nanavati, at the time of the alleged
murder, was second in command of the Indian Naval
Ship Mysore. He married Sylvia in 1949 and had three
children.
Since the time of marriage, the couple were living at
different places having regard to the exigencies of
service of Nanavati. Finally, they shifted to Bombay.

In the same city the deceased Ahuja was doing business

in automobiles and in the year 1956, Agniks, who were
common friends of Nanavatis and Ahujas, introduced
Ahuja and his sister to Nanavatis. Ahuja was unmarried
and was about 34 years of age at the time of his death.
 Nanavati, as a Naval Officer, was frequently going
away from Bombay in his ship, leaving his wife and
children in Bombay.Gradually, friendship developed
between Ahuja and Sylvia, which culminated in illicit
intimacy between them.

On April 27, 1959, Sylvia confessed to Nanavati of

her illicit intimacy with Ahuja.

Enraged at the conduct of Ahuja, Nanavati went to

his ship, took from the stores of the ship a semi-
automatic revolver and six cartridges on a false
pretext, loaded the same, went to the flat of Ahuja
entered his bed-room and shot him dead.
 Thereafter, the accused surrendered himself to the police. He was put
under arrest and in due course he was committed to the Sessions for facing
a charge under s. 302 of the Indian Penal code.
But the defence version was that the accused was away with his ship from
April 6, 1959, to April 18, 1959. Immediately after returning to Bombay, he
and his wife went to Ahmednagar for about three days. Thereafter, they
returned to Bombay and the accused noticed that his wife was behaving
strangely and was not responsive or affectionate to him. When questioned,
she used to evade the issue.

At noon on April 27, 1959, when they were sitting in the sitting-room for
the lunch to be served, the accused put his arm round his wife
affectionately, when she seemed to go tense and unresponsive.
After lunch, when he questioned her about her fidelity, she shook her head
to indicate that she was unfaithful to him. He guessed that her paramour
was Ahuja. As she did not even indicate clearly whether Ahuja would marry
her and look after the children, he decided to settle the matter with him.
Sylvia pleaded with him not go to Ahujas house, as he might shoot him.
 Thereafter, he drove his wife, two of his children and a
neighbors child in his car to a cinema, dropped them there and
promised to come and pick them up at 6 P.M. when the show
ended. He then drove his car to his ship, as he wanted to get
medicine for his sick dog, he represented to the authorities in
the ship, that he wanted to draw a revolver and six rounds from
the stores of the ship as he was going to drive alone to
Ahmednagar by night, though the real purpose was to shoot
himself.

On receiving the revolver and six cartridges, and put it inside a

brown envelope. Then he drove his car to Ahujas office, and not
finding him there, he drove to Ahujas flat, range the door bell,
and, when it was opened by a servant, walked to Ahujas bed-
room, went into the bed-room and shut the door behind him.
 He also carried with him the envelope
containing the revolver. The accused saw the
deceased inside the bed-room, called him a
filthy swine and asked him whether he would
marry Sylvia and look after the children. The
deceased retorted, Am I to marry every woman
I sleep with? The accused became enraged, put
the envelope containing the revolver on a
cabinet nearby, and threatened to thrash the
deceased.
 The deceased made a sudden move to grasp at the
envelope, when the accused whipped out his revolver
and told him to get back. A struggle ensued between
the two and during that struggle two shots went off
accidentally and hit Ahuja resulting in his death. After
the shooting the accused went back to his car and
drove it to the police station where he surrendered
himself.

The trail court convicted under S.304 A of IPC and in

appeal the high court convert it into S.302 of IPC.

So the accuse made an appeal before the SC and at the

same time he made an application to governor under
Art.161.
 The definition of provocation as
explained by the Supreme Court of India
in the case ofK. M. Nanavativ.The State
of Bombay, is as follows :-
The test of grave and sudden
provocation is whether a reasonable man,
belonging to the same class of society to
which the accused belongs, and placed in
the situation in which the accused was
placed, would be so provoked as to lose
his self-control.
 In India, words or gestures may
also, under certain
circumstances, cause grave and
sudden provocation to an
accused to an accused so as to
bring his at within the first
exception to section 300 of the
Indian Penal Code.
.
 The mental background created by the
previous act of the victim may be taken into
consideration in ascertaining whether the
subsequent act caused grave and sudden
provocation for committing the offence.

The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the

influence of passion arising from that
provocation and not after the passion had
cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise
giving room and scope for premeditation and
calculation
 In the case ofRv.Duffy, the court gave a
very clear definition of the term
provocation which is as follows :
Provocation is some act, or series of
acts, done by the dead man to the
accused, which would cause in any
reasonable person, and actually causes in
the accused, a sudden and temporary loss
of self-control, rendering the accused so
subject to passion as to make him or her
for the moment not master of his mind.
 Words alone :-

Under the Indian law, it is well established that

words alone, whether in the form of insults or
abuses or whether in the form of providing
information regarding adultery etc. can amount to
provocation. This particular position of Indian law
is largely based on the 1837 draft of the Penal
Code wherein the following is provided :-
it is an indisputable fact, that gross insults by
word or gesture have as great a tendency to move
many persons to violent passion as dangerous or
painful bodily injuries; nor does it appear to us
that passion as excited by insult is entitled to less
 indulgence than passion excited
by pain. It would be a fortunate
thing for mankind if every
person felt an outrage which left
a stain upon his honour more
acutely than an outrage which
had fractured one of his limbs
 Cumulative provocation :-

Indian courts have accepted the principle of

cumulative provocation ever since the inception of the
code. Courts could relegate all matters having an
element of time in them to the requirement of
suddenness, leaving alone matters not related to the
time factor to be framed under the head of grave
provocation.Under sudden rovocation, the following
could be considered :-
Response to the provocation (the homicide) was
unexpected as opposed to planned and calculated.
Interval between the homicide and the provocation
must be short.
Accused is operating under loss of self control
 But what matters most is whether the previous
provocations however numerous the occasions, had
an impact on the accuseds mental state at the time
of killing. For example, in the case ofAktarv.State
the Court held that the particular situation and past
experiences of an accused in relation to the
deceased must be taken into account to understand
the extent to which the accused was provoked into
losing self-control. In many similar cases, the courts
held that cumulative provocation has to be given
due consideration and that the act of the homicide
should not be looked at in isolation.
 Provocation in the presence of the defendant :-

Indian courts recognize the possibility of provocation

even in the absence of the defendant. This sort of
provocation is called hearsay provocation under
English common law. In the case ofChanan
Khanv.Emperor, the court was prepared to regard the
provocation although it was not in the presence of the
accused on the basis that he received the provoking
information from a very reliable source and the fact
that the act was committed in very close proximity to
the accused itself which meant that the act could be
verified immediately. Thus, the court held that the
provocation in this case was just as much as if the
person provoked had seen it happen with his own eyes
 Self-induced provocation :-

Exception 1 to section 300 of the

Indian Penal Code expressly disallows
the defence from succeeding when the
accused has sought the provocation.
The first proviso to the exception
states that :-
That the provocation is not sought or
voluntarily provoked by the offender
as an excuse for killing or doing harm
to any person.
 Harchandra v. State of
Rajasthan
In Harchandra v. State of Rajasthan, the
facts are that the incident took place all
of a sudden and there was no evidence to
show that the injuries were inflicted on
the body of the deceased with the motive
or intention to kill him or to cause such
bodily injury which was likely to cause
death. The High Court of Rajasthan held
that the offence caused by the accused
would amount to culpable homicide not-
amounting to murder.
 Exception 2:
Culpable homicide is not murder if the
offender, in the exercise in good faith of
the right of private defence of person or
property, exceeds the power given to
him by law and causes the death of the
person against whom he is exercising
such right of defence without
premeditation and without any intention
of doing more harm than is necessary for
the purpose of such defence.
 Exceeding the right of private defence:
In order to apply this Exception (2) certain
conditions must be fulfilled
(a) The act must be done in exercise of right of
private defence of person or property.
(b) The act must be done in good faith.
(c) The person doing the act must have exceeded his
right given to him by law and have thereby caused
death.
(d) The act must have been done without
premeditation and without any intention of causing
more harm than was necessary in private defence.
Illustration:
 Deceased though committing criminal
trespass was not armed. There could
have been no apprehension that death or
grievous hurt was likely to be caused to
accused. It has been held that the
accused far exceeded his right of private
defence of property by using dangerous
weapon, chhura, with deadly effect and
causing two injuries which cut the heart
and lung. Hence, he was guilty of an
offence under Section 304, Part I, I.P.C.
 In Ram Avtar v. State of U.P.,the
Supreme Court held that the
sequence of the events shows
that the assault by accused
continued even after the danger
of life of the accused had
ceased. Therefore, the accused
exceeded the right of private
defence because it is limited to
the extent it could have been
 In a case the accused was going in his
jeep when he was surrounded by the
victim and his companions whereupon he
fired thrice from his revolver. It was held
that it cannot be said that he fired with
an intention of causing death of any
particular person, and he exceeded in
the exercise of right of private defence.
As such he had only knowledge that his
act was likely to cause death and he was
convicted under Section 304, I.P.C.