Aircraft Fuel Tank System Safety

Training

1
Course objectives

Inform candidates of the safety issues and

shortcomings that have led to a decline in fuel system
reliability and safety to assist them in establishing
Maintenance and continuing airworthiness
management procedures
Effective Quality and Safety management procedures
Assist candidates to prepare for the
implementation of a wide range of fuel system safety
related requirements
Statisfy Part M& 145 Amendments on fuel system
safety

2
Introductions
Course format/methodology
Questions / Participation

3
Module 1 - Introduction

4
EASA Agency Decisions

2007/001R
2007/002R
2007/003R

All relate to Aircraft Fuel System Safety why?

5
The Agency Decisions are the outcome of the most
extensive aviation safety investigation in the history
of aviation

The accident to B747 operated

by US Operator TWA on 17
July 1996- TWA 800
6
TWA Flight 800 crashed at 20.30 on July 17 1996
In flight break up due to explosive failure in fuselage
212 pax 18 crew die
Initial investigation focuses on terrorism
6 months pass before terrorism or external
explosion discounted
Fuel tank explosion induced by system failures 9
months into investigation

7
TWA Flight 800crashed at 20.30 on July 1996

8
9
The Agency Decisions are the outcome of the most
extensive aviation safety investigation in the history
of aviation

10
The EASA decisions relate to
Design and Production standards
Continuing Airworthiness Management
Operating procedures and limitations
Part 145 organisations and maintenance of aircraft
Licensing standards for aircraft for maintenance
engineers

11
The investigations surrounding the accident led to
many basic design and certification assumptions
about installed fuel tank system safety to be
substantially revised.

What have design and certification assumptions got to

do with in-serice continuing airworthiness
management and maintenance of aircraft ?

12
The purpose of this training is to explain in more detail
what effect the design and certification assumptions
have on in-service continuing airworthiness

Can you identify some of the processes which might be

affected for an in-service aircraft if design and
certification assumptions are subsequently revised ?

13
All of the continuing airworthiness processes
could be affected !

covers all of the processes ensuring that at any time in

their operating life, all aircraft comply with the
airworthiness requirements in force and are in a
condition fit for safe operation.

Regulation 2042/2003 Article 2 - Definitions

14
AD Maintenance Programme
Flight Manual Maintenance Standards
Modifications Reliability Programme
Repairs Certification
MMEL MaintenanceRequirements
Life Limits Weight & Balance
Airworthiness Limitations
C of A
Records
15
 As you can see, these processes are those associated
with the operation, continuing airworthiness and
maintenance of aircraft.

In the global fleet of aircraft all of the processes have

been affected

16
We all accept that aviation fuel is dangerous when
handling the fuel: but it has mostly been safe inside
aircraft installations.

17
Or has it been safe?

18
Or has it been safe?

19
 Aircraft Fuel Tank System Safety
Module 1
Or has it been safe?

20
Or has it been safe?

A global review of in-service fuel tank safety data

demonstrated that fuel tank safety does not meet
contemporary standards for system safety targets

21
8 December 1963 Pan Am B707
9 May 1976 Iranian Air Force B747
22 August 1985 BA Air Tours B737
11 May 1990 Philippine Air Lines B737
17 July 1996 TWA 800 B747
3 March 2001 Thai Airways B737
5 September 2001 BA B777
20 August 2007 China Air B737

22
7 Hull losses and 1 ground fire that all resulted in
fatalities

Perhaps it is not quite as safe as we

thought?

23
 Not all of the aircraft losses arose from the
same failure causes but there are
characteristics that require further study

This is the primary purpose of this course

to study the failure characteristics and
learn from the failures

24
In order to better understand it was necessary to :-
Assess the TWA accident causes
Compare with other accident data to seek common
cause failure characteristics
Review Design assumptions
Review development of scheduled maintenance
requirements and inspection/maintenance standards

25
 The assessment led to the discovery of 3
similar failures:-

1990 Philippine airlines B737

1996 TWA 800
And in the midst of the investigation
2001 Thai Airways B737

26
Aviation Fuel System Safety
Module 1

27
 Aviation Fuel System Safety
Module 1
In order to learn from these accidents we are
going to have to go back to basics!

Design and Production standards

Airworthiness Management principles
Maintenance and Inspection Standars development
and principles

28
 Aviation Fuel System Safety
Module 1

This course is essentially about fuel system safety

initiatives :at the same time these initiatives were
being developed 2 parallel investigations were
underway:-
Lightning HIRF
Ageing Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory
Committee ( ATSRAC) Airplane wiring

29
Fuel System Safety
Module 2:-

The history of the

Rulemaking

30
July 1996 TWA 800 accident

August 1996 White House Commission:

The Ageing Airplane Non-Structural System
Programme

The same year Start of a major industry study into

Fuel System Safety

31
32
1990 B-737-300 Manila , Philippine
- Almost new airplane
- Air Conditioning Packs running during Ground
Operations
- Empty CWT explosion during pushback from gate
- CWT pumps operating at time of explosion
- 8 fatalities
- Jet-A fuel, approx.95 degree F ambiet temp.
- NO IGNITION SOURCE IDENTIFIED

33
 1996 - B-747, TWA 800, JFK
-25 year old airplane
- Air Conditioning Packs running during Ground
Operations
- Empty CWT explosion during climb
- 230 fatalities
- Jet-A fuel, approx. 120 degree F tank temp.
- NO IGNITION SOURCE IDENTIFIED

34
TWA 800 accident

35
2001 B-737-400 Bangkok Thailand

36
2001 B-737-400 Bangkok Thailand
- 10 year old airplane
- Air Conditioning Packs running during Ground Operations
- Empty CWT explosion minutes after refueling
- CWT pumps operating at time of explosion
- 1 fatality
- Jet-A1 fuel, approx. 97 degree F ambient temp.
- NO IGNITION SOURCE IDENTIFIED

37
3 Centre Wing Tank explosions

What Coused them?

How could it happen?
There had not been any indications previously that
the tank systems were unsafe
Is it an age-related issue?

38
Heating of the centre wing tank to temperatures that
were higher than anticipated during design were
apparent at an early stage

Heat transfer from externally mounted Air

Conditioning System (ACS) a large contributor to an
explosive condition

39
A series of trial flights flown to replicate the TWA 800
final hours establishes CWT intenal temperatures as
high as 145f.

40
Heat transfer into the Centre Wing Tank (CWT)
is possible from the ACS what about the
Exposure on all fleets aroud the world?

41
Fuel Tank Flammability Exposure Worldwide Fleet Average

42
 Fuel Tank Flammability Exposure Worldwide Fleet Average

Main Tanks 2-4%

Tail Tanks 2-5%

Heated Center Wing Tank 15-30% Body Tanks

Un-heated Center Wing Tanks 2-6% Pressurized <5%
Un-pressurized>20%

43
Prevent fuel system
accidents through ignition
source elimination and
flammability reduction

44
The explosive condition required oxygen, fuel and an
ignition source

The fuel source came from fuel vapour from heated

tank ullage

Where does the ignition source come from?

Tanks were specifically designed to eliminate ignition

source werent they?
45
Ignition source requirements were developed on the assumption
that flammability levels lower than tank heating proceduced
under certain critical conditions:-

Ignition source requirements were reassessed

permissible energy level limits too high to
prevent an unsafe condition occurring

46
There is now a probable scenario which expalins the
fuel tank explosions that have been happeninig:
what is the condition of the rest of the world fleet,
are there latent threats out there?

1998 Industry Fuel System Safety programme

implemented which included a programme of survey
of sample aircraft around the world

47
Industry Fuel System Safety Programme Survey was not
conclusive but there were finding
Bonding provisions missing
Swarf and contamination in tanks
Damaged components
Evidence of overheated pumps
Wiring problems
Vent systems incorrectly assembled

48
49
Industry were carrying out an Industy Fuel System
Safety Programme what about Regulatory rules and
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
initiatives?

50
NTSB concluded that tank flammability is the main
culprit the most likely ignition source was a wiring
defect, possibly related to the Fuel Quantity
Indicating System (FQIS)

NTSB recommend reducing flammability as the

priority
Reducing ignition sources as a secondaryneed

51
FAA nad Regulators from JAA initially then Canada
and Brazil worked towards a common harmonised
set of requirements to reduce the likelihood of an
unsafe condition arising in fuel tanks
Wing tanks assumed to be safe from effects of
heating
Flammability target level is wing tank level or better

52
Flammability at first, the most difficult problem to solve

Initial efforts focused on ignition source reduction

Flammability not ignored but difficult

53
Regulatory effort co-ordinated by FAA.FAA rulemaking
initiatives to be developed in harmony with Europe,
Canada and Brazil

Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committees (ARAC)

established review flammability issues
ARAC is USA process for rulemaking
ARACs included representatives from Europe,
Canada, Brazil

54
2 ARAC activities commence in parallel:-

ARAC (1) Study flammability reduction

ARAC (2) Study flammability reduction
systems ground and air
Air - nitrogen enriched air (NEA)
Ground ullage washing and fuel scrubbing

55
Flammability Reduction ARAC:-
Nitrogen Gas inerting on board and pre-flight
Foam Filled tanks
Tank Membranes
Nitrogen Gas inerting benefits inconclusive when weighed
against cost and operator hazard issues
ARAC (1) concludes that with current technology, benefits of
airborne system not cost effective and unsubstantiated
Rulemaking effort requiring future aircraft to be designed
without heated tanks

56
Ignition Source Reduction studies uncover
failure modes that could lead to ignition
sources:-
Mechanical failures pumps friction
Electrical faults in tank systems electrical arcs
Cross-coupling effects on in tank systems from
external faults including hot surface effects
Bonding system faults internal and external
Lightning protection

57
 Airplane surveys and comparison of
previous requirements against TWA 800
scenario leads to need to carry out safety
assessment of all designs TC and STC

58
Design safety assessment to address flammability vs
ignition sources for fuel tank system

In order for the safety assessment to be carried out,

requirements have to be developed setting out
standards for designs.
Ignition sources os all types mechanical and
electrical
vs
Heating effects on tanks

59
Guidance material initially developed in the form of
FAA AC by ARAC and Fuel System Safety Team as an
Internationally harmonised guidance document
AC 25.981-1B Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention
Guidelines
AC 25.981-2 Fuel Tank Flammability Minimization
Guidelines
JAA issues eqivalent guidance document
JAA TGL 47

60
FAA AC and TGL 47 (Appendix B) define the process for
determining the action required in the design review
Apply unsafe condition criteria to design
List unsafe conditions
Provide proposals to address unsafe condition
If no unsafe condition review ICAW for best
practise

61
In order to initiate review of in-service airplanes and
initiate changes necessary in TC standards for future
airplanes Regulation required:-

FAA Special Federal Aviation Rulemaking (SFAR) 88

JAA INT/POL/25/12

62
October 1999- FAA Issued Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM)
May 2001 Final Rule issued SFAR-88
SFAR 88 is suite of rule amendments- SFAR 88
codified as FAR 21 plus FARs 25 , 91 ,121 & 125
JAA issue INT/POL/25/12
JAA INT/POL/25/12 is purely a policy statement
there is no JAA equivalent to FAA SFAR process

63
September 2002 -Spot Amendment issued that changed
FAR 21 to allow Equivalent Safety Provisions for Fuel Tank
System Fault Tolerance Evaluations
Transport Airplane Fuel System Design Review, Ignition Source
and Flammability Reduction, and Maintenance and Inspection
Requirements.
Effective 6 June 2001, Design Review to commence 18
months to complete.(i.e. 6 December 2002)
Applicability All Turbine Powered Aircraft with 30 seats or
more, or max payload of 7,500lbs, Type Certificated after 1
January 1958.

64
Design review to be carried out on fuel tank system
required of TC and STC Holders
Operators required to survey aircraft and advise
TC/STC Holders of configuration in order that
review can be conducted

65
JAA do not issue equivalent safety policy but
implement design review
Transport Airplane Fuel System Design Review,
Ignition Source nad Flammability Reduction, and
Maintenance and Inspection Requirements.
Effective March 2002, Design Review to commence
18 months to complete
Applicability All Turbine Powered Aircraft with 30
seats or more, or max payload of 7,500lbs, Type
Certificated after 1 January 1958.

66
Part 21 TC and STC Holders to conduct a design
review more than a 25.1309 SAA taking into
account the new 25.981(b) changes.

67
This review task was completed in USA and
(probably) in the JAA Member States at the time
JAA Member States were required to issue individual
requirement for operators to inspect fleet
No guarantee what the position is/was for the rest
of the world fleet

68
Significant differences between Boeing and Airbus fuel
tanks system design features

Pump power supplies through tank conduits in Being

models external supplies in Airbus fleet
No pump low-level protection in Boeing models

69
Occurrence on B737 when pax notices fluid pumping
out of wing leading edge after engine start
Arc through in conduit allows fuel in wing tank to
leak out through hole in conduit
Campaign on Boeing fleet to address problem
Pump power supplies to be protected inside conduit
by teflon wrap

70
FAA Spot Amendment takes into account development
of a Flammability Reduction System(FRS) or
Nitrogen Gas System (NGS) in USA resulting from
research part sponsored by FAA Tech.Centre.

FAA emphasis now retuirns to flammability reduction

concept

71
FAA press for harmonised requirement to
retospectively fit FRS as well as for new types

JAA and then EASA not convinced of cost/safety benefit

from retrospective rule-making for FRS systems

Regulatory Impact Assessment carried out which

confirms cost/safety benefit not justifying
retrospective rule-making

72
March 2007- EASA Agency Decisions
2007/01R,2007/02R and 2007/03R issued on Fuel
system safety
Part 145 organisations component and airplane
level
Part M airworthiness Management organisations
Part 66 Licensing

73
Regulations awaiting implementation

FAA Regulations to implement changes and standars

e.g. MPD Revisions, Design Changes
EASA Regulatios to implement MPD Revisions

74
Where are now?
TC Holder manuals now include fuel tank system
safety provisions
ADs issued for same actions
Full implementation including design rule changes
awaiting EASA/FAA
EASA implements changes to Parts M, 145,66

75
Part M requires that vertification procedures are put in
place after working in an area.

Take 10 minutes now, to develop a verification

procedure following a zonal inspection in a CWT
which resulted in a minor structural repair and the
replacement of a length of vent pipe
We will review the procedure later in the course

76
 ARAC
Flammability SFAR 88
Reduction SFAR Assessment
Study NPRM SFAR 88
Manila Bangkok Implementation
New York

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

NTSB Industry Fuel

recommendations Systems NGS
Safety Development
Program
FAA Task to Industry ARAC
based on NTSB Interting
Recommendations Study

Industry and Regulatory consensus: Reducing flammability would provide major

benefit to enhancing fuel tank safety

77
In summary:-

Centre Wing tanks and some other tanks (e.g.

auxiliary tanks) are assesed for flammability
Efforts to be made to reduce flammability
All fuel system source installationc (including wing
tanks) to be ignition source suppressed against new
requirements

78
Fuel System
Safety
Module 3:-
Developments in
Fuel Tank
System
Design
Requirements

79
An overview of fuel tank system safety related
developing design requirements.

Why is it necessary for an Airworthiness Engineer or an

Aircraft Maintenance Engineer to know about design
requirements?

80
Design Requirements form the basis for Continuing
Airworthiness management processes.

These processes ensure that the aircraft and product

remain in compliance with the airworthiness
requirements in force and that the airplane and
product remain in a condition fit for safe operation

81
Design Requirements form the basis for Continuing
Airworthiness management processes.

For example, the Failure Modes and Effects analysis

required for fuel tank systems provides date which is
required for the basis of the development of the
MRB as well as the inspection standards required in
scheduled maintenance

82
Developments in Fuel System Safety Design
requirements:-
Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88
FAA AC 25.981-1-Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention
Guidelines
FAA AC 25.981(b)-2 Fuel Tank Flammability Minimization
JAA INT/POL/25/12
JAA TGL 47
Flammability Reduction System requirements

83
SFAR 88
FAA Rulemaking enables FAA to enact several rulemakings
simultaneously as well as retrospectively.
Changes to Parts 21, 25, 91, 121, 129
Introduces new design/build requirements and implementing
rules for operators
Design/build requirements initially harmonised with JAA
(EASA)
Introduces 3 element analysis tool and Monte Carlo analysis
methodology to determine flammability
Goes further than 25.1309 in system safety assessment

84
SFAR 88
Spot Amendment introduces provision for equivalent safety
by flammability reduction system in flight or on the ground
Flammability reduction intended to be retrospective to
existing fleet EASA position still unclear: Regulatory Impact
Assessment carried out shows cost/safety benefit to be
unproven.

85
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12-1
JAA ( part) equivalent to SFAR 88 and AC 981-1(b)
Cannot be used to implement
Note: EASA implementation of complete rulemaking not yet
clear awaiting decision on flammability reduction systems
JAA TGL 47 adopted by EASA as the current standars
TGL 47 contains Interpretative Material to INT/POL/25/12
3 element design appraisal tool
Listing of failure modes to be considered during design

86
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 2

Definition of Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation

Definition of fuel system Airworthiness Limitation item
Flow chart to map fuel tank system safety assessment
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICAW) guidance
Development of scheduled maintenance tasks using
Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) methodology

87
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 3

Ignition sources
Electrical arcs and sparks wiring and component failures,
lightning, HIRF\EMI, static
Friction sparks metallic surfaces rubbing debris in
pump impeller or interference between impeller and case
Hot surface ignition

88
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued - 4

89
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 5
Pump problems

90
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 6

Pump problems encountered include

Debris from mis-functioning pumps and fittings
Stator winding and internal wiring failures leading to arcing
Dry running/overheating of pumps
Thermal protective devices missing after pump build
Electrical connections exposed leading to arcing
Thermal switches incorrectly set
Poor/no bonding across mating surfaces or bond jumpers
Power supply connectors corroding leading to leaks and arcing
Cooling port tubes missed during ressembly
Pump problems for the MRO and Operator

91
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 7

Wiring to pumps iside tanks

Arcing due to rubbing in conduit protecting the

pump electrical supply Boeing Design feature
Poor circuit protection response
Operator resetting CB

92
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 8
FQIS system

93
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 9
FQIS system problems

Degradation of wire insulation inside/outside tank

Copper sulphate deposits on connectors reduced breakdown
voltage
Routing of FQIS wires with high voltage wires in conduits
FOD in tanks wire wool, lock wire, washers, tools potential
reduced arc path in probes
Probe damage reduced arc path

94
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued - 10
Bonding straps

95
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued - 11
Bonding straps in tanks
Straps missing, broken, loose
Straps frayed/worn as a result of wing movement

Lightning strikes have resulted in the loss of aircraft due

to poor bonding!
Poor/missing bonds are often caused by maintenance
error! You are only 1 fault away from an unsafe
condition!

96
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued - 12
Foregoing lists of design related failure modes form the basis for

Inspection standards
Maintenance procedures

97
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 13

Many of the characteristic inspecion items appear to be

those of the zonal inspection programme (ZIP):
so why do we need to worry?

The list was compiled after an extensive survey of aircraft

and components world-wide the zonal inspection
standard was not producing the results that it should!

98
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 14
Once the TC/STC Holder has reviewed the design and identified
potential un-safe conditions, then the conditions must be
mitigated
Design changes
Operational Procedure changes
Maintenance Programme changes
Airworthiness management procedure changes
Training
Not all of these are the responsibility ot the TC/STC Holder

99
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 15

So that is inspection standards and maintenance

procedures is that all we need to concern ourselves
with in TGL 47?

100
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 16

No!
Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations
Fuel System Airworthiness Limitations
MSG Analysis Significant Item development
These are also covereds by the TGL!

101
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 17

Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation

(CDCCL): what is that?

102
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 18

ritical esign onfiguration ontrol imitation

( ):
A fuel system feature the design integrity of which must
be maintained to ensure that an unsafe condition
does not develop. Features in an aircraft system or
componenet. May exist in fuel system but may also
be features in systems or assemblies that interact or
cross-couple with fuel systems

103
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 19
Examples of CDCCL:-
Bonding feature attaching to component and tank
Separation of fuel gauge wiring from other high
power wiring
Fuel pump configuration
Wire support for high power wiring near to tank
We will later look at some characteristic CDCCL
from TC Holders

104
Power cables riding
on structure can
cause damage to the
power cables

105
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 21
For the identification and management of CDCCL
Related tasks highlighted by TCH in AMM/CMM
Airworthiness management procedures put in place
Ensure features are protected during repair/changes
Ensure maintenance organisation is aware
Implement traninig programmes
Remember, the feature itself may not be directly related to the
fuel system and also may be at component level e.g. fuel
pump

106
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 22
For the identification and management of CDCCL

107
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 22
For the identification and management of CDCCL

If fuel pump, configuration is to be identified as a

CDCCL, how will the operator control the CDCCL?
Pool parts
Component suppliers

108
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 22
For the identification and management of CDCCL
Fuel Pump CDCCL management:-
This will be a challenge for the operators
EASA Part 145 From 1 , FAA 8130-3
Contracts will need to specify CDCCL managed and complied
with during MRO activity box 13?
CAME procedure in place
Maintenance procedure for MRO

109
JAA TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 continued 23
For the identification and management of CDCCL WIRING
Wire repair and inspection practises training
required to
Ensure acceptable wiring standard practises splicing,
support routing
Provide comprehensive knowledge of CDCCL for type

110
111
TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 cont. 25
Fuel Tank System Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI)
Fuel System Mandatory Instructions can include
Design changes
Maintenance
Inspections
Procedures

112
TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 cont. 25
Fuel Tank System Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI)
Those items necessary to ensure that
Unsafe conditions do not arise in the fuel system
throughout the service life of the airplane
ALI to be mandated by AD and included in the
Airworthiness Limitation Section of ICAW

113
TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 cont. 25

Fuel Tank Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI)

ALI contained in:-
Section 9 of MPD
Note: Airbus now cross-refer to Scheduled Maintenance Data
(SMD) document
Maintenance Manual Section 5

114
TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 cont. 25
Could a CDCCL be an ALI?
No, A CDCCL does not fall within the definition
of an ALI
An ALI requires some positive action to be taken
modify/change, inspect etc.
A CDCCL is a design feature

115
TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 cont. 25
Another form of an ALI could be a
modification/change:-
EASA AD 2006-0191
A330-200, A340-200/300 aircraft
Air Conditioning prevention against fuel explosion
risks installation of heat shields in belly faring

116
TGL 47 and INT/POL/25/12 cont. 25
Fuel Tank System Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI)

EASA AD 2006-0204 July 2006

ATA 28: Fuel Fuel Tank Safety ALS Part 5 Fuel

Airworthiness Limitations (FAL)

117
AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI Maintenance and
Ispection tasks
Mandatory accomplishment no change or deletion
Can be escalated in accordance with approved
escalation practises based on data collection and
analytical techniques CAME procedure
Aligned with ZIP
Dedicated tank entry to be avoided maintenance
error

118
AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI Maintenance and
Ispection tasks continued
Exceptional short term externsions permitted (CAME
procedures)
10% or 500FH FH
5% or 250FC FC/LDGs
Calendar limits extensions
RI <12m 10% or 1 month
RI> 12m>3y 2 months
RI>3y 3 months

119
AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI Maintenance and
Ispection tasks continued
A 330 Fuel Airworthiness Limitation (FAL)

Task Ref: 281800-02-01 Detailed inspection of vapour

seal/drip shield 6y
A330-300 post mod 49520

120
AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI CDCCL
It is important to remember that these CDCCL are
design features that require management in
Scheduled maintenance
Repair
Change/modification

They are not scheduled maintenance tasks to be

carried out at specific intervals
121
AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI CDCCL
Air gap FQI probe to structure
FQI wiring separation from other wiring
Direct bonding of equipment items in fuel tank
Safety critical features of fuel pumps

122
AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI CDCCL

Is this everything from Airbus?

123
AIRBUS Fuel Tank System ALI CDCCL

No, we still have to look at scheduled

maintenance and MSG 3 as maintenance
procedures see module 5

124
What about other TC Holders?

Boeing for example?

125
Most other states appear to be following FAA
policy

FAA has been issuing a series of NPRM TO

mandate certain fuel tank system safety items

It would appear that these actions will not be

implemented until 2008
126
e.g. FAA NPRM 2006-NM-163-AD on B767 seeking
operatot comment
Amend maintenance programme to incorporate ALI
Initial inspection of repetitive ALI items to phase in
inspections
Intended to reduce likelihood of ignition sources

127
FAA policy appears to require inspections to ensure
initial configuration this is not yet required in
Europe

EASA Part M will mandate FAA and other State of TC

fuel tank system safety provisions

128
Boeing Airplane MPD already published with
ALI/CDDCCL
e.g. B767 MPD
AWL No. 28-AWL-01: Task ALI detailed inspection of
wire bundles over CWT 12y/3600H
AWL No. 28-AWL-02: CDCCL External Wires over CWT
maintain existing wire bundle routing and clamping

129
Boeing Airplane MPD already published with ALI/CDDCCL
e.g. B767 MPD
AWL No. 28-AWL-03: CDCCL Lightning protection Engine
fuel feed line verify electrical fay surface bond from
bulkhead fitting to structure 0,5 milliohms or less
AWL No. 28-AWL-04: CDCCL Lightning protection
Hydraulic line fuel tank penetration bond checks on
heat exchanger and lines to structure and in-line
connectors

130
Boeing Airplane MPD already published with ALI/CDCCL
e.g. B767 MPD
AWL No. 28-AWL-06: AC and DC Pump
Maintenance repair and overhaul of fuel pumps must
be IAW with CMM

131
Boeing Airplane MPD already published with ALI/CDCCL
e.g. B767 MPD
AWL No. 28AWL-07: CDCCL AC fuel Pump Fault
Current bonding path installation of bonding
straps pump housing to structure bond 0.2
m.ohm pump to housing bond 0.3 m.ohm

132
Boeing Airplane MPD already published with
ALI/CDCCL
e.g. B767 MPD
AWL No. 28-AWL-14: CDCCL tank access door
configuration verify seal position apply grease
both sides of knitted aluminium mesh gasket

133
Boeing Airplane MPD already published with
ALI/CDCCL
e.g. B767 MPD
AWL No.28-AWL-17: CDCCL resetting tripped
fuel pumb CB must trouble shoot faul at
component level before resetting CB

134
Boeing Airplane MPD already published with
ALI/CDCCL
e.g. B767 MPD
AWL No.28-AWL-17: CDCCL resetting tripped
fuel pumb CB must trouble shoot faul at
component level before resetting CB How
will operators manage this?

135
Boeing Airplane MPD already published with ALI/CDCCL
Managing the B767 Fuel Tank System ALI will be
more problematical than the Airbus A330 (6 ALI no
measuring) vs B767 (17 ALI 11 measurement items)

What if FAA mandate threshold inspections for these

ALI?

136
If FAA mandate configuration threshold inspection
using the OPS Rule e.g. Part 121 this would not be
automatically applicable in Europe.

137
Boeing issue spread sheets of ALI/CDCCL for each type

See Course Handouts

138
Note the requirement for the installation of Ground
Fault Interrupters (GFI)
115v AC supplies for many tank mountes pumps on
Boeing aircraft are routed through conduits inside
the tank from front spar to rear spar.
Failres have occurred when wires arc through to the
conduit metal sleeve. Trickle earth faults sometimes
do not trip the airplane CB quickly enough. GFI will
do this.

139
We have covered design requirements with regard to
ignition source suppression, with the exception of
the maintenance requirements what about
flammability reduction?

140
For flammability Supperession see next
module module 4!

141
Fuel System Safety
Module 4:-
Flammability
Reduction in
fuel tank
systems

142
The NTSB recommended that fuel tank flammability
was primary causal effect trying to make tanks
ignition proof was (probably) unachievable in the in-
service condition. Given that fact, then unless the
tanks were flammability reduced then the likelihood
was that there will be another incident.

143
2 ARAC`s were convened to study flammability
protection
ARAC 1 -1998 - initially finds on-board systems
difficult
ARAC 2 2001 considers FAA device based on food
processing unit to be feasible and develops basic
certification proposals

144
Various methodologies studied with mixed results
Ullage washing
Fuel scrubbing
Polyurethane foam filled tanks
Inner tank membranes
On Board Inert Gas System (OBIGS)
Remove heat from CWT

145
FAA Tech. Centre studies with a system that used
Hollow Fibe Technology to separate out oxygen
seemed promising

ARAC hypothesises that Ox reduction to 12% would

provide the necessary margin to reduce flammability

146
147
Air Separation Module separates out

Oxygen
Water
Carbon Dioxide

Remaining air rich in Nitrogen, depleted in Oxygen

148
 Fuel System Safety Module 4
Boeing test system on Boeing 747 aircraft

Airbus test using A 320

Note: Airbus do not agree with FAA model that shows some
variants to have similar flammability as Boeing airplanes.

149
 3d Model of typical
installation

150
151
FAA propose that system
is not an MMEL candidate aircraft can `safely
operate` without system available
No flight deck effects no operating condition
monitor
Maintenance tasks:-
Change ASM Life Limit
Zonal Inspection of system installation

152
US Military experience with Nitrogen systems very
obscure
Nitrogen enriched atmosphere will suffocate
Difficult to purge tanks
Loss of life of mechanics

153
FAA policy to require installation of some form of
Flammability Reduction (FRS) either fitted to aircraft
or through groud based inerting to
All existing high flammability aircraft 10 year
compliance time-frame
All new designs

154
Regulatory Impact Assessment carried out by JAA Fuel
System Safety team
No proof that retrospective implementation would
be cost effective
More emphasis on removing heat sources from all
new designs
Current initiatives to suppress ignition sources would
provide a reasonable defence for existing fleet

155
EASA now carrying out another RIA
Results awaited!

156
Fuel System Safety
Module 5:-
Developments in Fuel
Tank System
Maintenanace
requirements

157
JAA TGL 47 Appendix B requires that maintenance
Steering Group (MSG) methodology takes into
account the safety features inherent in Fuel Tank
System and components design
MSG analysis previously only takes into account the
intended airplane system function e.g. `supply low
pressure fuel`

158
MSG 3 analysis also provides a Zonal Inspection
Programme (ZIP)
MSG 2 analysis does not provide a ZIP

159
Findings from the fleet survey carried out by the
Industry AFSSP and in-service experience reviews
(SB, AD, MOR) gave evidence that the ZIP was not
providing the necessary preventative maintenance
required to ensure continuing airworhiness

160
Findings from the fleet survey carried out by the
Industry AFSSP and in-service experience reviews
(SB, AD, MOR) gave evidence that the

ZIP not providing necessary preventative

maintenance required to ensure continuing
airworthiness and reliability
Maintenance procedures were deficient

161
If these shortcomings led to an unsafe condition , then
surely they should have led to mandatory AD
action?

162
All unsafe conditions must be subjected to AD
action.
Some conditions were not unsafe according to
the various definitions
But they are undesirable and cauld lead to
unsafe conditions developing under certain
failure conditions.

163
For example, leaving lockwire in a fuel tank is not of
itself an unsafe condition but it could lead to one if it
Bridged an FQIS probe
Lodged in a pump inlet and led to impeller rubbing or
pump bearing failure

164
TGL 47 requires Fuel Tank System to be reanalysed
using new MSG criteria
Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedure (EZAP)
System installation and component safety features to
be addressed when assessing fault conditions

165
What does this all mean?

EZAP?

Safety fault conditions?

166
MSG 3 analysis only addresses the fault condition
associated with function of the system e.g. supply
low pressure fuel to the engine fuel system
The safety features e.g. bonding of pipes for safety in a
lightning event are not specifically addressed

167
Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedures (EZAP) were
developed by the Ageing Transport Systems
Regulatory Advisory Committee (ATSRAC) to address
wiring fault conditions

More of this later!

168
At this stage in order to understand more fully, we
need to go back to MSG analysis and Zonal
Inspection Programme development!

169
A review of MSG 3 methodology for fuel tank
system safety

170
Refer to MSG handout

171
 Level 1 Consequences of Failure
Evident or Hidden
Function Failure

Effects of Failure on Operating Safety

and Operating Capability

172
Level 2 Applicable and Effective Maintenance Tasks

Failure Effect Category (FEC)

FEC 5 FEC 6 FEC 7 FEC 8 FEC 9

Evident Evident Evident Hidden Hidden
Safety Operational Economic Safety Non-Safety

173
Selection begins at the highest manageable level.
Maintenance significant items (MSIs)
Systems and assemblies
Identified by manufacturer as items whose failure:
Could affect safety (on ground or in flight).
and/ or
Could be undetectable or, are not likely to be detected during
operations.
and/ or
Could have significant operational economic impact.
and/ or
Could have significant economic impact.

174
 Provide clear MSI definition
IDENTIFY EACH
MSI Function
Functional Failure
LIST Failure Effect
Failure Cause
Additional Data
APPLY LOGIC
For each MSIs functional failure and failure
cause
DETERMINE IF Applicable and effective task
TASK IS NECESSARY

SCHEDULED Formed by resultant tasks and intervals

MAINTENANCE
PROGRAMME

175
Logic Diagram

Logic Diagram Flow starts at top

Answers (Yes or No) dictate analysis flow direction
First level determines consequences of failure
Each functional failure analysed
Identifies one effect category for each functional failure

176
Evident Safety (FEC 5)
Evident Operating capability (FEC 6)
Evident Economic non capability effects (FEC 7)
Hidden Safety Effects (FEC 8 )
Hiden Non-Safety (FEC 9)

Second level determines if there is an applicable and effective

maintenance task.
Each failure cause for each functional failure is driven through second
level questions

177
Second level maintenance task analysis.

Uses paralleling and default logic.

In safety effects paths (evident or hidden) all subsequent

questions must be asked.

Multiple Yes answer allowable.

In absence of adequate infomation default logic dictates No

answer and subsequent question to be asked.

178
Consequences of Failure
Evaluation (Level1)
Significant Item Evaluation
IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
EVIDENT TO THE OPERATING CREW DURING THE
PERFORMANCE OF NORMAL DUTIE?

DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OR DOES THE COMBINATION OF A HIDDEN

SECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE &ONE ADDITIONAL
THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT FAILURE OF A SYSTEM RELATED OR BACK-UP
ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY? FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE EFECT ON
OPERATING SAFETY?

DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A

DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT OPERATING
CAPABILITY?

179
Hidden / Evident Functional Failure (Question No 1)

IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE EVIDENT TO THE OPERATING
CREW DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF
NORMAL DUTIES?

This question asks if the operating crew will be aware of loss (failure) of the
function during performance of their normal operating duties. Question 1
must be asked for each functional failure of the item being analysed. The
intent is to segrerate the evident and hidden functional failures.
180
Hidden / Evident Functional Failure (Question No 1)

IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE EVIDENT TO THE OPERATING
CREW DURING THE PERFORMANCE
OF NORMAL DUTIES?

Function does not include safety

181
Function does not include safety

Function of airframe fuel tank system is to provide

low pressure fuel to engine High pressure system.

182
Function does not include safety

Function of airframe fuel tank system is to safely

provide fuel

183
A Yes answer indicates the functional failure is
evident: proceed to Question 2
A No answer indicates the functional failure is hidden
: proceed to Question 3.

184
Direct Adverse Effect on Safety
(Question No 2)

DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OR SECONDARY

DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE FUNCTIONAL
FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT ON
OPERATING SAFETY?

For a" Yes answer the functional failure must have a directive adverse effect on
operating safety.

185
A Yes answer indicates that this functional failure is
safety related and task(s) must be developed in
safety effects, Category 5.

A No answer indicates the effect is either operational

or economic and Question 4 must be asked.

186
Operational Effect (Question No 4)
DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT
ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATIONG
CAPABILITY?

If the answer to this question is "Yes, the effect of the functional failure
has an adverse effect on operating capability, and task selecion will be
handled in operational effects, Category 6.

ANo answer indicates that there is an economic effect and should be

handled economic effects, Category 7.

187
Hidden Functional Failure Safety Effect
(Question No 3)

DOES THE COMBINATION OF A HIDDEN FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE AND ONE ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF A SYSTEM
RELATED OR BACK-UP FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE
EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY?

This question is asked of each hidden functional failure which has been
identified in Question 1.

188
For protective safety / emergency system or equipment
, the additional failure is the event for which the
system or equipment is designed.

If a Yes answer is determined, there is a safety effect

and task development must proceed in hidden safety
effects, Category 8.

ANo answer indicates that there is a non-safety effect

and will be handled in non-safety effects, Category 9.

189
Effect Analysis (Level 2)
Effect Categories and Maintenance Tasks

Failure Effect Categories FEC (from first level questions)

FEC 5 Evident Safety

FEC 6 Evident Operating capability
FEC 7 Evident Economic non-capability
FEC 8 Hidden Safety effects
FEC 9 Hidden Non-Safety

190
Maintenance Tasks for each effect category
Lubrication / Servicing
Operational / Visual Check
(for Hidden Categories only)
Inspection / Functional Check
Restoration
Discard
Combination (for Safety Categories only)

191
 Is a Lubrication or Servicing Task
Lubrication/Servicing applicable & effective?

Is an Inspection or Functional Check to

Inspection / Functional
detect degradation of function
Check
applicable&effective?

Is a Restoration Task to reduce failure rate

Restoration applicable & effective?

Is a Discard Task to avoid failures or to

Discard reduce the failure rate applicable and
effective?

Is there a Task or Combination of Tasks

applicable & effective?
192
 Lubrication/ Servicing Is a Lubrication or Servicing Task applicable &
effective?

Is a Check to vertify operation applicable &

Operational/ Visual Check effective

Is an Inspection or Functional Check to detect

Inspection / Functional Check degradation of function applicable& effective?

Is a Restoration Task to reduce failure rate

Restoration applicable&effective?

Is a Discard Task to avoid failures or to reduce

the failure rate applicable and effective?
Discard
Is a Discard Task to avoid failures or to reduce
the failure rate applicable and effective?

193
The analysis will result in the development of large
numbers of General Visual inspections especially in
relation to systems instalations
General Visual Inspections may be precluded by the
Zonal Inspection Programme
What does this mean?

194
We need to look at the zonal programme development
prescribed in MSG 3

195
MSG 3 analysis of an SSI or MSI may result in a task
described as General Visual Inspection or General
Surveillance Inspection
EMSG analysis produces structural Zonal Inspection
Programme
General Visual ( or surveillance) Inspection (GVI)
tasks become candidates for the Zonal Inspection
Programme

196
General Visual (GV) Inspection items within zone
All items given equal treatment no pay particular
attencion to..
Zones defined by ATA
Zoning criteria 100-200 etc
Zones further defined by subzone

197
MSG3 Definition:
General Visual Inspection:-

A visual examination that will detect obvious

unsatisfactory conditions/ disrepancies. This type of
inspection may require removal of fillets, fairings,
access panels / doors, etc. Workstands, ladders etc.
may be required to gain proximity.

198
No characteristic items ( such as airframe, engine
electrics, etc)
MSI/ SSI Analysis may result in general visual
inspection ( GVI) tasks
GVI tasks are candidates for zonal inspection
programme
Zonal candidate tasks are transferred from ATA
working groups to zonal WG using transfer sheets

199
 Zonal WG assesses suitability of candidate tasks
Packaged tasks become precluded by zonal
programme
Precluded MSI / SSI tasks lose individual identity
Zonal task has an allocated MRB Reference
(e.g.Z10-010)

200
Remember this zonal task may include a number of
precluded MSI/SSI items
Precluded tasks listed in Appendix to MRB
Zonal Programme validated access rules sampled

201
Manufacturer provides A/C zoning diagrams / access
panel diagrams and door diagrams
Manufacturer provides worksheets for each zone
Working group meeting to review data, discuss
service experience, assign preliminary zonal
inspection by packaging precluded tasks

202
Summarise proposed zonal inspections in
appropriate packages based on access requirements
Validate zonal inspections on aircraft
Present to ISC

203
1. Systems maintenance activity and frequency in the
zone
2. Structural inspection requirements in the area
3. Normal airline maintenance operatios within the
zone.
4. System components and structure contained in
the zone
5. The density of the zone(closely packed with
systems / structural items)

204
6. Importance of systems/ components within the zone
7. Failures have operational or safety related effects or
impact other components in close proximity
8. Environoment of the zone (exposed, pressurised, high
temperature, etc)
9. Degree of accessability of the zone

205
10. MSIs & SSIs contained in the zone
11. Operators service experience / type of
abnormalities
12. Content / format of past A/P programmes

206
Composite area what type of composite how is
damage evidenced
Inspect ability of structures items
Insulation removal required
Surface preparation / cleaning required
Corrosion task applied to the area

207
Surface to be inspection may be identified as
internal or external
Logic used to determine internal / external is not
always self evident
e.g. outside (external) surface of stab box is inside
(internal rear fuselage
Logic may vary from type yo type

208
Extent depth of the inspection usually set by access
requirement

Remove Trim
Remove Panel(s)
Remove Soundproofing
Remove Surface Preparation etc
Access requirement is circumscribed within maintenance
manual reference
For full intet of task to be met task cards require accurate
transcription

209
Care must be exercised when collating zonal findings
sine defects / failures may be recorded by ATA
Chapter (e.g. ATA 28- Airframe Fuel, ATA 29
Hydraulic Power, ATA 53- Fuselage)
Zonal programme threshold inspections are often
linked to SSI Initial Inspection Interval
Lack of findings in thershold inspections should not
provide basis for escalation of programme

210
Planners and inspectors require zonal programme
training

Development of ZIP
Access Rules
Inspection Surface Rules
Inspection Standards
Data Processing Rules

211
We now are re-familiarised with MSG 3
methodology and Zonal Inspection
Programme development

What next?

212
The Fuel System Safety Programme and the in-service
experience reviews all indicate that the Zonal
Inspection Programmes are not achieving the results
expected

213
The MSG methodology does not cover the system
plumbing very well

Inspectors are frequently not trained adequately on the

principles of the inspection nor familiar enough with
the technology of the systems instsallations

214
The ZIP requires GVI to be applied to a zonal volume

Let us look at some wiring instalation problems

215
Wires improperly tied, riding on
hydraulic lines, contaminated
with caustic fluid

216
Bundle riding on structure

217
Heat Discoloration

218
Overheated wire at the splice

219
 Bend radii problem
Less than 3 times the diameter

220
221
O.K so there are problems with some of the wiring
inspection standards but some of the examples
were installation standards problems nothing to
do with scheduled maintenance

222
Organisations approved in accordance with Part 145
are approved to carry out repairs and changes/
modifications
Installation inspection standards are then an issue

223
Fuel spraying and sloshing resulting from incorrectly
restored internal tank components dams,
bulkheads, pipe connections contribute to
flammability by enhancing vapour propagation.
These factors need to be taken into account as well

224
We are probably now in a better position to review the
verification procedure which we developed at the
beginning of the course!
Part M 402(f) requires that the aircraft/component is
checked for
Clear of tools and equipment
Clear of extraneous material
Panels correctly refitted

225
So, Part M requirements alone do not meet this
neeed.
We need help from the TC Holder !

226
We have dealt with scheduled maintenance
development and considered some related problems
in changes/modifications/repairs is that all?

227
No, we have to consider airworthiness management
and maintenance procedures
Task card development
Maintenance Procedures including verification tasks
tank closure
Repairs/changes
Maintenance Programme development
ARC issue
MEL management
Occurrence reporting standards

228
Task Card development Part M or Part 145
Task card development must take into account
Sufficient information with regard to inspection
standard
Highlight CDCCL
Ensure verification checks/tank closure procedures
followed
Include cleaning stage

229
Maintenance Procedures Verification Procedures Part
M 402(f)
CDCCL
Damage to components
Connections correctly re-assembled fuel and wiring
Bonding checks carried out as necessary
Panels refitted
Tools and other extraneous material
Function checks as necessary
Leaks
Attachment of components/system
Independent Inspection? best practise

230
Maintenance Procedures General Pump dry-running
is to be avoided
Most Boeing pumps do not have auto-shut off
Airbus pumps with auto-shut-off must be switched
to the auto position when maintenance task is
completed
CDDDL must be managed during maintenance and
change/repair advise MRO organisation
especially in case of nonstandard STC

231
Repair and changes/modifications
CDCCL must be managed
Refer to Boeing documentation for authorisation of
tank repairs
Avoid contamination of wiring systems
Observe wiring standard practises wire clipping,
routing, splices etc.

232
Maintenance Programme development:-

Escalation of tasks associated with ZIP nad ATA 28

and in some cases associated systems (CDCCL
related)
Reliability programme
NRC tracking
MPD revisions

233
ARC issue:-

CDCCL, ALI, compliance

Modification/changes, Repair standards
Airplane survey
Part M and Part 145 compliance fuel system safety

234
MEL Management
Fault Isolation
CB reset procedures
ALI and TC Holder recommendations in OPS Manual

235
 Fuel System Safety Module 6
ATSRAC Meeting 23/24 January 2002 decided to
add new tasking:
T10WG to review far 135/FAR 25 aircraft to ascertain
applicability with ATSRAC proposed rulemaking.
Included because of on NTSB recommendation out
of the Learjet 35(Payne Stewart) accident.

236
 Proposed Outputs of ATSRAC
New/dedicated Section on FAR/CS-25 - H (1700
series) addressing Electrical Wiring Interconnection
Systems (EWIS)
Plus identify:
EWIS Definition
Design mitigatios for ageing wiring
Specific Wiring System Safety Assessments 25.1705
(inline with 25.1309)

237
 Fuel System Safety Module 6
CS/FAR 25.1529 Appendix H
Standard Wire Practices data, as improved under
ATSRAC TASK 7
Wire Separation Design Guidelines
Special Identification Requirements
Electrical Load Analysis
Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedure (EZAP)

238
Fuel System Safety Module 6

MSG 3
Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedures

Refer to handout

239
 Fuel System Safety Module 6
Proposed rulemakig cont.
Retroactive application of the Enhanced
Zonal Analysis Procedure (EZAP) to all turbine
powered aircraft TC after 1 January 1958 with
30 seats or more, or greater than 7,500lbs
payload (cargo)
TC nad STCs to be reviewed and included in
the application of EZAP, as appropriate.

240
 Fuel System Safety Module 6
Proposed rulemaking cont.

As well as Ops Rule changes requiring Operators to

introduce specific EWIS Training.
FAR 145 to be amended to require maintenance
providers to introduce similar training programmes.

241
 Fuel System Safety Module 6

Proposed rulemaking cont.

FAA rules to be amended:

FARs 21,25,91,121,125,129, possibly 135 plus SFAR
(codified as part 21) for the retroactive review of
TC/STC standard and application od EZAP

242
 Fuel System Safety Module 6
Proposed rulemaking cont.

EASA rules to be amended:

Most probable outcome will be to follow the SFAR 88
model
Amendments to Parts M, 145,66
AD for relevant changes to scheduled maintenance

243
 Fuel System Safety Module 6
Rulemaking time frames

All task group reports have to be presented to

ATSRAC by January 2003
FAA plan to have NPRM published in the Federal
Register 3rd quarter 2003
Final Rule (subject to comments ) - awaited

244
 Fuel System Safety Module 6
Rulemaking time frames

EASA timeline to be similar to the planned by FAA

EASA development could affect this timeframe

245
 Fuel System Safety Module 6
The End!!

We hope that the course delivered all of the

objectives for you.

246
 Fuel System Safety Module 5
Occurence Reporting standards

Strip reports for CDCCL ITEMS

CDCCL and ALI events require reporting to TC Holder

247
 Fuel System Safety Module 5
Ageing Transport
Systems Rulemaking
Advisory Committee
ATSRAC.
Aircraft Wire
Interconnect Systems

248
 Fuel System Safety Module 6

TWA 800 accident 1996

White House Commission: The Ageing Airplane Non-
Structural Systems Programme
1998 Ageing Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory
Committee (ATSRAC) is formed.

249
 Fuel System Safety Module 6

Fuel Tank Ignition AND Flammability Reduction

initiative (SFAR-88) ran in parallel with a ATSRAC.
First two year commission of ATSRAC produced five
reports.
ATSRAC commissioned for a further two years to turn
reports into rulemaking.

250
 Fuel System Safety Module 6
FAA Ageing Transport
Non Structural Systems
Plan

ATSRAC

Task 1 Task 2 Task 4

Task 3 Task
Fleet Standard
Sample
Fleet Service Maintenance Training
History Review Practices
Inspection

251
 Fuel System Safety Module 6
Four sub working groups set up to undertake this
tasking.

T6WG to address certification rules and guidance

T7WG to address Wiring Standard Practices Manual

252
 Fuel System Safety Module 6

T8WG to address Training rulemaking and guidance

T9WG to address continued airworthiness and
maintenance rules and guidance

253
 Fuel System Safety Module 6

ATSRAC

Task 7
Task 8 Task 9
Task 6 SWPM
Training Maintenance
Wire Systems HWG Standarisation
HWG HWG
WG

Reorganise existing Rules Wire System

Determine new Wire Systems Training
Standard Format Maintenanace
Programme SWPM
Requirements Identify.1309 Standard Content Programme SEDLP
Recurrent Training
compliance requirements Maitenance ICAW EZAP

Ops Rule & AC

Ops./Maint EZAP SFAR
Part 25 Rule
ATA Specification Rule EZAP AC
Part 25 AC ICAW Appendix
Ops/Maint AC
H

254