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David Rosenthal
Central claim:
A conscious mental state is a mental state of which one is conscious.
i.e. state consciousness = transitive consciousness of the state
Therefore,
the necessary and sufficient condition for having a conscious mental
state is to have a second order thought that you are in that mental state.
It is in virtue of the thought "I see that there is an apple in front of me"
that the first order thought is a conscious thought.
A thought with the content it is moving up"
makes you conscious of the object moving up
but not consciously aware of it moving up
(cf blindsight)
the thought "I see that it is moving up" makes one consciously aware of
the object moving up
(what a blindsight patient lacks)
First order mental state: A mental state about the world
Makes us conscious of the world
The world
Second order thought makes us conscious of
having the first order thought;
Second-order mental
Makes us consciously aware of the tree being
state (higher order
green
thought)
I see the
tree is
green
Refers to First-order
mental state
The
The
tree
treeisis
green Refers to
green
The world
Note, logically, the second order thought itself
I see that the tree is green
is not a conscious thought until one becomes conscious of it by a
third order thought
e.g. I am aware that I am seeing that the tree is green
Unconscious Conscious
mental state mental state
1. Does the theory rule out animals and young children being
conscious?
Critic:
To think about being in mental states one needs to have concepts
referring to mental states (not just referring to states of the world).
Childrens understanding of mental states develops dramatically
e.g. prior to age 3-4 they do not fully understand belief because they
fail to understand false belief (Sally Anne task )
They do not understand mental states are representational.
Does that mean they cannot have higher order thoughts? Surely
young children can be consciously aware??
Reply:
One does not need to understand mental states as representational in
order to have some concept of a mental state
Adults understanding of mental states continues to develop, but we
still at every point have some concept of a mental state
Children younger than 3-4 clearly have some concept of a mental
state because they talk about mental states. They can use those
concepts in their higher order thoughts.
Critic:
OK, but what about children younger than one year and animals? I
find it hard to believe my dog does not have conscious mental states.
At least, I do not want to rule that possibility out.
Reply:
One can have concepts without language.
All that is needed for a higher order thought is some concept or
representation of a mental state.
Maybe all mammals, for example, have some concept or
representation of (some) mental states (Rosenthal).
Maybe dogs do not have a full concept of see nor of I,
but they may have a representation for I-see-blue and a different
one for I-see-yellow etc.
They do not realise they are all cases of seeing, nor that when I am
seeing blue, I am in the same type of state as you seeing blue. (These
dog thoughts could be called non-conceptual.)
But still the dog could think it is in a certain state, hence render that
state conscious.
Ones conscious experience would become more articulate and rich
as one became better at conceptualising. (cf learning to taste wines.)
There need be no evolutionary magic moment when human-like
conscious awareness suddenly appeared from nothing.
Maybe conscious experience gradually emerged as representations and
concepts of mental states emerged in more and more fine grained
ways.
Contrast:
Carruthers: It is ONLY when one understands mental states as
representational that the right sort of higher order thoughts can be
formed! Babies and animals are not consciously aware!
2. But we dont seem to have HOTs all the time.
Reply:
By HOT theory, second order thoughts will only be conscious if you
are conscious of having them (with third order thoughts).
Presumably we have third order thoughts a lot more rarely than second
order thoughts.
Thus it follows from HOT theory that we will not be conscious of
having second order thoughts most of the time.
3. Arent so many HOTs wasteful? Why would evolution bother?
Reply:
True, we dont need to consciously see to act on the world. (cf
Milner and Goodale brain damaged people can be very bad at
reporting how something looks, but act appropriately.)
So we must have acquired our rich repertoire of mental state
concepts for reasons other than simple acting on the world.
Maybe we acquired so many concepts of mental states in order to
explain and predict other peoples behaviour in our richly complex
primate social structure?
(But why are humans in particular endowed with so rich mental
state concepts? Many animals are intricately social.)
Maybe humans in particular have an extraordinary number of HOTs
because of sexual selection (not because it was useful in any other
way).
We evolved to be proficient in talking about mental states in order to
chat each other up? (Miller, 2000)
An indicator of genetic fitness might be how elaborately one can
wax lyrical about mental states in an original way! This takes an
extravagant amount of resources, so people who can do it must be
genetically fit.
Or maybe we have such rich mental state concepts because the
selective pressure was to have rich concepts (for chatting people up).
Richly articulated HOTs were just a by-product of this more general
ability.
4.Why doesnt thinking about a rock make it conscious?
Reply:
Introspection is being consciously aware of being in a mental state,
not being consciously aware of simply the world.
A second order thought makes one consciously aware of only the
world.
Introspection requires a third order thought.
Thus, HOT theory is a theory of conscious awareness itself, not just
of introspection.
6. But HOTs are conceptual and intellectual and conscious states are
often fine-grained and qualitative? How can that be?
Reply:
Yes, HOTs are just representations, just thoughts, so they can
misrepresent.
They may represent that you are in a state you are not in!
It would consciously seem to you that you are in that state!
We will use this property of HOTs in explaining various
psychological phenomena later in the course. This turns out to be a
strength not a weakness of the theory.
8. But what are mental states? Doesnt the theory beg the question
about what mental states are?
Reply:
No one knows what makes mental states mental states. It is not a
failing of HOT theory that there still remains much to be
explained!
(see Edelman & Tononi (2001) A universe of consciousness. Basic
books. Has some interesting ideas)
Variants of higher order theories:
Memory: Can you use memory and not be aware you are doing so?
Perception: Can you perceive without being aware of perceiving?
Knowledge: Can you be using knowledge and not be aware of
knowing?
Learning: How can you acquire unconscious knowledge?
Volition: Can you intend to think or behave in a certain way and not be
aware of so intending?