HAZARD AND

OPERABILITY STUDY

Brainstorming, Multidisciplinary Team Approach

Structured Using Guide Words
Problem Identifying
Cost Effective
 When to Use?
Optimal from a cost viewpoint
1.when applied to new plants at the point
where the design is nearly firm and
documented or
2.to existing plants where a major redesign is
planned.

It can also be used for existing facilities.

 Results
Types: The results are the team findings.
Which include: (1) identification of hazards
and operating problems, (2) recommended
changes in design, procedure, etc., to
improve safety; and (3) recommendations
for follow-on studies where no conclusion
was possible due to lack of information.
Nature: Qualitative.
 Requirements
Data: The HazOp requires detailed plant
descriptions, such as drawings, procedures, and
flow charts. A HazOp also requires considerable
knowledge of the process, instrumentation, and
operation, and this information is usually provided
by team members who are experts in these areas.
Staff: The HazOp team is ideally made up of 5 to 7
professionals, with support for recording and
reporting. For a small plant, a team as small as two
or three could be effective.
 Time and Cost
The time and cost of a HazOp are directly related to
the size and complexity of the plant being
analyzed. In general, the team must spend about
three hours for each major hardware item. Where
the system analyzed is similar to one investigated
previously, the time is usually small. Additional
time must be allowed for planning, team
coordination, and documentation. This additional
time can be as much as two three times the team
effort as estimated above
 HAZOP STUDY - TEAM COMPOSITION
A Team Leader, an expert in the HAZOP Technique
Technical Members, for example

New Design Existing Plant

Design or Project Engineer
Process Engineer
Commissioning Manager
Instrument Design Engineer
Chemist
Plant Superintendent
Process Supervisor (Foreman)
Maintenance Engineer
Instrument Engineer
Technical Engineer
 Principles of HAZOP
Concept
Systems work well when operating under design conditions.
Problems arise when deviations from design conditions occur.

Basis
a word model, a process flow sheet (PFD) or a piping and
instrumentation diagram (P&ID)

Method
use guide words to question every part of process to discover what deviations
from the intention of design can occur and what are their causes and
consequences may be.
 PRINCIPLES OF HAZOPS

GUIDE WORDS*
NONE
MORE OF
LESS OF
PART OF
MORE THAN
OTHER

CAUSE DEVIATION CONSEQUENCES

(from standard (trivial, important,
condition catastrophic)
or intention) -hazard
-operating difficulties
*COVERING EVERY PARAMETER RELEVANT TO THE SYSTEM
UNDER REVIEW:
i.e. Flow Rate. Flow Quantity, Pressure, Temperature, Viscosity, Components
STUDY NODES
The locations (on P&ID or procedures) at which the process parameters are investigated
for deviations. These nodes are points where the process parameters (P, T, F etc.) have
an identified design intent.

INTENTION
The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate in the absence of deviations at
the study nodes.

DEVIATIONS
These are departures from the intension which can be discovered by systematically
applying the guide words.

Process conditions
activities
substances
time
place
 GUIDE WORDS

Guide Words Meaning

No, None Negation of Intention
More Of Quantitative Increase
Less Of Quantitative Decrease
As Well As (More Than) Qualitative Increase
Part Of Qualitative Decrease
Reverse Logical Opposite of Intention
Other Than Complete Substitution
Deviations Generated by Each Guide Word
Guide word Deviations

NONE No forward flow when there should be, i.e. no flow.

More of any relevant physical property than there should
be, e.g. higher flow (rate or total quantity), higher
MORE OF temperature, higher pressure, higher viscosity, etc.
LESS OF Less of any relevant physical property than there should be,
e.g. lower flow (rate or total quantity), lower temperature,
lower pressure, etc.
PART OF Composition of system different from what it should be,
e.g. change in ratio of components, component missing, ect.
MORE THAN More components present in the system than there should
be, e.g. extra phase present (vapour, solid), impurities (air.
Water, acids, corrosion products), etc.
OTHER THAN What else can happen apart from normal operation, e.g.
start-up, shutdown, uprating, low rate running, alternative
operation mode, failure of plant services, maintenance,
catalyst change, etc.

REVERSE: reverse flow

B
A B

EXAMPLE
C
The flowsheet shows that raw material streams A and B are transferred by
pump to a reactor, where they react to form product C. Assume that the
flow rate of B should not exceed that of A. Otherwise, an explosion may
occur. Lets consider the flow of A in line 1:
FB FA
NONE No flow of A
MORE Flow of A greater than design flow
LESS Flow of A less than design flow
AS WELL AS Transfer of some component additional to A
PART OF Failure to transfer a component of A
REVERSE Flow of A in a direction opposite to design direction
OTHER THAN Transfer of some material other than A
Beginning

1 Select a vessel

2 Explain the general intention of the vessel and its lines

3 Select a line

4 Explain the intention of the line

5 Apply the first guide words

6 Develop a meaningful deviation

7 Examine possible causes

8 Examine consequences

9 Detect hazards

10 Make suitable record

11 Repeat 6-10 for all meaningful deviations derived from first guide words
12 Repeat 5-11 for all the guide words
13 Mark line as having been examined
14 Repeat 3-13 for each line
15 Select an auxiliary system (e.g. Heating system)
16 Explain the intention of the auxiliary system
17 Repeat 5-12 for auxiliary system
18 Mark auxiliary as having been examined
19 Repeat 15-18 for all auxiliaries
20 Explain intention of the vessel
21 Repeat 5-12
22 Mark vessel as completed
23 Repeat 1-22 for all vessels on flow sheet
24 Mark flow sheet as completed
Figure 8.9 Hazard and operability studies : detailed sequence of examination
25 Repeat 1-24 for all flow sheets (Chemical Industry Safety and Health Council, 1977 Item 6)
End
 HAZOP DISPLAY

Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Action Required

No No Flow Pump Fail System Over- Shutdown
Heated System
Line Blockage
Operator
Stops Pump
More More Excessive Over-Cooled Product
Flow Pump Speed Product Unacceptable;
(Control System) (Incomplete Dump
Reaction)
EXAMPLE
An alkene/alkane fraction containing small amounts of
suspended water is continuously pumped from a bulk
intermediate storage tank via a half-mile pipeline into a
buffer/settling tank where the residual water is settled out prior
to passing via a feed/product heat exchanger and preheater to the
reaction, is run off manually from the settling tank at intervals.
Residence time in the reaction section must be held within
closely defined limits to ensure adequate conversion of the
alkene and to avoid excessive formation of polymer.
 Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank
Guide word Deviation Possible causes
NONE No flow (1)No hydrocarbon available
at intermediate storage.
(2)J1 pump fails (motor
fault, loss of drive,
impeller corroded away
etc.)
(3)Line blockage, isolation
valve closed in error, or
LCV fails shut.
(4)Line fracture
Consequences Action required
Loss of feed to reaction section (a)Ensure good
and reduced output. communications with
Polymer formed in heat exchanger intermediate storage
under no flow conditions. operator
(b)Install low level alarm
on settling tank LIC.
As for (1) Covered by (b)
As for (1) Covered by (b)
J1 pump overheats. (c)Install kickback on J1
pump.
(d)Check design of J1
pump strainers.
As for (1) Covered by (b)
Hydrocarbon discharged into (e)Institute regular
area adjacent to public highway. patrolling & inspection
of transfer line.

(1)
 Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank
Guide word Deviation Possible causes
MORE OF More flow (5)LCV fails open or LCV
bypass open in error.
More pressure (6)Isolation valve closed in
error or LCV closes, with
J1 pump running.
(7)Thermal expansion in an
isolated valved section due
to fire or strong sunlight.
More (8)High intermediate storage
temperature temperature.
Consequences
Settling tank overfills.
Incomplete separation of water
phase in tank, leading to
problems on reaction section.
Transfer line subjected to full
pump delivery or surge pressure.
Line fracture or flange leak.
Higher pressure in transfer line
and settling tank.
(2)
Action required
(f)Install high level alarm
on LIC and check
sizing of relief opposite
liquid overfilling.
(g)Institute locking off
procedure for LCV
bypass when not in use.
(h)Extend J2 pump suction
line to 12 above tank
base.
(j)Covered by (c) except
when kickback blocked
or isolated. Check line.
FQ and flange ratings
and reduce stroking
speed of LCV if
necessary. Install a PG
upstream of LCV and
an independent PG on
settling tank.
(k)Install thermal expansion
relief on valved section
(relief discharge route to
be decided later in study).
(l)Check whether there is
adequate warning of
high temperature at
intermediate storage. If
not, install.
 Results of hazard and operability atudy of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank
Guide word Deviation Possible causes Consequences Action required
LESS OF Less flow (9)Leaking flange of valved Material loss adjacent to public Covered by (e) and the
stub not blanked and highway. checks in (j).
leaking.
Less (10)Winter conditions. Water sump and drain line (m)Lag water sump down
temperature freeze up. to drain valve and steam
trace drain valve and
drain line downstream.
PART OF High water (11)High water level in Water sump fills up more quickly. (n)Arrange for more frequent
concentration intermediate storage Increased chance of water phase draining off of water from
in stream. tank. passing to reaction section. intermediate storage tank.
Install high interface level
alarm on sump.
High concen- (12)Disturbance on distillation Higher system pressure. (p)Check that design of
tration of lower columns upstream of settling tank and associated
alkanes or intermediate storage. pipework, including relief
alkenes in stream. valve sizing, will cope with
sudden ingress of more
volatile hydrocarbons.
MORE Organic acids (13)As for (12) Increased rate of corrosion of (q)Check suitability of
THAN present tank base, sump and drain line. materials of construction.
OTHER Maintenance (14)Equipment failure, flange Line cannot be completely (r)Install low-point drain and
leak, etc. drained or purged. N2 purge point down-
Stream of LCV. Also
N2 vent on settling tank.

(3)
C
HAZOP PREPLANNING ISSUES
Preplanning issues addressed in a typical refinery unit HAZOP include the
following:
Verification of as-built conditions shown on the P&IDs
Line segment boundaries set; markup of P&IDs
List of support documents compiled
P&IDs (base study document)
Process flow diagrams (PFDs)
Process description
Operating manuals/procedures
Processing materials information
Equipment and material specifications
Tentative schedules of time to be spent per P&IDs sheet
Recording technique (computer program or data sheet) determination
List of standard abbreviations and acronyms compiled
Criticality rankings devised
HAZOP training given to all team members (one day)
Arrange for system or process briefings for team before work begins.
 HAZOP STUDY LOGISTICS

Logistical development of this refinery unit HAZOP included the

following:
Preplanning issues were addressed the prior week.
The team include three core team members and four part-time members.
The study included 16 moderately busy P&Ids.
The study took three and one-half weeks.
The team met 4 hours per day in morning review sessions and spent 2 hours
per day on individual efforts for reviews, follow-ups, and field checks.
Dedicated space was required for storing the large number of documents.
The study resulted in 170 data sheets.
The team recorder used a personal computer to record, sort, and retrieve data.
The Stone & Webster proprietary program PCHAZOPa was used.
The plant operator was the key contribution plant member of the team.
Key operating procedures were reviewed relative to the P&Ids and safe
engineering practices.