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Meta-ethics ME1.P1
•Normative ethics
Derives idea of goodness from somewhere (eg from experience)
Applies these ethical theories
What we practically ought to do
Meta-ethics
Meaning of the good
Moral language
Meta- beyond (foundation of ethics eg is it observable?)
What Does Good Mean?
“For consider - a judgment must be true or false, and its truth or falsehood
cannot lie in itself. They involve a reference to a something beyond. And this,
about which or of which we judge, if it is not fact, what else can it be?”
(1883:41)
FH Bradley (1846 – 1924)
What Does Good Mean?
Does good mean the same thing?
• A good guitar is one that makes a good tune (function is to produce good
music). This can be tested objectively.
• A good kettle boils quickly and efficiently. This can be tested objectively.
• A good book is one that the reader finds satisfying in some way. Is this
more subjective?
• A good person is…….. What? What would a utilitarian say? Is this
objective?
A mindmap
Non-
Cognitive
cognitive
Non- Non-
Naturalism
naturalism naturalism
Situation
Ethics
Virtue Ethics
Naturalistic Goodness
Naturalistic goodness
Linked to Eudaimonia (flourishing) in Natural Law.
Linked to pleasure and happiness in utilitarianism.
Linked to agape love, in Situation Ethics.
So - linked to some idea of a human’s proper purpose, true function, or
activities which benefit measurable goods - health, pleasure, fulfilment, long
life.
Non-naturalistic goodness
Linked to an a priori method of reason in Kantian ethics
Linked to a non-definable property by GE Moore
Summary - What is Naturalism?
Note: the idea of a moral ‘fact’ means different things in naturalist theories of
natural law, utilitarianism and situation ethics
Naturalistic Fallacy – What Hume Said
•“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the
ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or
makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am
surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations, is, and is not, I
meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an
ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last
consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new
relation or affirmation, it’s necessary that it should be observed and
explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for
what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.” (Hume,
1739, p. 468)
Naturalistic Fallacy – What Moore Said
•“When a man confuses two natural objects with one another, defining the one by
the other, if for instance, he confuses himself, who is one natural object, with
pleased or with pleasure which are others, then there is no reason to call the
fallacy naturalistic. But if he confuses good, which is not in the same sense a natural
object, with any natural object whatever, then there is a reason for calling that a
naturalistic fallacy; this specific mistake deserves a name because it is so common.”
(Moore, Principia Ethica)
Is the Naturalistic Fallacy itself a Fallacy?