Dfmea

FMEA
Intelligent use of FMEA
This guideline is for training purposes only; Not ISO controlled

Potential
__ System
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
__ Subsystem (Design FMEA)
__ Component FMEA Number:
Page 1 or 1
Model Year/Vehicle(s): Design Responsibility Prepared by: Lee Dawson
FMEA Date (Orig.):
Core Team: Key Date:
Item C Potential O Current Current D Responsibility Action Results

Potential Potential S L C E R. Recommended
Cause(s)/ Design Design & Target
Failure Effect(s) of E A Mechanism(s) C T P. S O D R.
Controls Controls Action(s) Completion Actions
Mode Failure V S U E N.
Date
E C E P.
Function S Of Failure R Prevention Detection C Taken V C T N.
2
What Is An FMEA?
 Opportunity to Defeat Murphy’s Law

MURPHY’S
 Focus on Prevention LAW
 Failure Mode And Effects Analysis is
An assessment of Risk
Safety
Regulatory
Customer Satisfaction
Program
Coordinated/Documented team effort
To determine what can go wrong
A method to determine the need and priority of actions
3
Plan & Define Section 1 RELIABILITY BY DESIGN
IDEA
APQP Tool Linkage
Opportunity Design & Development - Section II
Defined
GD & T
Process Design & Development - Section III
- Drawings
Form Team - Math Data Process Flow
- Timing Finalized
- Resources
f?
Prototype Control
DFMEA Special Characteristics
oo
DFMEA Plan Characteristic
Pr
Customer Matrix Pre - Launch
ke
Collect
sta
Wants/Needs/Desires Control Plan
Market Research
Mi
- QFD - Risk/Action
PFMEA YES
- Special Characteristics
- Manufacturing IF
- Assembly
- Current Controls Process Validation - Section IV
Priorities Develop Concepts Packaging
Input Design Test Plans NO
Design Actions Designs Process Trial
From Wants/Needs/ - Product Change - Design Verification
Special Run
5 Desires - Process
Controls Min 300 pcs/Hits/shots Validation
Process Validation Plan
- Failure Mode IF Testing
No - Gage Plan
Analysis Design Plan
- Capability Plan
- History Develop Product OK
Feasibility Instructions GR & R
- Past Performance Specifications
- Team Yes - Initial - Gage Plan Repeatability OK?
- Lessons Learned - Linked to Customers
Reproducibility
Design Risk Assessment IF

NO
IF No - Open Issues
Feasible - Spec. Agreements Statistics
- Materials Revisit III YES
- Via Control Plans
Yes - Budget PFMEA
- Capability Plan
- Manufacturing For Additional
Process Risk Assessment
- Program Risks Potential
- Equipment Failures STABLE?
Process Development
- Gages
IF
- Controls NO
- Instructions YES
- Equipment Installation - Plans Can we change YES
Initial Process Kick Off Tools / Equipment Gages - Tooling Progress - Status of Open Issues process to IF
CAPABLE?
- Gage Design & Progress contain? NO
IF
NO
Concept
Initiation/Approval Design YES
Program Change Sample The Process
Approval Prototype Pilot Launch Back to II
Create Production - Source Warrants
Control Plan - Supporting Documentation
PLANNING PLANNING - Level of PPAP
- Reduced (n)
PRODUCT DESIGN AND DEV. - Reduced (f)
- Optimizing Characteristics
PROCESS DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT.
PRODUCT AND PROCESS VALIDATION.
PRODUCTION
FEEDBACK ASSESSMENT AND CORRECTIVE ACTION
CONTROL PLANS
Open Issues / Time Line

Requirements
Cascade
How Fmea fits into Product and
Process Development

Potential KPC Development
Requirements Documents
•Regulatory
•Dimensional
•Cosmetic
Robustness Tools
Req. Spec. Document
Drawings Boundary Diagram
Warranty History P-Diagram Item / C O D Action Results
Process Potential Current Response &
Potential Potential S l c e R
Interface Matrix
Step Cause(s)/ Design Recommended Target
Failure Effect(s) of e a c Controls t P S O D R
Mechanism(s) Actions Complete Action
Mode Failure v s
Of Failure
u e N
Date Taken E C E P
Function
s r c V C T N
Prevent Detect
DFMEA
Special Characteristics Matrix

10 POTENTIAL CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS
S 9 Safety/Regulatory
E 8 POTENTIAL
V 7 SIGNIFICANT
Cascade Technical E
R
6
5
CHARACTERISTICS
Customer Dissatisfaction
Requirements Into Special T

I 4
3
ANOYANCE
ZONE
Product Characteristics
ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
Y 2
Appropriate actions /
1 controls already in place
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OCCURRENCE
6
Special
Sources
•Drawings
•Regulations
•DFMEA (Potential
Characteristics
Potential Critical and Significant
SEAL
FACE
KPCs: Significant and
SHOULDER
Critical Characteristics)
SERATION DAMAGE
Matrix
JACK SHAFT SEAL AGAINST
SEAL COMPRESSION HEIGHT
Relative Importance
Weighted Importance
DOWEL PINS 0.260 TO 0.270 " TO
Direction of Improvement
Special Characteristics
BUSHING TO FACE OF JACK SHAFT
BEARING FLUSH TO SNAP RING FACE
PRIMARY GASKET SEAL SURFACE FINISH

1.090 TO 1.110 " FACE OF PRIMARY HOUSING
5
9
9
3
9
3
5
Severity
0 Receive Material
81 Material handling
F
81 Shipping Damage
F
72 Component Manufacture
Y
H
0 Vehicle Assembly
Op 100 Step 1
9 PRE-LOAD DOWEL PINS TO
H
FIXTURE
Op 100 Step 2
41 PRE-LOAD JACK SHAFT
G
G
SEAL TO FIXTURE
IF
Op 100 Step 3
END
0 PRE-LOAD PRIMARY
HOUSING BUSHING TO
START
YES
FIXTURE
Op 110
0
OPERATION
OPERATION
Pre-load bearing to fixture #2

NO
Op 120
27 Pre-load main shaft oil seal to
H
mandrel
54 Op 200
H
Housing to fixture #1
261 Op 210
H
F
F
F
F
Operate press
Process Flow
Op 220
3
G
Retaining ring to top groove
0 Op 230
Reload fixture #1
54 Op 300
H
H
81 Op 310
F
Operate press
Process Steps
Op 320
3
G
0 Op 330
Mandrel to main shaft bore I.D.
0 OP 340
Operate press
0 Op 350
Re-load fixture #2 and mandrel
27 Op 400
Primary Drive Manufacturing Process Steps
Housing to table
0 Op 410
Reserved
Op 420
45
F
Chain adj sub assy to housing
Op 430
9
G
Lubricate bushing & seal
9 Op 445
G
Move or stage for final assy
0 Op 10
O-ring to shifter tube
0 Op 500
Shifter tube to housing
0 Op 510
Clamp to shifter tube
Op 20
0
Assemble shifter lever
0 Op 520
Wave washer to shifter lever
Op 530
0
Shifter lever to shifter tube
0 Op 535
Que for final assy line
Customer
Assessment
7
Characteristics Matrix Development
SEAL
FACE
SHOULDER
SERATION DAMAGE
Matrix
Sources
Relative Importance
Weighted Importance

from DFMEA & Other
Critical Characteristics
5
9
9
3
9
3
5
Potential Significant and
Severity
0 Receive Material
F
81 Shipping Damage
F
H
Y
0 Vehicle Assembly
Op 100 Step 1
relative to risk
FIXTURE
of process steps
Op 100 Step 2
Prioritized ranking
G
G
SEAL TO FIXTURE
Op 100 Step 3
PRE-LOAD PRIMARY
0
HOUSING BUSHING TO
FIXTURE
Op 110
0 Pre-load bearing to fixture #2
Op 120
H
mandrel
Importance
Op 200
54
Characteristics
H
H
Op 210
Ranked in order of
261
F
F
F
F
H Operate press
Op 220
3
G

Op 230
0
Reload fixture #1
Op 300
54
H
H
Op 310
81
F
H
H
Operate press
Process Steps
Op 320
3
G

Op 330
0
OP 340
0
Operate press
Op 350
0
Op 400
27
H
Housing to table
Op 410
0 Reserved
Op 420
45
F

Op 430
9 Lubricate bushing & seal
Op 445
9
G G

Op 10
0
Op 500
0
PFMEA
Op 510
0
Process Operation
Op 20
from Process Flow
0
0 Op 520
Op 530
0
causes/failure modes in

Op 535
0
High/Medium Interactions are
Customer
Assessment
8
Characteristics Matrix
FMEA Deployment
 A layered approach is highly recommended

as FMEAs can get complex.
 FMEAs are like ONIONS/LAYERS.
Each layer is closer to the root cause
Each layer is more detailed
The closer to core the more detail
Core gets to the root cause
Do too many and you will cry.
9
System Boundary Diagram
Cylinder Head Compression Brake
Additional Clearances Arm Group Assembly Shaft Assembly

•Injector & Spring •Intake rocker assembly •Shaft
Intake Rocker Assembly
•Exhaust rocker assembly •Cup Valve Cover
•Injector & Spring Base Exhaust Rocker Assembly
•Stand(s) W & W/o oil supply •Pin
•Body
•Injector & retainer •Shaft Assembly
•Insert
•Injector & Bridge •Mounting Bolt
•Roller
•Spring/Spacer
•Injector & injector clamp •Pin
•Clip
Valve Bridge Lube Oil
Pushrod
•Injector oil •Rod
•Cup
Spring Group •Ball
•Inner & Outer Springs
Cylinder Head •Spring Base
•Retainer/Rotator
•Valve Keeper Lifter Assembly
•Body
Valve Stem Seal
Valve Group •Insert
•Intake Valve •Roller
•Exhaust Valve •Pin
•Intake Seat •Clip
Lube Oil •wire Oscillating Lifter
•Exhaust Seat
•Valve Guide •Pressure Lube
CAM Shaft
Cylinder Head •Valve Guide Seal OR
Bore in Block
Valve Seat CAM Bearings
•Pressure Lube
Seat Insert
Thrust Plate
Cylinder Head
Cylinder Block
P-Diagram
Noise Factors
1. Piece to piece variation 2. Other systems 3. Customer usage/duty cycle

Heat shields Foot peg location After market changes
Pipe maufacturing variation Engine mount -mufflers, foot pegs, decorative covers
Frame variation Change calibrations, runs hotter, componet discoloring, over drive
system, excesive lean angle
Supension changes, lowers bike
Improper storage practices
4. Deterioration/degredagtion over time 4. Environment

Gasket wear Ocean sea side (salt)
Motor mount wear Sand, dust
Corrosion Gravel
Loss of torque on fasteners Parade duty (low speed)
Input Ideal function

Exhaust gases from engine Exhaust Pipes, Front & Rear
Engine vibration
Road vibration Meet Styling Requirements
Transfer of exhaust gas
Adequate clearance to other components
Control factors Meet Durability Requirements
Regulatory Error states

Lean Angle (SAE)
Difficult to service
Durability Requirements (GES) Does not meet styling review
Difficult to assemble
High warranty
Poor lean angle
11
FMEA Preparation Vertical Approach
 Key Elements of Efficient Development

 Identify all functions/process steps
Boundary Diagram
P Diagram
 Identify all failure modes via
brainstorming/data/warranty/COQ
 Identify all effects via brainstorming/data
Customer focus
 Develop data pools for
Failure Modes, Effects and Causes for future/ faster
FMEA development
12
System/Subsystem/ Design FMEA
 Failure Mode: Pure anti-function
FUNCTION
(ANTI)
13
System/Subsystem/ Design FMEA
 Effect
Customer view/customers words
Regulation violation
Level of dissatisfaction
 Consider All Customers
End User
Engineering Community
Manufacturing Community
(Operators/Employees)
Regulatory Body
14
Severity Column
Item / C O D Action Results

Potential Potential S l c Process e R
Step Cause(s)/ Recommended Traget S O D R
Failure Effect(s) of e a c Controls t P Action
Mechanism(s) Actions Complete E C E P
Mode Failure v s u e N Taken
Of Failure Date V C T N
s r c
Function Prevent Detect
Severity
Column
15
AUTOMOTIVE EXAMPLE SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA
SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA

EFFECT CRITERIA: Severity of Effect RNK.
Hazardous- Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
without operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without
10
warning
warning
Hazardous- Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
with operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning
9
warning
Very High Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of primary function). 8
Vehicle/item operable but at a reduced level of performance. Customer very

High dissatisfied. 7
Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable. Customer

Moderate dissatisfied. 6
Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) operable at a reduced

Low level of performance. Customer somewhat dissatisfied. 5
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most
Very Low customers (greater than 75%). 4
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of
Minor customers. 3
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by
Very Minor discriminating customers (less than 25%). 2
None No discernable effect. 1
16
FMEA General
For High Severity 9/10
17
Failure Mode/Cause Relationship
In Different FMEA Levels
Inadequate
Electrical
Connection
Failure
Cause Mode
Motor
Stops
Failure
Mode Inadequate
Electrical Connection
Inadequate Causes Harness

Locking Too Short
Feature
18
Causes
 Causes from P-Diagram

Noise factors
Continue through all failure modes.
 Note that many causes are recurring.
19
Occurrence Column
Item / C O D Action Results

Potential Potential S l c Process e R
Step Cause(s)/ Recommended Traget S O D R
Failure Effect(s) of e a c Controls t P Action
Mechanism(s) Actions Complete E C E P
Mode Failure v s u e N Taken
Of Failure Date V C T N
s r c
Function Prevent Detect
Occurrence
Column
20
Occurrence Evaluation Criteria
SUGGESTED OCCURRENCE EVALUATION CRITERIA

Probability of Likely Failure Rates Over Design Life Ranking
Failure
 100 per thousand vehicles/items 10

Very High: Persistent failures
50 per thousand vehicles/items 9

High: Frequent failures

Moderate: Occasional failures 2 per thousand vehicles/items 5
0.5 per thousand vehicles/items 3

Low: Relatively few failures
0.1 per thousand vehicles/items 2
Remote: Failure is unlikely  0.01 per thousand vehicles/items 1
*Note: Zero (0) rankings for Severity, Occurrence or Detection are not allowed
21
Occurrence Rating
 If an action would effectively eliminate the

possibility of the cause occurring, the action
is listed as described earlier.
Occurrence of 1 or 2 require proof using a
surrogate product or mistake proofing.
DATA HARD FACTS

22
Example of Significant/ Critical Threshold
10 POTENTIAL CRITICAL
9 CHARACTERISTICS Safety/Regulatory
S
E 8 POTENTIAL
V 7 SIGNIFICANT
E 6 CHARACTERISTICS
R 5
I 4 ANOYANCE
T 3 ZONE
Y 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OCCURRENCE
*Used by permission of Ford Motor Company 23
Classification And Definition Column
C O D Action Results
Item Potential Response &
Potential Potential S l c Current e R. Recommended
Cause(s) / Target
Failure Effect(s) of e a c Design t P. Actions Actions S O D R.
Mechanism(s) Complete
Mode Failure v s u Controls e N. Taken e c e P.
of Failure Date
Function s r c v c t N.
Classification and
Definition Column
24
Design Verification (Current Design Controls)
 Think of Design Control in two ways; Prevention

and Detection. List them separately.
 To save time, add any new (untried)
prevention/detection ideas to the document under
Recommended Actions column.
Prevention is specifically related to reduction or
elimination of a cause.
Detection is how well the test or series of tests may find
the design flaw
Causes
Failure Mode
25
Detection Rating
SUGGESTED DETECTION EVALATION CRITERIA
DETECTION CRITERIA RNK.
Design Control will not and/or cannot detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
Absolute
subsequent failure mode; or there is no 10
Uncertainty Design Control.
Very Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
Very Remote 9
subsequent failure mode.
Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
Remote 8
Very Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
Very Low 7
Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
Low 6
Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
Moderate 5
Moderately Moderately High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
4
High and subsequent failure mode.
High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
High 3
Very High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
Very High 2
Almost Design Controls will almost certainly detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
1
Certain subsequent failure mode.
26
Analysis Of Risk
 RPN / RISK PRIORITY NUMBER

 What Is Risk?
 Probability of danger
 Severity/Occurrence/Cause
27
RPN / Risk Priority Number
Top 20% of Failure

Modes by RPN
R
P
N
Failure Modes
28
Evaluation by RPN Only
 Case 1
S=5 O=5 D=2 RPN = 50
 Case 2
S=3 O=3 D=6 RPN = 54
WHICH ONE
 Case 3
S=2 O=10, D=10 = 200
IS WORSE?
 Case 4
S=9 O=2 D=3 = 54
29
Example
 Extreme Safety/Regulatory Risk

=9 & 10 Severity
 High Risk to Customer Satisfaction
Sev. > or = to 5 and Occ > or = 4
 Consider Detection only as a measure of
Test Capability.
30
Example of Significant/ Critical Threshold
10 POTENTIAL CRITICAL
9 CHARACTERISTICS Safety/Regulatory
S
E 8 POTENTIAL
V 7 SIGNIFICANT
E 6 CHARACTERISTICS
R 5
I 4 ANOYANCE
T 3 ZONE
Y 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OCCURRENCE
*Used by permission of Ford Motor Company 31
Actions
Your Company Name Here Potential

System (Design FMEA) FMEA Number:
Subsystem Page of
Component: Design Responsibility: Prepared by:
Key Date: FMEA Date (Orig.): (Rev.):
Model Year/Vehicle (s):
Core Team:
Item Action Results
c Potential Responsibility
Potential Potential s l o Current D R.
e a Cause (s)/ c P. Recommended & Target Actions
Failure Effect (s) of c Design e
v s Mechanism (s) t N. Action(s) Completion Taken
Mode Failure s u Controls s o D R.
Failure r e Date
c e c e P.
Function v c t N.
32
Actions
EXAMPLE:
Project: Date Of
Meeting:
Issue Issue Status/ Issue Action Action Action Person Resp. Completion
Number Open Date Champion Number Date Team Date
143
33
Re-rating RPN After Actions Have Occurred
Your Company Name Here Potential

System (Design FMEA) FMEA Number:
Subsystem Page of
Component: Design Responsibility: Prepared by:
Key Date: FMEA Date (Orig.): (Rev.):
Model Year/Vehicle (s):
Core Team:
Item Action Results

Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R. Recommended Responsibility
e l c e P.
Failure Effect (s) of v a Cause (s)/ c Design t N. Action(s) & Target S O D R.
Actions
Mode Failure s Mechanism (s) u Controls e Completion e c e P.
s r c Taken v c t N.
Failure Date
Function
34
Re-rating RPN After Actions Have Occurred
 Severity typically stays the same.

 Occurrence is the primary item to reduce / focus
on.
 Detection is reduced only as a last resort.
 Do not plan to REDUCE RPN with detection
actions!!!
100% inspection is only 80% effective!
Reducing RPN with detection does not eliminate failure
mode, or reduce probability of causes
Detection of 10 is not bad if occurrence is 1
35
FMEA in a continuous flow process
Steel Making example:
Design FMEA was performed on a Crankshaft to

determine the best material for the product being
considered. This was a critical application.
Key features such as Geometry, Strength, Duty

Cycle, were described to the Steel producer.
36
The key product requirements were mapped
against the required customer features. E.g.
chemistry and microstructure, Internal stress at
ingot level,
Product Grade and requirements documents
created.
Key characteristics mapped against processes
Process FMEA was performed on processes that
affected customer wants based on priority.
37
Phase I QFD Product
Specifications
Phase
Progression
Systems / Sub-Systems /
Phase II Components
QFD
Customer
Wants
(Marketing
Information)
DFMEA Failure Modes
Product
Specifications System DFMEA
Sub-System DFMEA
Component DFMEA
Inputs
•Drawings •Boundary Diagram
•Warranty •P-Diagram
•FMA •Interface Matrix
QFD Phase Progression

38
SEAL
FACE
SHOULDER
SERATION DAMAGE
Matrix
Relative Importance
Weighted Importance

5
9
9
3
9
3
5
Severity
DFMEA
and Critical
0 Receive Material
F
Characteristics from
Potential Significant
81 Shipping Damage
F
H
Y
0 Vehicle Assembly
Op 100 Step 1
relative to risk
FIXTURE
of process steps
Op 100 Step 2
Prioritized ranking
G
G
SEAL TO FIXTURE
Op 100 Step 3
PRE-LOAD PRIMARY
0
HOUSING BUSHING TO
FIXTURE
Op 110
0 Pre-load bearing to fixture #2
Op 120
H
mandrel
Importance
Op 200
54
Characteristics
H
H
Op 210
Ranked in order of
261
F
F
F
F
Operate press
Op 220
3
G

Op 230
0
Reload fixture #1
Op 300
54
H
H
Op 310
81
F
H
H
Operate press
Process Steps
Op 320
3
G

Op 330
0
OP 340
0
Operate press
Op 350
0
Op 400
27
H
Housing to table
Op 410
0 Reserved
Op 420
45
F

Op 430
9
G
Lubricate bushing & seal

Op 445
9
G

Op 10
0
Op 500
0
PFMEA
Op 510
0
Process Operation
Op 20
from Process Flow
0
0 Op 520
Op 530
0
causes/failure modes in

Op 535
0
High/Medium Interactions are
Customer
Assessment
39
The Completed Characteristics Matrix
Phase III Process
System DFMEA
Sub-System DFMEA
QFD Operations
Component DFMEA
Phase IV
QFD
Process
Parameters /
High Priority Process Variables
Operations
SC’s & CC’s

Classification
of Characteristics Causes from
DFMEA’s

10 CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS
S 9 Safety/Regulatory
E 8 SIGNIFICANT
V 7 CHARACTERISTICS
E 6 Customer Dissatisfaction
R 5
I 4 ANNOYANCE
T 3 ZONE
SC’s & CC’s
Y 2 Appropriate actions /
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OCCURRENCE
Process Related
SC’s & CC’s Failure Modes Causes on
From all DFMEA’s on PFMEA PFMEA Key Control
Characteristics
Process FMEA
Inputs
•Failure Data •Process Flow
Control Plan
•Process •Line Layout
Capability •MFMEA
QFD Phase Progression 40

Summary
FMEA can be used creatively in continuous

processing.
Linking key customer requirements to process

outputs instead of standard product grade is
valuable.
Future customer requirements will drive new and

modified processes to achieve specialty results as a
normal practice
41
Q&A

Dfmea

Încărcat de

Informații document

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Dfmea

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

FMEA

Intelligent use of FMEA

This guideline is for training purposes only; Not ISO controlled

Item C Potential O Current Current D Responsibility Action Results

 Opportunity to Defeat Murphy’s Law

Design Risk Assessment IF

PROCESS DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT.

PRODUCT AND PROCESS VALIDATION.

FEEDBACK ASSESSMENT AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

Open Issues / Time Line

This guideline is for training purposes only; Not ISO controlled

Special Characteristics Matrix

Requirements Into Special T

JACK SHAFT SEAL AGAINST

SEAL COMPRESSION HEIGHT

BUSHING TO FACE OF JACK SHAFT

BEARING FLUSH TO SNAP RING FACE

PRIMARY GASKET SEAL SURFACE FINISH

Pre-load bearing to fixture #2

Retaining ring to top groove

Retaining ring to top groove

Chain adj sub assy to housing

Lubricate bushing & seal

Move or stage for final assy

JACK SHAFT SEAL AGAINST

SEAL COMPRESSION HEIGHT

BEARING FLUSH TO SNAP RING FACE

PRIMARY GASKET SEAL SURFACE FINISH

Retaining ring to top groove

Retaining ring to top groove

Chain adj sub assy to housing

Move or stage for final assy

Shifter lever to shifter tube

 A layered approach is highly recommended

Additional Clearances Arm Group Assembly Shaft Assembly

1. Piece to piece variation 2. Other systems 3. Customer usage/duty cycle

4. Deterioration/degredagtion over time 4. Environment

Input Ideal function

Regulatory Error states

 Key Elements of Efficient Development

 Failure Mode: Pure anti-function

Item / C O D Action Results

SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA

Vehicle/item operable but at a reduced level of performance. Customer very

Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable. Customer

Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) operable at a reduced

None No discernable effect. 1

For High Severity 9/10

Inadequate Causes Harness

 Causes from P-Diagram

Item / C O D Action Results

SUGGESTED OCCURRENCE EVALUATION CRITERIA

 100 per thousand vehicles/items 10

20 per thousand vehicles/items 8

5 per thousand vehicles/items 6

0.5 per thousand vehicles/items 3

Remote: Failure is unlikely  0.01 per thousand vehicles/items 1

 If an action would effectively eliminate the

DATA HARD FACTS

Special Characteristics Matrix

 Think of Design Control in two ways; Prevention

 RPN / RISK PRIORITY NUMBER

Top 20% of Failure