G.R. No.

L-77282 May 5, 1989

 Petitioner instituted this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition to overturn the decision of
the respondent director which ordered the holding of a
certification election among the rank-and-file workers
of the private respondent GAW Trading, Inc.
 ALU informed GAW Trading that majority of the
latter’s employee have authorized ALU to be their sole
and exclusive bargaining unit. It was opposed by the
SPFL and NAMGAW which undertook an illegal
strile. ALU and GAW Trading executed CBA.
 On June 11,1986 The med-arbiter held a certification of
election, which ALU filed an MR/Appeal. Director
Trajano ruled in favor of ALU but it was overturned by
the public respondent.
 Whether the CBA entered into between
petitioner and GAW Trading was defective
A. Kick Loy vs. National Labor Relations Commission

the mechanics of collective bargaining are set in

motion only when the following jurisdictional
preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession
of the status of majority representation by the
employees' representative in accordance with any
of the means of selection and/or designation
provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of
majority representation; and (3) a demand to
bargain under Article 251, paragraph (a), of the
New Labor Code.
 Petitioner Associated Labor Unions (ALU) informed private respondent GAW Trading,
Inc. that a majority of the latter's employees had authorized it to be their sole and
exclusive bargaining representative. Petitioner thereafter requested that private
respondent conduct a conference with it for the execution of an initial CBA.
 On the ff day, ALU's Chairman furnished GAW Trading 10 final copies of the CBA for
Comment, or otherwise, for signing. Two days later, ALU (in behalf of majority of the
employees of GAW Trading, Inc.) signed and executed the collective bargaining
agreement.
 In the meantime, the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) together with
nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa GAW (NAMGAW) undertook a strike after it failed to get
the management of GAW Trading, Inc. to sit for a conference respecting its demands.
Specifically, SPFL wanted GAW Trading, Inc. to make a turn-about of its standing
recognition of ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of its employees.
 GAW Trading filed a petition for a Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin SPFL from continuing with the strike. Acting on the petition, the Labor Arbiter
declared the strike illegal.
 Later, the Med-Arbiter issued an order declaring that a certification election be held for
all branches of GAW Trading, Inc. Aggrieved by the decision, ALU filed an appeal,
which the Bureau of Labor Relations Director granted. However, the decision was
reversed by respondent Director, on the ground that the CBA between petitioner and
GAW Trading was defective.
 Petitioner thus filed SCA-C, asserting that the Med-Arbiter committed GAD in issuing
the order declaring that a certification election be held for all branches of GAW Trading,
Inc. It asseverated that the CBA between it and GAW Trading was not defective
 Yes. The CBA is defective. petitioner's status as an exclusive bargaining
representative was found to be dubious. Respondent GAW Trading sent a letter to the
petitioner, merely indicating that it was not against the desire of its workers and
required petitioner to present proof that it was supported by the majority in a meeting to
be held on a specified date. Yet petitioner did not positively establish that the employees
expressly recognized it as their exclusive bargaining representative. Clearly, respondent
GAW Trading acted with undue haste in recognizing petitioner as the exclusive
bargaining agent of the employees, for it merely relied on the latter's self-serving claim
that it was indeed recognized as such by said employees. Hence, there is no clear
compliance with the jurisdictional preconditions for collective bargaining.
 Second, there was a failure to post the CBA in at least two conspicuous places in the
establishment at least 5 days before its ratification. Petitioner ratiocinated that the illegal
strike staged by SPFL made it impossible to comply with the posting requirement, for it
resulted in the absence of impartial members of the bargaining unit who could be
apprised of the CBA's contents.
 The SC found petitioner's justification puerile and unacceptable. In the first place, the
posting of copies of the CBA is the responsibility of the employer, and not the petitioner.
Secondly, the formulation and finalization of the CBA was suspect, for there appeared to
be undue haste in the conduct thereof. Hence, that an illegal strike was conducted by the
SPFL is of no moment.
 Third, the public respondent director found that 181 of the 281 workers who supposedly
ratified the CBA had soon manifested their strong and vehement denial and/or
repudiation of the alleged negotiation and ratification of the CBA. This indicates that the
CBA would be detrimental to industrial stability.
 I concur with the decision of the Supreme
Court. It must be noted that in interpreting the
protection to labor and social justice provisions
of the labor laws on rules and regulations
implementing the mandates of the law, the
Supreme Court has always adopted the liberal
approach which favors the exercise of labor
rights.
G.R. No. 85085 November 6, 1989
 Eleven days before the expiration of the CBA
between petitioner ALU and the Philippine
Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation
(PASAR), private respondent
National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU)
filed a petition for certification election with
the Bureau of Labor Relations Regional Office in
Tacloban city.
 Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition on
the ground that NAFLU failed to present the
necessary signatures in support of its petition.
Is the contract bar rule applicable where a
collective bargaining agreement was hastily
concluded in defiance of the order of the med-
arbiter enjoining the parties from entering into
a CBA until the issue on representation is
finally resolved?
 Article 256 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order
No. 111, provides:
ART. 256. Representation issue in organized
establishments. — In organized establishments, when a petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent
is filed before the Department within the sixty-day period before
the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-
Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot to
ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit. To have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible
voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union
receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as
the exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the unit. When
an election which provides for three or more choices results in no
choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, a run-off
election shall be conducted between the choices receiving the two
highest number of votes.
 Petitioner had a collective bargaining agreement with PASAR which expired
on April 1, 1987. on March 23, 1987, private respondent filed a petition for
certification election.
 Petitioner moved to intervene and sought the dismissal of the petition on the
ground that NAFLU failed to present the necessary signatures in support of
its petition. Med-Arbiter Elorcha dismissed the petition. However, the order
of dismissal was set aside and enjoined PASAR from entering into a collective
bargaining agreement with any union until after the issue of representation is
finally resolved.
 Private respondent appealed the order of dismissal. While the appeal was
pending, petitioner ALU concluded negotiations with PASAR on the
proposed CBA. Thereafter, petitioner ALU moved for the dismissal of the
appeal alleging that it had just concluded a CBA with PASAR
 In a resolution dated September 30, 1987, the public respondent gave due
course to the appeal by ordering the conduct of a certification election among
the rank-and-file employees of PASAR with ALU, NAFLU and no union as
choices, and denied petitioner 's motion to dismiss
 Both parties moved for reconsideration of the said resolution. However, both
motions were denied by public respondent in the order dated April 22, 1988
 No, reasoning in cases organized establishments
where there exist a certified bargaining agent,
what is essential is whether the petition for
certification election was filed within 60 day
freedom period. When an election which provides
for three or more choices result in no choice
receiving a majority of the valid votes casts, a run-
off election shall be conducted between the choices
receiving the two highest number of votes.
 Art.256 is clear. The mere filing of a petition for
certification election within the freedom period is
sufficient basis for the responded to order the
holding of a certification election.
 I concur with the decision of the Supreme
Court. The last 60 days in a collective
bargaining agreement is referred to as the
freedom period. Even though the parties have
already agreed upon a CBA despite the courts
order for the PASAR to not enter a CBA with
any union, the order of the labor to hold a
certification election is proper so that fraud can
be avoided.
G.R. No. 84685 February 23, 1990
 This is a special civil action of certiorari with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to annul the orders of the Med-
Arbiter and the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR), for the holding of a certification election
in the Calasiao Beer Region of the San Miguel
Corporation.
 Did Director of the Bureau of Labor Relation
gravely abuse her discretion in ordering the
holding of a certification election
 ART 258 of the Labor Code
“When an employer may file petition. - When
requested to bargain collectively, an employer may
petition the Bureau for an election. If there is no
existing certified collective bargaining agreement
in the unit, the Bureau shall, after hearing, order a
certification election.
All certification cases shall be decided within
twenty (20) working days.
The Bureau shall conduct a certification election
within twenty (20) days in accordance with the
rules and regulations prescribed by the secretary of
Labor."
 On September 7, 1987, petitioner requested San Miguel
Corporation for voluntary recognition as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all the covered employees which
consist of the monthly- and daily-paid employees of the
Calasiao Sales Office.
 SMC denied the union's request
 On November 27, 1987. SMC, filed a petition for
certification election among the sales personnel of the Region
only, excluding the daily-paid and monthly-paid employees,
but including the sales offices of the entire beer region.
 The Union filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the
petition for certification election was premature as it did not
ask SMC to bargain collectively with it.
 February 22, 1988, the Med-Arbiter issued a decision
ordering a certification election be conducted among the
sales force personnel of the SMC.
 The petition has no merit.
 in an unorganized establishment If a union asks the
employer to voluntarily recognize it as the bargaining agent
of the employees as the petitioner did, it in effect asks the
employer to certify it as the bargaining representative of the
employees a certification which the employer has no
authority to give for it is the employees' prerogative to
determine whether they want a union to represent them.
 The petitioner's request for voluntary recognition as the
bargaining representative of the employees was in effect a
request to bargain collectively, or the first step in that
direction, hence, the employer's request for a certification
election was in accordance with Article 258 of the Labor
Code, and the public respondents did not abuse their
discretion in granting the request.
 I concur with the decision of the Supreme
Court. The act of SMC in filing a certification of
election for the union is nothing but proper.
There can be no other reason why the SMC
filed the petition for certification election in
behalf of the union, it is also for their benefit.
The SMC will not gain anything from filing the
petition on their behalf.
GR No. 85915, Jan 17, 1990
 Petitioner labor union sought to represent
employees of Triumph International and filed
petition for certification election. Triumph
opposed contending that the employees sought
to be represented by the union were
managerial and supervisory employees and are
therefore disqualified to join a union
 whether or not the public respondent gravely
abused its discretion in ordering the immediate
holding of a certification election among the
workers sought to be represented by the
respondent union.
A. Philtranco Service Enterprises v. Bureau of Labor Relations
The Labor Code recognizes two (2) principal groups of employees, namely, the
managerial and the rank and file groups. Thus, Art. 212 (k) of the Code provides:
k) "Managerial employee" is one
who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively
recommend such managerial action. All employees not falling within this definition are considered
rank and file employees for purposes of this Book.
B. Franklin Barker Company of the Philippines v. Trajano The test
of "supervisory" or "managerial status" depends on whether, a person possesses authority to act
in the interest of his employer in the matter specified in Article 212 (K) of the Labor Code and
Section 1 (m) of its Implementing Rules and whether such authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
C. Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Sanchez
Art. 245 of the Labor Code prohibits managerial employees from joining,
assisting or forming any labor organization. Hence, employees who had then formed
supervisory unions were classified either as managerial or rank-and-file depending on
their functions in their respective work assignments.
Petitioner is the recognized collective bargaining agent of the rank-
and-file employees of Triumph International. A petition for
certification election was filed by the respondent union with the
Department of Labor and Employment. A motion to dismiss the
petition for certification election was filed by Triumph
International on the grounds that the respondent union cannot
lawfully represent managerial employees. Labor Arbiter issued an
order granting the petition for certification election. On appeal, the
public respondent affirmed the Labor Arbiter's order. Triumph
International filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the public respondent
 There is no evidence in the records which sufficiently distinguishes and
clearly separates the group of employees sought to be represented by the
private respondents into managerial and supervisory on one hand or
supervisory and rank-and-file on the other. The respondents’ pleadings
do not show the distinctions in functions and responsibilities which
differentiate the managers from the supervisors and sets apart the rank-
and-file from either the managerial or supervisory groups. As a matter of
fact, the formation of a supervisor’s union was never before the Labor
Arbiter and the Bureau of Labor Relations and neither is the issue before
us. The Supreme Court, therefore, abide by the public respondent’s
factual findings in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
 In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the petitioner is the
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file
employees of Triumph International. A careful examination of the
records of this case reveals no evidence that rules out the
commonality of interests among the rank-and-file members of the
petitioner and the herein declared rank-and-file employees who
are members of the respondent union. Instead of forming another
bargaining unit, the law requires them to be members of the
existing one. The ends of unionism are better served if all the
rank-and-file employees with substantially the same interests and
who invoke their right to self-organization are part of a single unit
so that they can deal with their employer with just one and yet
potent voice. The employees’ bargaining power with management
is strengthened thereby. Hence, the circumstances of this case
impel us to disallow the holding of a certification election among
the workers sought to be represented by the respondent union for
want of proof that the right of said workers to self-organization is
being suppressed.
 I concur with the decision of the Supreme
Court. The right of the employees to self
organization cannot be deprived to them if
there is no sufficient evidence to anchor the
opposition’s claim that they are not a rank-and-
file employee. It must always be remembered
that the law is always in favor of the labor.