Article 32

Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced
by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a
statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant’s act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance
of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute.
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION , G.R. No.
141309 June 19, 2007
FACTS:
On June 10, 1993, RA 7654, which took effect on July 3, 1993, was enacted. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands Champion,
Hope and More were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. On July 1, 1993, or two days
prior to the effectivity of the said Act, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying Champion, Hope and More as locally
manufactured cigarette bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private capacity, contending
that the latter should be held liable for damaged under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93
violated its constitutional rights against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the
laws.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued
RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority; and that the complaint states no
cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
ISSUE: WON Petitioner is liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION , G.R. No.
141309 June 19, 2007
RULING: YES
There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers:
1. the duty owing to the public collectively. This embraces those officers whose duty is owing primarily to the public collectively – to
the body politic – and not to any particular individual; who act for the public at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public
treasury.
2. the duty owing to particular individuals. This includes those who, while they owe to the public the general duty of a proper
administration of their respective officers, yet become, by reason of their employment by a particular individual to do some act for
him in an official capacity, under a special and particular obligation to him as an individual. They serve individuals chiefly and
usually receive their compensation from fees paid by each individual who employs them. (e.g. a sheriff or constable serving for a
private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording the deed or mortgage of an individual, etc.)
In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or non-performance of a duty, it must first be
determined which of the two classes of duties is involved. Stated differently, when what is involved is a duty owing to the public in
general, an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured
by the action or inaction of the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the individual but no wrong to him.
In the instant case, what is involved is a public officers duty owing to the public in general. The petitioner, as the then Commissioner
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued
without the requisite notice, hearing and publication, as having fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance. A public
officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules
which are compliant with the requirements of valid administrative regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but
to the entire body politic who would be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative rule.
ABERCA VS. VER, G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
FACTS: Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants who were members of a military raiding team, Task Force Makabansa (TFM) were
liable for damages for violating their rights when the said raiding team, in undertaking its raid, employed defectively issued
search warrants; confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; made arrests without proper warrants
from the courts; denied the visits of relatives and lawyers; interrogated them in violation of their right to counsel; and employed,
during this interrogation, threats, tortures and other forms of violence to obtain incriminatory information or confessions, all in
violation of their constitutional rights.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging, among others, that the complaint states no cause of action against the
defendants as they are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties.
ISSUE: WON defendants are liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
RULING: YES.
It is obvious that the purpose of Article 32 of the NCC is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms
enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. respondents'
invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts
done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating
the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility.
Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with
vigor.
LIM VS. PONCE DE LEON, G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975
FACTS: In 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch. A year later, Alberto
Timbangcaya filed a complaint alleging that after the sale, Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal, of
Palawan, filed with the CFI of Palawan an information for Robbery against Jikil Taha. Fiscal Ponce de Leon further requested the
Provincial Commander of Palawan direct the detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor
launch. However, the motor launch was sold to Delfin Lim. Ponce de Leon explained that the sale cannot prevent the court from
taking custody of the motor launch, hence it was seized and impounded.
Plaintiffs Delfim Lim and Jikil Taha filed with the CFI of Palawan a complaint for damages against defendant-appellees Ponce de
Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that Maddela entered the premises and seized the motor launch of Delfin Lim without a
search warrant. In their answer, defendants alleged that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch, for being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that
Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the orders of his superior officer to impound said launch.
ISSUE: WON defendants-appellees are civilly liable despite good faith.
RULING: YES.
Pursuant to Article 32 of the NCC, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and
moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. Defendant Ponce de Leon’s defense of good faith
cannot be sustained. To be liable under Article 32 of the Nit is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of
the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.
But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he impounded the motor launch upon the order
of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior officer, there
are certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from liability.
ANG VS. QUILALA, A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1476. February 4, 2003
FACTS: Benito Ang was charged of Estafa before RTC of Manila violation of Batas Pambansa before MTC presided by respondent
Jugde Quilala. He attended the scheduled Arraignment, however, he failed to attend the second scheduled arraignment. Thus,
Judge Quilala issued the warrant of arrest. The Clerk III of the MTC of Manila, Louie Macabeo, offered to help Ang for the lifting
of the warrant in exchange of P30,000, which Ang rejected. Consequently, Ang was served a warrant of arrest. Benito Ang
charged Presiding Judge Reinato G. Quilala, Clerk of Court Zenaida Reyes-Macabeo and Clerk III Louie Macabeo, all of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, with extortion
ISSUE: WON respondents are liable.
RULING: NO.
The settled doctrine is that judges are not liable to respond in a civil action for damages, and are not otherwise administratively
responsible for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction.
Certain it is that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold
otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process
of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. More importantly, the error must be gross or patent, deliberate and
malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or
intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.
In the instant case, respondent judge denied the first motion for reconsideration for complainants failure to attend the
scheduled arraignment on the ground that he was indisposed to attend the same. Respondent judges action was within his own
judicial discretion. Any error therein that a dissatisfied litigant may raise would be merely an error of judgment, for which the
judge may not be held administratively liable. The record does not show that respondent judge was moved by ill-will or bad faith
in rendering the adverse judgment, or that his ruling was manifestly unjust.