Interfacing Nuclear Power Plants with the Electric Grid:

the Need for Reliability

May, 2019
 Nuclear Power Plant (NPP): World Review
• There is a clear need for new generating capacity around the world, to replace old fossil fuel units, especially coal-fired ones,
which emit a lot of carbon dioxide, to produce green energy, to meet increased demand for electricity, generate electricity at a
low tariff to help minimizing losses or doing profit from energy sector. NPP came in this regard and first commercial NPP was
brought in 1950s. Nuclear energy now provides about 11% of the world's electricity. According to OECD, electricity generation
from nuclear will be increased by almost 90% by 2040 to 4960 TWh, and capacity grows to 678 Gwe. The World Nuclear
Association has put forward a more ambitious scenario than this – the Harmony programme proposes the addition of 1000 GWe
of new nuclear capacity by 2050, to provide 25% of world’s electricity.
• USA has 98 operable nuclear reactors, with a combined net
capacity of 99.4 GWe. Nuclear generated 20% of the
country's electricity.
• France has 58 operable nuclear reactors, with a combined
net capacity of 63.1 GWe. Nuclear generated 72% of the
country's electricity.
• Russia has 36 operable nuclear reactors, with a combined
net capacity of 28.0 GWe. Nuclear generated 18% of the
country's electricity.
• China has 45 operable nuclear reactors, with a combined
net capacity of 43.0 GWe. In 2017, nuclear generated 4%
of the country's electricity.
• India has 22 operable nuclear reactors, with a combined
net capacity of 6.2 GWe. In 2017, nuclear generated 3% of
the country's electricity.
• Bangladesh, Belarus, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates
are all constructing their first nuclear power plants.
 Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) : Bangladesh Review
• Bangladesh Started construction of two VVER-1200/523 (Water-Water Power Reactor) of 2.4 GWe which will
hopefully be in operation at 2023 & 2024. Project cost is 12.65 billion USD (GoB will bear 10%). Russian state
owned company Rosatom is the EPC contractor. Plant life is 60 years. Grace period 10 years, loan repayment
period is 28 years. Tariff will be cost based and hopefully be very low compared to conventional plants due to
bulk generation and very low fuel cost. 1 Kg U-235 is equivalent to 3 X 10^6 kg of high grade coal. Fuel will be
supplied and disposed by EPC contractor.
• Rooppur NPP will be bulit in the safest technology available today, said BAEC Chairman Md. Ali Zulquarnain.
Locals of the area will not have to move from the project area even in case of an accident, he added.
• It will have a very positive effect to our economy if we can use NPP at high capacity factor efficiently, safely and
reliably. Levelized Tariff will be lower than 5 BDT.
• For a country that does not yet use nuclear power, the introduction and development of nuclear power is a major
undertaking. A major part of the necessary infrastructure is the electric grid to which the Nuclear Power Plant
(NPP) will connect. The efficient, safe, secure and reliable operation of the NPP requires that the grid to which it
connects is also efficient, safe, secure and reliable. Sadly but truly, our grid is one of the worst in the world with
high fluctuations of voltage and frequency.
• As NPP requires less space, it can be located near load centers.
• Bangladesh seeks cooperation from Russian Federation in the form of assistance package like national training
course, Seminar/Workshop, Expert mission/view and other form of bilateral arrangements in establishing
infrastructure for Rooppur NPP.
 Power Grid System
• The grid is the electrical highway through which all electricity traffic passes as it moves
energy from the supplier (‘generation’) to the customer (‘load’). Interconnected electric
grids can encompass several countries.
• Rapid economic development in the 20th century made the electric grid system a critical
part of the economic infrastructure in industrialized countries and a permanent feature of
the landscape.
• Power Grid is responsible for Operation, Maintenance and Development of the
transmission system of the Country for distribution of generated electricity. The backbone
of the grid is the high-voltage transmission lines that run across the country to remote
areas.
• The central load dispatch centre monitors and controls the entire grid system from the
work stations in the control room. It coordinates with generation and distribution to ensure
a steady supply of quality electricity.
• The tolerances of electrical parameters in generators are voltage ± 10% and frequency ±2
Hz. When several sets run in parallel, one of them will act as the leading set. The
generators can share load on auto/manual mode.
 Key Features of a Grid
• Changes in generation and transmission at any point in the system will change loads on
generators and transmission at every other point, which is not easily controlled.
• To avoid system failures, the amount of power flowing through each transmission line
must remain below the line’s capacity. Exceeding capacity can cause overheating.
Overhead lines which overheat will sag, and may cause electrical flashover to trees or the
ground. Underground cables which overheat can damage their insulation. Exceeding
capacity can also create power supply instability such as phase and voltage fluctuations.
• The grid must accommodate changing electricity supply and demand conditions, planned
or unexpected outages of generating stations, transmission lines, and customers, as well
as extreme weather conditions.
• The grid systems in developed countries are normally designed and operated with a
contingency margin. They are operated so that no single fault on the system can lead to
unacceptable problems such as abnormal voltage, abnormal frequency or disconnection
of demand. However, if this margin is not maintained, or multiple faults happen close
together in time, a major failure can still occur.
• Hence electric grids require continuous control and balancing actions based on
engineered systems.
 Grid Failure
• Grid failure leading to blackout occurs mainly due to major imbalance between the real time
generation and consumption. This is what happened on 1-11-2014 when incoming 344 MW supply
from India suddenly ceased at Bheramara HVDC station. When a bulk input of power fails, the
burden of this load falls on the running sets of the power plants. The sudden extra load grips the
prime mover like a brake and reduces its speed momentarily. When the speed falls below the set
limit of frequency, the low frequency safety guard disengages the set from bus bar. The
phenomenon is termed the set tripped. A set, when it trips, is relieved instantly of the carrying load
and its speed of rotation tends to increase. When the speed crosses the upper set point, the set
stops due to over speed safety guard. Thus the imbalance between generation and consumption
goes on increasing and the generators trip and stop in the power plants one after another, leading
to cascading failures causing a widespread blackout in the country. (Source: The Daily Star, 24th
Feb, 2015)
• The collapse of a grid may be caused by a combination of human errors and technical challenges:
uninformed power plant outages, overextended controllers, transmission line failures, the
overheating of alternate transmission lines causing lines to sag into trees, an insufficient ability to
repair or replace sensors and relays quickly, poor maintenance of control room alarms, poor
communications between load dispatchers and power plant operators, insufficient understanding of
transmission system interdependencies, and the grid operating very near its transmission capacity.
 Site Selection & Assessment for a NPP
• Energy market and demand
• Land availability
Regional
• Grid capacity and grid connection
Analysis

• Generation development opportunity

• Transmission lines (historical and predicted fault rates)
• Grid connection, capacity and sstability
Screening of • Grid enhancements for stregthening
Potential Sites • Reliable off-site power

• The distance to the centres of demand

• The number and length of new transmission lines, and their cost
• The cost of other grid investments that may be needed
Comparison • The difficulty and cost of providing a secure and diverse power supply to the NPP site
and Ranking • The final ranking leading to a short list should integrate the socio-political aspects
 Off-site Power
• An important characteristic of all nuclear power plants is that after a nuclear reactor is shut down, it continues to
produce a significant amount of heat for an extended period. With current designs, the thermal power of the
reactor immediately after shutdown is around 6.5% of the thermal power before shutdown, although this reduces
to around 1.5% after one hour, and 0.4% after one day. It is to be noted that for a modern 1200 MWe NPP,
Reactor Nominal Thermal Power is around 3200 MW.
• The pumps used in a NPP are high capacity ones. Frequency variation of input power to the pumps leads to
process parameter deviation and voltage fluctuations lead to high/low current flow to the powerful pump motors.
• Moreover, NPP requires electrical input for safety functions like.
— Control of reactivity ;
— Confinement of radioactive materials;
— Control of operational discharges;
— Limitation of accidental releases.
• Hence the reactor cooling systems must continue to operate for several days after a reactor shuts down, to
prevent overheating and damage to the reactor core. Therefore, reliable cooling arrangements must be provided,
and this requires robust and diverse sources of reliable electrical supply. So, as stated, the safe startup, operation
and shutdown of NPPs require a reliable and stable power supply from the electric grid, referred to generally as
‘off-site power’.
• For practical reasons (e.g. to allow maintenance on transformers and switchgear) it would be normal to have at
least two independent connections.
 Self Auxiliary & On-site Power
• Power plants auxiliary consumption can be met through self generation where power lines are
connected from a place before unit breaker of generator output. NPPs have self auxiliary
connections but prefer to draw auxiliary power from grid because of its robustness.
• Power to drive auxiliaries of a NPP is typically 5–8% of the NPP rated load . During a grid failure
condition, NPP can be operated in “house- load” mode to power its auxiliary system only.
• For a sudden grid failure or emergency conditions, a reliable and diverse backup power source
(Batteries, Diesel Engines, Gas Turbines etc.) is needed. This emergency, in house power source is
called on-site power.
• Well designed and hardened construction structures must be provided to protect these power
sources from extreme external events such as hurricanes, tornados, flooding, earthquakes and
tsunamis.
• The loss of all alternating current (AC) power to the safety and non-safety busses at a NPP involves
the simultaneous loss of offsite power (LOOP), turbine trip, and the loss of the onsite power
supplies. Such a condition is referred to as a station blackout (SBO). Risk analyses performed for
NPPs indicate that a station blackout event is a significant contributor to the calculated core
damage probability.
• An increase in the frequency or duration of LOOP events increases the probability of station
blackout and hence of core damage. Hence it is important that the transmission system can provide
a reliable electrical supply to an NPP, with adequate capacity.
 Load following vs Baseload Operation
• A load following power plant adjust its output as demands for electricity fluctuates throughout the day.
Load following power plants can be hydroelectric power plants, Diesel & Gas engines, combined cycle,
gas turbine power plants and steam turbine power plants that run on natural gas or heavy fuel oil,
although heavy fuel oil plants make up a very small portion of the energy mix. A relatively efficient model
of gas turbine that runs on natural gas can also make a decent load following plant.
• Power plants that do not change their power output quickly and tends to give maximum dispatchable
generation are baseload plants. Large coal or nuclear plants, are generally baseload power plants.
• Nuclear power plants are rarely operated in this ‘load following’ mode. Rather they provide a constant
‘baseload’ (steady-state operation at full power) supply of electricity to the grid. Thus having a baseload
nuclear plant on a grid means that other plants must be ‘load following’, i.e. able to increase or decrease
their output to balance changes in electricity demand.
• For modern baseload plants, the effect of thermal transients during load change will have restrictions in
their safety cases or operating licences that limit the magnitude or speed of load variation or the number
of load cycles.
• “Load following” mode is normally inefficient and it requires distinct features in design and control system.
As capital cost of NPP is very high and fuel price is very low, it is commercially beneficial to operate NPP
at baseload mode because the capacity payment will (USD/kW/month) be higher. For a NPP to be
operated in “load following” mode, it should be designed before project implementation. Design of plant
equipment, application of instrumentation and control is very much costly for this mode of operation.
 Performance of the Grid
• In order to understand the performance of the grid system, to use for system planning, and for predicting
future performance, the Transmission System Operator (TSO) should routinely collect data on the operational
performance of the power system.
Data that should be collected and analyzed include:
— Daily, weekly and monthly load variation;
— The magnitudes and frequencies of random load variations;
— The frequency variations during normal system operation, i.e. without any major disturbances such as
generation losses, line losses or faults;
— Voltage variations at selected points, particularly at the proposed connection point of the NPP;
— The power flow through the tie lines;
— The frequency of transmission line faults;
— The voltage, frequency and tie line flow oscillations and recovery time after faults;
— The speed and reliability of protective systems;
— The frequency of planned outages and forced outages of generating units;
— The frequency of severance of the interconnection with neighbouring systems;
— The swings in system frequency and voltage following generator or line trip, particularly the initial rate of
frequency drop, the lowest frequency reached and the time for recovery;
— The frequency of the load shedding operation to manage shortages;
— The frequency of line outages leading to the formation of islands within the grid;
— The frequency and duration of grid collapses (blackouts), if any;
— The amount of reserve capacity maintained during the year.
 Reliability of the Grid System
• A stable and reliable grid would be one where voltage and
frequency are controlled within pre-defined limits and
disconnections are infrequent events. Typical values are
— Frequency is controlled within +/–1% of nominal frequency
for the majority of the time. Frequency may go outside +/–1%
for short periods on a few occasions per year, to a limit of
around +3% and -5%;
— Voltage is controlled within +/–5% of the nominal value on
the high voltage transmission system for the majority of the
time. Voltage can go outside this range for short periods on a
few occasions each year, with a limit of up to +/–10%,
depending on the nominal voltage;
— Events that disconnect parts of the grid, or lead to blackout
of a major part of the grid are rare (much less than once per
year). This applies particularly to that part of the grid to which
the NPP is connected;
— The grid recovery following a regional blackout restores
power for essential services, including offsite power for NPPs,
in less than two hours.
 Reliability of the Grid System (Contd..)
• A reliable, balanced and well maintained electric grid is crucial for bringing new nuclear power
plants online and operating them cost-effectively and safely.
• Specific issues that should be considered in the early phases of a nuclear power programme
include grid capacity and future growth, historical stability and reliability, and the potential for local
and regional interconnections. Assessment of the current grid and plans for improving the grid
should therefore be developed to be consistent with plans for nuclear power.
• In order for the grid system to be reliable, it needs to be designed and operated so that the
performance is not adversely affected by the common faults, and that unusual or severe events
such as multiple faults have limited consequences. This requires the system to be designed and
operated with sufficient redundancy.
• The reliability of off-site power is usually assured by two or more physically independent
transmission circuits to the NPP to minimize the likelihood of their simultaneous failure. Similarly,
the reliability of on-site power is enhanced by sufficient independence, redundancy and testability of
batteries, diesel generators, gas turbines and the on-site electric distribution systems to perform
safety and other functions even if a single failure occurs.
• Because of the importance of reliable off-site power as well as considerations of cost effectiveness
and efficiency, the electric grid is an important factor in NPP site selection, which must take into
account the plant’s position within the grid as well as its proximity to centres of electricity demand,
population density and other factors.
 Reliability of the Grid System (Contd..)
• During operation of NPP, off-site power provided by grid should be stable and reliable for
cost effective and safe operation.
• Power system must have enough reserve generating capacity to ensure grid stability
during the NPP’s planned outages for refueling and maintenance.
• Any unexpected sudden disconnect of the NPP from an otherwise stable electric grid
could trigger a severe imbalance between power generation and consumption causing a
sudden reduction in grid frequency and voltage. This could even cascade into the collapse
of the grid if additional power sources are not connected to the grid in time. Reliable grid
should have solutions to such events.
• A modern NPP may be equipped with Passive Heat Removal System (PHRS) and diverse
source of “on-site power” to back-up emergency grid failure.
• The transmission system characteristics will need to be specified in the bid invitation
specification (BIS) that is issued to vendor companies, and it will also be necessary to
demonstrate to the nuclear regulatory authorities in the country, as part of the application
for a construction or operating licence, that the grid characteristics are acceptable for
nuclear safety.
 Considerations for Grid: Startup and Shutdown of
NPP
• The time required to start up a nuclear unit from a fully shutdown condition is typically
considerably longer than required by a conventional fossil fuel plant and very much longer
than required for a hydroelectric power plant.
• During a reactor startup after a refueling outage, there is usually a need for tests, and a
rather slow increase in power over several days in order to condition the fuel.
• If the nuclear unit has shut down because of an unplanned trip there is likely to be an
additional delay before the reactor can restart because of requirements in the NPPs
operating license to investigate and understand the cause of the reactor trip before the
reactor can be returned to power.
• Because of this longer startup time and other restrictions in their operating licenses,
nuclear units are not used as black start power plants.
• For reactor designs that shut down for refueling (PWRs and BWRs), the ability of the
reactor to change output is greatly reduced towards the end of the fuel cycle — in the few
weeks before the reactor shuts down for refueling.
• After a PWR or BWR has been refueled, the new fuel has to be ‘conditioned’ when the
reactor returns to power, which means that in the first few days after return to service, the
reactor power has to be kept steady and increased slowly, so the reactor cannot operate
flexibly during this period of a few days at the beginning of the fuel cycle.
 Transmission System Modeling
• Grid interconnectivity and redundancies in transmission paths and generating sources are key
elements in maintaining reliability and stability in high performance grids. When relatively large
NPPs are connected to the electric grid, abnormalities occurring in either can lead to the shutdown
or collapse of the other.
• To examine the system at steady state conditions it is necessary to carry out a load flow analysis.
Steady state models are sufficient for such purpose. To understand the behaviors of the system
during transients, full dynamic models of the system components have to be used. For small
disturbance, small signal models, essentially linearized models, can be used. However, for large
transients, such as faults, full nonlinear models are needed to capture the true system behaviors. To
be more specific to the grid and a grid connected NPP, the following studies are usually required:
— The steady state performance of the system when the NPP is working normally;
— The transient behaviors on the electrical grid when the NPP is tripped;
— The ability of the electrical grid to supply sufficient off-site power to maintain safety of the tripped
NPP;
— The effects of grid disturbances on the safe operation of NPP.
• There are a number of well-established computer software packages that incorporate the necessary
mathematical models, which can readily be used to carry out the majority of the analysis and
simulations that are required. These software packages were developed by large utility companies,
engineering consultancies or universities; many are commercially available.
 Control of Frequency
• The rate at which frequency falls immediately after a reactor trip depends
on:
(a) The amount of generation lost;
(b) The inertia of the system as a whole (i.e. the inertia of all the
generating units and motors connected to the system);
(c) The natural tendency of the demand to reduce as frequency falls (due
to the motors present in the load on the system).
• Factor (a) above means that the larger the amount of generation loss, the
faster the frequency falls. Factors (b) and (c) mean that for a given loss of
generation, frequency will fall much faster on a small system (i.e. the total
system demand is small), than on a large system (total system demand is
large).
• If the frequency falls by 5% or more, it is very likely that most generating
units would trip off on their own low frequency protection.
 Control of Frequency (Contd..)
• The fall in frequency can be contained by a combination of increasing the generation and
decreasing the demand:
— Generating units operating at less than full load, in automatic frequency control mode,
that will increase their
power output automatically under the control of their speed governors when frequency
falls;
— Disconnecting some demand by a trip signal from the nuclear unit;
— Disconnecting some demand using low frequency relays;
— The natural tendency of the demand to reduce as frequency falls (due to the motors
present in the load on the system).
• Fine control of frequency is achieved by some generating units operating at less than full
output, in automatic frequency control or “load following” mode, so that they can
automatically increase or decrease their output when system frequency falls or rises.
Load following plants are discussed in a previous slide and it should be ensured that
enough “load following” plants are in operation even in off-peak time.
• If the frequency control arrangements fail, and system frequency raises to an abnormally
high or abnormally low value, then it is likely that many generating units will trip off,
probably leading to more extreme frequencies and eventually system blackout.
 Control of Frequency (Contd..)
• Coarse control of frequency is achieved by the grid control centre issuing instructions to
generating units to increase or decrease output, as system demand varies, to maintain
generation and demand approximately in balance.
• There is a practical limit to the rate at which a generating unit can increase its output
when operating in automatic frequency control mode, and there is a limit to the maximum
increase that can be achieved. As a consequence there is a practical limit to the size of
the largest generating unit that can be installed, if system frequency is to be controlled
reliably after a trip of that generating unit. This practical limit is around 10% of the system
load, unless it is acceptable to disconnect a large amount of demand immediately after a
reactor trip. If it is planned to connect a nuclear unit that is close to or greater than 10% of
minimum system load, it will necessary to carry out detailed studies to establish whether it
is possible to achieve acceptable control of frequency after a reactor trip.
• Dynamic simulations can be performed to investigate the frequency stability under various
contingent conditions. This calls for detailed dynamic models of system components, such
as the speed governors and power controllers on the turbines in power plants.
 Control of Power Flow
• The connection of a new NPP is likely to have a significant
effect on the power flows in the transmission system, and the
Transmission System Operator (TSO) will need to carry out the
system studies to design any modifications to the transmission
system so that it can accept the maximum output from the NPP
without exceeding any power flow limits, for a wide range of
system conditions (e.g. maximum demand and minimum
demand, and with various transmission circuits out of service for
maintenance etc.).
• The TSO should carry out similar studies if the power of an
existing NPP is to be uprated.
 Control of Voltage
• The TSO has the primary responsibility for ensuring that the voltage at all points on the
transmission system is within the allowed range. Controlling the voltage on the
transmission system is closely associated with controlling the flow of reactive power.
• Individual generating units connected to the transmission system are generally operated
with the automatic voltage regulator controlling the generator terminal voltage to a
constant value.
• The transmission system operators control the voltage on the system by issuing
instructions to generating units to change the reactive power output of the generating unit.
In some countries the standard practice is that the generating unit step-up transformer is
operated at fixed tap. In this case, the change in reactive power is achieved by changing
the generator terminal voltage. In other countries, the standard practice is that the
generating unit step-up transformer has an on-load tapchanger, and the change in
reactive power is achieved by changing the tap position on the step up transformer, and
the generator terminal voltage is not changed.
• There is a limit to the range of control that a generating unit can provide, due to the limits
on the range of variation of generator terminal voltage, the limited tap range of the stepup
transformer, or the reactive power capability of the generating unit.
 Control of Voltage (Contd..)
• The transmission system operator can also control voltage by the use of reactive
compensation equipment such as Static Var Compensators (SVCs).
• The ability of generating units at NPPs to provide voltage control and a range of reactive
power is similar to that of large fossil fuel units.
• To provide voltage control from a nuclear unit generally does not affect the control of the
nuclear reactor in normal operation. However, there is a potential nuclear safety problem
for the nuclear unit if there is a disturbance that results in islanding of the NPP at a time
when it is exporting a large amount of reactive power;
• It is important to the NPP that the grid voltage is also controlled within the acceptable
range to provide power to the auxiliary plant when the reactor is shut down. If voltage
falls, high current will flow through various pump motors, heat them up and after a certain
range, may even trip the motors.
• If a nuclear unit trips at a time when it is exporting a large amount of reactive power to the
system, then the local grid voltage will fall after the trip. The voltage control arrangements
on the grid should ensure that the grid voltage will remain within the acceptable range
after such an event.
 Control of Voltage (Contd..)

• The trip of any generating unit is likely to cause a change in voltage on the grid
system near to the generating unit.
• If a large nuclear unit is a long distance from centres of demand and from other
generating units, there is likely to be a large fall in the grid voltage near the
nuclear unit after a reactor trip.
• In order to keep the grid voltage within the acceptable range after a reactor trip it
may be necessary to install reactive compensation equipment on the grid system
close to the NPP. The amount of compensation required does not necessarily
impose a limit on the size of nuclear unit.
 Requirements on Generators
• It has already been indicated that the preferred mode of operation of nuclear plants is at steady full
load, and not providing automatic frequency control (FGMO). The NPP developer and the TSO will
need to agree on the capability required for the nuclear unit and the requirements of the nuclear
regulatory body in the country
• The requirements for voltage control and the provision of reactive power will impact the design of
the generating unit and the step-up transformer as follows.
— The reactive power capability of the generating unit itself;
— If the step-up transformer has an on-load tap changer, the tapping range required;
— If the step-up transformer has a fixed tap, the range of generator terminal voltage required.
• The first two points above should not affect the design of the nuclear island within the NPP.
• However, the last point may affect the design of the nuclear island if the TSO wants a wide range of
voltage control, because of the effect on the voltage of the auxiliary supply buses within the NPP
that are supplied from the generating unit.
• A typical value of acceptable voltage variation is up to +/-5% of the terminal voltage to the
generating unit, leading to no more than +/-10% variation of the voltage supplied to the NPP’s
auxiliary equipment.
• It is important that the range of voltage of the electrical supplies to the auxiliary equipment remains
within the equipment’s design limits.
 System Stability
Dynamic Unstability:
• The system is said to be dynamically unstable if there are sustained oscillations of power between different parts
of the system.
• Such oscillations of the system (typically within the frequency range 0.2 Hz to 1 Hz) can occur in transmission
systems if two parts of the system are connected by a weak connection (for example a single long transmission
circuit), when the power flow through the connection exceeds a critical value.
• This may arise following the introduction of a new NPP, if the NPP is located far from a load centre, or if it
causes an increase in power flow between two parts of the system that are weakly connected.
• The transmission system operator should carry out the necessary computer studies at the design stage to
establish if this is likely to be a problem.
Transient Unstability:
• If the system is transiently stable then after the fault is cleared the generating units near to the fault may
oscillate with respect to the rest of the system for a few seconds, but remain in synchronism with the rest of the
system.
• If the system is transiently unstable, one or more generating units will lose synchronism with the rest of the
system (‘pole-slip’) after the fault is cleared.
• Such loss of synchronism may affect a single generating unit on its own, or a number of generating units in one
part of the system may remain in synchronism with each other, but lose synchronism with the rest of the system.
The transmission system operator (TSO) will need to carry out computer modeling studies to check the
proposed design of the transmission system with the NPP in operation to confirm whether there is a problem
with transient stability.
 System Stability (Contd..)
• Even though steady state load flow analysis can show that the grids with
associated system components satisfy all the steady state operation, it
does not mean that the entire system can reach a new equilibrium at the
steady state following some severe disturbances, such as short-circuit of
the transmission lines, or trip of one or more generating units.
• Transient stability is particularly important for safety reasons if a NPP is
connected to the grid. To examine the transient stability of a power system,
one has to use models involving time to describe the dynamic behaviours
of the system. The models are often in the form of differential equations.
• The critical period for the grid to achieve transient stability is a few tens of
seconds after the disturbance. If the generators can maintain synchronism
in this period, the transients will diminish gradually. The transient
oscillation can last as long as a few minutes. During this period, automatic
frequency control and voltage control loops will regulate system frequency
and voltage to help generators to maintain synchronism.
 Electrical Protection
• The aim of the protection design is to remove the faulted circuit from service rapidly before permanent
damage is caused but to leave other circuits in service.
• With modern circuit breakers and protection systems, the circuit breakers can open to clear the fault
within around 100 milliseconds.
• The transmission system operator has the responsibility to design the electrical protection on the
transmission system, and to ensure that the electrical protection on generating units connected to the
system is coordinated correctly with the transmission system protection.
• The addition of an NPP to the system with a large generating unit may require improvements to the
existing protection system, so that the protection has a shorter operating time (shorter fault clearance
time) to ensure transient stability.
• It is common practice for protection systems to provide auto-reclose, so that the circuit breakers that have
tripped are closed shortly after clearing the fault to return the faulted circuit to service, provided that the
fault has been cleared.
• If auto-reclose is to be used on circuits near a NPP then the transients caused by the reclose action
should be investigated to determine that they do not cause damaging torque transients to the turbine
shaft.
• In some Member States, the practice is to first attempt auto-reclose of the circuit breaker at the far end of
the circuit (not the end nearest to the NPP) so that the NPP is not subjected to an additional transient if
the fault has not been cleared.
 Design and Sizing of Unit Transformer
• The design of the unit transformer must satisfy two conflicting objectives that the impedance should
be high enough to limit the short circuit current to an acceptable level, but be low enough to limit the
voltage drop through the transformer, including the additional voltage drop that occurs when starting
large motors.
• Whichever tap-changer is chosen, it must be possible to maintain the voltage to the electrical
auxiliaries within the necessary range for the full range of auxiliary load, and the full range of
variation of the grid voltage or generator terminal voltage. This should include the ability to allow
reactor start up when the grid voltage is low. Computer studies should also be carried out to verify
the dynamic behavior of the auxiliary motors for the transformer design that has been chosen.
• In practice, the design and sizing of the unit transformer may be carried out as follows:
(1) Establish the largest power loading, which normally corresponds to the nuclear unit at full power;
(2) Decide the number of windings (for example two-winding or three winding transformer) and
hence the power rating of each winding;
(3) Carry out a calculation of short-circuit currents to check that the rating of the circuit breakers is
compatible with various operations considered;
(4) Deduce the maximum value of the reactance of the unit transformer, starting from the tolerances
on the impedances of power transformers;
(5) Use computer transient studies to check that the rating of the unit transformer is compatible with
various events on the transmission system (close short-circuit, voltage dip, islanding following a grid
fault).
• Station Transformers should also be designed and sized maintaining the above mentioned criteria's.
 NOTIFICATION OF LOSS OF CONTINGENCY

• In order to ensure that the transmission system is secure, it is normal practice in

developed countries for the transmission control centre to operate a real time computer
system that continuously monitors the condition of the system, and alerts the control
centre operating staff if changing conditions on the system mean that there has been a
reduction in the required redundancy against unplanned events. The TSO should notify
the NPP operator if there is a loss of contingency that could affect the NPP.
• For example, a transmission system fault may weaken the system so that although the
transmission system voltage at the NPP connection may be adequate, a subsequent trip
of the NPP would result in a low grid voltage that is below the NPP design requirements
for offsite power. In this case, the TSO control centre should notify the NPP of the loss of
contingency. The NPP operating staff should then declare the offsite power not available
and follow the operation requirements for inoperable offsite power source(s) in
accordance with the plant-specific operating specifications. This is so that the risk to the
plant can be reduced by making sure that other safe shutdown emergency power sources
are available, and staff take actions to prevent performing any maintenance and testing
on systems that are needed for accident mitigation and safe shutdown.
 Grid Blackout Situation
• For an NPP, the priority in a blackout situation is to have the off-site supplies
restored as soon as possible.
• However, the main priority for the TSO would be to re-establish the grid system
and restore electricity supplies to customers, particularly priority customers.
Hence in a blackout event the TSO will wish to reconnect as quickly as possible
any power plant that is able to start generating immediately to assist the recovery
of the system.
• A nuclear unit that has tripped off is generally not able to restart generation in
less than 24 hours, so from the grid operator’s narrow point of view it would not
be a high priority to restore supplies to a nuclear unit that has been disconnected
from the grid if it has tripped. For this reason, it will be necessary for the NPP
operators to enter into agreements with the TSO to ensure that appropriate
priority is given to restoring grid supplies to nuclear power plants during recovery
from a blackout. The recovery time would be of great significance to nuclear
safety.
• An NPP can be sited near a cross border connection to receive alternative off-site
power in the blackout situation.
 Influence of Load Rejection or Complete Loss of
Load
• A load rejection is a sudden reduction in the electric power demanded by the grid.
Such a reduction might be caused by the sudden opening of an interconnection
with another part of the grid that has carried a large load. An NPP is designed to
withstand load rejections up to a certain limit without tripping the reactor.
• A loss of load is a 100% load rejection, that is, the entire external load connected
to the power station is suddenly lost, or the breaker at the station’s generator
output is opened. Under this severe condition, it may still be possible to ‘island’
the NPP so that it powers only its own auxiliary systems.
• During this ‘house-load’ operating mode, the reactor operates at a reduced power
level that is still sufficient to assure enough electricity for its own needs, typically
5% of full power. Once the grid disturbance has been eliminated, the NPP can be
re-synchronized to the grid and its production quickly raised again to full power.
This operational characteristic of the NPP is important when the loss of load is
expected to last for just a short time.
 Influence of Degraded Grid Voltage or Frequency
• Grid frequency tends to ‘droop’ if the load exceeds generation and increase if
generation exceeds the load. A eduction in frequency can be caused by
several events, such as insufficient available generation, a major electrical
disturbance such as a circuit fault, or the trip of a major generator unit. A small
droop in the grid frequency caused by the loss of generation can be controlled
by:
a. quickly activating the grid’s available ‘spinning reserve’, either automatically
or manually. Spinning reserve is any unused capacity that is already
connected and synchronized to the grid (‘spinning’) and can be activated
immediately on the decision of the grid operator, reaching its full capacity
within 10 minutes.
b. starting up additional generation capacity, such as gas turbines or
hydroelectric power, and
c. disconnecting selected loads (i.e. customers) from the grid (load shedding).
 Influence of Degraded Grid Voltage or Frequency
(Contd..)
• Isolating the section of the grid with the NPP from the rest of the grid (‘system islanding’)
can also help maintain the proper frequency in the islanded system. System islanding
may reduce the load on the NPP, requiring that its generation be reduced accordingly by a
quick set-back to an intermediate power level. Proper islanding prevents the NPP from
tripping because of the lower frequency, but may further aggravate the power imbalance
in the rest of the grid. A plant trip including reactor shutdown should be regarded as a last
resort. During a trip the plant is subject to rapid changes in power, pressure and
temperature, which shorten the lifetime of the plant. Moreover, if the NPP is immediately
disconnected from the grid, the lost generation will exacerbate the already degraded
conditions on the grid.
• Any change in the grid frequency affects an NPP’s operation by changing the speed of
the NPP’s turbogenerator and the speed of pumps circulating coolants through the reactor
and the secondary coolant circuits. The main reactor circulating pumps, steam generator
feedwater pumps and long term decay heat removal systems rely on stable electric power
to function properly. The speed of the reactor’s main coolant pumps is directly
proportional to the frequency of the electric power supply. Therefore, if the frequency of
the power from the grid drops far enough, the pumps will slow, which will lead to
inadequate core cooling, and the reactor will trip.
 Influence of Degraded Grid Voltage or Frequency
(Contd..)
• Other AC motors in the NPP may also trip due to rising currents and consequent
overheating caused by reduced frequency. The performance of AC motors is directly
affected by the voltage and frequency of their power supplies. If electric grid voltages are
not sufficient, motors cannot develop sufficient motor torque to start, and if the frequency
drops below a certain value, the start and operation of AC motors would require higher
operating voltages. If the voltage is insufficient, it results in excessive current being drawn
by the motor that in return would lead to overheating and the opening of protective
breakers.
• The frequency and voltage ranges in which large AC motors can operate are relatively
narrow. Thus, in severely abnormal conditions, safety systems in nuclear power plants are
required to take protective actions such as tripping the reactor and turbine, separating the
plant electrical systems from the degraded conditions present on the grid, and switching
to on-site emergency power sources until the grid voltage and frequency are restored to
acceptable values. These actions protect the NPP by safely shutting it down and keeping
it cooled. However, any sudden automatic shutdown of a large baseload nuclear unit
during periods where there is already a mismatch between generation and load on the
grid can only further degrade the grid’s condition, potentially leading to a partial or full
collapse.
 Loss of Off-site Power
• Results show that isolated grids are inherently less stable than
equivalent grids of the same size with supporting grid
interconnections.
• A loss of off-site power interrupts power to all in-plant loads such as
pumps and motors, and to the NPP’s safety systems. As a protective
action, safety systems will trigger multiple commands for reactor
protective trips (e.g. turbine and generator trip, low coolant flow trip,
and loss of feedwater flow trip).
• The reactor protection system will also attempt to switch to an
alternate off-site power source to remove residual heat from the
reactor core. If this fails, in-plant electrical loads must be temporarily
powered by batteries and stand-by diesel generators until off-site
power is restored.
 Loss of Off-site Power (Contd..)
• However, diesel generators may not be as reliable as off-site power
from the grid in normal conditions. Diesel generators may fail to start
or run 1% of the time. However, the probability of failure can be
significantly reduced by installing independent trains of diesel
generators. Batteries can provide power only for a limited time.
• Therefore the design and licensing basis for ‘poorly sited’ NPPs
should include provisions for more reliable on-site power, i.e.
additional capacity for the on-site power system beyond the normal
requirements (e.g. more diesel generators and fast-starting gas
turbine engines). This would compensate for less reliable off-site
power by providing more reliable on-site power.
 Conclusion
• The electric grid should provide reliable off-site power to NPPs with
necessary control, protection and stability.
• Any potential lack of reliability in off-site power from the grid must be
compensated for by increased reliability of on-site power sources.
• Enough reserve generating capacity should be available to ensure
grid stability to replace NPP generation during planned NPP
outages.
• The grid should also have a sufficient ‘spinning reserve’ and standby
generation capacity that can be quickly brought online in case the
NPP were to be disconnected unexpectedly from the grid.
• The national grid should have enough interconnections with
neighbouring grids to enable the transfer of large amounts of
electricity in case it is needed to offset unexpected imbalances of
generation and demand.
 Conclusion (Contd..)
• In preparation for the introduction of an NPP, if grid reliability and the
frequency and voltage stability of the existing grid are insufficient, they
should be made sufficient before the NPP is brought online. Any
improvements will not only allow the grid to incorporate the new NPP but
will have additional benefits for all customers and other generators.
• Communication is critical, in this case between the NPP operators and grid
dispatchers. Effective communication protocols will need to be developed.
If NPP outages can be communicated sufficiently earlier, dispatch centre
can schedule for loads. For this, highly skilled operation and maintenance
team need to perform effectively. Scheduled maintenance of equipment
should be well documented and performed on mandatory basis in this
regard.
• SCADA/SMART Grid shall be implemented to solve real time problems.