Sunteți pe pagina 1din 27

REPUBLIC VS.

SERENO
Kelvin Jaluag Culajara
Juris Doctor (Non-Thesis), Class of 2019-2020
Ateneo de Zamboanga University College of Law
KEY FACTS OF THE CASE
Out of Sereno’s 20 years of employment,
only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and
Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP
HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy
of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced
from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The
Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN
filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the
existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of
service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
KEY FACTS OF THE CASE
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed
as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of
Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the
JBC directed the applicants to submit
documents, among which are “all previous
SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in
the government and “SALN as of December
31, 2011” for those from the private sector.
CONTENTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
• OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy
because what is being sought is to question the validity of her
appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of
committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust while in office.
• OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office” in
Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of
the SC may be removed through modes other than
impeachment.
CONTENTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
• OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the
ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a person of
proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for
membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of
the Constitution.
• According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC
requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains
unproven. The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal
obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a
candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office.
SERENO’S DEFENSES
• Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only
be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
• Sereno further argues that the word “may” on Section 2
of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after
the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno
contends that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has
no jurisdiction.
SERENO’S DEFENSES
• Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred.
Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo
warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause
of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the
disqualification.
• Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the
fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to the
inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs
were filed should give an inference to a pattern of filing, not
of non-filing.
Whether the only way to remove an
impeachable officer is through
impeachment
DEMETRIA, ET. AL. VS. ALBA
THE GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
• Said section allows the president to override the
safeguards, form and procedure prescribed by
the Constitution in approving appropriation.
• Said section amounts to an undue delegation of
legislative powers to the executive.
DEMETRIA, ET. AL. VS. ALBA
THE GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION

• The threatened and continuing transfer of


funds by the President and the
implementation thereof by the budget
minister and the treasurer of the Philippines
are without or in excess of their authority
and jurisdiction.
DEMETRIA, ET. AL. VS. ALBA
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL’S ANSWER
The Solicitor General questioned the legal standing of
the petitioners, who were allegedly merely begging an
advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable
controversy fit for resolution or determination.
However, the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground of change of the administration, and
the subsequent abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25,
1986 which has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot
and academic.
DEMETRIA, ET. AL. VS. ALBA
ISSUE 1: HAS THE INSTANT PETITION BECOME MOOT
AND ACADEMIC? NO.
It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted,
as well as to avoid great disservice to national interest that We
take cognizance of this petition and thus deny public
respondents' motion to dismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact
that the new Constitution, ratified by the Filipino people in the
plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, carries verbatim section
16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution under Section 24[5],
Article VI. And while Congress has not officially reconvened, We
see no cogent reason for further delaying the resolution of the
case at bar.
DEMETRIA, ET. AL. VS. ALBA
ISSUE 2: DO PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL STANDING TO
FILE THE INSTANT PETITION? YES.
“In the determination of the degree of interest essential to
give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a
statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually
affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may
therefore question the constitutionality of statutes
requiring expenditure of public moneys.”
Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad
v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said that as regards taxpayers'
suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same
or not.
DEMETRIA, ET. AL. VS. ALBA
ISSUE 3: IS PARAGRAPH 1 OF SECTION 44 OF P.D. NO.
1177 CONSTITUTIONAL? NO.
It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to
any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the
item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely
disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to
an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the
tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision
in question null and void.
DEMETRIA, ET. AL. VS. ALBA
ISSUE 3: IS PARAGRAPH 1 OF SECTION 44 OF P.D. NO.
1177 CONSTITUTIONAL? NO.
Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the
enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in
uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses
accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches
the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well
expand [sic] public money not on the basis of
development priorities but on political and personal
expediency.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA) VS. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. NOS. 113105, 113174, 113766, AND 113888, 19 AUGUST
1994 (THIS IS A CONSOLIDATED CASE)
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill
of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As
passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain
items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members
of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork
barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective
operating budgets.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA) VS. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. NOS. 113105, 113174, 113766, AND 113888, 19 AUGUST
1994 (THIS IS A CONSOLIDATED CASE)

The President signed the bill into law, and declared


the same to have become R.A. No. 7663 (An Act
Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government
of the Philippines from January 1 to December 31, 1994).
The Congress did not take steps to override the vetoes.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA) VS. ENRIQUEZ
IN G.R. NO. 113105

Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up


a Countrywide Development Fund of
P2,977,000,000 to be used for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances
and computers and other priority projects
and activities and credit facilities to
qualified beneficiaries.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA) VS. ENRIQUEZ
IN G.R. NO. 113105
Petitioners claim that the power given to the
members of Congress to propose and identify the
projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide
Development Fund is an encroachment by the legislature
on executive power, since said power in an appropriation
act in implementation of a law. They argue that the
proposal and identification of the projects do not involve
the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof,
the only function given to the Congress by the
Constitution.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA) VS. ENRIQUEZ
ISSUE: Whether the Countrywide Development Fund is
invalid on the ground that it is the legislature’s
encroachment on executive power. NO, IT IS VALID.
The power of appropriation carries with it the power
to specify the project or activity to be funded under the
appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA) VS. ENRIQUEZ
ISSUE: Whether the Countrywide Development Fund is
invalid on the ground that it is the legislature’s
encroachment on executive power. NO, IT IS VALID.
The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall
be used "for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and
computers and other priority projects and activities and credit
facilities to qualified beneficiaries . . ." It was Congress itself that
determined the purposes for the appropriation. Executive
function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves
implementation of the priority projects specified in the law.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA) VS. ENRIQUEZ
ISSUE: Whether the Countrywide Development Fund is
invalid on the ground that it is the legislature’s
encroachment on executive power. NO, IT IS VALID.
Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for
funding under the Funds, it is the President who shall
implement them. In short, the proposals and
identifications made by the members of Congress are
merely recommendatory.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA) VS. ENRIQUEZ
IN G.R. NO. 113105
Under the GAA of 1994, the appropriation for the
Senate is P472,000,000.00 of which P464,447,000.00 is
appropriated for current operating expenditures, while the
appropriation for the House of Representatives is
P1,171,924,000.00 of which P1,165,297,000.00 is
appropriated for current operating expenditures.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA) VS. ENRIQUEZ
IN G.R. NO. 113105
The law provides that a member of Congress may
realign his allocation for operational expenses to any
other expenses category provided that the total of said
allocation is not exceeded. The appropriation for
operating expenditures for each House is further divided
into expenditures for salaries, personal services, other
compensation benefits, maintenance expenses and other
operating expenses.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA) VS. ENRIQUEZ
IN G.R. NO. 113105
In turn, each member of Congress is allotted for his
own operating expenditure a proportionate share of the
appropriation for the House to which he belongs. If he
does not spend for one items of expense, the provision in
question allows him to transfer his allocation in said item
to another item of expense.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA) VS. ENRIQUEZ
IN G.R. NO. 113105
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member
of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses,
claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5) Article VI
of the Constitution, which provides: “No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA) VS. ENRIQUEZ
ISSUE: Whether the special realignment provision violates
Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. NO.

Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines,


the members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of
the savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the
best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there
are savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in
other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it
is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment.

S-ar putea să vă placă și