Quantum Key Distribution

Yet another method of generating a key.

 Two major methods
BB84
Alice generates entangled
photons: orthogonal or
diagonal.
Bob reads photon as orthogonal
or diagonal.
They compare notes on which
they chose.
Keep results from the same
ones.
E91
Device between Alice and Bob
generates entangled photons.
Alice and Bob read photons as
orthogonal or diagonal.
They compare notes on which
they chose.
Keep results from the same
ones.
 Information reconciliation.
• Cascade Protocol:
• Divide Key into blocks.
• Using public channel, check blocks for parity.
• If parity violated, binary search.
• If error is from previous block that matched
parity, that block has two errors.
• Recursively done, thus name.
• Errors found, yet Eve gains more knowledge.
 Privacy Amplification.
• If key is found to have been compromised.
• Use a universal hash function to cut key to
shorter length.
• Shortening amount determined by amount
Eve likely has found.
 Methods of Attack
• Intercept and resend.
• Man in the Middle
• Photon Number Splitting.
• Hacking.
• Denial of Service.
 Intercept and Resend
• Eve reads photons sent to Bob in orthogonal
or diagonal.
• Resends photon in same state she read.
• 25% error rate found between Alice and Bob:
50% chance of right angles, if wrong, 50%
chance that Bob reads it right anyways.
• Pd=1-(3/4)n where n is number of bits.
• In order for Pd=0.999999999, n≥72.
 Man in the Middle
• When there is no authentication, quantum
systems cannot tell friend or foe any better
than classical systems.
• If Alice and Bob have no shared secret, they
cannot make a secure line.
 Photon number splitting
• Only works on BB84.
• Photons sent via laser pulses.
• Laser pulses are .2 photons, actual numbers
follow Poisson.
• Many 0s, some 1s, some 2+ photon pulses.
• Eve reads off singles of the 2+ photon pulses.
 Hacking
• Equipment tampered with to not generate
actual random numbers.
• Trojan Horse: shine light on Alice’s emitter to
find her state.
• Faked State
• Phase remapping
• Time Shift
 Denial of Service
• Without any lines of communication, no key
can be made.
• Not a security issue so much as a
communication issue.
 Overall value of QKD
• Worthwhile for instantaneous generation of
key over a distance.
• Otherwise, one-use keys just as secure.
• QKD currently feasible up to 148km in fiber-
optic.
• Could be used to generate keys between
servers.
• Still subject to brute-force hacking.