The nexus between displacement and

radicalization in Eastern Mindanao:

association, causality, and effects

International Alert Philippines:

20 August 2019, Butuan, AN
 Background and objectives
Background
• Increase in conflict-induced
forced displacement and the view
that the trigger is rebellion-related
conflict
• Empirical evidence that displaced
peoples join rebel movements,
and the thesis that displacement
led to radicalization, and
ultimately to recruitment.
• Claims by the security forces that
CARAGA and Southern Mindanao
are key areas of the communist
insurgency.
Objectives
• One, the study should deepen
understanding of the links between
violence, displacement, and
radicalization in the Eastern
Mindanao region.
• Two, the study should identity ways
to prevent conflict and displacement
from being used by armed groups to
recruit vulnerable sectors
• Three, the study should influence
the development and peace building
strategies of local government units
and development agencies at
various levels.
Internal displacement defined (UNHCR, WB)

• UNHCR defines the internally displaced as "persons or groups of

persons who have been forced to flee, or leave, their homes or
places of habitual residence as a result of armed conflict, internal
strife, and habitual violations of human rights, as well as natural or
man-made disasters involving one or more of these elements, and
who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border".

• The World Bank (2015) defines the internally displaced as “persons

who leave or flee their homes due to conflict, violence, persecution
and human rights violations.”

• Globally, there are now almost 20 million refugees, and millions of

internally displaced persons – and most are hosted in developing
countries. Without a clear end in sight of the conflicts that are the
main drivers of displacement, this crisis is expected to worsen.
Displacement is also protracted, spanning years in many cases. Only
126,800 refugees were able to return to their home countries in 2014 –
the lowest number in 31 years.
Radicalization defined (UNDP)

• Radicalization is a process marked by a departure from generally

accepted social norms and values; the objective of those using
radicalization as a tool is to pressure others to subscribe to the same
worldview. The methods used to convert others to the same worldview may
take a coercive form, including outright violence.

• Radicalization is a phenomenon characterized by aggressive and

exclusive imposition of one’s identity on others, consequently
constraining or denying space for the expression of other identities.
The uncompromising imposition of one belief system onto another through
violent means characterizes processes of radicalization that lead to violent
extremism. This form of absolutism requires compliance (with no exception).

• Radicalization can manifest itself in the form of physical violence, in

systems (including laws, regulations, etc.) and the broader denial of
rights. It is largely context-specific and, therefore, subject to local driving
factors which contributes to the challenge of establishing a common definition
Review of the literature (1)
Association between displacement and radicalization

• “The risk of radicalization is especially heightened where IDPs and

refugees find themselves in protracted situations: marginalized,
disenfranchised, and excluded.”
• “Finding solutions for displaced populations should be an urgent
priority for humanitarian reasons but also as a security issue.”
(Koser 2015)
Review of literature (2)
Diverse factors with displacement as only one factor

• “Targeted violence on civilians may seek to offset or undermine the

government’s primary role of protection, making it imperative to rely
on rebels for security in areas controlled by them.” (Ozerdem and
Podder 2012)

• There are pull and push factors for radicalization and recruitment:
 Push factors include: (a) poverty rather than religion; (b) bravery; (c)
intra-factional struggles and revenge; (d) displacement and familial
separation; (e) having a family member among the rebels.
 Pull factors include: (a) the power and authority that comes with holding
a gun; (b) truncated learning trajectories of youth; and (c) national,
subnational, and/or Islamist narratives.
Review of literature (3)
Initial endowments and the greed and grievance dynamic

• “Initial endowments matter in terms of displacement and

recruitment. Areas with rich resources promote forced displacement
and coercive recruitment.” Meanwhile, movements that emerge in
resource-poor contexts perpetrate far fewer abuses and employ violence
selectively and strategically. (Weinstein, 2007)

• The ‘greed’ thesis is an application of rent-seeking theory, which, in

its simple form, posits that the existence of a valuable ‘prize’
induces individuals to spend time and resources to appropriate the
‘prize’. Mineral resource rents (such as from oil), in this model, provide
both the motivation to try to capture the state and, potentially, the means
to finance rebellions.

• The idea that rebels can ‘do well out of war’ was proposed as a more
convincing explanation of the onset of conflict than sociopolitical
grievances, income and asset inequality, ethnic rivalry or the absence of
democracy (Collier, 2000).
Review of literature (4)
Radicalization utilizes displacement as a strategy of war

• The UNHCR has stated that “refugee movements are no longer the
side effects of conflict, but in many cases are central to the
objectives and tactics of war.” (Newman 2014)

• “Insecurity arising from extremism has led to the highest levels of

population displacement - both IDPs and refugees since the Second
World War; a large proportion of that displacement is taking place in
Africa, with over 1.5 million displaced in Nigeria, over 1 million in
Somalia, half a million in CAR and 600,000 across the Sahel.” (UNDP
2015)
Research question

Why are the displaced more vulnerable to

radicalization?

Independent (explanatory) variable is DISPLACEMENT

Dependent variable is RADICALIZATION
Recruitment is treated as a proxy for radicalization
Displacement shapes and is shaped by radicalization
Hypothesis about radicalization

• Lack of security and protection from the State. The Philippine Human
Development Network (2005) argue that security must now be
understood not in terms of abstract geopolitical or regime goals, but in
how safe and free ordinary people feel in their daily lives and in their
communities.
• Displacement and recruitment is the product of discrimination and
persecution. Radicalization can be caused by the systematic
discrimination of a group, and their legal and political persecution in their
homeland.
• The resurgence of horizontal conflict and proxy wars and the
utilization of ethnic cleavages polarize and radicalize communities.
Soeter (2005) and Wippler (1978) propose that more violence is used
between peers than between a superior and a subordinate group or party.
• Radicalization as the consequence of inequalities and exclusion of
certain groups in the domestic and international governance of
displacement and aid.
Methodologies

• Interdisciplinary literature review and secondary research will provide the

base conflict/context analysis materials and analysis related to violence in
various forms, including radicalization.
• Use of descriptive statistics and tests of association and regression.
• In-depth interviews of key respondents and the documentation of random
interviews at the community level by the research team, including the
conduct of focus group discussions
• Field visits and community consultations are a means to generate
community-level explanations
• Use of mapping techniques and map overlays
• Use of case studies. The study shall compare-and-contrast specific actors
and communities using a with-or-without case study to accompany the
quantitative and qualitative analysis
• Work in progress meetings.
Research sites
• The research covered the dynamics of displacement and radicalization in
the CARAGA region, using a sample of cities and municipalities. Two
sites were purposively chosen for the extreme cases study.

Provinces Cities and municipalities

Agusan delNorte Carmen

Butuan City
Agusan del Sur Prosperidad
Bayugan City
Surigao delNorte Gigaquit

Surigao del Sur Tandag City

EXTREME CASES Lianga and Lanuza (SS)

Causes and incidents
Divergent reports
Causes of conflict incidents, by province, CARAGA, 2011-2015 (PNP)

Common Crimes Identity Issues Shadow Economy Issues Governance Issues Resource Issues Political Issues

Agusan del Norte

Surigao del Norte

Surigao del Sur

Dinagat Islands

Agusan del Sur

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900

Causes of conflict incidents, by province, CARAGA, 2011-2015 (AFP)

Rebellion Resource Issues Identity Issues Governance Issues Shadow Economy Issues Common Crimes

Agusan del Sur

Surigao del Sur

Agusan del Norte

Surigao del Norte

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

 Causes of conflict (identity vs rebellion)
Divergent reports

Number of conflict incidents by causes, Number of conflict incidents by causes,

CARAGA, CARAGA,
2011-15 (AFP) 2011-2015 (PNP)
Rebellion Resource Issues Identity Issues

90

80

70 200
Rebellion Resource Issues Identity Issues

60

50

40
100
30

20

10

0 0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Highlights of the results (1)

• The PNP report of Surigao Sur shows that the main cause of conflict is
common crimes, followed by identity issues. Meanwhile, the AFP
report shows that the main cause is rebellion, followed by resource
issues.
• When connected to effects on displacement, a disconnect emerges
between causes and costs. There are more incidents caused by rebellion
and/or common crimes, but their displacement effects are less than those
conflicts caused by identity.

The empirical evidence clearly points to identity-based conflict as the

nexus between displacement and radicalization. In short, ethnicity or
ethnic identity trumps ideology or political identity as a predictor of
displacement.

Identity-based conflict induces displacement more than rebellion-

related violence.
Highlights of the results (2)

• Displacement is essentially an avoidance strategy.

• Displacement is also an insurgent strategy (taktikang bakwet).

INTERVIEW:
We had to leave after the military established a camp in our
community and we knew that it can attacked by the NPA and then we
would be accused of supporting the guerrillas.

INTERVIEW:
“We were trained in conducting evacuations even before our
communities became a hotbed, we know what to do, what to say, what
not to say, where to go, where not to go, whom to get assistance from,
whose assistance we should refuse, who to speak to, and whom not to
speak to.”
Highlights of the results (3)

• Displacement is shaped by previous conflicts and wars. Hence, it is easy

for identity to be weaponized by forces on both sides of the conflict divide.

• Ethnic polarization is more important than fragmentation (heterogeneity),

and can often become triggers of violent proxy wars. Ethnic polarization
shapes and is shaped by radicalization.

The extreme case studies of Lianga and Lanuza suggest that

demographic differences in population and language composition
makes Lanuza more fragmented than Lianga yet less vulnerable to
tribal/ ethnic conflicts.
Highlights of the results (4)

• Initial endowments such as natural resources also influences

displacement (resource curse). Endowments include companies that can
be the source of forced payments.
• The effects of mineral wealth including potentials for fossil fuel extraction
(coal) in CARAGA as a source of rents is undisputed. Displacement
occurs as a strategy for resource-capture.
INTERVIEW:
“They say it is voluntary, but then a fixed price is announced depending on the
size of your business and those who refuse to pay are singled out and labelled
as non-supporters of the rebels.”

The extreme cases study of Lianga and Lanuza has turned up some interesting
empirical evidence about how the differential impact of access to ancestral lands
may predict onset of identity-based conflict. Indigenous peoples groups in
Lanuza have been able to secure CADTs in their areas while IP groups in Lianga
have not.
Highlights of the results (5)

• Radicalization and recruitment is not path dependent . It does not

rely solely, or even principally, on displacement. Displacement
becomes a push factor only in connection to other variables.

 conditions in evacuation areas, duration of displacement,

government presence and support or the lack of it.
 opportunity sets in evacuation areas (employment in security-
related activities, other recruitment incentives )

INTERVIEW:
“Financial support, provision of employment, “big-brother” mentoring and
the constant monitoring of the needs of those who have left the rebel
ranks is discontinued when a new government comes to power. Some of
the former rebels I helped have been harnessed by kidnap-for-ransom and
hit squads.”
Highlights of the results (6)

• Recruitment does not require adherence to an ideology.

• Radicalization may result from: (a) kinship relations and peer
pressure, (b) the desire to get an education (youth bulge and the lack of
education in displacement areas, setting up of “lumad or salugpungan”
schools, (c) revenge and retaliation, and (d) feelings of exclusion and
discrimination

INTERVIEW:
“Most of the recruits were too young to be politically or ideologically aware,
since most recruits nowadays are below the age of 18. In these cases, it was
mainly their kinship ties and the presence of elder authority figures that
induced them to join the NPA.”

INTERVIEW
“I am the product of labour organizing in a logging company, I was angry
because of the discrimination we faced and the violation of our rights because
we were considered below the stature of a Bisaya. This anger led me to the
NPA.”
Highlights of the results (7)

• Recruitment often precedes radicalization. Respondents report

that radicalization happens after recruitment through the conduct
of education and training sessions—this is the case on both sides.
• Recruitment is not unidirectional. The military and rebels
recruit, but also criminal gangs.

INTERVIEW
“Displacement is not unidirectional—some of the victims who
got displaced avoided violence from both sides, yet some were
displaced to areas closer to the NPA, and still others got
displaced to areas closer to the ARMY and CAFGU camps.”
Highlights of the results (8)
Gender-displacement-radicalization

• Both the rebels and the military are gender blind: “we suffer the
most, and those who engineer displacements are either gender-
blind or are not bothered by the multiple burdens that women face
in camps.”
• Women less prone to radicalization and recruitment, as they often
carry the multiple burdens in camps.
• Masculinity issues in the camps are highly pronounced and can
intensify gender-based violence, but there is no evidence of
triggering radicalization. Some cases of abandonment and suicide
have been reported.
• Most cases of identity-based violence happen in urban areas
where gender-based violence is at a high 90 percent. Further
study is needed to assess the links between gender violence and
radicalization.
Highlights of the results (9)
Causal linkages

• Five (5) causal linkages emerge from the study as empirical and plausible
explanations of the links between conflict and displacement, and between
displacement and radicalization. The current narrative suggests that the
stepwise process is Rebellion ► Displacement ► Radicalization
• However, several nuances accompany the causal linkage above:
Rebellion-related conflict ►Ethnic polarization ►tribal and
clan (identity) conflicts ► displacement
Radicalization ► Polarization ► Rebellion-related Conflict ►
Displacement (to provoke or to capture communities as a
strategy of war)
Displacement ►Discrimination ► Radicalization
Economic endowments ► Resource capture ► Displacement
► Radicalization (resource-curse thesis)
Displacement ►Criminal violence ► Recruitment/
radicalization
Identity is at the nexus between conflict,
displacement and radicalization

CONFLICT

IDENTITY
Conclusions

• Research question:
 Why are the displaced more vulnerable to radicalization?
 Because displacement arises mainly from identity-based conflict, not
displacement per se, that provides fertile ground for polarization and
eventual radicalization.
 We cannot distinguish a robust linear connection between conflict-
displacement-radicalization. Instead conflict has to induce polarization
for radicalization to occur.
 Ethnic polarization is the avenue that leads to radicalization and
recruitment, and is also the reason why insurgent activity is often in
the form of revenge killings and retaliation.
 Ethnic fragmentation can also lead to corruption and exclusion that
triggers polarization, but it can also strengthen diversity and social
cohesion.
Conclusions

• Initial endowments in an area certainly affects the nature of conflict

and recruitment incentives. Endowments include demographic
features, natural resources, and other economic attributes.
• Most cases of displacement are multi-causal in nature, so it is
unwise to treat the causes as discrete variables. In many cases the
causes of displacement are interrelated with each other.
• Economic benefits and other social support to displaced and/or
radicalized communities are often highly-politicized, poorly planned,
and short-lived. Changes in political regimes often lead to the
termination of subsidies and other support. Many victims are left behind.
• EO 70 ands the so-called WON approach has changed the dynamics
of conflict, displacement and radicalization, yet few initiatives are
being undertaken to monitor its effects. LGUs have become more reactive
than pro-active.
• The monitoring and study of conflict types and dynamics are not
being undertaken especially at the local/ provincial level. There is a
tendency to treat CARAGA as just another insurgency affected region.
Implications and ways forward
• Preventing polarization is critical and responding to internal
displacement remains crucial. However, interventions should go
beyond purely humanitarian approaches and incorporate insider
mediation and the introduction of restorative justice measures that march
in step with other change projects.
• Addressing identity-based inequalities is as important as poverty
alleviation strategies.(Anti-discrimination initiatives, preventing exclusion
and labelling)
• Multi-causal violence produces parallel conflict strings that need to be
addressed. If causes are indiscrete, then the monitoring of conflict strings
is critical. (Multi-stakeholder, integrated, and coordinated responses)
• Development of targeted relief programs that reduce the multiple
burdens faced by women in displacement areas is critical. Change
projects should challenge masculine stereotypes.
• Education is a clear priority. This should be targeted in areas with a
youth bulge and at the secondary level.
Implications and ways forward
• The identification and prioritization of communities due to ethnic
polarization, initial endowments, and resource lack or abundance is
good practice. New baselines must be identified that focus on identity
issues (demographic factors, fragmentation vs polarization; access and
redistribution of land and other resources, etc.), and should lead to the
development of “conflict-resilient communities” or CRCs.
• Coherence, consistency, and sustainability of key government
programs that provide attention and support to the displaced should be
guaranteed. The same coherence, consistency, and sustainability we
witnessed in the delivery of CCT schemes can be a source of learning.
• Ongoing shifts in the orientation, programs, and projects of key
organizations such as OPAPP or NCIP will require “tactical side-
steps” and the strengthening of ties with local governments at
various levels. A multi-stakeholder summit at the provincial level to
address the so-called WON approach and EO 70 must be held as soon
as possible.
Implications and ways forward
• New dialogue processes such as “trialogues” that “harness insider
mediators” should be prioritized in capacity building, including the
conduct of multi-stakeholder processes focused on “problem-solving” and
the reconstruction of solidarity through restorative justice.
• Demand-driven rather than supply-driven interventions should be
expanded. Funds set aside for both individual and collective change
projects targeting youth and women must be given consideration.
• Continuing and expanding the use of violence data and the analysis
of conflict dynamics that was used in this study must be considered.
Thank you for your presence and
participation

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