COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

IN GENERAL

Group 4:
Joyce Ann M. Villaruel
Joseph Manuel C.Manahan
Winston A. Pingoy
Question and Answer
1. What is Collective Bargaining?

It is a process where the parties agree to fix and administer terms and
conditions of employment which must not be below the minimum standards
fixed by law, and set a mechanism for resolving their grievances.
2.What is Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)?

It is a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the

exclusive bargaining representative of the employees incorporating the
agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work
and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for
adjusting any grievances or questions under such agreement.

3.Is the ratification of the CBA by the majority of all the workers in the
bargaining unit mandatory?

Yes. The agreement negotiated by the employees’ bargaining agent should

be ratified or approved by the majority of all the workers in the bargaining
unit.

4.Is there any exception to the requirement of mandatory ratification by the

majority of all the workers in the bargaining unit?

Yes. Ratification of the CBA by the employees in the bargaining unit is not
needed when the CBA is a product of an arbitral award by appropriate
government authority or by a voluntary arbitrator.
5.What constitutes CBA registration?

It is a process of determining whether the application for registration of

a Collective Bargaining Agreement complies with the Rules on CBA
registration specifically Rule XVII of the Department Order No. 40-03 or
the Rules amending the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor
Code of the Philippines.

6.What is the effect of the CBA registration?

The registration of the CBA will bar a certification election except within
the last sixty days (freedom period) before the expiration of the five-
year CBA.

7.What is the lifetime of a CBA?

With respect to representation aspect, the CBA lasts for 5 years.

However, not later than 3 years after the execution of the CBA, the
economic provisions shall be renegotiated.
8.What is the freedom period?

It refers to the last sixty days immediately preceding the

expiration of the five-year CBA. A petition for certification election
may be filed during the freedom period.

9.Where to file the application for CBA registration?

The application for CBA registration shall be filed at the Regional

Office that issued the certificate of registration or certificate of
creation of chartered local of the labor union-party to the
agreement.

10.When to file the application for CBA registration?

The application for registration of the CBA shall be filed within

thirty (30) days from the execution of such CBA.
11.What are the requirements for CBA registration?

The following are the requirements for CBA registration (original

and two (2) duplicate copies which must be certified under oath
by the representative of the employer and labor union
concerned):

a) The Collective Bargaining Agreement;

b) A statement that the Collective Bargaining Agreement was

posted in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the
establishment concerned for at least five (5) days before its
ratification; and

c) A statement that the Collective Bargaining Agreement was

ratified by the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit of
the employer concerned.
12.Is registration fee required?

Yes. The certificate of CBA registration shall be issued by the

DOLE Regional Office only upon payment of the prescribed
registration fee.

13.How long will it take to process the CBA registration?

The application for CBA registration shall be processed within

one day from receipt thereof.

14.What is the ground for denial of the CBA registration?

Failure of the applicant to complete the requirements for CBA

registration but such denial is without prejudice for the filing of
another application for registration.
NON-ECONOMIC
PROVISIONS OF
COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS IN
2016
TYPES OF NON-ECONOMIC CLAUSES OF
CBA’s IN 2016
•Union Security
•Job Security
•Union Privileges
•Health and Safety Programs
•Leave Benefits
•Productivity Enhancement Programs
 TABLE 1 - Number and Percent Share
Union Security Clause of CBAs by Type of Union Security
Clause, Philippines: 2016
• The most stipulated clause in CBA’s.
• Check-offs deductions of union dues
from a worker’s pay check or salary for
funding union-related activities.
• Contains management right or
prerogative.
• Maintenance of union membership.
• Rights of worker to self-organization
and collective bargaining.
Job Security Clause TABLE 2 - Number and Percent Share of
CBAs by Type of Job Security Clause,
Philippines: 2016
• The assurance of employees on the
continuity of gainful employment
during his/her working life.
• Tenure of employment in terms of
just dismissal and lay-offs.
• Non-discriminatory filling-up of
vacancies through promotion of
existing employees.
• Rehire dismissed employees
through union referral.
Union Privileges Clause
• Using company’s bulletin boards
for posting of union-related
notices or announcements.
• Use of union office.
• Reproduction of CBA booklets.
• Granting assistance through the
provision of mobilization fund.
Health and Safety Programs Clause
• Conduct family
program/services.
• Recreational
activities/facilities.
• Use of health and
safety equipment.
• Drug- Free
Workshop
 TABLE 3 - Number and Percent Share of
Leave Benefits Clause CBAs by Type of Leave Benefit Provided,
Philippines: 2016

• Provisions concerning
vacation leave, sick
leave, emergency
leave.
• Union leaves to
employees
participating in union-
related activities.
Productivity Enhancement Programs Clause
• Labor-management
committees
productivity/quality
councils.
• Job enrichment.
• Industrial Peace Council.
• Reduction of monotony at
work.
• Merit Increase.
Economic Pr o vis io n s of Co lle ct ive Ba rg a in in g
Ag re e m e n t

Monetary value of wage increases

loan benefits
Bonuses
Allowances
retirement plan
other fringe benefits
With wage provision as one the most discussed concerns during
collective bargaining negotiations, several CBAs during the period
stipulated different economic provisions in their agreements which
mostly focused in the granting of various wage increases to workers.
CASE # 1
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 168569 October 5, 2007

SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTWGO, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The present petition for review on certiorari raises the issue of whether respondent’s complaint is one for unfair labor practice
(ULP) over which a Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.

At the time material to the case, respondent, San Miguel Corporation Employees Union – PTWGO (the Union), was the sole
bargaining agent of all the monthly paid employees of petitioner San Miguel Foods, Incorporated (SMFI). On November 9, 1992,
some employees of SMFI’s Finance Department, through the Union represented by Edgar Moraleda, brought a grievance against
Finance Manager Gideon Montesa (Montesa), for "discrimination, favoritism, unfair labor practices, not flexible [sic], harassment,
promoting divisiveness and sectarianism, etc.,"1 before SMFI Plant Operations Manager George Nava in accordance with Step 1 of
the grievance machinery adopted in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) forged by SMFI and the Union.

The Union sought the "1. review, evaluat[ion] & upgrad[ing of] all Finance staff and 2. promot[ion of] G.Q. Montesa to other SMC
affiliate[s] & subsidiaries."2
The "work management review" was not completed by March 1993, however, prompting the Union to, on March 26, 1993,
elevate the grievance to Step 2.3

Almost nine months after the grievance meeting was held or on October 6, 1993, SMFI rendered a "Decision on Step 1 Grievance"
stating that it was still in the process of completing the "work management review,"4 hence, the Union’s requests could not be
granted.

The Union thereupon filed a complaint on October 20, 1993 before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Arbitration
Branch, against SMFI,5 its President Amadeo P. Veloso, and its Finance Manager Montesa for "unfair labor practice, [and] unjust
discrimination in matters of promotion . . . "6 It prayed that SMFI et al. be ordered to promote the therein named employees
"with the corresponding pay increases or adjustment including payment of salary differentials plus attorney’s fees[,] and to cease
and desist from committing the same unjust discrimination in matters of promotion."7

Instead of filing a position paper as required by the Labor Arbiter, SMFI et al. filed a motion to dismiss,8 contending that the issues
raised in the complaint were grievance issues and, therefore, "should be resolved in the grievance machinery provided in [the]
collective bargaining agreements [sic] of the parties or in the mandated provision of voluntary arbitration which is also provided in
the CBA."9 The Union opposed the motion to dismiss.

In its Position Paper, the Union specified acts of ULP of SMFI et al. under Article 248, paragraphs (e) and (i) of the Labor Code10
which Article reads:

Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor
practices:

xxxx

(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization. x x x

xxxx
By Order of February 18, 1994, the Labor Arbiter granted SMFI et al.’s motion to dismiss and ordered the remand of the
case to the grievance machinery for completion of the proceedings.11 The Union appealed the said order to the NLRC
by "Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal"12 which its Second Division granted and accordingly ordered the Labor Arbiter
to continue the proceedings on the Union’s complaint.13 SMFI et al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC
order but it was denied, hence, they filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. After the parties and the Solicitor
General had filed their respective pleadings, this Court, by Resolution of January 25, 1999, referred the case to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.14

By Decision of July 31, 2002,15 the Court of Appeals denied SMFI et al.’s petition for certiorari, it holding that the Labor
Arbiter has jurisdiction over the complaint of the Union, they having violated the seniority rule under the CBA by
appointing and promoting certain employees which amounted to a ULP.16

Before this Court, SMFI lodged the present petition for review on certiorari, faulting the appellate court in

A.

. . . FINDING THAT THE LABOR ARBITER HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT UNION

B.

. . . FINDING THAT SMFI’S ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE CBA CONSTITUTES UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.

The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters, enumerated in Article 217 of the Labor Code, includes complaints for ULP.

SMFI argues that the allegations in the Union’s complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter do not establish a cause of
action for ULP, the Union having merely contended that SMFI was guilty thereof without specifying the ultimate facts
upon which it was based. It cites Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court as applying suppletorily to the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter, which Section reads:
Section 1. In general. – Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim . . .

Alleging that the Union failed to comply with this Rule, SMFI concludes that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over
its complaint.

A perusal of the complaint shows that, indeed, the particular acts of ULP alleged to have been committed by SMFI were
not specified; neither were the ultimate facts in support thereof. In its Position Paper, however, the Union detailed the
particular acts of ULP attributed to SMFI and the ultimate facts in support thereof.

Section 7, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides:

Nature of Proceedings. – The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the
requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law shall
not strictly apply thereto. The Labor Arbiter may avail himself of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the
controversy speedily, including ocular inspection and examination of well-informed persons. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court should thus not be strictly applied to a case filed before a Labor Arbiter. In
determining jurisdiction over a case, allegations made in the complaint, as well as those in the position paper, may thus
be considered.

As stated above, the Union, in its Position Paper, mentioned the particular acts of ULP and the ultimate facts in support
thereof. Thus it alleged:

This is a complaint for unfair labor practices pursuant to Article 248 (e) and (i) of the Labor Code, as amended, which
reads:
Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:

xxxx

(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.

xxxx

(i) to violate a collective bargaining agreement.

and which was committed by herein respondents as follows:

1. large scale and wanton unjust discrimination in matters of promotion, particularly upon the following members of complainant: Ellen
Ventura, Julie Geronimo, Ronnie Cruz, Rita Calasin, Romy de Peralta, Malou Alano, And E. M. Moraleda, all assigned with the Finance
Department or respondent SMFI.

2. gross and blatant violations by respondent SMFI of Section 5, Article III (Job Security) and Section 4, Article VIII (Grievance Machinery) of
the current collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between complainant and respondent SMFI, which provisions of said CBA are hereunder
quoted for easy reference. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On the questioned promotions, the Union did not allege that they were done to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization.
In fact, those promoted were members of the complaining Union. The promotions do not thus amount to ULP under Article 248(e) of the
Labor Code.
As for the alleged ULP committed under Article 248(i), for violation of a CBA, this
Article is qualified by Article 261 of the Labor Code, the pertinent portion of which
latter Article reads:

x x x violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in

character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as
grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article,
gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or
malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Silva v. NLRC instructs that for a

ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC to exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, the allegations in the complaint should show prima facie the concurrence
of two things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; AND (2) the violation pertains to
the economic provisions of the CBA.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As reflected in the above-quoted allegations of the Union in its Position Paper, the
Union charges SMFI to have violated the grievance machinery provision in the CBA.
The grievance machinery provision in the CBA is not an economic provision, however,
hence, the second requirement for a Labor Arbiter to exercise jurisdiction of a ULP is
not present.
The Union likewise charges SMFI, however, to have violated the Job Security provision in the CBA, specifically the
seniority rule, in that SMFI "appointed less senior employees to positions at its Finance Department, consequently
intentionally by-passing more senior employees who are deserving of said appointment."

Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this
Code, including implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." Since the seniority rule in the
promotion of employees has a bearing on salary and benefits, it may, following a liberal construction of Article 261 of
the Labor Code, be considered an "economic provision" of the CBA.

As above-stated, the Union charges SMFI to have promoted less senior employees, thus bypassing others who were
more senior and equally or more qualified. It may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or flagrant
violation of the seniority rule under the CBA, a ULP over which the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.

SMFI, at all events, questions why the Court of Appeals came out with a finding that it (SMFI) disregarded the seniority
rule under the CBA when its petition before said court merely raised a question of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
having affirmed the NLRC decision finding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the Union’s complaint and thus
remanding it to the Labor Arbiter for continuation of proceedings thereon, the appellate court’s said finding may be
taken to have been made only for the purpose of determining jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Case study # 2
COMPROMISE
AGREEMENTS AND
CBAs
 SMI FISH INDUSTRIES, INC., Amado c.
Santero, jr., Virgilio Rodaje and Armando
Estrellado, Petitioners,
VS.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, labor arbiter Fructuoso t.
Aurellano, Jesus de la Trinidad, Gertrudes
Arroyo, Avelina Bendaña, Jesus Azares and
Dolores Parro, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 96952-56. September 2, 1992
 THE
FACTS:
• The alleged compromise
agreement,
dated January 15, 1987
By Respondents
• On March 30, 1987, private respondents filed separate but
identical complaints for unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal, illegal suspension, illegal lay-off, under payment,
non-payment of overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and
rest days, night-shift differential, 13th month pay, (ECOLA),
service incentive leave pay, and damages.
THE FACTS: By Petitioners
continue…
• Petitioners denied all the foregoing charges and claims. After
hearing and submission by the parties of their respective
position papers.
• On December 22, 1988, petitioners appealed the aforestated
joint decision to the NLRC, disputing the findings of the labor
arbiter that they violated the security of tenure of private
respondents.
THE FACTS: By Petitioners
continue…
Petitioners have come raising the following arguments:
1. The labor arbiter and the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when they failed to consider and
thus set aside the compromise agreement; and
2. The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the individual private
respondents despite their acceptance of the decision of the labor
arbiter ordering payment of separation pay with backwages, including
ECOLA, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay, equivalent to
three (3) years, without loss of privileges, seniority rights and other
benefits
Ruling:
• Dated January 15, 1987, has
only • As duly found by the labor arbiter, the
The effect of putting an end to compromise agreement was signed by
those previous cases but will only three (3) of the herein five (5)
respondents, namely, Jesus de la
not and cannot bar the
Trinidad. Gertrudes Arroyo and
signatories therein from filing Dolores Parro, while they were still in
complaints against petitioners the employ of petitioner company.
for subsequent or future Private respondents Avelina Bendaña
violations of the Labor Code. and Jesus Azares were not signatories
thereto, hence, they cannot be bound
by that amicable settlement or
compromise agreement.
Ruling: continue…
• Failure to Appeal by Respondents,
Since private respondents did not appeal from the decision of
the labor arbiter, they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication therein.
Appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from
the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those
granted in the decision of the court.
The appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision
on other grounds, but not for the purpose of modifying the
judgment in the appellee’s favor and giving him other
affirmative reliefs
THE DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission, dated August 27, 1990 and
December 21, 1990, are SET ASIDE and the joint decision of Labor
Arbiter dated October 28, 1988, which instead of reinstating
private respondents awarded them separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month’s salary for every year of service and full backwages
in the total amount of P153,476.23, is hereby REINSTATED. This
judgment is immediately executory.
CASE # 3
G.R. No. 124224 March 17, 2000

NEW PACIFIC TIMBER & SUPPLYCOMPANY, CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONALLABORRELATIONSCOMMISSION, MUSIB M. BUAT,LEONG.
GONZAGA, JR., ETAL., NATIONALFEDERATION OF LABOR, MARIANOAKILIT
and 350 OTHERS,respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Issues:
May the term of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) as to its
economic provisions be extended beyond the term expressly stipulated
therein, and, in the absence of a new CBA, even beyond the three-year
period provided by law?
Are employees hired after the stipulated term of a CBAentitled to the
benefits provided?
The antecedents facts, as found by the NLRC,are as follows:

The National Federation of Labor (NFL) was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative
of all the regular rank-and-file employees of New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. (NPTSC) NFLstarted to
negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment for the employees in the bargaining unit
which it represented. However, the same was allegedly met with stiff resistance by petitioner Company,
so that the former was prompted to file a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) against the latter on
the ground of refusal to bargain collectively.

March 31, 1987 - Executive Labor Arbiter Hakim S. Abdulwahid issued an order declaring (a) petitioner
Company guilty of ULP; and (b) the CBAproposals submitted by the NFLas the CBA between the regular
rank-and-file employees in the bargaining unit and petitioner Company.

November 15, 1989 - NLRC rendered a decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. A motion for
reconsideration thereof was, likewise, denied in a Resolution, dated November 12, 1990.

Unsatisfied, petitioner Company filed a petition for certiorari. But the Court dismissed said petition in a
Resolution, dated January 21,1991.

Thereafter, the records of the case were remanded to the arbitration branch of origin of the execution
of Labor Arbiter Abdulwahid's Order, dated March 31, 1987, granting monetary benefits consisting of
wage increases, housing allowances, bonuses, etc. to the regular rank-and-file employees.
October 18, 1993 - Labor Arbiter Reynaldo S. Villena issued an Order directing petitioner Company to pay
the 142 employees entitled to the aforesaid benefits the respective amounts due them under the CBA.
Petitioner Company complied; and the corresponding quitclaims were executed. The case was
considered closed following NFL's manifestation that it will no longer appeal the October 18, 1993 Order
of Labor Arbiter Villena.

May 12, 1994 - a "Petition for Relief" was filed in behalf of 186 of the private respondents "Mariano J.
Akilit and 350 others". In their petition, they claimed that they were wrongfully excluded from enjoying
the benefits under the CBA since the agreement with NFL and petitioner Company limited the CBA's
implementation to only the 142 rank-and-file employees enumerated. They claimed that NFL's
misrepresentations had precluded them from appealing their exclusion.

August 4, 1994 – the said commission issued a resolution declaring that the 186 excluded employees
"form part and parcel of the then existing rank-and-file bargaining unit" and were, therefore, entitled to
the benefits under the CBA.The NLRCheld, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the Order of the Labor arbiter dated October 18, 1993 is
hereby. Set Aside and Vacated. In lieu hereof, a new Order is hereby issued directing respondent New
Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. to pay all its regular rank-and-file workers their wage differentials and
other benefits arising from the decreed CBAas explained above, within ten (10) days from receipt of this
order.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Company filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution.

Meanwhile, four separate groups of the private respondents, including the original 186 who had filed the
"Petition for Relief" filed individual money claims, docketed as NLRC Cases Nos. M-001991-94 to M-
001994-94, before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, Cagayan de Oro City. However, Labor Arbiter
Villena dismissed these cases in Orders, dated March 11, 1994; April 13, 1994; March 9, 1994; and, May
10, 1994. The employees appealed the respective dismissals of their complainants to the NLRC. The
latter consolidated these appeals with the aforementioned motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Company.

February 29, 1996, the NLRCissued a resolution, the dispositive portions of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for reconsideration of respondent is DENIED for lack of merit and the
Resolution of the Commission dated August 4, 1994 Sustained. The separate orders of the Labor Arbiter
dated March 11, 1994, April 13, 1994, March 9, 1994 and May 10, 1994, respectively, in NLRC Cases Nos.
M-001991-94 to M-001994-94 are Set Aside and Vacated for lack of legalbases.

Conformably, respondent New Pacific Timber and Supply Co., Inc., is hereby directed to pay individual
complainants their CBAbenefits in the aggregate amount of P13,559,510 plus ten (10%) percent thereof
as Attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED
The petitioner Company raises the followingissues:
I. The public respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the “Petition for
Relief” to prosper.
II. The public respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that private respondents
Mariano Akilit and 350 others are entitled to benefits under the CBA in spite of the fact that they
were not employed by the Petitioner much less they were members of the bargaining unit during
the term of the CBA.
III. The public respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in making factual findings without
basis.
IV. The dispositive portions of the assailed resolutions are defective and/or reveal the grave abuse of
discretion committed by public respondent.

- Petitioners argues that the private respondents are not entitled to the benefits under the CBA
because the employees hired after the term of CBA
- The provision on wage increase in the 1981 to 1984 CBA between petitioner Company and NFL
provided for yearly wage increases. Logically, these provisions ended in the years 1984 — the last
year that the economic provisions of the CBA were, to contract and law, effective. Petitioner claims
that there is no contractual basis for the grant of CBA benefits such as wage increases in 1985 and
subsequent years, since the CBAstipulated only the increases for the years 1981 to 1984.
- Moreover, petitioner alleges that it was through no fault of theirs that no new CBA was entered
pending appeal of thedecision in NLRCCase No. RAB-IX-0334-82.
The Supreme Court allowed appeals from decisions of the labor arbiter to the NLRC, even if filed
beyond the reglementary period, in the interest of justice. Under Article 218 (c) of the Labor Code,
the NLRC may, in the exercise of its appellate powers, "correct, amend or waive any error, defect or
irregularity whether in the substance or in form." Further, Article 221 of the same provides that "In
any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that
the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiter shall use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure, all in the interest of due process.

Anent the issue of whether or not the term of an existing CB, particularly as to its economic
provisions, can be extended beyond the period stipulated therein, and even beyond the three- year
period prescribed by law, in the absence of a new agreement, Article 253 of the Labor Code explicitly
provides:

Art. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. — When
there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that
neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party
can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its
expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full
force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60- day period and/or
until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
Having established that the CBA between petitioner Company and NFL remained in full force and effect
even beyond the stipulated term, in the absence of a new agreement; and, therefore, that the economic
provisions such as wage increases continued to have legal effect, we are now faced with the question of
who are entitled to the benefits provided thereunder.

The Court held that when a collective bargaining contract is entered into by the union representing the
employees and the employer, even the non-member employees are entitled to the benefits of the
contract. To accord its benefits only to members of the union without any valid reason would constitute
undue discrimination against nonmembers.

To exclude them would constitute undue discrimination and deprive them of monetary benefits they
would otherwise be entitled to under a new collective bargaining contract to which they would have
been parties. Since in this particular case, no new agreement had been entered into after the CBA's
stipulated term, it is only fair and just that the employees hired thereafter be included in the existing
CBA. This is in consonance with our ruling that the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining
agreement continue to have force and effect even beyond the stipulated term when no new agreement
is executed by and between the parties to avoid or prevent the situation where no collective bargaining
agreement at all would govern between the employer company and its employees.

The instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack ofmerit.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., is on official business abroad.
BACKGROUND & JUSTIFICATION:
Years before the inception of AFTA (Asian Free Trade Agreement) in the
Philippines and eventual passage by Congress of our entry to World Trade
Organization (WTO) in most cases having a trade union then was a
guarantee of availing a considerable package of negotiated CBA
(Collective Bargaining Agreement).

Thereafter, as the World Economic integration is on its full swing, the

norm in the CBA negotiations rapidly changed. The mode and
improvement of existing and additional provisions become illusive.
Moreover, while the stability of trade unions threatened by the anti-union
stance of the most employers manifested through dismissals,
retrenchment, lay-offs and other form of displacement of militant leaders
or activists supportive to union activities, the litigation of labor cases is on
its usual snail phase.
BACKGROUND & JUSTIFICATION:
• Nowadays, having a union is no longer a
guarantee to secure employment and
acquiring a responsive amount of CBA
benefits.
• The most common stand of employers
nowadays, is using the impact of AFTA and
WTO justifying very little if none at all salary
increase and other fringe benefits.
References:
• www.chanrobles.com
• www.blr.dole.gov.ph
• www.lawphil.com
• www.psa.gov.ph