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When to file?
Facts: On March 21, 1996, Lucita Ong filed a Complaint for Legal
Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code before the RTC of
Dagupan City. She alleged the following:
1. That after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost
every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her;
2. That William would shout invectives at her like putang ina mo, gago,
tanga, and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against
concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand;
3. That William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of
their bodies using the buckle of his belt and that whenever she tried to stop
William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her;
4. And that On December 14, 1995, a violent quarrel ensued and William hit
her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her
on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the
head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house.
William for his part denied the charges and asserted
that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of
legal separation should not be granted, following the Family
Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied
when both parties have given ground for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not the Decree of Legal Separation should be
granted?
Held:
Yes. As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the
general denial for William, the Court gives more weight to those
of the former. The Court also gives a great amount of
consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the unique
opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the
stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals.
Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar
closeness to his male companions. She also found several pornographic
homosexual materials in his possession.Her worse fears were confirmed
when she saw Manuel kiss another man on the lips. At this point, Leonida
took her children and left their conjugal abode.
Manuel, for his part, denied his wife's allegations and asserted that his
wife's action is based on an ongoing family rivalry as between Leonida's
family-owned hospital and his.
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but
Article 45 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage should be annulled based on
petitioner’s alleged homosexuality?
HELD:
No. The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no
basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not legally
make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." If so, the lower court
should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the
guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were
Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally
predominant among homosexual individuals. She wanted to prove that
the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the
essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the
marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated
consent by virtue of fraud.
In 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now
lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired
American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated the proceedings at bar and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce
from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo
Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff
from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife.
ISSUE:
W/N a decree of legal separation should be granted?
HELD:
YES. In the Philippine jurisdiction, Vicenta Escaño's divorce and
second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid for her
previous union to Tenchavez must be declared to be existent
and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform
her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion
of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her
fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated
charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality
against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate
excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell
Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her
husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation
under our law, on the basis of adultery."
4. Sexual Infidelity
FROILAN GANDIONCO VS HON. PENARANDA
G.R NO. 79284, NOVEMBER 27, 1987
Facts: Private Respondent, Teresita, the legal wife of the
petitioner, filed a complaint against petitioner for legal separation
on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and
payment for damages. She also filed a criminal case against
petitioner for concubinage. Subsequently, an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendente lite was filed by Teresita
and which was granted by the lower court.
Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and
the incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for
support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the
criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private
respondent.
It is petitioner's position that such civil action arises from, or
is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so
that all proceedings related to legal separation will have to
be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for
concubinage in the criminal case.
Issue:
W/N conviction for concubinage will have to be first
secured before the action for legal separation can prosper?
HELD:
No. A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage,
may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action
for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce
the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense.
Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of
offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the
innocent spouse, among others.
When Serafina was questioned by the Fiscal upon orders of the court,
she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation. Interpreting these
facts virtually to mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court
declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could not be decreed.
ISSUE:
W/N the lower court's ruling to deny the petition for being
based on a confession of judgement is proper?
HELD:
NO. Article 100 of the Civil Code does not exclude, as evidence,
any admission or confession made by the defendant outside of
the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a
confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually
happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the
right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly
agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.
Jose and Serafina were married in 1938. In 1951, Jose discovered that
Serafina maintained illicit relations with a certain Arcalas. In 1955,
plaintiff again surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with
another man.
When Serafina was questioned by the Fiscal upon orders of the court,
she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation. Interpreting these
facts virtually to mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court
declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could not be decreed.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the lower court's ruling to deny the petition for being
based on a confession of judgement is proper?
2. W/N there is collusion in the present case?
1. NO. Article 100 of the Civil Code does not exclude, as
evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant
outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation
upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually
happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the
right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly
agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.
Mandatory.
NOTE!
Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent
even if he fails to file an answer. In case of
summons by publication and the respondent failed
to file his answer, notice of pre-trial shall be sent to
respondent at his last known address.
PRE-TRIAL
What are the contents of Pre-Trial Brief?
The pre-trial brief shall contain the following:
(1) A statement of the willingness of the parties to
enter into agreements as may be allowed by law,
indicating the desired terms thereof;
(2) Their respective claims together with the
applicable laws and authorities;
(3) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of
facts, as well as the disputed factual and legal
issues;
(4) All the evidence to be presented, including
expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing
the nature and purpose thereof;
PRE-TRIAL
What are the contents of Pre-Trial Brief?
NOTE!
Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its
required contents shall have the same effect as failure
to appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding
section.
PRE-TRIAL
What is the effect of failure to appear at the
Pre-Trial?
If the petitioner fails to appear personally:
Dismissed, UNLESS his counsel or a duly authorized
representative appears in court and proves a valid
excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.
When is it made?
Benjamin then filed a case for legal separation. Leonila filed an answer vehemently
denying the averments of the complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After
Benjamin testified, Leonila's counsel moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground of condonation.
ISSUE:
Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and
Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of the
action.
HELD:
YES.
Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were
commited by the wife, the act of the husband in persuading
her to come along with him and the fact that she went with
him and together they slept as husband and wife deprives
him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for legal
separation against the offending wife because his said
conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil
Code.
b. Consent
People vs Sensano and Ramos
58 PHIL 73
FACTS:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married and had a child whom the latter
allegedly abandoned when he went and stayed in Cagayan for three years without
letters or financial support to the former who worked hard for herself and her son
until she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who later took care of them.Ventura
charged Sensano and Ramos for adultery, found by the court guilty of the crime
charged and served their sentence.
Sensano after serving her sentenced and leaving her paramour made steps to
reconcile with and go back to her husband but to no avail - She and her child were
abandoned for the second time. Thus, they went back to her co-accused Ramos.
Despite the knowledge that she resumed living with her codefendant, her husband
did nothing to assert his right as her spouse. Instead, he went abroad for seven
years and presumably had completely abandoned them..
When Ventura returned home, he charged Sensano of adultery for the second time
in order to obtain divorce under Act No. 2710.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramos can file adultery against his spouse
for the second time being the offended party.
HELD:
William H. Brown filed a petition for legal separation from his wife, Juanita
Yambao, before the Court of First Instance of Manila on the ground of
adultery.
Brown is now praying for the confirmation of their liquidation agreement; for
custody of the children issued of the marriage; and that the defendant be
declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff and for other remedy as might
be just and equitable.
Now, because Juanita Yambao failed to file her answer to the
petition in due time, the trial court declared her in default and
ordered the City Fiscal to represent the state and investigate, in
accordance with Article 101 of the New Civil Code, if collusion
exists between the parties.
In the case at bar, the SC said that the petition for legal
separation should not be granted it being evident that Brown is
also guilty of co-habiting with a woman other than his wife.
Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that:“The legal separation
may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion
between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the
dismissal of the petition.”
After having been summoned, the defendants repeatedly asked the court
for extension of filing for an answer which eventually resulted to being
declared in default. Five months after the petition was filed the court
granted the issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation and declared the
properties in question as conjugal properties of Alanis and Pacete which
were ordered forfeited in favor of Alanis. The court also nullified his
marriage to Clarita.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court gravely abused its discretion in
deciding the case
HELD:
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code,
further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no
case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a
“cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.
DECISION
NOTE!
The appellant shall serve a copy of the Notice upon the
adverse parties.
LIQUIDATION, PARTITION AND
DISTRIBUTION, CUSTODY, AND
SUPPORT OF MINOR CHILDREN
Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or,
in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of
judgment of the appellate court granting the petition,
the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall
proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, including custody
and support of common children, under the Family
Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
ISSUANCE OF DECREE OF LEGAL
SEPARATION
When shall the court issue the Decree of Legal
Separation?
Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation,
the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
FAMILY CODE
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the
following effects: