LABOR

 To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and
valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.[13] Article 282 of the Labor
Code enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer: (a) serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or the latters representative in connection with the employees
work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud
or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or his duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by
the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member
of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes
analogous to the foregoing. (Agabon)
Standards of due process: requirements of notice. In all cases of termination
of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially
observed:
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article
282 of the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds
for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that
upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.

In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employees

last known address.
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause
under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two
written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if
requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which
dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and
after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the
decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer
must give the employee and the Department of Labor and
Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of
his separation.
The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is
not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The
commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not
prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right,
as in this case.[32] Certainly, an employer should not be
compelled to pay employees for work not actually performed
and in fact abandoned.

The employer should not be compelled to continue employing

a person who is admittedly guilty of misfeasance or
malfeasance and whose continued employment is patently
inimical to the employer. The law protecting the rights of the
laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of
the employer.[33]
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant
case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify
the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However,
the employer should indemnify the employee for the
violation of his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v.
National Labor Relations Commission.[36] The indemnity
to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the
abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later, which we
sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction
should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty
and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into
special consideration the gravity of the due process
violation of the employer. (Agabon)
Evidently, the sanctions imposed in both Agabon and Jaka
proceed from the necessity to deter employers from future
violations of the statutory due process rights of employees.78 In
similar regard, the Court deems it proper to apply the same
principle to the case at bar for the reason that an employer’s
contractual breach of its own company procedure – albeit not
statutory in source – has the parallel effect of violating the
laborer’s rights. Suffice it to state, the contract is the law between
the parties and thus, breaches of the same impel recompense to
vindicate a right that has been violated. Consequently, while the
Court is wont to uphold the dismissal of Alcaraz because a valid
cause exists, the payment of nominal damages on account of
Abbott’s contractual breach is warranted in accordance with
Article 2221 of the Civil Code. (Abbott)
This Court has held that there is no violation of due process even if no hearing
was conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his side of the
controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
Parenthetically, the Court finds that it was error for the NLRC to opine that
petitioner should have been afforded counsel or advised of the right to counsel.
The right to counsel and the assistance of one in investigations involving
termination cases is neither indispensable nor mandatory, except when the
employee himself requests for one or that he manifests that he wants a formal
hearing on the charges against him. In petitioners case, there is no showing that
he requested for a formal hearing to be conducted or that he be assisted by
counsel. Verily, since he was furnished a second notice informing him of his
dismissal and the grounds therefor, the twin-notice requirement had been
complied with to call for a deletion of the appellate courts award of nominal
damages to petitioner. (Lopez)
A collective bargaining agreement (CBA), as used in Article 252 of the
Labor Code, refers to a contract executed upon request of either the
employer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the
agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of
work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including
proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such
agreement.
While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between
the parties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied
the principles of law governing ordinary contracts. 4 A CBA, as a labor
contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital,
is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest,
thus, it must yield to the common good. As such, it must be construed
liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must
place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due
consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose
which it is intended to serve. (Davao Integrated)
It is a well-settled doctrine, that if doubts exist between the
evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the
scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-
honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his
master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the
interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in
the formers favor.[12] The policy is to extend the doctrine to a
greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits
under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy
of the State to give maximum aid and protection of labor.[13]
This rule should be applied in the case at bar, especially since
the evidence presented by the private respondent company is
not convincing. Accordingly, we uphold the finding that
petitioner rendered overtime work, entitling her to overtime
pay. (Nicario)
In affording full protection to labor, this Court must
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race
or creed. Even as we, in every case, attempt to carefully
balance the fragile relationship between employees and
employers, we are mindful of the fact that the policy of
the law is to apply the Labor Code to a greater number
of employees. This would enable employees to avail of
the benefits accorded to them by law, in line with the
constitutional mandate giving maximum aid and
protection to labor, promoting their welfare and
reaffirming it as a primary social economic force in
furtherance of social justice and national development.
(Francisco)
This Court has upheld a company’s management prerogatives
so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement
of the employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating
or circumventing the rights of the employees under special
laws and valid agreements.[31]
The Court is wont to reiterate that while an employer has its
own interest to protect, and pursuant thereto, it may terminate
an employee for a just cause, such prerogative to dismiss or lay
off an employee must be exercised without abuse of discretion.
Its implementation should be tempered with compassion and
understanding. The employer should bear in mind that, in the
execution of said prerogative, what is at stake is not only the
employees position, but his very livelihood,[32] his very
breadbasket. (Marival)
Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an
employee. The Constitution does not condone wrongdoing
by an employee; nevertheless, it urges a moderation of the
sanction that may be applied to him.[33] Where a penalty
less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may have
been committed by the worker ought not to be visited with
a consequence so severe such as dismissal from
employment
Indeed, the consistent rule is that if doubt exists between
the evidence presented by the employer and the
employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of
the latter. The employer must affirmatively show rationally
adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable
cause (Marival)
In the interpretation of contracts, obscure words and
provisions shall not favor the party that caused the
obscurity. Consequently, the terms of the present
contract should be construed strictly against petitioner,
which prepared it.
Indeed, a contract of employment is impressed with
public interest. For this reason, provisions of applicable
statutes are deemed written into the contract. Hence,
the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and
their relationships from the impact of labor laws and
regulations by simply contracting with each other.[19]
Moreover, in case of doubt, the terms of a contract
should be construed in favor of labor. (Innodata)
The cause of social justice is not served by upholding the interest of
petitioners in disregard of the right of private respondents. Social justice
ceases to be an effective instrument for the equalization of the social
and economic forces by the State when it is used to shield wrongdoing.[
While it is true that compassion and human consideration should guide
the disposition of cases involving termination of employment since it
affects ones source or means of livelihood, it should not be overlooked
that the benefits accorded to labor do not include compelling an
employer to retain the services of an employee who has been shown to
be a gross liability to the employer. It should be made clear that when
the law tilts the scale of justice in favor of labor, it is but a recognition of
the inherent economic inequality between labor and management. The
intent is to balance the scale of justice; to put up the two parties on
relatively equal positions. There may be cases where the circumstances
warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but never
should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer,
Justicia remini regarda est (Justice is to be denied to none). (Jamer)
 II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
A. Elements of illegal recruitment
In order to hold a person liable for illegal recruitment, the
following elements must concur: (1) the offender undertakes
any of the activities within the meaning of ―recruitment and
placement‖ under Article 13(b) 20 of the Labor Code, or any of
the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the
Labor Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042) and (2) the offender
has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him
to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. In
the case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is
added: that the offender commits any of the acts of
recruitment and placement against three or more persons,
individually or as a group. All three elements are present in the
case at bar. (People v. Michelle Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 214500,
2017)