Hazops Practices Training: Pelatihan IKATEMIA-UNTIRTA, Sept, 2019

HAZOPS PRACTICES TRAINING
Pelatihan IKATEMIA-UNTIRTA, Sept, 2019
1
COURSE AIMS
Review on Process Safety and how HAZOP is a critical aspect
in achieving good process safety performance
Discussion on Controls / Barriers
Review on HAZOP Preparation, Methodology and Post-

HAZOP activities
Best practices in HAZOP
Practical exercise
2 HIMATEMIA – FT UNTIRTA
INTRODUCTION TO
PROCESS SAFETY
3 3 HIMATEMIA
HIMATEMIA – FT UNTIRTA
What is Process Safety Management?
CCPS defines Process Safety Management as:
“Application of management principles and systems to the

identification, understanding and control of process hazards in
order to prevent process related incidents and injuries”
In other words:
“PSM addresses the issues of keeping the energy in control and the
materials contained in the process equipment”
4 IKATEMIA – FT UNTIRTA
What is Process Safety?
Process Safety
• Protection from exposure to the risk of harm or injury from process
hazards. It addresses the design and construction of a facility AND the
operation and maintenance of the facility so as to keep (contain) the
material and energy in the process
Hazard
• A potential source of harm to people, assets, environment or business
objectives
Process hazard
• Hazard related to the process environment resulting in loss of
containment of hazardous material, e.g. overpressure from an explosion,
exposure to toxic gas (e.g. H2S), exposure to heat radiation from a fire
Process Safety Management

• A management system that is focused on prevention or, preparedness
for, mitigation of, response to, or restoration from catastrophic releases
of chemicals or energy from a process associated with a facility [CCPS,
RBPS]
What is Process Safety?
• Systematic framework for managing the integrity of

hazardous processes
• It uses a blend of engineering and management skills focused
on preventing major accidents, particularly fires, explosions
and toxic releases
• It focuses on three key aspects:-
• Hardware
• Systems
• People
Short-form definition of PSM

“Keep the stuff inside the
pipes and equipment”
Building Blocks
SAFE
OPERATIONS
PLANT
INTEGRITY
MAINTAIN IT
OPERATE IT
BUILD IT
RIGHT
RIGHT
RIGHT
KNOWLEDGE
PEOPLE
Barriers
• We need to use safety measures as barriers to
block the pathway
• These barriers are known as Layers of
Protection or Lines of Defence
Hence, The Swiss Cheese Model (next slide)
Process Safety Aspects
• Management of Change (MOC)
• Mechanical Integrity (MI)
• Process Safety Information (PSI)
• (Process Hazard Analysis PHA)  HAZOP
• Operating Procedures (OP)
• Design Integrity (DI)
• Pre-Activity Safety Review (PASR)
• Proprietary and Licensed Technology Assessment (PLTA)
• Training
• Contractor Management
• Employee participation
• Incident Investigation
• Emergency Preparedness and Response
• Safe Work Practices
PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS
(PHA)
Integration of Process Safety
PTS 60.0101
Leadership and Commitment

Process Hazards
Analysis (PHA)
Identification, assessment and
Policy and Strategic Objectives mkitigation of hazards
Organization, Responsibilities
Resources, Standards & Doc PSI
Hazards & Effects

Management (HEMP)
PHA, DI, PLTA, PASR
Corrective
Planning & Procedures Action
MOC, MI, OP
Implementation Monitoring
Assurance
Audit Corrective Action &
Improvement
Review Corrective Action &

Improvement
PHA Concern
• PHA focuses on process & safety issues and their impact

on:
» People
» Environment
» Assets
» Reputation
• PHA compliments occupational health and safety

activities.
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IKATEMIA – FT UNTIRTA
PHA Fundamental
Underlying aim of PHA is to maintain the containment of the

process fluids.
Known Unsafe or Uncertain Zone

Mechanical Design
Pressure
Buffer Zone
Critical Operating Process Safety
Parameter (COP) - NEL Buffer
RV
Troubleshoot Zone
Maximum Normal
Operation Limit PAH
Normal
Operating
Zone
15 15 HIMATEMIA
Key requirements
• Assessment of process-related hazards

• Use of suitable hazard identification and risk assessment tools
• Implementation of actions resulting from the analysis
• Bow-Tie Analysis
Which
• Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP)
technique?
• Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
• Hazard Identification (HAZID)
HEMP
• Hazard Analysis (HAZAN)
• Structured What-if Technique (SWIFT)
• Safety Integrity Level Assessment (SIL)
HAZOP, FMEA, Bowtie, QRA, PHR, etc
• Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
• Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
Hazards & Effects Register
16 16 HIMATEMIA
Analysis Techniques
•Conceptual Design
•Detailed Engineering
•Construction/Start-Up
•Operation
•Expansion or Modification
•Incident Investigation
•Decommissioning
Rarely used or Commonly used
inappropriate
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Risk Ranking
Risk level to be determined in order for us to set the priority of

action plans
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EAIA HRA
HEALTH HEALTH RISK
ASPECTS IMPACTS RISK
1 High HAZARDS EFFECTS
1 High
2 Medium
2 Medium
3 Low
3 Low
Description of Activity, Product or Service:

HAZARD: Threats
Determine Barriers for Each Threat

Top Events
Consequences:
Determine Recovery Control Measures
Risk Impact Scores: P E A
Remedial Action Plan: R
HAZOP HAZID
Potential
CAUSE of Consequen RISK EFFECTS RISK
Deviation ce HAZARDS
1 High
1 High
2 Medium
2 Medium
3 Low
3 Low
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What are Controls?
Features that eliminate, prevent, reduce or
mitigate the risk of incidents
Control Measures must be understood in terms
of effectiveness and viability
Defined by a range of factors:
• functionality
• reliability
• independence
• survivability
• maintainability
• availability
• cost
20 20 HIMATEMIA
Risks Controls
Control Measures are the features of a facility that protect (safeguard) the people,
environment and property from harm.
They are the means by which we ensure safe operations.
Physical equipment (RVs, Guards, Ring

They take many forms: Main)
Process Control Systems (alarms,
interlocks, ESD)
Management Processes (MoC, PTW)
Operating and Maintenance systems

(OPP,MI)
Emergency Plan
Persons and actions (Training, etc.)
21 21 HIMATEMIA
Risks Controls
Risk Control Hierarchy

• 1. Elimination/substitution
tiv ls
ess
• 2. Engineering Controls
fec tro
en
Ef Con
• 3. Warnings
• 4. Training and Procedures/
Administrative
• 5. Personal Protective
Equipment
22 22 HIMATEMIA
Risks Controls
The control must
• Be reliable and consistent throughout its life

• Be measurable, in terms of effectiveness, throughout
its life
• Not create additional uncontrolled hazards
• Minimize the need for worker responsibility for his/her
own protection
• Protect against all routes of entry
• Be able to achieve its target level of protection
• Be accepted by the employee, and be compatible
with the work
• Not adversely affect product performance or quality
• Be cost-effective and financially feasible for the
organization
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Risks Controls
Basic Strategies for Hazard Reduction
To prevent the creation of the hazard in the first place
To reduce the amount of the hazard brought into being
To prevent the release of the hazard that already exists
To modify the rate or spatial distribution of release of the hazard from its source.
To separate, in time or in space, the hazard and that which is to be protected.
To separate the hazard and body or structure with a material “barrier.”
To modify relevant basic qualities of the hazard.
To make the body or structure more resistant to damage from the hazard.
To begin to counter damage already done by the environmental hazard.
To stabilize, repair, and rehabilitate
24 24 HIMATEMIA
How do we identify the Control Measures
PHA (Hazops)
Previous Incidents
Mechanical Integrity
JSA
Task Analysis
Experience Causes Hazards Incidents Outcomes
MoC
Standards
Proactive Controls Reactive Controls
Design Parameters
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Control Measures Performance Standards
Capability/Functionality
• speed of operation and leak-tightness of shutdown valve

• competence, experience and training of personnel
• speed of response or fire brigade
Reliability/Availability
• availability of fire pumps

• reliability of emergency lighting
• reliability of operator emergency actions
Vulnerability/Survivability
• speed of operation and leak-tightness of shutdown valve

• competence, experience and training of personnel
• speed of response or fire brigade
The Control Measures must be supported by the SMS,

that have to have its own Performance Standards
26 26 HIMATEMIA
Key Aspects of Control Measures
Controls commensurate with Hazards (ALARP )
Control measures must be clearly linked to the potential process incidents and associated hazards
Neither the incidents, nor the hazards, nor the controls should be consider generically
Control Options should consider Past/Current/Future Decisions
Controls address full scope of causes
Adequate depth of controls
Controls Implemented
Performance Standards established
Performance of controls understood & monitored
Understood
Continuous review
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Periodic Review
• The update and review of risk assessments is triggered for a number

of reasons:
• The original assessment was wrongly conducted

• New information or the implementation of recommendations
reduces some of the uncertainty within the original study
• There has been a change to the information used
• PHA studies to be regularly reviewed every 5 years
28 28 HIMATEMIA
Exercise 4
• 2 process unit/equipment are to be

tied-in with a bypass line connected
(indicated in red)
• Work in table groups to discuss and
brainstorm on
– What tool to be used
– What are the aspect/areas to be look
into during risk assessment that may
have impacts on the process or safety
• Group present/share using flip-

charts
29 29 HIMATEMIA
Exercise
Operating Pressure = 7.0 barg
Operating Temperature = 5°C
Design Pressure = 12 barg
Design Temperature = 15°C 12
barg 12
R-VC from unreacted of
80-P12103-3160X barg
polymerisaton
V-201
1.0
barg V-210
FC
RO FT FV
Operating Pressure = 5.0 barg
Operating Temperature = 5°C
V-101 Design Pressure = 12 barg
Design Temperature = 15°C
25-P10103-
LT 1101Y LC
LV
15
100-P10102-1101Y barg
150-P10101-1101Y
P-101 V-102
Discharge Pressure = 8.5 barg Operating Pressure = 4.0 barg
Operating Temperature = ambient Operating Temperature = ambient
Design Pressure = 15 barg Design Pressure = 15 barg
Design Temperature = 20°C Design Temperature = 25°C
30 30 HIMATEMIA
Exercise - Answer
12
Aspect should have been considered in
the risk assessment :
barg
12
barg
1.0
1. Operating and design pressure of both
systems
barg
FC
RO FT FV
2. Operating and design flowrate in the

LT LC lines of both system
3. Temperature difference of both systems
15
barg
4. Pressure difference of both system

5. Composition of process medium e.g.
purity
6. Compatibility of materials of
construction with the “new” process
medium
7. Other HSE considerations e.g. size,
location and ergonomic issues
31 31 HIMATEMIA
Expectations
• Installations handling hazardous materials and conditions shall

be assessed using PHA
• Use of suitable hazard identification and risk assessment tools
• Consider past and possible incident scenarios in PHA study
• PHA is led by competent personnel supported by a team of
individuals with relevant knowledge and experience
• Results of PHA are captured in Hazards and Effects Register
• PHA actions are logged and tracked to completion
• PHA are reviewed on a regular basis to ensure they remain
current
HAZOP STUDY & PRACTICES
Key learning will include:
• Mechanics of the HAZOP process

• HAZOP Team Dynamics
• HAZOP Leadership Skills
• Human Errors
• Planning for Top, Middle and Tail of a HAZOP
• Leadership
Hazard
A physical or chemical potential to cause harm to people, property,
reputation or the environment.
Risk
The combination of the probability of the hazard eventuating and the
magnitude of its effects.
Risk = Frequency x Consequence
Hazard Analysis - The functions, steps and criteria for design and plan
of work which identify hazards.
Risk Analysis - A systematic use of available information to determine

how often specific events may occur and the magnitude of their likely
consequences. (May be either quantitative or qualitative
Risk Assessment - The process used to determine risk management

priorities by evaluating and comparing the level of risk against
predetermined standards, targets risk levels and/or other criteria.
Risk Management - The systematic application of management

policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of identifying,
analysing, assessing, treating (controlling), monitoring and re-
evaluating risk
Identifying, Defining & Monitoring Critical Controls
How do we identify the Control Measures
PHA (Hazops)
Previous Incidents
Mechanical Integrity
JSA
Task Analysis
Experience Causes Hazards Incidents Outcomes
MoC
Standards
Proactive Controls Reactive Controls
Design Parameters
Key Aspects of Control Measures
Controls commensurate with Hazards (ALARP )
Control measures must be clearly linked to the potential process incidents and associated
hazards
Neither the incidents, nor the hazards, nor the controls should be consider generically
Control Options should consider Past/Current/Future Decisions
Controls address full scope of causes
Adequate depth of controls
Controls Implemented
Performance Standards established
Performance of controls understood & monitored
Understood
Continuous review
Typical Controls / Barriers
Parameter Preventive Controls Mitigative Controls
Deviation
Pressure Pressure Alarm Bund / Dike
Pressure Trip Gas Detection
Relief Valves
Temperature Temperature Alarm Quench / Deluge System
Temperature Trip
Level Level Alarm Bund / Dike
Level Trip Closed drain system
Overflow Line
Relief Valves
For “Other Than” Guideword (1/3)
Parameter Issues Controls / Possible resolutions

Deviation
Maintenance Accessibility Proper layout (during project)
Permanent lifting equipment
Extensions or permanent platform
Isolation Blinding / spading
Double block and bleed
Draining Permanent closed drain piping
Steam Out Permanent connection

Deviation
Commissioning Equalization of Pressure Procedure
Too many steps
Relief Inadequate Adequacy study
No spare (for testing) Provision for spare
In-situ testing
Location of relief Regulations / guidelines

Deviation
Sampling No purging facility for gas Install purging facility
sampling
No drain pot
Residue in liquid line Double block and bleed
Utilities Failure Valves going to fail safe Blowdown system philosophy
Valves do not go to fail safe Pressure relief management

positions
Inadequate backup supply
In simple terms, we must
Adopt control measures based clearly on the Hazard
Assessment
Understand and monitor effectiveness of control measures

via performance indicators
Challenge the current regime of control measures by

considering past and future critical decision options
Adopt a robust regime of controls which incorporates

diversity with a preference for elimination of hazards
HAZOP Preparation
HAZOP Scope
Must be clearly defined
Mark up on Master Drawings
Think critically about:
• projects with phased implementation

• “typical” drawings
• extent of HAZOP past tie-ins to existing plant
• handling vent, drain, utility connections
Information Required
Apart from (as built) P&IDs:
• Layouts/models
• Design and Operating rates, temperatures, pressures
• Equipment data sheets / drawings,including Vendor Package
• Alternative operating modes
• Operating procedures including start-up, shutdown and maintenance
• Process description and design philosophy
• Data sheets for instruments and control valves
• Schedule of alarm/trip settings and cause/effect charts
• Equipment and piping layouts
• Piping specifications and standards
• Interlock logic charts
• Design duties of RVs, Rupture Disks, etc.
• Properties and hazards of process materials, intermediates
• PFDs and material balances
• Electrical single line diagram
• Instrumentation philosophy
• Utilities specifications
• Interface/tie-in drawings
• P&IDs for vents and drains
Common Problems with Data
New Design: Existing plant:
• insufficient • operating
design conditions
development known, but
• vendor data design
missing information lost
Master drawings
Important part of HAZOP record
Highlight sections as they are reviewed
Clearly mark extent of HAZOP
Can use to mark up drafting changes required
Do NOT mark up HAZOP actions unless you are sure they will be
implemented!
Planning a HAZOP Study - Main
Preparations
Establish the study scope and ground rules
Decide which drawings to study
Estimate time requirements
Plan the study schedule
Identify the team members and arrange for their assistance
Organise the data base
Arrange a suitable meeting place
Prepare a guideword list
Ensure that the team is prepared
Establishing the Ground Rules
Identify all causes which could lead to a safety or operability hazard
Recommend changes, or further study, to overcome safety or operability problems
Provide training for new staff in design intentions and expected operation
Provide background for the preparation of plant manuals and operating procedures
Review operating procedures
Record the background to all recommendations
Record all useful information from the study
Deciding Which Drawings to Study
Do not omit a drawing Omit a drawing only

because: because:
• there is no hazard • the team agrees not to

• there are only service study it (record this)
lines on it • it is in the scope of
• it is similar to another another study
drawing • it is identical to another
drawing (where all
recommendations for that
drawing must be applied
here)
HAZOP Methodology
Outline of HAZOP Technique
Systematically review deviations from design intent
Team of knowledgeable, experienced personnel
Using guide words
Stimulate creative thinking
To identify significant consequences and reasonable causes (reject trivial issues)
Review the available Safeguards.
Develop Recommendations to manage the risk.
Proceed to the next Deviation.
Outline of HAZOP Technique
The results are qualitative
• Operability and Safety deviations

• Identify problems to address
• Do not solve them
• In depth thinking required for multiple failure modes
Further studies may be required to quantify significant issues
HAZOP assumptions
One Failure at a time (No Double Jeopardy).
The system will perform as the design intends.
Will be managed competently.
Operated and maintained in line with design intent.
Protective systems will be tested as required.
The design is largely complete and the plant has effective safety
management
Normal operating conditions.
Alarm are functional and operators will respond according to standard
operating procedures (SOP’s) in ample time to alleviate any consequences
associated with alarm. In addition, alarms and shutdowns are tested as
necessary to ensure reliability.
Piping and instrumentation diagrams reflect actual field conditions.
Inspection procedures and training are appropriate for the equipment under
review.
HAZOP assumptions
SOP’s are in place for each operating phase and operators are
adequately trained to performed their work duties.
Maintenance procedures are written, up-to-date, understood, and
followed. Hot work, vessel entry, and other work procedures are in
place and followed.
Relief systems and flare systems are adequate for the major
contingencies (or operate as described in the Safeguarding
Memorandum) i.e. Power failure, Steam failure, Instrument failure,
Cooling water failure, fire and blocked vapor or liquid outlet.
The Distributed Control System (DCS) will provide additional
equipment protection through intermediate alarms for equipment as a
level of protection for warning operators when normal operating
parameters are about to be exceeded.
Original HAZOP Guidewords
Guideword Process Deviation
NO, NOT or NONE The complete negation of the design intention
MORE OF Quantitative increase of any relevant physical property
LESS OF Quantitative decrease of any relevant physical property
AS WELL AS Qualitative increase of any relevant physical property
PART OF Qualitative decrease of any relevant physical property
REVERSE The logical opposite of the design intent
OTHER THAN Complete substitution
More Explanation
Guideword Process Deviation Comments
NO, NOT or NONE The complete negation. No part of intention is achieved
MORE OF Quantitative increase ... Refer to Flow, Temp etc.
LESS OF Quantitative decrease ... Refer to Flow, Temp etc.
AS WELL AS Qualitative increase ... All intentions achieved, + ...
PART OF Qualitative decrease ... Some intentions not achieved
REVERSE The logical opposite ... Reverse Flow, Reverse Reaction
OTHER THAN Complete substitution Something quite different happens

“Parametric” Guidewords for Each Line
HIGH FLOW / HIGH LEVEL

LOW FLOW / LOW LEVEL
ZERO FLOW / EMPTY
REVERSE FLOW / LEAK
HIGH PRESSURE
LOW PRESSURE
HIGH TEMPERATURE
Guidewords for Each Line (Continued)
PHASE • GAS / LIQUID /SOLID
COMPOSITION • TWO PHASE / CHANGES WITH TIME / SLUGGING /ADDITIVES
• EQUIPMENT /HYDROCARBON STREAMS / EFFLUENTS/

TESTING • SAMPLE POINTS
• OPERABILITY
OPERATION • MAINTAINABILITY
• AREA CLASSIFICATION
ELECTRICAL • ISOLATION/ EARTHING
• SUFFICIENT FOR CONTROL /TOO MANY/ CORRECT LOCATION

INSTRUMENTS • CONSISTENT PHILOSOPHY /CONTROL SEPARATE FROM ALARMS/
SHUTDOWNS
“Global” Guidewords (Other Than)
• TOXICITY
• COMMISSIONING, START-UP
• SHUTDOWN (Isolation, Purging)
• BREAKDOWN (including Services and Utility Failure)
• EFFLUENT
• NOISE
• FIRE AND EXPLOSION
• SAFETY EQUIPMENT
• MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION
• QUALITY, CONSISTENCY & RELIABILITY (new processes)
• EFFICIENCY & SIMPLICITY (new designs)
Describe Design Intention
SELECT a
• Explain general intention of the items on the
DRAWING (P&ID) drawing
FOR THE FACILITY
SELECT a SECTION • Explain intention of section / vessel and its

interactions / lines
or VESSEL • Select a line (“node”) & apply a list of guide words
CONTINUE UNTIL ALL LINES (“NODES”) ARE COMPLETE CONSIDER

OTHER SPECIAL VESSEL FEATURES REPEAT FOR ALL EQUIPMENT ON
P&ID APPLY OVERVIEW GUIDEWORDS
HAZOP FLOWSHEET
Describe design intention,
operating conditions etc
Consider first or next guide word
Identify all causes and record
Identify all consequences and record
List existing safeguards and record
Agree any recommendations

necessary and record
No
Last guide word?
Yes
Take next section
Selecting a HAZOP Study Node
This is the HAZOP Leader’s responsibility
Choice depends on the system and the team
Large, complex systems increase the chance of missing something
Plan the nodes before the HAZOP - this is essential for Batch HAZOP
The golden rule is “Keep it simple”
Node Definition and Intention
Normally follow the process flow

Start at an isolation point (valve or equipment item) of where the
line enters or leaves the P&ID
Continue to next change of design intent
or
Continue to where a critical parameter (flow, pressure,
temperature) changes
or
Continue to next equipment item
Causes, Consequences and Safeguards
Brainstorm causes
Methodically develop consequences and existing safeguards for each cause
What type of consequence?
• People (P)
• Environment (E)
• Assets (A)
• Reputation (R)
Are the safeguards adequate?
Are recommendations required?
Identifying Cause
The cause identified MUST be within the NODE
It must be a credible scenario
Typically done using a brainstorming technique, i.e list down

all causes without considering the Consequences
It is possible that there are none or no new cause identified

for a deviation.
HAZOP Deviation Causes
No Flow More Pressure Composition Change
• Wrong routing • Surge problems • Phase change

• Blockage • Thermal • Settling of slurries
• Incorrect slip plate overpressure • Leaking isolation
• Isolation in error • Isolation of relief valves, exchanger
• Burst pipe devices tubes etc.
• Large leak • Positive displacement • Incorrect feedstock
pumps specification
• Incorrectly installed check
valve • Failed open PCV's • Process control
• Incorrect design upsets
• Equipment failure (auto
valve, pump, filter, etc.) pressures • Reaction
• Gas breakthrough intermediates or
• Incorrect pressure
(inadequate venting) byproducts
differential
• Connection to high
pressure systems
• Specification of
pipes, vessels,
fittings, instruments
Relief Instrumentation Sampling

•Relief philosophy •Control philosophy •Sampling Procedure
(process, fire etc.) •Fail-safe philosophy and operator safety
•Type of relief device •Location of •Time needed for
reliability, blocking etc. instruments, response analysis of result
•Relief discharge time etc. •Calibration of
location •Time available for automatic samplers
•Multi-phase flow operator intervention •Reliability and accuracy
•Effect of •Panel arrangement and of representative
debottlenecking on location sample
relief capacity •Fire protection •Diagnosis of result
•Inlet and outlet piping, •Set points of alarms,
manifold etc. trips and authorisation
of changes
•Alarm and trip testing,
auto/manual switches
and human error
Service Failure Abnormal Operations Ignition Suppression

•Instrument air, steam, •Purging •Grounding
water, nitrogen •Flushing arrangements
•Hydraulic power, •Start-up •Insulated
electric power •Normal Shutdown vessels/equipment
•Telecommunications, •Emergency Shutdown •Low-conductance fluids
computer and •Two liquid phases
interfaces •Emergency Operations
•Inspection of operating •Splash filling of vessels
•Heating and ventilation •Insulated components
machines
•Contamination of: •Dust and powder
•Guarding of machines
•Instrument air, steam, handling
nitrogen •Electrical classification
•Flame arrestors
•Hot work and hot
surfaces
•Auto-ignition and
pyrophoric materials
Maintenance Safety Equipment
• Isolation philosophy • Fire and gas detection

• Insulated vessels/equipment • Testing of emergency
• Low-conductance fluids equipment
• Two liquid phases • Emergency shutdown
• Splash filling of vessels • First aid, medical resources
• Insulated components • Fire-fighting response time
• Dust and powder handling • Effluent disposal
• Electrical classification • Emergency Plans, Training
• Flame arrestors • Hazards created by others
• Hot work and hot surfaces • Toxic and hazardous
• Auto-ignition and pyrophoric properties of process
materials materials
Consequence
To be linked to the cause identified
Safeguards is not considered in Consequence determination
Consequence can be within the Node, Outside (Upstream or Downstream) of the Node
One Cause could leads to many Consequence, to list it all.
Remember PEAR
Meaningful
Worst that could happens, apply “so what”
It’s OK to be conservative
Safeguards
It is the designed system or administrative controls to prevent or mitigate the
Consequence
List it by Consequence or cumulative
Indicator or gauge is usually not considered a Safeguards
Non-hazardous events?
Procedures could be a safeguards, however will need to confirm that it exist

and cover the cause & consequence discussed
Response time to be evaluated
Recommendations
Considering the Consequence and the available safeguards, to determine if the risk is
acceptable
Usually a risk ranking can be applied to help determine the risk categories. Recording of Risk
Ranking only compulsory for PHA study
Must be clear, use “3W”, What, Why & Where
Recommendations must address the issue and bring it to ALARP
Recommendations must address either /and the causes, consequences and safeguards
Sometime, more then 1 recommendations could be proposed.
A further study may be recommended due to HAZOP is not a tools to solve the issue (Not a
design workshop)
WRITING HAZOP RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation must be:

• clear
• concise
• unambiguous
• relevant
• prioritised
• Actioned
Before writing recommendations

• Identify problem
• Understand problem
• Agree:
• present situation unacceptable
• what is to be changed or not enough information available
When team cannot make a recommendation, ask for
further study. Must clearly define:
• problem
• scope of study
• objectives of study
What is needed in recommendations?

• Enough detail to carry out the action
• If options, all must solve the problem
• Clarity and no chance of misunderstanding
• Do not use “consider” unless it is truly optional
The “3Ws” Rule
• What do you want?

• Where do you want it?
• Why do you want it?
Quality Control
• Is it relevant to the problem?

• Does it solve the problem?
• Does it introduce any other problems?
• Is it easy to understand?
(Sample)
Notes Full Recommendation

Add a check Add a check valve on line 2”
valve - 11015 - HD between
E5041 and TV - 1015, to
reduce the risk of backflow,
which could lead to major
damage to the compressor.
(Sample)
Notes Full Recommendation

Further study An explosion in vessel V2301 may be possible
needed if gas composition control is lost.
Carry out a study of explosion peak pressures

and rate of pressure risk for representative
vapour/oxygen/ nitrogen mixtures, to
identify whether detonation could occur.
Include experiments with bursting discs, to
help design interlocks and vents to reduce
probability of rupture of vessel V2301.
Results required before Jan 1st.
Risk Ranking for Baseline PHA
Consequence vs. Probability = Risk Matrix
Risk Ranking for PHA shall be conducted to all scenarios after completing it.
Means to counter check on analysis
Application for prioritization of action item
3 Categories Low, Medium & High
Risk Matrix
1 2 3 4 5
Severity
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
Single Multiple
People Slight Injury Minor Injury Major Injury
Fatality Fatalities
Slight Minor Local Major Extensive

Asset
IMPACT Damage Damage Damage Damage Damage
Localized Massive
Environment Slight Impact Minor Impact Major Impact
Impact Impact
Major Major
Limited Considerable
Reputation Slight Impact National International
Impact Impact
Impact Impact
E Happens several
times per year at E1 E2 E3 E4 E5
Almost Certain location
D Happens several
LIKELIHOOD
times per year in D1 D2 D3 D4 D5

Likely company
C Incident has
occurred in our C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
Possible company
B Heard of incident in
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
Unlikely industry
A
Remotely Never heard of in
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
likely to industry
happen
Summary of HAZOP Sequence
1. Select a P&ID SYSTEM
2. Select a SECTION or VESSEL
3. Select LINES until COMPLETE
4. Select an AUXILIARY (utility link)
5. Look at other VESSEL FEATURES
6. Look at other MODES of OPERATION
7. Look at “GLOBAL” issues
HAZOP Reporting & Follow-up
85 85 HIMATEMIA

Hazops Practices Training: Pelatihan IKATEMIA-UNTIRTA, Sept, 2019

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HAZOPS PRACTICES TRAINING

Pelatihan IKATEMIA-UNTIRTA, Sept, 2019

Discussion on Controls / Barriers

Review on HAZOP Preparation, Methodology and Post-

Best practices in HAZOP

CCPS defines Process Safety Management as:

“Application of management principles and systems to the

Process Safety Management

• Systematic framework for managing the integrity of

Short-form definition of PSM

Hence, The Swiss Cheese Model (next slide)

Leadership and Commitment

Hazards & Effects

Review Corrective Action &

• PHA focuses on process & safety issues and their impact

• PHA compliments occupational health and safety

Underlying aim of PHA is to maintain the containment of the

Known Unsafe or Uncertain Zone

• Assessment of process-related hazards

Risk level to be determined in order for us to set the priority of

Description of Activity, Product or Service:

Determine Barriers for Each Threat

Defined by a range of factors:

They are the means by which we ensure safe operations.

Physical equipment (RVs, Guards, Ring

Management Processes (MoC, PTW)

Operating and Maintenance systems

Persons and actions (Training, etc.)

Risk Control Hierarchy

• Be reliable and consistent throughout its life

To reduce the amount of the hazard brought into being

To prevent the release of the hazard that already exists

To separate, in time or in space, the hazard and that which is to be protected.

To separate the hazard and body or structure with a material “barrier.”

To modify relevant basic qualities of the hazard.

To begin to counter damage already done by the environmental hazard.

To stabilize, repair, and rehabilitate

Experience Causes Hazards Incidents Outcomes

• speed of operation and leak-tightness of shutdown valve

• availability of fire pumps

• speed of operation and leak-tightness of shutdown valve

The Control Measures must be supported by the SMS,

Control Options should consider Past/Current/Future Decisions

Controls address full scope of causes

Adequate depth of controls

Performance Standards established

Performance of controls understood & monitored

• The update and review of risk assessments is triggered for a number

• The original assessment was wrongly conducted

• PHA studies to be regularly reviewed every 5 years

• 2 process unit/equipment are to be

• Group present/share using flip-

2. Operating and design flowrate in the

4. Pressure difference of both system

• Installations handling hazardous materials and conditions shall

• Mechanics of the HAZOP process

Risk = Frequency x Consequence

Risk Analysis - A systematic use of available information to determine

Risk Assessment - The process used to determine risk management

Risk Management - The systematic application of management

Experience Causes Hazards Incidents Outcomes

Control Options should consider Past/Current/Future Decisions

Controls address full scope of causes