Presumptions in Statutory

Construction
Presumptions – are aids to reasoning and argumentation, which
assume the truth of certain matters for the purpose of some given
inquiry. They may be grounded o general experience, or probability of
a kinds; or merely on policy and convenience. (Prof. James Bradley
Thayer)

- A legal inference or assumption that a fact exists, based on the

known or proven existence of some other fact or group of facts. Most
presumptions are rules of evidence calling for a certain result in a given
case unless the adversely affected party overcomes it with other
evidence. A presumption shifts the burden of production or persuasion
to the opposing party, who can then attempt to overcome the
presumption. (Black’s Law Dictionary)
Presumptions affects the BOP.

He who alleges must prove.

He who claims to the contrary has the duty to present evidence

necessary to establish the amount of evidence required by law.

Prima facie case

Quantum of Evidence
Presumption of Validity and Constitutionality of Laws

Remman Enterprises v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are

not favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must
be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they
cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible
must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for
inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance
clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute
must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly
enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.15
Moreover, the failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the
intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency
and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.
Since every law is presumed valid, the presumption of constitutionality
can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed
an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is
reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the
discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must
be struck down.

Indeed, "all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one

who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship
does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be
conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the
challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute;
and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
Presumption Against Injustice

Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if
we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court. Legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to
a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would
negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in
the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. Ninguno non deue enriquecerse
tortizerzmente con damo de otro. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or
ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the
vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377)
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of
Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused
Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the
guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Alonzo v. IAC

As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623

deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that
notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by
the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-
day period.

The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes

dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously
cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice
given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted,
Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such
deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run,
much less expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise,
we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning
of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume
the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To
be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary
when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions,
to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we
do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may
be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to
the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them." 13
While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the
power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of
the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose
that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it
the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the
letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to
the law maker's will.
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the
private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the
sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By
requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our
eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of
ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The
purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners
are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other
brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in
writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice
was sufficient.
Presumption Against Implied Repeal

Lledo v. Lledo
As a general rule, repeals by implication are not favored. When statutes are in
pari materia, they should be construed together. A law cannot be deemed
repealed unless it is clearly manifested that the legislature so intended it.

The repealing clause of P.D. No. 1146 reads:

Section 48. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts of law specifically inconsistent
herewith shall be considered amended or repealed accordingly.
On the other hand R.A. No. 8291s repealing clause states:

SEC. 3. Repealing Clause. All laws and any other law or parts of law specifically
inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided,
That the rights under existing laws, rules and regulations vested upon or
acquired by an employee who is already in the service as of the effectivity of
this Act shall remain in force and effect: Provided, further, That subsequent to
the effectivity of this Act, a new employee or an employee who has previously
retired or separated and is reemployed in the service shall be covered by the
provisions of this Act.
On the other hand R.A. No. 8291s repealing clause states:

SEC. 3. Repealing Clause. All laws and any other law or parts of law specifically
inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided,
That the rights under existing laws, rules and regulations vested upon or
acquired by an employee who is already in the service as of the effectivity of
this Act shall remain in force and effect: Provided, further, That subsequent to
the effectivity of this Act, a new employee or an employee who has previously
retired or separated and is reemployed in the service shall be covered by the
provisions of this Act.
This Court has previously determined the nature of similarly-worded repealing clauses.
Thus:

The holding of this Court in Mecano vs. COA is instructive: The question that should be
asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are
intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision, as
stated in Opinion No. 73, s. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal
under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to
repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in
the terms of the new and old laws. This latter situation falls under the category of an
implied repeal.
There are two accepted instances of implied repeal. The first
takes place when the provisions in the two acts on the same
subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, in which case,
the later act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied
repeal of the earlier one. The second occurs when the later act
covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute; thus, it will operate to repeal the earlier
law.
Addressing the second instance, we pose the question: were the later
enactments intended to substitute the earlier ones? We hold that there
was no such substitution.

P.D. No. 1146 was not intended to replace Commonwealth Act No.
186, as amended by R.A. No. 660, but to expand and improve the
social security and insurance programs administered by the
Government Service Insurance System.[21] Thus, as the above-quoted
repealing clause indicates, only the laws or parts of law specifically
inconsistent with P.D. No. 1146 were considered amended or repealed.
Under the first instance of implied repeal, we are guided by the
principle that in order to effect a repeal by implication, the later
statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent with and repugnant
to the existing law that they cannot be reconciled and made to
stand together. The clearest case of inconsistency must be made
before the inference of implied repeal can be drawn, for
inconsistency is never presumed.
For the latter law to be deemed as having repealed the earlier
law, it is necessary to show that the statutes or statutory provisions
deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be
inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of
repugnance, clear and convincing in character. The language
used in the later statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An
inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.
As mentioned earlier, neither P.D. No. 1146 nor R.A. No. 8291 contains
any provision specifically dealing with employees dismissed for cause
and the status of their personal contributions. Thus, there is no
inconsistency between Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186,
as amended, and Section 4 of P.D. No. 1146, and, subsequently, R.A.
No. 8291. The inevitable conclusion then is that Section 11(d) of
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, continues to govern cases
of employees dismissed for cause and their claims for the return of their
personal contributions.
Finally, it should be remembered that the GSIS laws are in the nature of social
legislation, to be liberally construed in favor of the government employees. The money
subject of the instant request consists of personal contributions made by the employee,
premiums paid in anticipation of benefits expected upon retirement. The occurrence
of a contingency, i.e., his dismissal from the service prior to reaching retirement age,
should not deprive him of the money that belongs to him from the outset. To allow
forfeiture of these personal contributions in favor of the GSIS would condone undue
enrichment.

Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, Cesar is entitled to the return of his premiums and
voluntary deposits, if any, with interest of three per centum per annum, compounded
monthly.
Presumption Against Ineffectiveness

Paras v. COMELEC
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an
elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph
(b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when
such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the
second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of
the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly
circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a
mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his
term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three
years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular
local election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be
conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective
law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain
thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being
construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a
statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.[7]
Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government
Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in
conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X
of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum x x x.

Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to

absurdity which we cannot countenance.
Presumption Against Absurdity

CIR v. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc.

The fact is that, as respondent Court of Tax Appeals has stressed, as early as
July 15, 1960, the Government already had in its hands the sum of P221,033.00
representing excess payment. Having been paid and received by mistake, as
petitioner Commissioner subsequently acknowledged, that sum
unquestionably belonged to ESSO, and the Government had the obligation to
return it to ESSO. That acknowledgment of the erroneous payment came
some four (4) years afterwards in nowise negates or detracts from its actuality.
The obligation to return money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that
payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation
to reimburse. The obligation of the payee to reimburse an amount paid to him
results from the mistake, not from the payee's confession of the mistake or
recognition of the obligation to reimburse.
In other words, since the amount of P221,033.00 belonging to ESSO was
already in the hands of the Government as of July, 1960, although the
latter had no right whatever to the amount and indeed was bound to
return it to ESSO, it was neither legally nor logically possible for ESSO
thereafter to be considered a debtor of the Government in that
amount of P221,033.00; and whatever other obligation ESSO might
subsequently incur in favor of the Government would have to be
reduced by that sum, in respect of which no interest could be
charged. To interpret the words of the statute in such a manner as to
subvert these truisms simply can not and should not be countenanced.
"Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a
meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.
That is a principle that goes back to In re Allen (2 Phil. 630) decided on
October 29, 1903, where it was held that a literal interpretation is to be
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.]” "Statutes should
receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the
legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion."
Presumption against Undesirable Consequences Not Intended by
the Legislative Measure

Ursua v. CA
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that
petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable
grounds under the afore-quoted provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his
petition for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or
intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at
birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a
competent authority. A mans name is simply the sound or sounds by
which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they
distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different
names and these are known as aliases.[11] Hence, the use of a
fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a
single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth
does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as
amended. This is so in the case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the
Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was the name of the messenger of
his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first
place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request
of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was
a respondent. There is no question then that Oscar Perez is not an alias
name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or
was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his
real name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in
an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to
expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at
the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a
copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the
Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of
public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone
under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such
does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as
amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business
transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent
are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those
contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There
exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute
is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.[12] Moreover, as C.A.
No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and
in favor of the accused.[13] The reason for this principle is the tenderness of
the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule
by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the
court limited.[14] Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that
petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act
done by him.
Presumption against Irrepealable Laws

The City of Davao v. RTC Davao

The second paragraph of Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, effectively

imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact future
legislation on the taxability of the GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the
plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, especially
considering that it is a lawmakers act that imposes such burden. Only the
Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment
or repeal of laws. Constitutional dicta is of higher order than legislative
statutes, and the latter should always yield to the former in cases of
irreconcilable conflict.
It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive
limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition against the
passage of irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws deprive
succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best senses carte
blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their
allowance promotes an unhealthy stasis in the legislative front
and dissuades dynamic democratic impetus that may be
responsive to the times. As Senior Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno once observed, [t]o be sure, there are no irrepealable laws
just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the
predicate of progress and we should not fear change.
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic
principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the
actions of future legislative body, considering that both
assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they
do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of
the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature
which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its
enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
It might be argued that Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended,
does not preclude the repeal of the tax-exempt status of GSIS,
but merely imposes conditions for such to validly occur. Yet these
conditions, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting the
powers of Congress. Thus, the same rationale for prohibiting
irrepealable laws applies in prohibiting restraints on future
amendatory laws. President Marcos, who exercised his legislative
powers in amending P.D. No. 1146, could not have demanded
obeisance from future legislators by imposing restrictions on their
ability to legislate amendments or repeals. The concerns that
may have militated his enactment of these restrictions need not
necessarily be shared by subsequent Congresses.
Datu Kida v. Senate

Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA

No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law.
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact
amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement
required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32] has to be
struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an
irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.
In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House
of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have
the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within
a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws
or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote
of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to
effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting
requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the
passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The
Courts pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS on this subject
best explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic
principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the
actions of future legislative body, considering that both
assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they
do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of
the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature
which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its
enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects,
whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction,
either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited
expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or
restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting
irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body
may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This
power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the
original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and
before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in
advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is
a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the
passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it
significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and
flexibility.