NENITA D. SANCHEZ VS ATTY. ROMEO A.C. No.

10543 March 16, 2016

G. AGUILOS
This administrative case relates to the
performance of duty of an attorney towards
his client in which the former is found and
declared to be lacking in knowledge and skill
sufficient for the engagement.
THE PARTIES IN THE CASE
PETIONER
NENITA D. SANCHEZ
RESPONDENT
ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS
FACTS OF THE CASE
Nenita D. Sanchez sought the legal services of Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos to represent her in the annulment of her marriage with her
estranged husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez. The respondent accepted
the engagement, fixing his fee at P 150,000.00, plus the
appearance fee of P 5000.00 per hearing.
The petitioner then gave to the respondent the initial amount of P
70,000.00. She then inquired on the development of her case, but the
respondent told her that he would only start working on the case
upon her full payment of the acceptance fee; that she had only
learned then that what he had contemplated to file for her was a
petition for legal separation, not one for the annulment of her
marriage; that he further told her that she would have to pay a
higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage.
FACTS
The petitioner then subsequently withdrew the case from him, and
requested the refund of the amount already paid, but he refused
to do the same as he had already started working on the case;
that she had sent him a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to
demand the return of her payment less whatever amount
corresponded to the legal services he had already performed.
The respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not
having rendered any appreciable legal services to her; and that
his constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her to bring an
administrative complaint against him in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.
In his answer, the respondent alleges that the complainant and her
British fiancée sought his legal services to bring the petition for the
annulment of her marriage; that based on his evaluation of her
situation, the more appropriate case would be one for legal
separation anchored on the psychological incapacity of her husband.
That in May 2005, she admitted to him that she had spent the money
that her fiancée had given to pay the balance of his professional
fees; and that in June 2005, she returned to him with a note at the
back of the prepared petition for legal separation essentially
requesting him not to file the petition because she had meanwhile
opted to bring the action for the annulment of her marriage instead.
The respondent admits that he received the demand letter
from Atty. Martinez, but states that he dismissed the letter
as a mere scrap of paper because the demand lacked
basis in law. :
Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for
refund dated 15 August 2005 (Annex “B” of the complaint) as a
mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her
counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ, who unskillfully relied on
an unverified information furnished him, to the urinal project of
the MMDA where it may serve its rightful purpose.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE IBP
IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.
declared that the respondent’s insistence that he could
have brought a petition for legal separation based on
the psychological incapacity of the complainant’s
husband was sanctionable because he himself was
apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal
separation; that because he rendered some legal
services to the complainant.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. observed that the
respondent’s statement in the last part of his answer, to the effect
that the demand letter sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the
complainant should be treated as a scrap of paper, or should have
been addressed “to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may
serve its rightful purpose,” was uncalled for and improper; and he
opined that such offensive and improper language uttered by the
respondent against a fellow lawyer violated Rule 8.0113 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP Board of Governors then affirmed the findings of
Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr.
ISSUES OF THE CASE
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
SHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY
LIABLE FOR MISCONDUCT; AND
2. WHETHER OR NOT HE SHOULD BE
ORDERED TO RETURN THE ATTORNEY’S
FEES PAID.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
RULING
Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to
return the entire amount received from the client:
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and
skill to the complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know
the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment
of marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him
as a lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either causes of
action. His explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the action
for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably
contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was
no other than an action for annulment of the complainant’s marriage with
her husband with the intention of marrying her British fiancée. They did not
contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render
her incapacitated to re-marry.
That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had
prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay
more as attorney’s fees if she desired to have the action for
annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to
serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim for services
rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed
on him as an attorney. He thus transgressed Canon 18, and Rules
18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he
knows or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he
may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain
as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because
as it was later revealed, it was way above his ability and
competence to handle the case for annulment of marriage. As a
consequence, he had no basis to accept any amount as attorney’s
fees from the complainant. He did not even begin to perform the
contemplated task he undertook for the complainant because it was
improbable that the agreement with her was to bring the action for
legal separation. His having supposedly prepared the petition for
legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage
was either his way of covering up for his incompetence, or his means
of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him to retain the
amount he had already received.
Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor towards his professional colleague:
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which
has necessitated lawyers to use strong language in the advancement of
the interest of their clients. However, as members of a noble profession,
lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent their clients’
cause, or, as in this case, to represent a personal matter in court, with
courage and zeal but that should not be used as license for the use of
offensive and abusive language. In maintaining the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language – spoken or in his
pleadings – must be dignified.28 As such, every lawyer is mandated to
carry out his duty as an agent in the administration of justice with
courtesy, dignity and respect not only towards his clients, the court and
judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal
Profession.
The respondent’s statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez
should be treated “as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed
by her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may service its
rightful purpose” constituted simple misconduct that this Court cannot tolerate.
In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive
and improper language by asserting that the phraseology was not per se
uncalled for and improper. He explained that he had sufficient cause for
maintaining that the demand letter should be treated as a mere scrap of
paper and should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not excuse the
offensiveness and impropriety of his language. He could have easily been
respectful and proper in responding to the letter.
 ARNOLD PACAO VS
ATTY. SINAMAR LIMOS
PARTIES OF THE CASE
PETITIONER
ARNOLD PACAO
RESPONDENT
ATTY SINAMAR LIMOS
FACTS OF THE CASE
Complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault custodian of BHF
Pawnshop (BHF) branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with
qualified theft by BHF. At the preliminary investigation, Atty. Limos
appeared as counsel for BHF. To buy peace, the complainant
initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a possible
settlement.
Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is demanding the sum of P530,000.00
to be paid in full or by installments. Further negotiation led to an
agreement whereby the complainant would pay an initial amount
of P200,000.00 to be entrusted to Atty. Limos, who will then
deliver to the complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a
compromise agreement, and a joint motion to approve compromise
agreement for filing with the court
On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of
P200,000.00 to Atty. Limos, who in tum, signed an
Acknowledgment Receipt recognizing her undertakings as counsel
of BHF. However, Atty. Limos failed to meet the tenns of their
agreement. Notwithstanding such failure, Atty. Limos still sought to
get from the complainant the next installment amount of their
purported agreement, but the latter refused.
Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's
representative, Camille Bonifacio, who informed him that Atty.
Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorized to
negotiate any settlement nor receive any money in behalf of BHF.
The complainant also learned that BHF did not receive the
P200,000.00 initial payment that he gave to Atty. Limos. This
prompted the complainant to send a demand letter to Atty.
Limos to return the P200,000.00 initial settlement payment, but
the latter failed and refused to do so.
The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty.
Limos before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) -
Commission on Bar Discipline. The Investigating Commissioner
found enough evidence on record to prove that Atty. Limos
committed fraud and practiced deceit on the complainant to
the latter's prejudice by concealing or omitting to disclose the
material fact that she no longer had the authority to negotiate
and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of BHF, nor was
authorized to receive the P200,000.00 from the complainant.
Atty. Limos was likewise ordered to return to the complainant
the full amount of P200,000.00 with interest thereon at the
rate of 12% per annum from the date of her receipt of the
said amount to the date of her return of the full amount.
ISSUE OF THE CASE
Whether or not the instant disbarment
complaint constitutes a sufficient basis
to disbar Atty. Limos from the practice of
law?
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty.
Limos is facing an administrative case, for she had already been
twice suspended from the practice of law, by this Court, for three
months each in Villaflores v. Atty. Limos and Wilkie v. Atty. Limos.
IN VILLAFLORES, Atty. Limos received attorney's fees of
P20,000.00 plus miscellaneous expenses of P2,000.00, but she
failed to perform her undertaking with her client; thus she was
found guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty.
IN WILKIE, Atty. Limos was held administratively liable for her
deceitful and dishonest conduct when she obtained a loan of
P250,000.00 from her client and issued two postdated checks in
the latter's favor to pay the said loan despite knowledge of
insufficiency of funds to cover the same.
The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her
offense. The foregoing factual antecedents demonstrate her
propensity to employ deceit and misrepresentation. It is not too
farfetched for this Court to conclude that from the very beginning,
Atty. Limos had planned to employ deceit on the complainant to
get hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming and
does not speak well of a member of the Bar.
By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any evidence for
that matter, to justify her actions, Atty, Limos failed to demonstrate
that she still possessed the integrity and morality demanded of a
member of the Bar. Her seeming indifference to the complaint
brought against her was made obvious by her unreasonable
absence from the proceedings before the IBP. Her disobedience to
the IBP is, in fact, a gross and blatant disrespect for the authority
of the Court.
The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court, however, does not hesitate to
impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has become a repeat
offender. Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of
Atty. Limos' prior misconduct which grossly degrades the legal profession, the
imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment is warranted.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos, the Court is aware
that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of
the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court. However,
Atty. Limos' recalcitrant attitude and unwillingness to heed with the Court's
warning, which is deemed to be an affront to the Court's authority over
members of the Bar, warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court.
Her repeated desecration of her ethical commitments proved herself to be
unfit to remain in the legal profession. Worse, she remains apathetic to the
need to reform herself.
"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions." "Of all
classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound
to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him,
of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the
laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and
office, and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
and dangerous elements of the body politic. "