Group -I

1. D S Patel
2. A K Goyal
3. H S P Singh
4. Dinesh Kumar
5. V V Prasad
28 Oct 2017
 Background
BP
 BP is a global oil and gas company

 Fourth largest company in the world

 BP operates in over 80 countries producing about 3.8 million

barrels of oil per day servicing 22400 stations

Gulf Disaster
 On April 20, 2010, there was a explosion on BP’s drilling rig
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, near Louisiana

 The oil spill caused the second largest environment disaster in

U.S. history
 Background
After effects of Disaster
 The well was officially sealed 19 September 2010 (5 Months)
 Total of about 4,900,000 barrels (779,794,828L), peaking 62,000
barrels per day were spilled. Crude oil is at about $100 per barrel

 An area of 180,000km squared was covered affecting 50% of the

16,000 species in the Gulf of Mexico
 Stakeholders

British U.S.
Transocean
Petroleum government

World
Workers Residents
Population
 Macondo - The Plan

 Drill an Exploration Well in the Gulf of Mexico

(Mississippi Canyon Block 252)

 Spud October 2009

 Depth: Approximately 20,000 ft (6,100 m)

 Water: Approximately 5,000 ft (1,525 m)

 Target: Geological structure (called Macondo)

 Target Depth: Below 17,000 ft (5,200 m) 6

©JA Turley
After The Casing And Cement Job, Temporary
Abandonment Would Include
1. Prepare well for testing and
the rig for abandonment
2. Positive and negative pressure tests—
remediate as necessary
3. Install Lockdown Seal Ring
4. Set and test cement plug
5. Displace riser with seawater
6. Pull BOPs and Riser The Well Blew Out
7. Release Rig
7
©JA Turley
 Six process failures – bypass of SOP

 No. 1: Fewer barriers to gas flow

 No. 2: Fewer centralizers to keep cement even
 No. 3: No bond log to check cement integrity
 No. 4: Pressure test misinterpreted
 No. 5: Mud barrier removed early
 No. 6: Blowout preventer failed
 BP Ignores Early Indicators of Disaster
Three flow indicators from the well before the
explosion.
 51 minutes before the explosion more fluid began flowing
out of the well than was being pumped in.

 41 minutes before the explosion the pump was shut down

for a “sheen” test, yet the well continued to flow instead of
stopping and drill pipe pressure also unexpectedly
increased.

 18 minutes before the explosion, abnormal pressures and

mud returns were observed and the pump was abruptly shut
down.

• The crew may have attempted mechanical interventions to

control the pressure, but the flow out and pressure increased
dramatically and the explosion took place.
 ‘Unexpected Events’ Ignored
• 5 hours before the explosion, an unexpected loss of fluid was
observed in the riser pipe, suggesting that there were leaks in
the annular preventer in the BOP.

• Two hours before the explosion, …, the system gained 15

barrels of liquid instead of the 5 barrels that were expected,
leading to the possibility that there was an “influx from the
well.”

• Having received an unacceptable result from conducting the

negative pressure test through the drill pipe, the pressure test
was then moved to the kill line where a volume of fluid came
out when the line was opened.

• The kill line was then closed and the procedure was discussed;
during this time, pressure began to build in the system to 1400
psi.

• At this point, the line was opened and pressure on the kill line
was bled to 0 psi, while pressure on the drill pipe remained at
1400 psi.
Failure of eight different safety systems
 Dodgy cement

 Valve failure (Float Shoe/ Float collar)

 Pressure test misinterpreted

 Leak not spotted soon enough

 Valve failure no. 2 (Annular preventer)

 Overwhelmed separator

 No gas alarm

 No battery for BOP

 series of complex events, rather than a single mistake or failure,
led to the tragedy. Multiple parties, including BP, [oilfield services
company] Halliburton and [offshore drilling company] Transocean,
were involved
Failure of eight different safety systems
 Dodgy cement
 The cement at the bottom of the borehole did not
create a seal, and oil and gas began to leak through it
into the pipe leading to the surface. BP says the
cement formulation seems not to have been up to the
job.

 Valve failure
 The bottom of the pipe to the surface was sealed in two
ways. It too was filled with cement, and it also
contained two mechanical valves designed to stop the
flow of oil and gas. All of these failed, allowing oil and
gas to travel up the pipe towards the surface.

 Pressure test misinterpreted

 Causes of Well flow
1. The flow of hydrocarbons that led to the blowout of the Macondo well began
when drilling mud was displaced by seawater during the temporary
abandonment process.

2. The decision to proceed to displacement of the drilling mud by seawater was

made despite a failure to demonstrate the integrity of the cement job even
after multiple negative pressure tests. This was but one of a series of
questionable decisions in the days preceding the blowout that had the effect
of reducing the margins of safety and that evidenced a lack of safety-driven
decision making.

3. The reservoir formation, encompassing multiple zones of varying pore

pressures and fracture gradients, posed significant challenges to isolation
using casing and cement. The approach chosen for well completion failed to
provide adequate margins of safety and led to multiple potential failure
mechanisms.
 Causes of Well flow
4. The loss of well control was not noted until more than 50 minutes after
hydrocarbon flow from the formation started, and attempts to regain control
by using the BOP were unsuccessful. The blind shear ram failed to sever the
drill pipe and seal the well properly, and the emergency disconnect system
failed to separate the lower marine riser and the Deepwater Horizon from the
well.

5. The BOP system was neither designed nor tested for the dynamic conditions
that most likely existed at the time that attempts were made to recapture well
control. Furthermore, the design, test, operation, and maintenance of the
BOP system were not consistent with a high-reliability, fail-safe device.

6. Once well control was lost, the large quantities of gaseous hydrocarbons
released onto the Deepwater Horizon, exacerbated by low wind velocity and
questionable venting selection, made ignition all but inevitable.
 Observations
 While the geologic conditions encountered in the
Macondo well posed challenges to the drilling team,
alternative completion techniques and operational
processes were available that could have been used to
prepare the well safely for temporary abandonment.

 2. The ability of the oil and gas industry to perform and

maintain an integrated assessment of the margins of
safety for a complex well like Macondo is impacted by
the complex structure of the offshore oil and gas
industry and the divisions of technical expertise among
the many contractors engaged in the drilling effort.
(Observation 5.1)
 Observations
 3. The regulatory regime was ineffective in addressing
the risks of the Macondo well. The actions of the
regulators did not display an awareness of the risks or
the very narrow margins of safety.

 4. The extent of training of key personnel and decision

makers both in industry and in regulatory agencies has
been inconsistent with the complexities and risks of
deepwater drilling.

 5. Overall, neither the companies involved nor the

regulatory community has made effective use of real-
time data analysis, information on precursor incidents
or near misses, or lessons learned in the Gulf of
Mexico and worldwide to adjust practices and
standards appropriately.
 Observations
 Industry’s and government’s research and development
efforts have been focused disproportionately on
exploration, drilling, and production technologies as
opposed to safety.
 Make Sure that all Players Understand the
Fundamental Science and Mechanics that
Affect the Outcomes of Risk Decisions

There is a not unreasonable expectation that those

involved in on-site risk-decision-making understand
the basic material consequences of their actions.

(c) Beverly A. Sauer, Ph.D. 2010 beverlysauer@gmail.com November 2, 2010

19
 Engage Stakeholders at all Levels.
• Maintenance workers--who are on the front line in
emergencies
• Administrative staff--who must make decisions in
real time
• Human resource personnel--who must plan and
execute training
• Technical experts--who must anticipate hazards and
provide information to assist risk mgt in systems
• Line Personnel—who understand risk in physical
sites based upon long-term field experience

(c) Beverly A. Sauer, Ph.D. 2010 beverlysauer@gmail.com November 2, 2010

20
 Create a Top-Down Safety Climate
Management is ultimately responsible

for creating,

encouraging, and

understanding

the fundamental science,

communication practices,

safety training, and

reasoning habits that

(c) Beverly A. Sauer, Ph.D. 2010 beverlysauer@gmail.com November 2, 2010
21
 Make Sure that all Players Understand the
Fundamental Science and Mechanics that
Affect the Outcomes of Risk Decisions

There is a not unreasonable expectation that those

involved in on-site risk-decision-making understand
the basic material consequences of their actions.

(c) Beverly A. Sauer, Ph.D. 2010 beverlysauer@gmail.com November 2, 2010

22
 Insist that Contractors Articulate Risks
& Options--In Writing--Before a Crisis

• Local Risk Decision—Rapidly Evolving Situation

– What’s my back-up plan in case of failure?
– How will the results of my decision affect events downstream in the system?

• Automated Risk Decision—Rapidly Changing Indicators

– What are the planned responses to changing indicators?
– What Indicators activate Plan B?

• Big Picture Risk Decision-Making—Before the Crisis

– What options are in place?
– How and upon what conditions will they be activated?

(c) Beverly A. Sauer, Ph.D. 2010 beverlysauer@gmail.com November 2, 2010

23
Factors evidenced by data that
CONTRIBUTED
to the Cause of the Blowout

• Rat Hole
• Float Collar
• Back-flowing well
• Unseen forensic data
• LCM in the BOP
• Simultaneous operations

24
©JA Turley
 Factors evidenced by data that
CAUSED
the Blowout

• Viable NPT results that confirmed a leak and the

well’s flow potential when underbalanced
• The lack of a primary cement-plug barrier
before seawater displacement
• Viable pump-pressure data that confirmed the
well flowed for an hour prior to the blowout
• Massive, unchecked well flow that ultimately
debilitated proper functioning of the BOPs
25
©JA Turley
 CONCLUSIONS:
• Macondo Blowout Evidence is defined by
basic petroleum-engineering concepts,
training, and responsibilities.
• Skilled application of such concepts,
would have made a difference on Macondo.
• Also helpful would have been industry
initiatives like: Drilling Process Safety, Human
Factors, Safety & Environmental Management
Systems, Real-time Data, etc.
• But . . .

26
©JA Turley
 CONCLUSIONS:
• Macondo Blowout Evidence is defined by
basic petroleum-engineering concepts,
training, and responsibilities.
• Skilled application of such concepts,
would have made a difference on Macondo.
• Also helpful would have been industry
initiatives like: Drilling Process Safety, Human
Factors, Safety & Environmental Management
Systems, Real-time Data, etc.
• But . . . How do we APPLY Macondo lessons to
future wells?
27
©JA Turley
 A well, from mob to demob,
from rig-up to rig-down,
is a sequence of processes . . .
with steps to be executed
as per the Plan

but when something

INTERRUPTS any PROCESS,
whatever’s broken needs to be fixed

28
©JA Turley
 Process Interruption Goal
 Process
• Running casing
• Testing BOPs
• Installing a wellhead
• Drilling to next casing point
• Testing Casing
 Interruption
• Any unplanned/unexpected result
 Goal
• Figure out what’s wrong & Fix it
29
©JA Turley
Process Interruption Example—

Drilling Ahead

Alarm Screams

Stop Drilling

Well Control

30
©JA Turley
Process Interruption Example—
Critical Data
Drilling Ahead About what
Interrupted
Alarm Screams the Process
of Drilling
Stop Drilling
Washout? Well Control? Bit failure?

Pack-off? Lost Circulation?

Other?

Remediate the Problem 31

 If any process related to the well
is interrupted

The
PROCESS INTERRUPTION PROTOCOL
must be . . .

Stop the Process

Resolve the Interruptive Data
Remediate the Problem
32
©JA Turley
 Process Interruption Protocol—
Negative Pressure Test
 Process
• Run drillpipe
• Fill with seawater, close BOPs
• Bleed trapped pressure to zero, hold 30 min
 Interruption
• Pressure wouldn’t bleed, and made 15 bbl
 Protocol
• Stop the Process, Resolve Interruptive Data
(at the Yellow #1), Remediate the problem
33
©JA Turley
 Macondo—A Lesson Learned:
PROCESS INTERRUPTION PROTOCOL—
STOP the Process
RESOLVE the Interruptive Data
REMEDIATE the Problem

Applicability:
Wells worldwide, any process, deep or shallow,
onshore or offshore, design through abandonment
Goal
To minimize the chance of ever
losing control of another well. 34
©JA Turley
 Recommendations
 Significantly increase the liability cap and financial responsibility
requirements for offshore facilities.

 Establish independent offshore safety agency.

 Develop a proactive, risk-based performance approach similar to the “safety

case” approach in the North Sea.

 Supplement the risk-management program with prescriptive safety and

pollution-prevention standards.

 Industry “best practice” standards should be applied and updated in the Gulf
of Mexico, in the Arctic, and globally.

 Create a rigorous, transparent, and meaningful oil spill risk analysis and
planning process for better oil spill response.

 Well components, including blowout preventer stacks, are equipped with

sensors or other tools to obtain accurate diagnostic information—for
example, regarding pressures and the position of blowout preventer rams.