CASE 29

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ET AL.,

VS HON. ALEXANDER
AGURRE, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ET
AL., G. R. NO. 133064

CARY M. DOLENDO
FACTS • 1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion
of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela,
into an independent component city. July
4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the
people of Santiago in a plebiscite.
• 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it
amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an
independent component city to a
component city. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the
lack of provision to submit the law for the
approval of the people of Santiago in a
proper plebiscite.
 • Respondents defended the
constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying
FACTS that the said act merely reclassified
the City of Santiago from an
independent component city into a
component city.
• It allegedly did not involve any
“creation, division, merger, abolition,
or substantial alteration of boundaries
of local government units,” therefore,
a plebiscite of the people of Santiago
is unnecessary. They also questioned
the standing of petitioners to file the
petition and argued that the petition
raises a political question over which
the Court lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE Whether or not the Court has
jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
RULING • Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared
unconstitutional. That Supreme
Court has the jurisdiction over said
petition because it involves not a
political question but a justiciable
issue, and of which only the court
could decide whether or not a law
passed by the Congress is
unconstitutional.
 • That when an amendment of the
RULING law involves creation, merger,
division, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local
government units, a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected is
mandatory.
 • Petitioners are directly affected in the
imple-mentation of RA No. 8528.
RULING Miranda was the mayor of Santiago
City, Afiado was the President of the
Sangguniang Liga, together with 3
other petitioners were all residents
and voters in the City of Santiago. It is
their right to be heard in the
conversion of their city through a
plebiscite to be conducted by the
COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in
RA No. 8528 gives them proper
standing to strike down the law as
unconstitutional.
 Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution
states that: the judicial power shall be
RULING vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established
by law. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instru-mentality of the Government.
 CASE 30
MUNICIPALITY OF PATEROS,
VS. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R.
157714

CARY M. DOLENDO
FACTS • The subject property in this case con
sists of portions of Fort Bonifacio. The
subject property is allegedly situated
within the territorial jurisdiction of the
respondent as per Proclamation No.
247 issued on January 7, 1986
(Proclamation No. 2475) by former
President Marcos.
• subsequently, on January 31, 1990,
former President Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 518, amending
Proclamation No. 247
 • Pateros, in 1991, filed against
FACTS Makati before the RTC of Pasig. It was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
• It was later re-filed with the RTC of
Makati. Pateros claimed that, based
on historical and official records, it
had an original are of 1,038 hectares,
more or less.
• However, when a cadastral mapping
was conducted in 1978,Pateros learned
that its territorial boundaries
had been substantially reduced to
merely 166 hectares.
The RTC's • The RTC issued an Order, dismissing
the case on the ground of lack of
Ruling jurisdiction.
• The RTC held that Proclamation No.
2475 specifically declared that the
subject property is within the
territorial jurisdiction of Makati
and, in as much as the Proclamation
was not declared unconstitutional,
the same is a valid and subsisting
law. In the main, citing.
The RTC's • Sections 10 and 11, Article X of the
1987 Constitution, and pursuant to
Ruling this Court's ruling in Municipality of
Sogod v. Rosal, the RTC held that
the modification or substantial
alteration of boundaries of
municipalities can be done only
through a law enacted by Congress
which shall be subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
The RTC's • Hence, the RTC opined that it is
without jurisdiction to fix the
Ruling territorial boundaries of the parties.
Pateros filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was,
however, denied by the RTC in its
Order dated August 30, 1996.
Aggrieved, Pateros appealed to the
CA.
The CA's • The CA denied Pateros' appeal. The
CA held that the RTC did not make
Ruling any findings of fact but merely
applied various provisions of law
and jurisprudence.
• Thus, the case presented a pure
question of law, which Pateros
should have brought directly to the
Supreme Court, pursuant to Section
5(2), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution and Section 2, Rule 41
of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure
The CA's • The CA also held that it would amount
to grave abuse of discretion
Ruling amounting to lack of jurisdiction if the
CA insisted on resolving the issues
raised therein.
• Thus, by undertaking a wrong mode of
appeal and citing Section 2, Rule 50 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
the CA denied Pateros' appeal. Pateros
filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the CA denied
in its Resolution dated March 27,
2003.
 THE • Pateros asseverates that the issues
raised before the CA involved mixed
ISSUES questions of fact and law, because
Pateros sought the determination
of its territorial boundaries and the
nullification of Proclamation No.
2475; that Pateros does not seek
the alteration, modification, or
creation of another or a new local
government unit (LGU), but is
concerned only with its territorial
boundaries which, according to
existing records
 THE • The non-presentation of evidence
before the RTC does not make the
ISSUES appeal purely a question of law,
because the parties were prevented
from presenting any evidence due
to the RTC's erroneous dismissal of
the case based on lack of
jurisdiction.
• Thus, Pateros prays that the
assailed CA Decision be reversed
and set aside, and that the RTC be
directed to proceed with the trial of
the instant case.
 THE • Makati claims that the sole issue in
Pateros' appeal before the CA is
jurisdiction and as the question of
ISSUES jurisdiction is a question of law and as the
CA lacks jurisdiction over pure questions of
law, therefore, Pateros resorted to a wrong
mode of appeal.
• The issues raised by Pateros do not consist
of questions of fact as the RTC rendered
the assailed Order based on Makati's
Motion to Dismiss and no trial on the
merits was ever conducted. Makati points
out that the CA quoted the decision of the
RTC's discourse in order to show that only
a question of law was involved in Pateros'
appeal.
 THE • Thus, Makati posits that Pateros defies the
rules on trial, evidence, and jurisdiction in
a desperate bid to extricate itself from its
ISSUES mistake in taking a wrong mode of
appeal, i.e., by notice of appeal to the CA
rather than a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure filed before this
Court
• Makati submits that the dismissal of
Pateros' appeal was proper, as mandated
by Section 2, Rule 50 of the said Rules.
Due to the availment of the wrong mode
of appeal, the RTC's Order dismissing the
case already attained finality.
 THE • The OSG (Office of the Solicitor
General) stresses that the parties
ISSUES never presented any evidence
before the RTC which resolved the
case based on the parties'
undisputed factual submissions and
the application thereto of the
pertinent laws, Rules of Civil
Procedure, and jurisprudence.
Hence, the OSG concludes that the
appeal before the CA involved a
pure question of law

Section. 118. Jurisdictional
Responsibility for Settlement
of Boundary Disputes.
Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall,
as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same
city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within
the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of
different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the
sanggunians of the province concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on
the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or
more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to
the respective sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement
within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it
shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be
formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the
issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred
to above.
 Section. 118. Jurisdictional
Responsibility for Settlement
of Boundary Disputes.
• Notably, when Pateros filed its
• At the time the instant case was file
d, the 1987 Constitution and the Lo
cal Government Code (LGC) of 1991
were already
in effect. Thus, the law in point is
Section 118 of the LGC.
complaint with the RTC of Makati,
Makati was still a municipality.
 Section. 118. Jurisdictional
Responsibility for Settlement
of Boundary Disputes.
• Neither
• There was no Sangguniang Panlalaw
igan that could take cognizance of t
he boundary dispute, as provided in
Section 118(b) of the LGC.
was it feasible to apply Section 118(
c) or
Section 118(d), because these two
provisions clearly refer
tosituations different from that obt
aining in this case.
 Section. 118. Jurisdictional
Responsibility for Settlement
of Boundary Disputes.
• Also, contrary to Makati's postulatio
n, the former MMA did not
also have the authority to take the
place of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan because
the MMA's power
was limited to the delivery of
basic urban services
requiring coordination in Metropolit
an Manila.
 Section. 118. Jurisdictional
Responsibility for Settlement
of Boundary Disputes.
• However, now that Makati is alread
y a highly
urbanized city, the parties should fo
llow Section 118(d) of the LGC
and should opt to amicably
settle this dispute by
joint referral to the respective sangg
unians of the parties.
 Section. 118. Jurisdictional
Responsibility for Settlement
of Boundary Disputes.
• The specific provision of the LGC,
now made applicable because of
the altered status of Makati, must be
complied with. In the event that
no amicable settlement is reached, as
envisioned under Section 118(e)
of the
LGC, a certification shall be issued to t
hat effect,
and the dispute shall be formally tried
by the Sanggunian
concerned within sixty (60) days
from the date of the aforementioned c
ertification.
 • upon failure of these intermediary
Section. 118. Jurisdictional steps will resort to the RTC follow, as
Responsibility for Settlement specifically
of Boundary Disputes. provided in Section 119of the LGC.
• WHEREFORE, the instant Petition
is DENIED, having been mooted by the
conversion of respondent Municipality
of Makati into a highly urbanized city.
The parties are hereby DIRECTED to
comply with Section 118(d) and (e) of
the Local Government Code, and Rule
III of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 without prejudice to
judicial recourse, as provided in the
Local Government Code. No costs.