QRA – Quantitative

Risk Assessment RENOVATIONS

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Risk Assessment Training
 SUMMARY

1 Introduction
2 QRA Overview
3 QRA Definitions
4 QRA Methodology
5 Strengths & Weaknesses
6 Additional Resources
1 Introduction RENOVATIONS

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 INTRODUCTION

 MODULAR SET OF STANDARD TRAINING MATERIALS RELATING TO

RISK ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES
 BASIC CONCEPTS THROUGH TO SAFETY CASES
 INFORMATIVE OVERVIEW OR INTERACTIVE PRACTICAL
APPROACHES
 INFORMATIVE = CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE
 INTERACTIVE PRACTICAL = SKILL ASSESSMENT BY EXAMINATION &
CERTIFICATE OF ACHIEVEMENT
 PRACTICAL EXAMPLES OF DOCUMENTS
 EMERGING BEST PRACTICES
 METHODOLOGY DOCUMENTS FOR FUTURE GUIDANCE
 INTRODUCTION

 THIS MODULE DEALS WITH QUANTITATIVE RISK

ANALYSIS – QRA’s.
 QRA OVERVIEW.
 QRA DEFINITION OF IMPORTANT TERMS.
 REVIEW QRA METHODOLOGY.
 EXAMINE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES.
 INFORMATION ON ADDITIONAL RESOURCES.
2 QRA Overview RENOVATIONS

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 OVERVIEW

 QRA UTILISES MANY INDIVIDUAL TOOLS AND

TECHNIQUES FOR HAZARD IDENTIFICATION, HAZARD
ASSESSMENT AND RISK QUANTIFICATION.
 USES NUMERICAL VALUES TO RELATIVELY RANK
RISKS POSED BY PROCESS PLANT ON ITSELF AND
PUBLIC.
 PRIMARY OBJECTIVE MUST BE STATED.
COMMUNICATION CLEAR AND PRECISE.
 FIVE BASIC STEPS OF QRA;
 Hazard Identification,
 Likelihood Analysis,
 Consequence Analysis,
 Risk Assessment, and
 Conclusions and Recommendations.
 OVERVIEW

Hazard Identification
• Review process and design data
• Review of safety management procedures
• Hazardous properties of process materials
• Review of historical incident/accident data
• Vulnerability of potential receptors
• Selection of credible incident/accident scenarios

Consequence analysis
Likelihood analysis
• Modelling studies
• Generic equipment failure data
• Transformation of results into
• Fault-tree analyses
fatality levels

Risk assessment
• Individual risk Conclusions and recommendations
• Societal risk • Risk acceptability
• Acceptance criteria • Recommendations
3 QRA Definitions RENOVATIONS

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 DEFINITIONS

 QUANTITATIVE – QUALIFIED WITH STATISTICAL DATA.

 IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT QRA DOES NOT
PRODUCE THE EXACT “LEVEL OR RISK” POSED BY A
PROCESS PLANT – IT IS ONLY “RELATIVE WITHIN
EACH ANALISIS”.
4 QRA Methodology RENOVATIONS

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 METHODOLOGY

 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION;
 Process Constituents, Process Conditions, Site Inventories,
 Process Documentation (PFD’s, P&ID’s etc.),
 Equipment Specifications,
 Control and Monitoring / Safety Systems,
 Corporate, National and International Codes and Standards,
 Safety / Environmental Management Systems,
 Maintenance / Operating Procedures / Management.
 METHODOLOGY

 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION;
 Topography at Plant / Outside and Meteorology for Area,
 Previous incidents with similar plants.
Date Location Quantity involved Quantity spilled Scenario

Fire in Agricultural Chemicals plant caused chlorine

19-Dec-67 Bankstown (NSW) N/A N/A release. Residents evacuated and airport closed. 5
injuries.
1. 2 t of liquid chlorine spilt in 27 mn when line valves
30-Oct-86 Adelaide 1200 kg 1200 kg not closed after maintenance. Nearby workers
evacuated. No injuries
Latest in a series of chlorine releases from local ICI
24-Mar-87 Osborne N/A N/A plant. Gas cloud takes 40 mn to disperse

Use or rubber/fibre washers instead of lead resulted

26-Nov-87 Port Hedland (WA) N/A N/A in release of chlorine from effluent treatment plant.
Nearby houses evacuated (1)
Release of large cloud of chlorine gas further to
09-Feb-88 Brisbane 70 t N/A explosion at detergent factory. Suburb sealed off for
5 hrs. 30 injured: firemen, police
Chemical factory with 70 t of chemicals/chlorine
1-Mar-88 Sydney 70 t N/A compounds detroyed by blaze. Release of toxic
fumess but quick dispersion and no injuries
 METHODOLOGY

 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION;
 Dow Fire and Explosion Index,
 Mond Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Index,
 Substance Hazard Index (API RP 750),
 SEVESO II Directive,
 Safety Audits,
 Checklists,
 Preliminary Hazard Analysis,
 What-If? Analysis,
 HAZOP Study. Etc.
 METHODOLOGY

 LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS;
 Failure data from own sources in plant, or
 Generic published data:
− OREDA
− MIL Standards,
− Loss Prevention in the Process Industry, etc.
 Evaluated using Event Trees or Fault Trees to determine
frequency of “Top Event”.
 METHODOLOGY

 LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS;
 Example fault tree:
Catastrophic rupture
of CS2 tank
TOP 1

Tank splits open Tank subject to huge

further to violent fall impact in storage area
GATE1 GATE2

Violent Tank splits High energy Nearby

fall open impact from explosion
machinery
GATE3 EVENT1 EVENT9
GATE8

From ship From cranes From prime

Impact from Severe
mover
machinery impact
GATE4 GATE5 GATE6
GATE9 EVENT10
 METHODOLOGY

 LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS;
 Example event tree:
Immediate Ignition Local Jet Fire, Flash Fire, Pool
P = 0.1 P = 0.1
Delayed Fire or Vapour Cloud Explosion
Release Yes Ignition Downwind Flash Fire or Unconfined
P = 0.1 to 0.9 = Y P = 0.9 x Y
No Vapour Cloud Explosion
Occurs
Yes
P = 0.9
No

P = 0.9 to 0.1 = 1-Y Toxic Cloud or No Consequences P = 0.9 x (1-Y)

Notes:
1. P = Probability of branch (Dimensionless)
2. Determine Y by distance to 0.5 Lower Flammability Limit:
* If inside battery limits (electrically classified area) Y = 0.1,
* If inside battery limits (within control of this company) Y = 0.5
* If outside battery limits (outside control of this company) Y = 0.9
 METHODOLOGY

 CONSEQUENCY ANALYSIS;
 Software used such as PHAST, TRACE, SLAB or ALOHA, See
comparison of PHAST, TRACE and ALOHA in document (2.6).
 Various “scenario” models such as toxicity concentrations, heat
radiation, over-pressure effects against distance from the event,
 Results transferred to “Lethality” levels using probit equations.
 Tabular output:
Meteorological Distances (m) at which (ppm) the following concentrations occur
conditions 2500 680 320 230 79 10
2/E 79 210 270 340 840 2590
3/D 47 110 190 230 470 1400
5/D 40 96 155 190 365 1100
 METHODOLOGY

 CONSEQUENCY ANALYSIS;
 Example Gas Dispersion screen from SLAB software:
 METHODOLOGY

 RISK ASSESSMENT:
 Risk = Probability x Consequence
 Risks are posed from many sources,
 Cumulative individual risk is summation of all risks at one particular
point.
Transhipment of CS2 through the Port of Singapore
Summary of AKZO NOBEL QRA Report

Assessment : Methodology
calculation of cumulative
grid individual risk at point MN
M
level of probability of r esulting
t1
ven
dam age oc currenc e r is k
E event 1 0.8 2.3E-07 1.8E-07
Event 3 event 2 0.2 4.0E-07 8.0E-08
t2

event 3 0.4 4.0E-08 1.6E-08

en
Ev

eve nt n 0.05 2.0E-05 1.0E-06

tot al 1.3E-06
B UR E A U
VE R IT A S
N 1
 METHODOLOGY

 RISK CONTOURS;
 Lines joining all the points of equal “cumulative individual risks”
around a process plant: storage & handling of
hazardous substances
light industrial
residential
SHIPS
UNLOADING JETTY

COAL GRAIN SILOS

STOCKPILE

LPG
STORAGE

50 x 10-6 p.a.
5 x 10-6 p.a.
1 x 10-6 p.a.
 METHODOLOGY

 RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA (NEA – SGP);

 Explosion Over-Pressure Distance for 5psi, 1psi and 0.5psi.
 Thermal Radiation Distance for 4kW/m2, 12.5kW/m2 and
37.5kW/m2.
 Fireball Diameter and Durations.
 Overall Cumulative Risks 5 X 10-5 (Site Boundary), 5 x 10-6
(Industrial Area and 1 x 10-6 (Public).
 METHODOLOGY

 SOCIETAL RISK;
 Danger to public against social benefits of industry.
 Plotted on F-N Curves (Frequency – Number of Fatalities)
 Example F-N Curve: 10-2

Frequency of unwanted event F

10-3

10-4

10-5

10-6

10-7
1 10 100 1000
Number of fatalities N
 METHODOLOGY

 REPORT = LOGICAL PRESENTATION OF ANALYSIS;

 Contain all referenced data or references to the sources,
 Conclusions should evaluate risk values against risk acceptance
criteria,
 Recommendations should be made for risk mitigation:
− Additional information or warning alarms and indications,
− Additional active or passive protection devices,
− Improved Procedures and Management Systems,
− Process or equipment modifications.
5 Strengths & Weaknesses RENOVATIONS

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 STRENGTHS / WEAKNESSES

 QRA STRENGTHS;
 Provides actual quantified risk (within analysis) that allows for
direct comparison of different risks posed by process plant.
 This allows effective cost-benefit analysis for risk mitigation
proposals.
 QRA WEAKNESSES;
 Information intensive.
 Commercial software can be expensive.
 Time consuming.
6 Additional Resources RENOVATIONS

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 ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

 FOR FURTHER INSIGHT, GUIDANCE AND

INFORMATION ON QRA REFER TO ANY OF THE
FOLLOWING;
 Risk Assessment and Risk Management for the Chemical
Process Industry, Greenberg and Cramer.
 Process Synthesis and Design, Kauffman.
 Process Reliability and Risk Management, Sutton.
 ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

 USEFUL WEBSITES;
 http://192.168.0.10/km/km5/identification.asp?
BV Knowledge Management website – BV Staff Only.
 http://www.icheme.org
The Institute of Chemical Engineers (UK).
 http://www.rsc.org
The Royal Society of Chemistry (UK).
 http://www.aicheme.org
The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (USA).
 http://www.acs.org
The American Chemical Society (USA).
THANK YOU RENOVATIONS

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