Philosophy and Nature of

Science
Part 1. Philosophy
Part 2. Philosophers
 Basic Questions
How do we know?
What is knowing?
Can we know with certainty?
Can we believe something with certainty?
Are there facts?
Is there truth?
Can an hypothesis be verified or falsified?
What Constitutes Evidence?
Is there a relationship between evidence and
hypothesis?

What evidence does one select to establish

an hypothesis?
 How Does One Do
SCIENCE?
Science does not adhere to the Baconian
procedure of observation before hypothesis,
hypothesis before testing.
It is more artistically driven. The scientist
responds to an observed event by curiosity.
The scientist follows up curiosity with
persistence having no sure and fixed method
to unravel the conundrum. Finally the
researcher employs memory to relate one
event to another and to avoid redundancy.
 Questions asked in the
philosophy of science
• Is science based on faith?
• What is the scientific method?
• How are new discoveries treated?
• Is everything reducible to physics and
mathematics?
• Is everything reducible to a few rules?
 Science and Faith
Some Articles of Faith

Science is based on articles of faith:

The universe is consistent over space and
time.
The universe is understandable.
We can understand the universe.
What’s valid here is valid there.
The universe is material and not spiritual
The universe is mathematical.
Experiment validates theory
 What Characterizes science?
• A method for retaining reliable knowledge about the
universe due to test and retest
• Science is a testing community
• Science seeks consistency not truth
• Science tells the best minimal story about the
universe. Pieces fit into a puzzle
• Science does not ask why, but asks how, what,
where, and when. Science seeks measurement
 Ideal Scientific Method
• Observation
• Repetition
• Induction(1)
Hypothesis
• Deduction or generalization
Consequence or prediction
• Testing
• Induction(2)
• Induction (1) not successful
 Critique of the Ideal scientific
Method
• What’s observed and studied depends on the
currently accepted explanation
• Explanation selects the observation
Explanation Influenced by:
Brain hardware
Gestalt formation
Optical illusions
Brain Software
Education
 Induction

induction
Observation -----------------> Hypothesis
 Induction
• Induction goes from effect to cause.
• Effect can possibly have many causes.
• A cause may have a single effect.
• Hypothesis is a kind of cause

caus effe
e ct
 Critique of Induction
• There is no logical way of going from
observation to hypothesis

• Hypothesis is a simple guess

• Frequently hypothesis precedes

observation
 Hypothesis, Theory, Fact
• Hypothesis are Guesses not logically
derivable from deduction or Induction

• Theories are statement of Probability

• Facts do not exist- nothing is 100%

certain
 Verification & Falsification
• What is meant by explanation?

• What is a fact?

• When is a Fact verified?

•
• How many observations needed?
 Deduction and Induction

induction
Observation ------------> Hypothesis

deduction
Hypothesis ------------> Observation
 Deduction
• If there is no cogent way of going from
observation to hypothesis (Tidak ada
cara yang menyakinkan dari observasi
ke hipotesa)
• Then there is no cogent way of
deducing from hypothesis to
observation
 Critique of Deduction

• Modern Science does not seek causes

but seeks relationship among variables
• Independent variables are not causes
and dependent variables are not effects
• If one knows Y =g(x), can one predict
(deduce) the future?
Verification (Pembuktian) and
Falsification (Pemalsuan)
• Replace Verification with Falsification
• Verification and falsification are asymmetrical
• Multiple verification does not establish a theory more
than a single verification
• A single falsification overturns a theory
It takes only one green swan overturns the theory
that all swans are white. Observing one million white
swans does no more to prove all swans are white
than witnessing ten white swans.
 Falsification (Pemalsuan)

• It is nearly impossible to falsify an hypothesis.

• Since a test depends on many factors it is difficult to
determine whether the hypothesis failed or one of the
other factors failed.
• Some failures of dependent factors:
precision and accuracy of instrumentation, correct
interpretation of data, flawless recording of data,
improper experimental conditions
Transition to Immanuel Kant

Rationalism and Empiricism

 Historical Overview
Rationalism

Descartes Spinoza Leibniz Wolff

Locke Berkeley Hume Kant

Empiricism
 Empiricism
• Basic tenets of Empiricism
– All knowledge comes from experience
– The mind is a blank slate (tabula rasa) (batu kosong)
– The mind is passive, merely a receptor of sense impressions
• Hume’s radicalizes these, ending in Skepticism
– Unbridgeable gap between sense impressions and objects in the
world
– All we know are ‘sensations’ playing in our minds
– The necessary ‘connectedness’ of experience is problematic
Causality is merely superstition, born of habit
 Rationalism
• Basic tenets of Rationalism
– Reason has access to reality as it really is
– Reason can go beyond what is given to us in experience
– Reason can then grasp things, not as they appear, but as they
really are
• The Leibniz-Wolffian School
– Reason (without experience) can know about God, immortality of
the soul, and human freedom
• Reason has direct access to “meta-physical” knowledge
 Part 2
• John Locke
• David Hume
• Immanuel Kant
• Thomas Bayes
• Karl Popper
• Thomas Kuhn
• Imre Lakatos
John Locke (1632-1704)

Introduction
John Locke
 Biography
• B. 1632, son of a small property-owner and lawyer
• Oxford, 1652-67
• Studied church-state issues, chemistry and medicine, new
mechanical philosophy
• Involvement in politics through Lord Ashley, whom he treated for
a liver abscess
• Plotted to assassinate King Charles II and his Catholic brother,
later James II
• Exile in Holland, 1683-89
• 1689: 3 major works published
 Major works and themes:
A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689)
- Argues for religious toleration;
- Except for atheists, “who deny the Being of a God”
and thus cannot be trusted to keep their promises
(e.g. in contracts).
Context:
- Religious wars and persecution in England and on the
Continent.
 Works, cont.
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689)
• Argues against innate ideas
• For the acquisition of knowledge through the senses:
“Intuitionism”
• Anti-Cartesian (Descartes)
• Re-opens debate about essentialism vs
conventionalism with his views on identity,
comparison, classification and natural kinds.
 Works, cont.
Two Treatises on Government (written 1679/80;
published 1689/90)
• First: Argues against traditional basis for
political authority expressed in Filmer’s
Patriarcha, divine right of kings;
• Second: protection of private property, life
and liberty = basis for civil government.
 Locke’s Basic Epistemology

• Human being = tabula rasa (blank slate)

• receives sense-impressions
• some of these transformed by Mind into Ideas
• Ideas represented in language by words
• However, no Ideas are innate
• Mind operates (through gradual learning process) w/out
reference to any received authority (of Church, State or others)
 Complex Ideas
• Sense-data of primary qualities (PQs)
and secondary qualities (SQs), produce
ideas in the mind:
• Ideas are mental results of sense-data
• -Sense-perceptions
• -Bodily sensations
• -Mental images
• -Thoughts and concepts
 Primary(PQ) and
Secondary Qualities(SQ)
Distinction between perceived aspects of things. The
primary qualities are intrinsic features of the thing itself
(its size, shape, internal structure, mass, and
momentum, for example), while the secondary
qualities are merely its powers to produce sensations
in us (its color, odor, sound, and taste, for example).
This distinction was carefully drawn by Galileo,
Descartes, Boyle, and Locke, whose statement of the
distinction set the tone for future scientific inquiry. But
Foucher, Bayle, and Berkeley argued that the
distinction is groundless, so that all sensible qualities
exist only in the mind of the perceiver.
 Attacks Innatism (Descartes)
(sifat bawaan)
Locke’s objections to innate ideas (“II’s”)
• Lack of universal assent: II’s not known to idiots,
children, illiterates
• Dependence on authority:
• “…a Man is not permitted without Censure (kecaman)
to follow his own Thoughts in the search of Truth,
when they lead him…out of the common Road”.
• Epistemological and political commitment to the
individual (who is the foundation of Locke’s political
liberalism).
 Revised, 11/21/03

David Hume
(1711-1776)

An Inquiry Concerning Human

Understanding
Anthem1

Anthem2
 1. Sensation & the Origin of
Ideas
The contents of the mind: (1) ideas & (2)
impressions (sensations & feelings) -- Ideas
(concepts, beliefs, memories, mental images, etc.)
are faint (redup) & unclear; impressions are strong
& vivid.
Ideas are derived from impressions: All ideas are
copies of impressions.
The meaning of ideas depends on impressions
 The empirical criterion of
meaning
"From what
impression is that
alleged (dugaan)
idea derived?"
No impression, no meaning?
No impression, no foundation in reality?
The Nature & Limits of
Human Knowledge
 Two kinds of ideas
(or judgments)
"All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided
into two kinds: relations of ideas and matters of fact".

"Hume's Fork"
 Judgments concerning relations of ideas

Ideas ("Hume's Fork")

Judgments concerning matters of fact

Judgments concerning relations of
ideas
 Intuitively or demonstrably certain
 Discoverable by thought alone [a priori]
 Cannot be denied without contradiction

*Hume's examples: Pythagorean Theorem

or
3 x 5 = 30  2
The Pythagorean Theorem
On a right triangle, the square of
the hypotenuse is equal to the
sum of the squares of the other
two sides

5'
4'
(hypotenuse)
2 2 2
3 +4 =5 3'
(9 + 16 = 25)
 Judgments concerning matters of
fact
"Every judgment concerning matters of fact
can be denied without contradiction" (e.g.,
"the sun will not rise tomorrow").
Neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain
Not discoverable by thought alone [a priori],
but rather on the basis of sense experience
[a posteriori]
More specifically,
 All judgments concerning
matters of fact are based on . .
..
the more fundamental] belief that
there is "a tie or connection"
between cause & effect.
And why do we believe that
there is a "tie or connection"
between cause & effect?

Answer: The belief arises entirely from

experience [a posteriori, not a priori],
namely, the experience of finding that
two events (cause & effect) are
"constantly conjoined" with each other.
It is not logically necessary
that a particular effect follows
a particular cause;

it is just a fact of experience.

This view leads to Hume's discussion of . . . .

3. The Nature & Limits of
Inductive Reasoning

(the problem of induction)

 Hume on Induction
 Induction is the process of drawing inferences
from past experiences of cause & effect
sequences to present or future events.
 Hume's point is that an "effect" cannot be validly
deduced from its "cause;"
 the inference from "cause" to "effect" is based
on past experiences of "constant conjunction,"
and these past experiences . . . .
accustom or habituate us

to believe that one event is the

cause of another, which we
believe to be the effect of the prior
event.

This is what leads us to believe that . . . .

the future will resemble the
past.

It is all a matter of CUSTOM or HABIT.

This is the foundation of . . . .

 The Idea that there is a
Necessary Connection
between Cause & Effect
If this is a meaningful (& true?) idea, then (according to
Hume) it must be derived from sense impressions.

What, then, is the sense impression from

which this idea is derived?
There is no sense impression
of causal power or necessary
connection of cause & effect,
but we do experience . . . .
 (1) the spatial contiguity,
 (2) the temporal succession, and
 (3) the constant conjunction

of "cause" & "effect."

 It is from this experience,
 especially the experience of constant conjunction,
 that the idea of a necessary connection between
"cause" & "effect" arises (or is inferred);
 but the "inference" is simply a matter of "custom or
habit."
 This seems to mean that the "inference" here is psycho-
logical rather than logical. Actually, there is no experience of
the necessary connection between cause and effect. Thus,
all factual judgments (which are based on the assumption
that there is a necessary connection between cause and
effect) are subject to doubt.
 No necessity, no certainty.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Immanuel Kant
• 1724-1804

• Lutheran (Pietist) background

• “Second Copernican Revolution”

in philosophy

• Spent all his life in Königsberg, a

small German town on the Baltic
Sea in East Prussia. (After World
War II, Germany's border was
pushed west, so Königsberg is now
called Kaliningrad and is part of
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Immanuel Kant
• At the age of fifty-five, Kant had published much
work on the natural sciences, taught at Königsberg
University for over twenty years, and achieved a
good reputation in German literary circles.

• During the last twenty-five years of his life,

however, Kant's philosophical work placed him
firmly in the company of such towering giants as
Plato and Aristotle.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Immanuel Kant
• Kant's three major works are often considered to
be the starting points for different branches of
modern philosophy:

the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) for the

philosophy of mind;
the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) for
moral philosophy;
and the Critique of Judgment (1790) for
aesthetics.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Immanuel Kant
• The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals was
published in 1785, just before the Critique of
Practical Reason.

• It is essentially a short introduction to the

argument presented in the second Critique.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant’s Intellectual Climate
• Kant lived and wrote during the Enlightenment.
This period produced the ideas about human rights
and democracy that inspired the French and
American revolutions. (Some other major figures of
the Enlightenment were Locke, Hume, Rousseau and
Leibniz.)
• The characteristic quality of the Enlightenment was
an immense confidence in reason, i.e. humanity's
ability to solve problems through logical analysis.
The central metaphor of the Enlightenment was a
notion of the light of reason dispelling the darkness
of mythology and misunderstanding.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant’s Intellectual Climate
• Enlightenment thinkers like Kant felt that history
had placed them in the unique position of being
able to provide clear reasons and arguments for
their beliefs.
• The ideas of earlier generations, they thought, had
been determined by myths and traditions; their own
ideas were based on reason.
(According to this way of thinking,
the French monarchy's claims to
power were based on tradition; reason
prescribed a republican government
like that created by the revolution.)
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• Kant's philosophical goal was to use logical
analysis to understand reason itself. Before we go
about analyzing our world, Kant argued, we must
understand the mental tools we will be using.
• In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant set about
developing a comprehensive picture of how our
mind – our reason – receives and processes
information.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• Kant later said that the great
Scottish philosopher David Hume
(1711-1776) had inspired him to
undertake this project. Hume, Kant
said, awoke him from an
intellectual "slumber."
• The idea that so inspired Kant
was Hume's analysis of cause-and-
effect relationships.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Hume
According to Hume, when we talk about events in
the world we say that one thing ‘causes’ another.

But nothing in our perceptions tells us that anything

causes anything else. All we know from our
perceptions is that certain events regularly occur
immediately after certain other events.

‘Causation’ is just a concept that we employ to

make sense of why certain events regularly follow
certain other events.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• Kant took Hume's idea and went one step further.
Causation, Kant argues, is not just an idea that we
employ to make sense of our perceptions. It is a
concept that we cannot help but employ. We don't
sit around watching events and then develop an idea
of causation on the basis of what we see. We
automatically bring the concept to bear on the
situation.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• Kant argued that causation and a number of other
basic ideas (e.g., time and space) are hardwired, as
it were, into our minds. Anytime we try to
understand what we see, we cannot help but think
in terms of causes and effects.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
Kant's argument has huge implications. If our
picture of the world is structured by concepts that
are hardwired into our minds, then we can't know
anything about how the world ‘really’ is.

The world we know about is developed by

combining sensory data (‘appearances’ or
‘phenomena,’ as Kant called them) with
fundamental concepts of reason (‘causation,’ etc.).

We don't know anything about the ‘things-in-

themselves’ from which sensory data emanates.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• This recognition that our understanding of the
world may have as much to do with our minds as
with the world has been called a “Copernican
Revolution” in philosophy – a change in
perspective as significant to philosophy as
Copernicus’s recognition that the earth is not the
center of the universe.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• Kant's insights posed a severe challenge to many
earlier ideas.
Ex.: Before Kant many philosophers offered
‘proofs’ of the existence of God.
One argument made was that there must be a
"first cause" for the universe. Kant pointed out that
the question of whether there "must" be a first
cause for the universe is irrelevant, because it is
really a question about how we understand the
world, not a question about the world itself.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• Kant’s analysis similarly shifted the debate over
free will and determinism. (Kant presents a version
of this argument in Chapter 3 of the Groundwork.)
When we use reason to understand why we
have made the choices we have, we can come
up with a causal explanation. But this picture is not
necessarily accurate. We don't know anything
about how things "really" are; we are free to think
that we can make free choices, because for all we
know this might "really" be the case.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• In the Critique of Practical Reason and the
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant
applies this same technique –using reason to
analyze itself – to determine what moral choices
we should make.
• Just as we cannot rely on our picture of the world
for knowledge about how the world "really" is, so
also we cannot rely on expectations about events in
the world in developing moral principles. Kant
tries to develop a moral philosophy that depends
only on the fundamental concepts of reason.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant’s Intellectual Climate: Criticisms
Some later thinkers have criticized Enlightenment
philosophers like Kant for placing too much
confidence in reason. Some have argued that
rational analysis is not the best way to deal with
moral questions.
Further, some have argued that Enlightenment
thinkers were pompous to think that they could
discover the timeless truths of reason; in fact, their
ideas were determined by their culture just as all
other people’s are.
 Karl Popper

• Popper replaces induction with falsification

• Science is not distinguished from non-science
on basis of methodology. No unique
methodology specific to science
• Science consists mostly of problem solving.
 Karl Popper

• All observations are selective and theory laden

• A demarcation between science and pseudo-
science is established by falsification. A theory is
scientific only if it is refutable by a conceivable
event
• Every genuine test of a scientific theory is based
on an asymmetry between verification and
falsification
 Sir Karl Popper (1902-1994)
• Falsification is the idea that science advances by
unjustified, exaggerated guesses followed by unstinting
criticism.

• Any "positive support" for theories is both unobtainable

and superfluous; all we can and need do is create theories
and eliminate error

• Scientists never actually use induction. It is impossible to

verify propositions by reference to experience
Falsificationism (1)
Scientific Method

• Is there a scientific method?

• What justifies scientific claims to
knowledge?
• Can we distinguish scientific method
from non-scientific ways of thinking?
(demarcation)
• Does science progress?
Falsificationism (1)
Falsificationism ‘No criterion of truth’:
Two Arguments:
2. No Theory/observation distinction:
• ‘Here is a glass of water’ is theory
laden
• In accepting the statement we must
accept a significant amount of theory
• We have only as much justification
for accepting the observation
statement as we do for the theory
Falsificationism (1)
Falsificationism ‘No criterion of truth’:
Two Arguments:
2. No Theory/observation distinction:
Upshot: we cannot use observation to
establish the truth of a theory

How can we establish the truth of

scientific theories?
We can’t!
Falsificationism (1)
Confirmation and Pseudoscience (ilmu semu)
Good scientific practice:
E.g. Einstein’s general relativity
Conjecture: mass of the sun bends the path of
light
Apparent
location

Actual
location

moon
 Falsificationism (1)
Confirmation and Pseudoscience
Good scientific practice:
E.g. Einstein’s general relativity
Conjecture: mass of the sun bends the path of
light
• If the apparent location of the observed star
doesn’t shift, the theory is wrong.
• It will have been refuted.
• The mark of a scientific theory is whether it
can be falsified by observation
 Falsificationism (1)
Conjecture and Refutation (dugaan &
sanggahan):
“Falsificationists… prefer an attempt to
solve an interesting problem by a bold
conjecture, even (and especially) if it
soon turns out to be false, to any recital of a
sequence of irrelevant truisms” (CR:
231)
This gives us:
(i) a glimpse (sekilas) of scientific method
(ii) a demarcation criterion for science
Falsificationism (1)
Scientific method:
Scientific theories have deductive
consequences
• They can be falsified but not confirmed.
• The objective of scientific theorizing is
to put forward (bold) hypotheses and
then test them in order to falsify them
• Theories are falsified by basic
statements
(what is a basic statement?)
Falsificationism (1)
Demarcation:
• Scientific theories are those that can
be falsified by basic statements.
• Good scientific theories do not make
themselves immune from falsification
by use of ad hoc hypotheses
Falsificationism (1)
Progress of Science:
• Science progresses by eliminating
theories that have been falsified?
• But does it progress?
• A scientific theory cannot be shown to
be true. But some scientific theories do
have varying degrees of success. They
resist falsification.
Falsificationism (1)

“We must not look upon science as a

body of ‘knowledge’, but rather as a system
of hypotheses which in principle cannot be
justified, but with which we work as long as
they stand up to tests, and of which we are
never justified in saying that we know
that they are ‘true’, or ‘more or less certain’ or
even ‘probable’
Kuhn (1)
Thomas Kuhn
(1922-1996)
The Copernican
Revolution (1957)
The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions
(1962)
• History of science not compatible with
rationalist view
• Progress of science not cumulative,
driven by the application of a method
Kuhn (1)
Thomas Kuhn
(1922-1996)
The Copernican
Revolution (1957)
The Structure of
Scientific
Revolutions (1962)
• No obvious science/non-science
demarcation
• No context of discovery/context of
Kuhn (1)
Kuhn’s History of Science
Two projects:
• Descriptive — what is the structure
of scientific history?
Normal science Scientific
revolution
• Explanatory — why does the history
of science have this structure?
Paradigms
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Descriptive Project:
Immature Science
Revolutio
n
Normal
Science
Crisis

Anomalie
 Paradigm Diagram
old paradigm unexplained observations competing new
paradigms
inc
ate ommen
sur

puzzle one dominant paradigm

solving Mopping up
operation

unsolved puzzles unexplained observations

ignored
unexplained observations
and alternative
interpretation ignored
until enough accumulates
to overturn current
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Immature Science:
No prevailing school of thought
Various disparate theories
Competition
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Normal Science:
• Stability
• Determination of significant facts
• Matching facts with theories
• Articulation of theories (refinement and
extension)
“puzzle -solving” neither tests nor confirms its
theories
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Normal Science:
• Driven by a paradigm (more later):
• Commonly held set of beliefs,
procedures, techniques
• Agreement upon questions of import
• Agreement on what counts as a solution
• Agreement upon standards of evaluation
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Anomalies:
Not all expectations are borne out
• Some anomalies lead to further
discoveries (e.g. orbit of Uranus)
• Some simply ignored
• Troublesome anomalies
Challenge key theoretical concepts
Resist solutions
Inhibit application of theory
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Crisis:
• Weight of accumulated anomalies
• No agreement on how anomalies
are to be dealt with
• Doubts arise
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Revolution:
A new paradigm emerges
Old Theory: well established, many
followers, politically powerful, well
understood, many anomalies
New Theory: few followers, untested, new
concepts/techniques, accounts for
anomalies, asks new questions
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Revolution:
A new paradigm emerges
Are old and new theories compared by
some rational procedure?
“A new scientific theory does not
triumph by convincing its opponents and
making them see the light, but rather
because its opponents eventually die,
and a new generation grows up that is
familiar with it” (Planck)
 Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Ptolemaic
model
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 Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Ptolemaic model

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Epicyc
How to explain le
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Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Ptolemaic
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 Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Ptolemaic Model:
Problems:
• Complexity: epicycle upon epicycle
• The accumulation of anomalies
• No clear way forward
 Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Copernican
model
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Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Copernican
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http://csep10.phys.utk.edu/astr161/lect/retrograde/copernican.html

The sun is at the centre of the solar

Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Copernican Revolution was not the
consequence of an old theory with less
‘empirical content’ being replaced by a new
theory with more
• No appeal to reason alone
• ‘propaganda’
To discover how scientific revolutions are
effected, we shall therefore have to examine
… the techniques of persuasive argumentation
within the quite special groups that constitute
the community of scientists (SSR: 94)
Kuhn (1)
2. Explanatory Project
Two Questions:
(i) If this is the course of the history
of science, why?
(ii) Why aren’t competing
theories/traditions measured
against each other by some
rational procedure?
Kuhn (1)
2. Explanatory Project
Paradigms
Disciplinary Matrix:
(i) Symbolic generalisations
(ii) Metaphysical commitments
(iii) Scientific values
(iv) Heuristic models
(v) Exemplars
Kuhn (1)
2. Explanatory Project
Why is normal science stable?
It is conducted wholly within the terms of a
disciplinary matrix:
questions
procedures
problems
priorities
standards of evaluation
All are generated by the disciplinary matrix
Kuhn (1)
2. Explanatory Project
Why is theory change revolutionary?
Theory change is brought about by a ‘gestalt
switch’ a complete change of world view

There is no neutral point from which one can

assess theories from two paradigms
simultaneously
 Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996)
• All research presupposes a world-view,a collection of
fundamental objects, natural laws, definitions, and above all a
definition of what research is.
• Kuhn called a world-view, paradigms

• Mature science have established paradigms

• Example of mature sciences are chemistry, physics, geology;
whereas, economics and psychology are
immature sciences.
 Paradigm
• Thomas Kuhn popularized the term in his book The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions (1996) by using it to describe how
science works. According to Kuhn, scientific explanations of
the world are controlled by a paradigm, some model of how
the world is expected to work and into which actual
observations are fitted, even if the fit is not very exact. As
inexact fits accumulate, it becomes more apparent that the
dominant paradigm is inadequate as a model of reality. When
enough contradictions exist, a paradigm revolution occurs and
a new paradigm is adopted.

• The word paradigm comes from the Greek paradeiknunai and

means "to compare." In science and philosophy it has the
same basic meaning as in common usage: a model or
instance used as a basis or example for further work.
 Need for Paradigms
• Research requires paradigms
• Paradigms are models of the way the world works
• Without paradigms research is a random collection of
observations lacking unification of structure into a
whole.
• Without paradigms, it is not possible to decide which
are and which are not important observations
 Dominant Paradigms

As a field matures, one paradigm

becomes the dominant one. Once
paradigms is established research
progresses quickly
 Paradigm guides direction of
Research
It becomes clear with aid of paradigm
which research areas are fruitful. These
areas are ones not totally explained

Paradigms give concepts and laws to

build on.
 Paradigm Shift
Paradigm shift occurs when old
paradigm shown inadequate

What is defined as research is reevaluated

Concepts turn upside down. Earlier research is
reinterpreted
 Real research
• Real Research occurs during a
paradigm shift
• Once a paradigm dominates, research
becomes puzzle solving
• Puzzle solving is not research due to
answers known beforehand
Example of Puzzle Solving
After Newton explained solar system,
later scientists using Newton’s theory
predicted
The presence of the then unknown
planets
Neptune, Uranus, and Pluto
 What New Paradigms Do
• Discovery of new paradigm results in
new questions being asked and old
questions abandoned
• Newton saw gravitation as a property of
matter. Earlier theories tried to find a
mechanical explanation as whirlpools in
space or angels.
 Paradigms are
Incommensurable
• Paradigms have different world view. It
is difficult to compare them

• Consequently, science defines truth

relative to a paradigm and not
absolutely. Truth is a story
 Science
• Science is a conformist society which present
only the currently accepted theory
Consequently science defines reality relative
to the accepted paradigm
• Students are educated into the accepted
paradigm and to ignore alternative paradigms
• The society of science determines what
scientists observe
 Imre Lakatos (1922 - 1974)
`

• All scientific theories are equally un-provable

• Falsification doesn’t work due to rescue hypotheses

• the "basic unit" of scientific development is not the

scientific theory, such that science progresses when one
theory proves to be more successful than another.
 Imre Lakatos

the "basic unit" is actually the research program.

Science progresses when one research program
becomes more productive and more useful than other
and, hence, receives a greater share of social resources
through funding and younger scientists looking to join.
A research program is characterized by a particular set
of "hard core" fundamental ideas and is deemed
successful so long as it contents continue to increase.
 Imre Lakatos

• In reality scientists do not abandon theories. They invent

rescue hypotheses or ignore anomalies or refutations

• Popperian crucial experiments and Kuhnian revolutions turn out

to be myths. What happens is progressive research replaces
degenerating ones.

• Progressive scientific programs predict and produce dramatic,

unexpected observations and results
Falsificationism
Popper
Science progresses toward its goal of increasing
verisimilitude by advancing bold conjectures and
then attempting to refute these by observations
• Theories cannot be verified by observation
—anti-inductivism
—no theory/observation distinction
• Theories are falsified by basic statements
• We choose between theories on grounds of
corroboration (mark of verisimilitude)
Falsificationism
Problems for Falsificationism (recap)
Falsification:
Some legitimate features of scientific
enterprise are not falsifiable:
• Probabilistic Statements
• Existential Statements
• Metaphysical Commitments
Falsificationism (finale)
Problems for Falsificationism
3. Basic Statements:
Theories are falsified by basic statements.
What warrants our acceptance of basic
statements?
(i) Observation?: No. Basic statements
are theory laden. Accepting them
requires accepting theory
(ii) Decision/convention: not grounded
in a rational procedure
Falsificationism (finale)
‘Whiff of Inductivism’
A Dilemma for Popper:
(i) Give up on induction
—No rational criterion for choosing
between competing theories
—No rational grounds for continuing to
use successful theories
(ii) Give up the distinctive features of
falsificationism
Falsificationism (finale)
Problems for Falsificationism
3. Basic Statements:
Theories are falsified by basic statements.
What warrants our acceptance of basic
statements?
(i) Observation?: No. Basic statements
are theory laden. Accepting them
requires accepting theory
(ii) Decision/convention: not grounded
in a rational procedure
Scientific Research Programmes
Revision versus Ad hoc Hypotheses
Two questions
In the light of anomalies:
(i) What should one change?
Principle of least change
(ii) When should one abandon a
theory(in favour of another)?
Scientific Research Programmes
Scientific Research Programmes (SRP)
A theory is:
• Rules of logic and mathematics
• Metaphysical commitments
• Statements of laws
• Assumptions about initial conditions
A SRP is a lineage of theories. SRP evolve
over time
Rules according to which SRP’s evolve over
time.
Scientific Research Programmes
Scientific Research Programmes (SRP)
Parts of a SRP:

Hard Core:
Theoretical assertions
Metaphysical
commitments
HC
Auxiliary Belt:
Initial conditions
A
Assumptions
B
Ad hoc hypotheses
 Scientific Research Programmes
Scientific Research Programmes (SRP)
Parts of a SRP:
e.g. Celestial Hard Core:
Mechanics Laws of Motion
Universal Gravitation
Space and time
HC
Auxiliary Belt:
A Number of planets
B Masses of planets