Protection

Requirements for
Power Distribution

NDPL Case
Studies
North Delhi Power Limited
 Flow of Presentation

•Overview of NDPL network

•
•Transformation for betterment
•
•Exploration in Relaying
•
•Exploitation of Relay facilities
•
•NDPL Case Studies
OVERVIEW
 Overview of NDPL Network
•NDPL is a Joint venture of TATA Power and Govt.
of NCT of Delhi
•
•NDPL looks after Power Distribution of North and
North-west area of Delhi
•
•Area of distribution network - 510 sq. km
•
•Total number of 66/33 KV Grid Stations – 59
•
•No. of Distribution Transformers – 9000
•
•Total no. of RMU’s - 8500
•
 Performance
Measurement
•NDPL has developed and maintained a Performance Index of Protection
since 2004 on a monthly basis
•
•Protection System Reliability has improved from 98.4% to 99.66%
•
•Reduction of uncoordinated tripping by 3-4 no’s every month has been
observed.
TRANSFORMATIO
N
 Transformation
•System reliability and availability is the main focus of
a power distribution utility.
•
•Protection and control system and its timely and correct
operation during faults is an important and crucial
aspect in efficient and successful operation of Power
distribution utilities.

•NDPL has completed its GSAS (Grid Substation Automation

Scheme) project in 2005

•Grids were commissioned with use of IED’s that are

compatible to SCADA
•
•This transformation from Electromechanical to Numerical
relaying lead to better system reliability.
Transformation ( Grid Stations )

After
GSAS in
Grid
Substati
ons
Transformation ( Distribution )
PRE- GSAS POST -GSAS

Old Switch Gears New Ring Main

Units
 Transformation Stages
PRE- GSAS POST- GSAS
Electromechanical relays were Numerical relays were used in
used in all the panels. all the new panels
commissioned after GSAS
No time synchronization feature Time synchronization
commissioning work. of all the
is available in the relay. Numerical relays with Data
Electromechanical relays are control center.
No FDR/
prone waveform/
to sluggish event list Availability of FDR /
operation.
can be downloaded and hence Waveform/Event in
Fault analysis becomes a milliseconds resolution helps in
Electromechanical
tedious job. relays are They areanalysis
detailed multifunctional IED’s
of various
single function relay. i.e. Measurement/ Protection/
faults.
Limitation of feature in the Inbuilt
Control.logic development
relay i.e. operational only for feature in the relay for the
selected protection element and purpose of better coordination.
no internal logic can be
developed.
Transformation Stages (Distributio

PRE- RMU/AR/PSS POST-RMU/AR/PSS

Sluggish Operation of the relay. Excellent Sensitivity and fast

operation.

No FDR / EVENT recording FDR/ EVENTS is recorded

which is useful for analysis.

Setting Coordination was a Better coordination between

major concern. grid and RMU can be obtained.
Expectations from newly adopted
relaying system
•Redundancy of Protection functions in terms of
ØMain/Backup relay.
ØMultiple protection elements.
•Communication compatibility for SCADA systems.
•Fast operation of the system with correct indication
•Improvement of the system with faster Corrective and
Preventive Actions.
•Efficient and Correct Fault Discrimination
•Record of Real time metering along-with its quality
features
•Online Diagnosis and relay setting
 Effective Distribution
Protection
ØApplication cum Coordination
Various characteristics like NI/VI/EI have been
effectively used from grid to RMU to accommodate stiffer relay
setting coordination of even 250ms.

ØSustainability :
Sustainability of the
settings has ensured proper
sealing of RMU relays.
EXPLORATION
 Improvement in System
Reliability
With IEDs used as relays, reliability of the Power System
improved due to various available functions.
•Faster relay operating time as low as 20 ms
•
•Effectiveness and Relay Co-ordination possibility on micro level by
utilizing multiple elements in the Relay. Almost all feeders
provided with High-set and IDMT Protection.
•
•As At feed end (DTL) only IDMT Protection is available best co-
ordination has been achieved by using DT-High set protection at our
end.
•
•Protection, Metering, Monitoring, Diagnosis and Control functions
can be performed from the one unit-IED
•
 Improvement in System
Reliability
•All Protection relays cum BCU’s are well protected with Password.
Separate Passwords for operation and Protection facilitate safe
Protection settings and eliminated tampering of the relay settings.
•
•Ultimate Goal of the Automation is to operate the system in
Unmanned mode. Mimic diagrams and friendly relay functions of the
Relay helps breakdown team to visualize and understand the fault
and operation.
•
•Additional Trip Supervision relay and wiring has been reduced by
using status inputs of the Numerical Relay.
•
•Following Logics has been Configured in the relay for having
effective control and Protection of the system without conventional
hard wiring.
•
1.CBFP cum LBB Scheme.
2.Reverse Blocking Scheme for Bus bar Protection.
3. No requirement of the Annunciation fascia due to
availability of sufficient Configurable LED’s on relay itself.
 Schemes / Logics
Implementation
•Important Projects/Logics includes:
•
•Reverse Blocking
•Local Breaker Backup
•Transformer Monitoring Unit
•CAP ON TAP
•Remote Relay Parameterization
•Multiple Relay setting groups
•Safety concerns tackled with
relaying
•Life assessment of Lightning
Arrestors
 Reverse Blocking
•Reverse Blocking scheme is very useful for having co-
ordination in tripping between 11 KV OG Feeder and 11 KV
Incomer Breaker of the Bus.
•
•All outgoing feeders send a blocking command for 50 ms to
prevent tripping of the Incomer breaker during heavy faults
and even in cases of delayed tripping of outgoing feeder
breaker.
•
•Control wiring has been reduced by around 30% owing to
facility of control logic development in the relay.
•
•No requirement of interposing CT’s and VT’s in the system
for relay operation.
•
•Ratio Correction facility will serve the purpose.
 Reverse Blocking
Reverse Blocking command is given by Outgoing feeders to
incomers/Bus-couplers to Block tripping of Incomers in case of
fault in 11 KV Outgoing feeder.

I>>> start

ers of Section
I>> start - 1
BLOCK HIGH SET I/C#1
I> (IDMT)

I< low

OR
BLOCK HIGH SET OF B/C
Reverse Blocking
Io>>> start command

Io>> start

Io> (IDMT) BLOCK HIGH SET OF I/C#2

Io< low B/C ON

&
 Reverse Blocking ( Cont .)
•Fault on one of the Outgoing feeder was being induced in the other one.
•This causes tripping of the incomer on account of summated timing

11 KV Incomer tripping al
Due to fault summation at

11 KV Incomer -1
 Reverse Blocking ( Cont .)
•ADLI Approach lead to rectification of Problem
•
•APPROACH: Specific type of fault was studied
•
•DEPLOYMENT: New Scheme implemented in 61850 compliant grid
stations
•
•LEARNING: On the lines of the scheme implemented in soft form
in 61850 compliant grid stations. New scheme designed for Grid
stations working on older standards is designed.
•
•INTEGRATION: The learning is integrated across all NDPL grids
and that helped a lot in increasing reliability of the network.
•
rectional Protection for parallel feede

•Parallel feeders are protected with the

help of a combination of directional as
well as non-directional relays
•
•Helpful in cases where we have stiff
margins in long feeders through a series of
grid stations.
•
•Directional relays are also effectively
used for protection of Line as well as Bus-
Bar by using Tri-mode settings.
•
•Use of relays in Tri-mode helps in reducing
the restoration time compared to that could
have been taken if the bus fault has been
cleared by DTL station.
 CBFP Protection
Circuit
• 1
•
•
1 •
2 200 ms Trip
3 & Time delay
& Upstream
Breaker
4
1.I>>> Start up (Used for CBFP Only)
2.Breaker in service
3.Breaker Close
4.86 Operated
Transformer Monitoring Units
•TMUs have replaced the older RTCC panels and enabled high control
over transformers
•
•Use of TMUs as IED in system has made the Transformer
functionality more accurate and redundant one.
•
•Some of the important features of TMU are:
•Voltage control/Regulation through various logics
•High speed Forward Backward Switching of OLTC for Voltage
control
•Fan control through temperature settings.
•Display of Voltage/Current/Power/Power factor etc and can
be used as Output also for remote indication.
•Event log of the selected functions.
•Recorder mode monitoring of OTI/WTI/VOLTAGE CURRENT in
Dual Parameters at a Time.
•Correct calculation based on Algorithm for WTI with input
of OTI/LOAD OF Transformer/Winding exponent/Time
constant of winding
 CAP ON TAP
•There was always a thrust within us to provide quality power to
our consumers.
•
•It lead to start of Automatic Tap changers for voltage/reactive
power control from 2007 onwards
•
•OLTCs were integrated with our Transformer Monitoring Units
(AVR)
•
Tap a
•But every solution comes with operations
problemincreased
. drastically
•
High maintenance cost and Equipment Breakdown !
Conventional Automatic Voltage Regulation

33 / 66 KV
unregulated
Input
Voltage

Automatic
Voltage
Regulator
Power
Transformer with
ON - LOAD Tap
Changer

Capacitor Bank

11 KV
regulated
output
voltage
 CAP ON TAP
33 / 66 KV
unregulated
Input
Voltage

Automatic
Voltage
Regulator
Power
Transformer with
ON - LOAD Tap
Changer

Capacitor Bank

11 KV
regulated
output
voltage
 Underlying logic used …..
Cap . Bank CB
status

K101 K102
U17 U18 11 12

52A ( Cap . Bank ) AVR ( Input - Cap . Bank Close ) Trip

Breaker +
Display On
AVR Signal + Relay Panel
Breaker and at CLD
O / V mo nitored Close ? through
by AVR SCADA
network

K101 Rela AVR Signal

S 53 50 7 8 y + Breaker
Open +
R8 ( O / V ) TMU I13 ( Relay - Open ) Efficacy
Time +
U/V I> Protection
monitored by monitored OK?
AVR by AVR
Rela
y
53 51 35 36 1 2
Close
R7 ( U / V ) AVR R4 (> I ) AVR I21 ( Relay - Close ) Breaker +
Display On
Relay Panel
and at CLD
K102 through
SCADA
network
crease in Power Quality after CAP on
P
Remote Relay Parameterization
•It is a concept that deals with connecting to the relays from a
remote location for the purpose of retrieving data.
•
•Connection to the relays from a remote location is done to enable
a distant user to retrieve Fault Data Records, along with making
configuration changes in terms of Relay settings.
•
•Remote parameterization is done for the following purpose:
•Downloading of Fault Data Records
•Changing the Relay settings according to Power flow
•Configuration changes in the relays
•Mitigating issues pertains to n/w changes
•
Relay setting and Centralized Fault
Data Downloading
 Advantages of RRP
PROFIT
•Downloading of Fault data from a central location would save considerable
amount of manpower and time.(There is saving of about 20-25 Km run daily
along with daily saving of 8-10 man-hours)
•
•Relay settings can be changed quickly after any updation in NOC to save
on MU’s lost in case of uncoordinated trippings due to inappropriate
settings.
•
•Exploiting of available features in relay with use of new/innovative
technology would lead to better utilization of available resources.
•
PEOPLE
•Time saved in commutation to the sites for downloading FDR’s could be used
by employees for other analysis/works.
•
PLANET
•There would be considerable saving in carbon credits due to saving in
commutation of engineers/technicians to site.
Multiple Relay setting groups
•Existing facility of multiple setting groups used to easily
change settings.
•
•With any updation in NOC, relay settings need coordination with
respect to new power flow.
•
•Non-updated/wrong relay settings can lead to uncoordinated
trippings
•
•Relay settings are entered in groups with reference to
generally used Normal operating conditions.
•
•These different setting groups are then activated through
local/remote signals for the specific NOC.
•
•It increases reliability and usability of the network.
e assessment of Lightning Arres
•NDPL has recently done residual life assessment of the Lightning
arrestors installed at its Grid stations to avoid damage to Bay
equipments owing to LA failure.

•Monitoring of the following attributes has been done to check the

life expectancy of the metal oxide arrestors in service.

•True RMS of the total leakage current.

•Peak value of the total leakage current.
•True RMS of the third harmonic in leakage current.
•
•
•These online tests were performed by using a Metal Oxide Surge
Arrester Test Set (SCAR-10, make-ISA)
•
•Tests were done according to IEC standard 60099-5 A1 ED. 1.0
Section 6: “Diagnostic indicators of metal-oxide surge arresters
in service – Method B1 and B2”
•
e assessment of Lightning Arrest
•Algorithms were developed and the LA’s were kept in three categories:
•RED Immediately replaced
•YELLOW Next assessment within 3 months
•GREEN Next assessment after 1 year
DECISION CRITERIA USED
EXPLOITATION
Exploitation of Relay
facilities
Harmonics Analysis of NDPL distribution System

•9 NDPL grids were covered in this case study.

•
•Following data pertaining to harmonics was taken from
Schneider PM 500 Series meters: -
•Line to line voltage THD.
•Phase voltage THD.
•Line Current THD.
•Instantaneous Loading
•
All the data was taken from the PM500 (Schneider) meters
connected to the C&R panels of all the outgoing feeders at 11
KV side.

Bus PT (potential transformer) gave voltage THD and CT (current

transformer) connected to the outgoing feeders gave current THD.
 Standards for Harmonics
Limitation
IEEE/IEC
•IEEE 519-1992 Standard: Recommended Practices and
Requirements for Harmonic Control in Electrical
Power Systems (Current Distortion Limits for 120v-69kv
DS)
Table 1: Current Harmonic Limits

Ratio
< 20 Harmonic
4.0 % odd Harmonic
0.3 % odd THD-i
5.0 %
Iscc / Iload numbers (<11) numbers (>35)
20 - 50 7.0 % 0.5 % 8.0 %
50 - 100 10.0 % 0.7 % 12.0 %
>1000 15.0 % 1.4 % 20.0 %

41
 Standard of Harmonics
Limitation
•IEEE 519-1992 Standard: Recommended Practices and
Requirements for Harmonic Control in Electrical
Power Systems (Voltage Distortion Limits)
Table 2: Voltage Harmonic Limits
•
• Voltage Harmonic limit as THD-v (%)
Bus Voltage
• <= 69Kv 3.0 5.0
(%) of Fundamental
•
69 - 161Kv 1.5 2.5
•
• >= 161 Kv 1.0 1.5
•
•

42
 H a rm o n ic M e a su re m e n ts
•PCC showing THD higher than the permissible limits is
investigated thoroughly to obtain the spectrum of voltage and
current waveform.
•
•THD is obtained from energy meters attached to the C&R
panels. Examples of such meters are PM500 (Schneider), Ref542+
(ABB), S80 etc.
•
•Power quality analyzer is used to obtain voltage and current
spectrum. Example of such instrument is Fluke power quality
analyzer.
•
•In second phase we would segregate different harmonics and
accordingly design mitigation techniques for specific
feeders.
Exploitation of Relay
facilities
• Detailed study of
∑kA²
•

• Data helps in analysis of Residual Life of Breakers.

• Predictive maintenance.
• Life Extension by swapping of Breakers.
• Fault level Studies.
•
•Way Forward

• Algorithm development based on Tripping.

• Life analysis of the Breakers
• Recommendations for future procurements of breaker
•
Detailed study of
∑ kA² 11 KV Trippings details atWAZIRPUR-1 Grid
∑kASqr.
S No Fdr Name Total 0-2In 2-5In 5- 10- >40In
1 shunt capac -3 253 65 26 10In
12 40In
148 0
2 b-67 wzp ind area 1468 80 1095 273 20 0
3 smb 5-a 1167 0 19 202 946 0
4 c.e.t plant a.v 175 0 14 45 116 0
5 d.s.i.d.c shed 21 w.i.a 285 0 24 21 240 0
6 b 32/2 w.i.a 44 0 10 3 31 0
7 enf office fdr w.i.a 845 0 35 67 743 0
8 I/C no.-3 2597 103 616 1877 0 0
9 bus section-2 1228 39 457 130 602 0
10 shunt capac-2 74 41 29 3 0 0
11 g.i.a -1A w.i.a 583 0 24 30 529 0
12 bc block w.i.a 745 0 22 67 654 0
13 c&a w.i.a 1337 0 32 77 1228 0
14 bb-1 block ashok vihar 279 0 41 39 199
15 kd block-1 283 0 41 21 221 0
16 smb-3A 451 0 33 0 418 0
17 I/C-2 1161 63 845 252 0 0
18 bus section -1 1007 74 210 403 320 0
19 I/C -1 553 105 266 182 0 0
Distribution Fault Restoration
using FPI’s
nFault occurrence
oUpstream Breaker Opens
oFPI indicate fault
o

NO
CASE STUDIES
 Tripping Analysis report for 11 KV Mithila
Vihar feeder along - with 11 KV Incomer .

DETAILS OF EVENTS
•11 KV Mithila Vihar feeder tripped along-with 11 KV Incomer
•
OBSERVATIONS
•Total load of the station is around 800 Amps and System is keeping
total load on any of the transformer keeping the other
transformer on no load.
•Mithila Vihar feeder tripped on over current High set.
•11 KV Incomer-2 tripped on over current High set.
•Fault data record of the Incomer show’s that Fault seen by 11 KV
Incomer is 9.1 KA while fault seen by Mithila Vihar feeder is 6.2
KA.
•It is observed that Nithari feeder was also seen the fault but not
tripped due to isolation of the fault. Protection settings were
coordinated and CT Ratio adoption was found correct.
•
CONCLUSION
After going through the tripping events it was observed that both
feeders were getting tripped simultaneously.
 CASE STUDY ( Contd ..)

•After going through the fault data record, it is very clear

that fault seen by Incomer is always on higher side as
compared to the outgoing feeder.

•The tripping in the incomer occurs as the fault current “seen”

by the incomer breaker is a summation of the outgoing faults.

•Both the outgoing feeders were routed on the same poles and on
same cross arm. Thereby, the occurrences of birdage in both
the feeders occur simultaneously.
•
•We have identified around twenty feeders that emerges from the
same bus and have same route, as a corrective action we
changed the emerging bus of those feeders.
Transformer Tripping on
differential protection
 PTR - 2 Tripping on differential
protection at Badli Grid .
OBSERVATION
•Stray DC Current component was present in R Phase current at the time of
event.
•It was also confirmed from the event that DC Ingress has caused the
tripping.
•It was confirmed that no ingress was there through external cabling.
•Even after isolating external circuit, Relay has generated tripping.
•Waveform of this particular event was showing that tripping is purely due
to DC Component of the current in CT Circuit. It also shows that after
decay of the DC Current Output relay got reset.
•
CONCLUSION
•It is confirmed that Tripping is due to intermittent DC Ingress in R
Phase Secondary of HV CT Circuit especially.
•In modular type Duo-bias relay, two separate modules are there for power
supply as Well as CT Circuit. It seems DC is getting mixed up in CT
Circuit within the relay.
•
CORRECTIVE ACTION
•Suitable input was given to the OEM for correction in the barrier plate
between power supply module and CT card.
 Malfunctioning of Directionality
sense
•On analysis of the cases, we found that the open delta voltage
from the installed IVT’s was causing the spurious trippings.
•
•The cause was mainly because of ageing effect of the IVT’s in the
circuits.
•
•Afterwards we started to make open delta with the spare core of
PT’s in the yard and extending that to the relays.
 CT Saturation leading to
differential fault
•Earlier transformer tripping on differential leads to a series of
transformer tests that are carried out to ascertain the health of
transformer.
•
•In some cases a through fault lead to saturation of CT that causes
tripping on differential protection.
•Tests on CT indicated
that knee point voltage
of PS Class CT Core has
got reduced due to
Saturation.
•
•
 CT Saturation leading to
differential fault
•A New feature of the Numerical relay can discriminate CT
Saturation.

•After the analysis we ascertained using the Saturation

Discrimination function for reliability of differential
protection schemes for transformers
• Thank you.

North Delhi Power Limited