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Presentation Agenda
Evolving Direction Current Status Caveat DoD/NSA Approved Cryptography DoD PKI Roadmap 2000 CAW & Fortezza Card Usage Policy
Evolving, particularly for classified information Trying to move from all expensive custom equipment to leverage off COTS products and standards where feasible Trying to move from point to point encrypted links to more modern and dynamic environments (e.g. SecureXML) Complicated by new types of foreign military coalitions Complicated by new types of domestic coalitions (local law enforcement, fire departments., etc.) in homeland security
Changes still being made Recent roadmaps are being changed Major problems still unsolved, especially for coalitions
Patriot Act supposedly removed the coalition data sharing issue between FBI law enforcement and intelligence But lots of very expensive old crypto gear is still used by military and intelligence (legacy problem)
CAVEAT
This talk has the most recent information released on the web (and even pre-web info) Some of it is already out of date for new deployments But a most of is still currently in use in places When you start your federal job, find out what is in place for your organization
An approved algorithm An implementation that as been approved for the protection of classified information in a particular environment; nearly always a dedicated device A supporting key management infrastructure
Privacy Act (1974): requires government to safeguard personal data on government systems DoD Directive C-5200.5 (1982) (revised 1990) defined basic crypto for classified data National Security Decision Directive 145 (1984):Mandates protection of both classified and sensitive (SBU) data. Guidance to come from NSA. (Revised by NSD 42, 1996) OMB Circular A-130 (1985) Management of Federal Information Resources: All federal IT systems required to provide a level of security against unauthorized access, commensurate with sensitivity, risk, and harm that could result from such access.
Computer Security Act of 1987 (1988): updates the Privacy Act of 1974. Standards and guidance for non Warner Amendment unclassified intelligence related data to come from NIST (then called the National Bureau of Standards) National Security Directive 42 (1990): Limits NSA involvement to classified and Warner Amendment unclassified data
Note that these relate primarily to confidentiality. NSA, DoD, NIST all have policies based on these and other basic laws/directives.
For Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) government communications; Warner Amendment unclassified data
Type 3 - Interoperable Inter-Agency (Federal, State and Local) & Commercial Use
NIST-approved data encryption standards (DES, AES, etc.) Not a federal standard, not used for federal info Exportable, for Commercial & International use
Type 4 - Proprietary
NSA is responsible for Type I, II; NIST for Type III standards
Algorithms
Last 2 decades: Baton (crypto), Skipjack (crypto), Firefly (Key exchange) originally classified; now declassified Since 2003, AES is also allowed
128 bit and higher for Secret 192 bit and higher for TS and above
Keys
True random numbers needed Generation based on physical phenomena Historic: centrally generated and tested by NSA
Difficult distribution problem Now used for special purpose keys Session keys generated by NSA approved embedded hardware (e. g.,leaky resistor for random noise generation)
Hardware design approved by NSA Usually a separate hardware device (box, card) is required Careful attention to red-black separation
Orange Book B2 equivalent or better Check for covert channels, sneak circuits Check for cross-talk (EMSEC) Failure modes cannot allow for red to black link to open
Still lots in use New technology used to emulate old devices for compatibility KG 175 Taclane classic IP (7 Mb/sec) and ATM KG 75 Fastlane Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) virtual circuit encryptor KG 189 SONET backbone encryptor STE encrypting phone High Assurance IP Encryption (HAIPE) program
Recent
Multiple products now and in development NSA adaptation of IPSEC protocol for session setup, mutual authentication, key exchange, and headers
Key materials on Fortezza Smart Card/Crypto Engine Approved for Classified use Phone not classified when card is removed
5 (Classified)
In person
Type 1
For Encryption: key & device must have classification & assurance level not lower than contents encrypted For Key Management: key issuer must have classification & assurance level not lower than key user; issuer may invalidate keys
For PKI: PKI & CA must have classification & assurance level not lower than certificates it issues
Two communication endpoints must have same classification & assurance level
NIST/FIPS approved for protecting sensitive (SBU) electronic data Reviewed & analyzed by NSA for classified data
Algorithm allowed for classified, unclassified, & commercial use Crypto device needs NSA approval for classified Government agencies may send system specification to NSA for an NSA-developed implementation 128-bit key & above are suitable for SECRET info TOP SECRET info requires 192 or 256 bits
Key Management
- 1. Keys for Classified Information
Keys and key material (e. g., hardware tokens) have a classification level (S, TS, SBU, etc.)
Key classification level must be >= information classification Keys are handled the same as any other information at that level
Identify and labels Access control, with storage in approved containers Inventory Possible compromises reported to ISSO Approved destruction
When a secure communication link is set up using PKI, endpoints make sure that the other end is using a key of the right classification level.
Key Management
- 2. Key Transfer
Key material:
Sending new keys to a remote device over the communications link (keys are encrypted) & automatically loading the crypto devices
NSA
KMI/PKI Today
Root Root
DISA
Commercial
Operations
Physical
Manual Systems
A framework for generation, production, distribution, control, revocation, recovery, & tracking of public keys (certificates) & their corresponding private keys
Uses CAW & Fortezza cards for a X.509-based PKI Has a modular design, conforms to federal standards, being an integral component of DoD KMI, focuses on a single (Class 4) assurance level, evolves in phases Existing: Class 3 PKI: Releases 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 (DoD PKI 1999) Underway: Class 4 PKI: Releases 4.0, 5.0, 6.0 (DoD PKI 2000)
Implemented in phases:
The Users: Subscribers (direct users) & Relying Parties (indirect users)
Uses the certificates (encryption & signing) Binds user to public key pair Level of trust determined by level of info verification
generate, produce, distribute, control, track & destroy public/private key pairs & associated PK certificates
Funding/Resources (managed by NSA/DISA & relevant agencies) Scheduling (uses project management strategies) Application Development Risks (availability & interoperability of PKI implementations) Technical Risks (managed by technical strategies)
Scalability, interoperability, transparency, security. Directories, transition, support for tactical operations, support to OCONUS/Theater Operations, communication capabilities, etc.
LRA
Web-based
y Ke W
Cert Cert
Password
2 3
Public Key
b-b e
d se a
Auto
Cert
User
Relying Party
Pull
Private Key
CAW is a trusted hardware platform used to create certificates & place X.509 certificates on Fortezza cards CAW is operated by a certificate authoring team
Certificate Authority (CA): certification work System Security Officer/System Administrator (ISSO/SA): hardware operator
Fortezza cards are tamper-resistant PCMCIAcompliant devices (portable hardware tokens) used to store DoD-issued X.509 certificates & private keys, trademarked by NSA
Fortezza Cards
PCMCIA (card bus)-compliant hardware Implements NSA/NIST-compliant crypto standards for network security Used by DoD organizations & individuals tamper-resistant = destroy key on malicious attempts
SECRET Classified: Fortezza for Classified (FFC) [Red label] Unclassified: Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) [White label] Unclassified when locked with owners PIN Classified as same level as its highest-level certificate (if multiple certificates present) 3 consecutive failed PIN checks disables card; only CAW can re-enable card and/or change PIN
PIN-protected:
Security breaches & policy violations associated with a Fortezza card must be reported
E.g. card loss/misuse/tampering/duplication, PIN compromise, user info changes/user leaves, certificate misuse, unattended terminals, etc.
user must sign & return the User Advisory Statement (UAS) within (up to) 60 days of delivery or the certificate will be considered compromised
X.509 Certificate Policy for the U.S. Federal PKI Common Policy Framework
Users w/ software crypto modules (class 2/3) Users w/ hardware crypto modules (class 4/5) Policy for devices
Mandates 2048-bit RSA or 224-bit elliptic curves & SHA224 or SHA-256 hashing Consistent with RFC-2527 X.509 certificate format, with only the certificate management policies, identity verification methods, various certificate field formats (unique name formats, revocation list formats, etc.), and key archival policies being specified for usage in governmental programs / DoD Includes a guideline for operational security (physical / procedural / personnel) & technical security controls Used in the civilian side of the government
References
Public Key Infrastructure Roadmap for the Department of Defense, Version 5.0, 18 December 2000 X.509 Certificate Policy for the U.S. Federal PKI Common Policy Framework, Version 2.2, 29 March 2005 The Certificate Authority Workstation white paper CNSS15FS CNSS Policy No. 15, Fact Sheet No. 1, National Policy on the Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to Protect National Security Systems and National Security Information, June 2003 DoD Public Key Infrastructure Tutorial
http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/contentmgmt/PKI%20Tutorial.ppt