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food crisis Topic: Some successes and failures of African subsidy policies in the agricultural sector Date: 3 November 2008
Lindiwe Majele Sibanda (CEO, FANRPAN) lmsibanda@fanrpan.org
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Outline of Presentation
About FANRPAN Level of the FOOD Insecurity Crisis Policy Responses Subsidies FANRPAN Studies on Input Subsidies Recovery vs Rescue Plans
FANRPAN
Network Topography
CSOs Farmers Government Malawi Zimbabwe Botswana Namibia Zambia
Node Secretariat
Private Sector
Researchers
Angola
Mozambique Madagascar
Lesotho
Tanzania
Mauritius
Farmers Organisations
FANRPAN
Development Partners
Objectives
Convince policymakers that the issue does indeed require attention Inform policymakers of the options and build a consensus
Network roles
Marshall evidence to enhance the credibility of the argument Extend an advocacy campaign Foster links among researchers, CSOs and policymakers Collate good-quality representative evidence and act as a resource bank Channel international resources and expertise into the policy process Build long-term collaborative relationships with policymakers Bypass formal barriers to consensus Enhance the sustainability and reach of the policy Act as dynamic platforms for action Provide good-quality representative evidence and feedback Link policymakers to policy end-users Provide a dynamic environment for communication and collaborative action Provide support and encouragement Provide a means of political representation
Formulation
Implementation
Evaluation
Underlying
Corn
$10 $9 $8 $7 $6 $5 $4 $3 $2 $1 $0
/3 1
/0
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Wheat
$14 $12 $10 $8 $6 $4 $2 $0
/3 1
/0
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A Food Secure Africa Free From Hunger and Poverty Profitable enterprises along the whole agric. value chain: (inputs, farming, processors, wholesalers, retailers, households, etc.)
Why subsidise?
Fertilisers and improved seeds at lower cost=reduction in disincentives to adoption that stem from farmers cash constraints, risk aversion and low expectations of returns from investments in inputs.
To encourage economically and technically efficient use of inputs. Means for raising farm incomes, particularly where farmers were being taxed in other ways through export tariffs and low fixed domestic prices
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1. To bring about policy changes for enhancing input s to small farmers. 2. To develop training materials for policy analysts to engage in complete policy analysis cycle.
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Swaziland Neighbourhood Care Points Public Assistance Grants Chiefs Fields Food and Inputs for OVC Zambia Food Security Pack Social Cash Transfer Pilots
Agriculture input subsidies a common element in agricultural development in poor rural economies Responsible for successful green revolutions such as the in the Asian green revolution.
Dominant donor thinking- subsidies seen as ineffective and inefficient policy instruments in Africa, Subsidies seen as contributing to government over- spending and fiscal and macro- economic problems.
2000-2008
A resurgence of interest in agricultural input subsidies in Africa, emergence of innovative subsidy-delivery systems.
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MALAWI Story
Malawis economy - agro based with 85% depending and surviving on subsistence farming. Agriculture sector generates over 90% of the countrys export earnings. Contributes 40% of the GDP. Smallholder sector with 3.2 million households less than 1 ha of land. Smallholder sub-sector dominates with a contribution of 75% of the food crop production in the country. Since Malawi got independence in 1964, the agricultural sector has undergone through several policy reforms.
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Objectives of AISP
Long term
Immediate
Improve accessibility and affordability of agricultural inputs among the most vulnerable farmers in the country
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2004/2005
2005-2007
the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) launched- financed by Government of Malawi, DfID, Norway, EU, WB, Irish aid, UNDP
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Improve national food security Improve accessibility and affordability of agricultural inputs among the most vulnerable farmers in the country
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3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
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BACKGROUND TO ISP
2005/2006 ISP 147,000 mt of fertiliser for both maize and tobacco production A surplus of approximately 500,000 mt of maize 2006/2007 ISP 176,000 mt of fertiliser
193,000 mt 23,500 mt
Expected harvest: 1-3 tons maize Landed maize cost per ton: USD 284
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2005/2006 ISP
147,000 mt of fertiliser for both maize and tobacco production A surplus of approximately 500,000 mt of maize 176,000 mt of fertiliser 156,000mt for maize growers 20,000 mt for tobacco growers A surplus of about approximately 1.1 million mt of maize 216,500 mt of fertiliser 193,000 mt 23,500 mt A surplus of about approximately 500,000 mt of maize has been produced
2006/2007 ISP
2007/2008 ISP
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Dates are announced in advance for the beneficiaries to gather at an open fora Those registered receives the coupons as follows:
Maize growing NPK (23:21:0 + 4S), Urea & Maize seed coupons Tobacco D Compound (8:18:15) & CAN Others flexible coupons (cotton, ground nuts, common beans, soya beans, pigeons peas).
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LOGISTICS UNIT
BENEFICIARIES
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Program Expenditures
Description Suppliers of fertilizer Transporters Redemption of fert. coupons Redemption of seed Coupon Operational costs Other Costs Total Actual Expenditure 10.7 billion 859 million 3.2 billion 1.05 billion 304 million 654 million 16.7 billion % OF Total 64 5 19 6 2 4 100
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2004
1.733.125
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Zambias Experience
Strategies for promoting increased use of improved inputs should heed the lessons of the past.
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Subsidies went to relatively wealthy farmers rather than intended beneficiaries. Program difficult to implement input subsidy extremely high costs, undesirable market and distributional effects.
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Targeting Abuse
Political expediency
Transparency & accountability
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Subsidies to boost the performance of farmers Subsidies to keep food costs below market prices
AFRICA: 1970-90s
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Policy Responses
How African Governments have responded to food crisis Short Term Responses Knee jerk reaction / striking the match
Policy action Number of countries implementing 5 Probable consequences
Short-term policies
Conditional cash transfers, e.g. cash-for-work, food-forwork programmes Self targeted food-forwork programmes
Not feasible for low income countries, require high administrative capacities Less costly than administrative targeting, physical food transfer may lead to significant leakages Physical food transfer may lead to significant leakages, disincentive to producer supply response Do not address malnutrition at 34 infancy
Policy Responses
How African Governments have responded to food crisis Medium Term Responses Case of Subsidy / extinguishing the fire
Policy action Number of countries implementing 8 4 Probable consequences
Mediumterm
Reduction in tariffs and other taxes (VAT) on key staples Food consumption subsidies for the poor, e.g. price subsidies, ration card systems, etc. Bans or taxes on grain exports
Reduction in fiscal revenues Create disincentives for domestic food producers if entrenched, require high fiscal costs Limited impact on domestic prices, negative earnings for producers and exporters, sharp price fluctuations for net importing countries High fiscal costs management and governance, price effects not clear Private sector involvement, improved market efficiency
Grain buffer stock policies Market based risk management tools, market information systems
5 1
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Policy Responses
How African Governments have responded to food crisis Long Term Responses Making the bread basket / investment (risk sharing) Who invests in Infrastructure
Policy action
Probable consequences
Long-term
Increased investment in agriculture sector R&D Investments in infrastructure inland transport links between surplus and deficit areas Support to an equitable international trading system
2 2
1
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SUDOKU games- Business of numbers: 10% national budgets to agric sector; 6% annual growth for sector NEPAD CAADP- Africans driving an African agenda
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2008 food crisis and plus 3 Fs (Fuel, Fertilizer, Financial) calls for lasting solutions and not rescue plans
Bold visionary leadership Investment in infrastructure Institutional reforms Credible data for policy development Home grown solutions (optimize on local resources (human and financial) and with AID for gap filling Evidence Backed Advocacy (policy dialogues, radio, TV, print, online)
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Role of CSOs
Who
Ordinary Citizens
Farmer Organisations Research Organizations
What
Demilitarise and empower with evidence to strengthen advocacy and hold GVT to account
Honest , credible leadership, set the agenda communicate issues Relevance, Credibility, Consistency, North-South and South to South Partnerships Inter disciplinary and multi-disciplinary teams Longitudinal studies Contribute to policy process in a transparent manner
Rallying point for CSO engagement, editorial, opinion pieces, commentaries, features, profiles, hard news, photo journalism, story telling, visual and personally, analysis Empowerment, Have a voice and insist on being heard; Honest representation
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Policy Processes
Issue
Participation
The elite, educated, technocrats , economists participate Unreliable data, Weak infrastructure for data collection Weak analytical skills Knee jerk reaction
CSOs participate and add value to policy processes Evidence is a public good and all citizens have access to information and voice
Cabinet
Policy Formulation
Parliament
Decision Making
Civil Society
Ministries
Policy Implementation
Private Sector
Source: John Young, Networking for impact. Experience from CTA supported regional 41 agricultural policy networks, 2007
Evidence
Resources Values and Policy Context
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Political context
Politics and Policymaking Policy analysis, & research
Campaigning, Lobbying
Links
Source: The Rapid Framework. Research and Policy in Development Programme Briefing Paper No1, October 2004
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TARGETTED INPUT SUBSIDIES ARE INVESTMENTS-RISK SHARING Being politically sensitive and professionally astute
The Global Food Crisis: Brings The Subsidy Debate to Full Circle LEARN & BUILD ON SUCCESS CASES
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Thank You