NUCLEAR DISASTER SAFETY AND PRECUATION

WHY NUCLEAR POWER IS DANGEROUS THAN OTHER POWER RESOURCES?

NUCLEAR
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL USED WHICH IS HEALTH HAZARDOUS. IT CAN CAUSES SEVEREL HEALTH PROBLEMS. FROM CANCER TO OTHER NON CURABLE DISEASES. IT NOT ONLY AFFECT THE RADIATION EXPOSED PERSON, IT PASSES THROUGH GENERATIONS IF THESE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL EXPOSED IN ENVIRONMENT IN SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT THE NUCLEAR PLANT AND IT SURROUNDING AREAS ARE COMPLETELY SHUT DOWN FOR MANY DECADES.

OTHER NON-RENUABLE

NO SUCH PROBLEMS OTHER THAN CARBON DI OXIDE EMMISION

SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT: THE CONTEXT

In relation to nuclear power, Safety is closely linked with Security, and in the nuclear field also with Safeguards. Some distinctions: Safety focuses on unintended conditions or events leading to radiological releases from authorised activities. It relates mainly to intrinsic problems or hazards. Security focuses on the intentional misuse of nuclear or other radioactive materials by non-state elements to cause harm. It relates mainly to external threats to materials or facilities. Safeguards focus on restraining activities by states that could lead to acquisition of nuclear weapons. It concerns mainly materials and equipment in relation to rogue governments

SOME BRIF HISTORICAL FACTS THAT CHANGED THE COURSE OF NUCLEAR POWER AND THE SAFTY MEASURMENT
IN 1951 FIRST NUCLEAR POWER PRODUCTION HAS BEEN DONE IN SOVIET RUSSIA AFTER 1972 TO TILL DATE NO NEW REACTOR HAS BEEN MADE 1979 THE THREE MILE ISLAND DISASTER- NO CASULTIES, RADIATION CONTAINED

1986 THE CHERNOBYL DISATER

1988 ITALY DECLEARED NO NUCLEAR POWER PRODUCTION WILL HAPPEN THERE 2010 THE FUKUSHIMA DISATER 2010 GERMANY, ONE OF THE INDUSTRIALLY DEVOLPED COUNTRY TO ANNOUNCE THAT NUCLEAR POWER TO ABANDON ENERGY BY 2020. ONLY THREE MAJOR ACCIDENTTO HAVE OCCURRED IN OVER 14500 CUMULATIVE REACTOR- YEARS OF OPERATION IN 32 COUNTRIES.

THE BACKGROUND OF NUCLEAR SAFETY

The three significant accidents in the 50-year history of civil nuclear power generation are: Three Mile Island (USA 1979) where the reactor was severely damaged but radiation was contained and there were no adverse health or environmental consequences Chernobyl (Ukraine 1986) where the destruction of the reactor by steam explosion and fire killed 31 people and had significant health and environmental consequences. The death toll has since increased to about 5 Fukushima (Japan 2011) where three old reactors (together with a fourth) were written off and the effects of loss of cooling due to a huge tsunami were inadequately contained

THESE THREE DISASTER CHANGED THE VIEWS ABOUT THE NUCLEAR POWER AND RADICALLY CHANGED ITS SAFTY FEATURE

 Where is it? -- The Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station[TMI 2] in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania near Harrisburg, United States. When the reactor -2 begin operation? -- Feb 1978 When disaster happen? ---The accident began at 4 a.m. on Wednesday, March 28, 1979

THREE MILE ISLAND DISASTER

STEPTS OF ACCIDENT THAT LEAD TO CORE MELTDOWN:

TMI-2core meltdown is a series of multiple event .

1. STUCK VALVE: 1 of 8 condensate polishers pump feeding stopped . Bypass valves closed and 2nd rys main feed water pump is not operating and steam generators no longer receiving water Rising temperatures caused emergency valve to open to release pressure Due to loss of steam, water level drops, water overheats and burns out pump
Reactor core overheats and begins to melt (a meltdown)

 lack of a dedicated instrument to measure the level of water in the core lead to faulty measurment.

operators turn off the emergency core cooling pumps

The quench tank relief diaphragm ruptured, and radioactive coolant began to leak out into the general containment building PORV was stuck open and the loss of coolant accident was still in progress, primary coolant with fission products and/or fuel was released, and ultimately ended up in the auxiliary building

STEPTS OF ACCIDENT THAT LEAD TO CORE MELTDOWN:

2. confusion over valve status: The design of the PORV indicator light was fundamentally flawed The unlighted lamp was actually misleading the operators by implying that the valve was shut . But actually the valve was open then A worker sees the open valve and closes it To prevent an explosion, he reopens it, releasing radioactive steam into the atmosphere

TMI-2 Core End-State Configuration

1.2B inlet 2.1A inlet 3.Cavity 4.Loose core debris 5.Crust 6.Previously molten material 7.Lower plenum debris 8.Possible region depleted in uranium 9.Ablated incore instrument guide 10.Hole in baffle plate 11.Coating of previously-molten material on bypass region interior surfaces 12.Upper grid damage

Radioactive material release

1979 Kemeny Commission from Metropolitan Edison and NRC data, a maximum of 13 million curies of radioactive noble gases(primarily xenon) were released by the event. However, these noble gases were considered relatively harmless, and only 1317 curies of thyroid cancer-causing iodine131 were released. Total releases according to these figures were a relatively small proportion of the estimated 10 billion curies in the reactor.

LESSONS LEARNED
Nuclear reactor operator training has been improved It focused on reacting to an emergency by going through a standardized checklist. improvements in quality assurance Improvements in control room habitability, "sight lines" to instruments, ambiguous indications each nuclear site needed to have an approved emergency plan to direct the evacuation of the public within a ten mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and to facilitate rapid notification and evacuation

The Chernobyl disaster

Where is it? Chernobyl plant, which is near the city of Prypiat and within a close proximity to the administrative border with Belarus and Dnieper river in Ukranie(then Soviet Union) When the accident happen? Saturday, 26 April 1986 at reactor number four.

STEPS TO MELTDOWN
IT WAS EXPERIMENT THAT TURNED INTO CATASTROPHIC DISASTER At 1:23:04 a.m. the experiment began. Four (of eight total) Main Circulating Pumps (MCP) were active The steam to the turbines was shut off, and a run down of the turbine generator began The diesel generator started and sequentially picked up loads, which was complete by 01:23:43 Momentum of the turbine generator decreased, the water flow rate decreased, leading to increased formation of steam voids (bubbles) in the core

STEPS TO MELTDOWN
At 1:23:40, an emergency shutdown of the reactor this fully inserted all control rods, including the manual control rods a massive power spike occurred, the core overheated. seconds later this overheating resulted in the initial explosion fuel rods fractured, blocking the control rod columns massive steam buildup, leading to a rapid increase in steam pressure A second, more powerful explosion occurred

STEPS TO MELTDOWN
the second explosion resulted from a nuclear excursion a graphite fire broke out greatly contributing to the spread of radioactive material and the contamination of outlying areas Several hypothesis about the nature of the second explosion

MAIN CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT

The operator error was probably due to their lack of knowledge of nuclear reactor physics and engineering, as well as lack of experience and training Insufficient communication between the safety officers and the operators in charge Flaw in construction of the reactor

RADIOACTIVE COMPONENT RELEASE

All of the noble gases, including krypton and xenon, contained within the reactor were released 55% of the radioactive iodine in the reactor, containing about 1760 PBq or 400 kg of I-131, was released, as a mixture of vapor, solid particles, and organic iodine compounds. Caesium (85 PBq Cs-137) and tellurium were released in aerosol form. An early estimate for fuel material released to the environment was 3 0.5%. This corresponds to the atmospheric emission of 6 t of fragmented fuel. Total atmospheric release is estimated at 5200 PBq.

Areas of Europe contaminated with 137Cs (km2)

Country Belarus Ukraine Russia Sweden Finland Austria Norway Bulgaria Switzerland Greece Slovenia Italy Moldova Totals 37185 kBq/m2 29 900 37 200 49 800 12 000 11 500 8 600 5 200 4 800 1 300 1 200 300 300 60 162 160 185555 kBq/m2 10 200 3 200 5 700 19 100 5551480 kBq/m2 4 200 900 2 100 7 200 +1480 kBq/m2 2 200 600 300 3 100

HUMAN CASULTY
IT WAS THE ONLY ACCIDENT THAT CAUSES SEVEREL HUMAN CASULTY BY DIRECT RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE 237 people suffered from acute radiation sickness (ARS), of whom 31 died within the first three months Within four years at least 5,000 of the more than 600,000 decontamination workers had died from various causes roughly 100 plant personnel, Pripyat residents, local farmers, coal miners and officials were killed in the immediate aftermath of the disaster

Assessing the disaster's effects on human health

Among the residents of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, there had been up to the year 2005 more than 6,000 cases of thyroid cancer reported in children and adolescents who were exposed at the time of the accident Thyroid cancer incidence in children and adolescents from Belarus after the Chernobyl accident. Yellow: Adults (1934) Blue: Adolescents (1518) Red: Children (014)

Fukushima Daiichi Disaster

Where is it? -- kuma, Fukushima, Japan When did it started? --12th MARCH 2011

Accident cause
11/03/2011, 2:46 p.m. local time (7 hours earlier Romanian time) near the Japanese island of Honshu was an earthquake of 9 on the Richter scale. The quake had an impact on section of north-east coast of Japan where they are located a series of nuclear power plants (NPP). Nuclear reactors have been shut down properly.

NPP DAIICHI before the earthquake

Schematic of BOILING WATER REACTOR of NPP DAIICHI

Event description 12.03.

Units 4-6 in shut down status for periodic maintenance and refuelling Units 1-3 were stopped automatically after the quake Reactor buildings and the containment successfully resist to the earthquake All reactor were dissconnected from the external AC supply Backup sources (diesel generators) started At approximately one hour after the earthquake tsunami hit the site destroyed fuel tanks of the diesel generators flooded the diesel generator building (10m protection wall was not sufficient) Mobile generators were sent to the site in a short time but they ran out of fuel Hydrogen Explosion Unit 1 Evacuation of population from the area of 20km Daiichi NPP and 10km Daina NPP (approx. 200 000 person) On-site radioactivity increased

Event description 13.03.

Lowering the internal pressure led to hydrogen explosion at unit 3 Injection of sea water into the reactor vessel without cooling units at unit 1-3 Variable on-site radioactivity Increased radioactivity at Onagawa NPP (north of Daiichi) revealed that comes from Daiichi NPP

Event description 14-15.03.

Cooling with seawater stopped at Unit 2 (unknown cause), variable water level in the reactor Hydrogen Explosion at Unit 2 Cooling with sea water stopped at all units due to lack of fuel and water source Fire then explosion in the spent fuel storage pool at unit 4 (relatively fresh fuel) Restart seawater injection in the reactor at all units Significant radioactive emission Housing on the area of 20-30 km evacuated Risk of melting the core and damage of the containment at Unit 2

Daiichi NPP after hidrogen explosion 15.03.

Event description 16.03.

Fire in spent fuel storage pool at Unit 4, cooling water evaporation Water level decrease at Unit 5, taking water from Unit 6 Unsuccessfull attempts to feed with cooling water and boric acid the spent fuel storage pool at Unit 4 Possible melting (at least partially, 50%) of the core at Units 1 and 3 Fill with water the reactor vessel of the Unit 2 Lowering water levels in the spent fuel pool at Units 3 and 4 Increasing temperature in the spent fuel pool at unit 5 and 6 Cooling with water canons from the police departement

Daiichi NPP after hidrogen explosion(16.03.)

Event description 17.03.

Radioactivity observed outside of the site
Fukushima: 3-170 Sv / h (30 km from the NPP) In two places increasing dose 80 to 170, and 26 to 95 Sv/h Other directions 1-5 Sv/h

Begining actions to connect a cable for AC supply to unit 2 Continue attempts for cooling Unit 4 with water from helicopters (without succes) then with water canons One of the diesel generators from Unit 6 supplies Unit 5 for cooling spent fuel storage pool and the reactor wessel

Event description 18-19.03.

An auxiliary transformer connected to external power source Actions to connect units 3 and 4 to AC power Actions to connect units 5 and 6 to AC power A backup generator from unit 6 repaired Continue seawater injection into the reactor vessel at Units 1-3 Cooling unit 3 with water canons provided by police and fire departement units (civil defense, fire rescu units from Tokioand U.S. army), unit 3 is considered cooling enough Considering additional cooling the spent fuel pools from Unit 4 At 5 AM, 19.03 starting pump C of the shutdown cooling system of unit 3, used to cool the spent fuel storage pool. Restart cooling Unit 4 with water cannons, in collaboration with civil defense.

Event description 20.03.

Continue works connect to the power supply units 3 and 4. Continue cooling units 3 and 4with water cannons Continue filling the spent fuel storage pools Water injection is continued in reactor vessels of units 1-3

Event description 20-21.03

Three holes are driven in the roof of reactor building units 5 and 6 to prevent hydrogen accumulation At around 15.55 light gray smoke is observed from the southpart of the 5th floor of Unit 3 Parameters of the reactor vessel and containment are not change significantly Increase of radioactivity is subsequently found that returns to lower levels later For security reasons work is stoped and personnel withdraw from unit 3 Smoke changing color to white and slowly disappears Ends connecting a cable from the main transformer of the temporary substation. It begins to restore power supply of units 3, 4, 5 and 6 It restores the power supply from diesel generator of Unit 5 March 21 the presence of radioactivity in seawater is detected near southern discharge channel near of the Daiichi NPP Cobalt, iodine and cesium is identified in seawater

Event description 22.03.

Ends cable connecting the power supply to unit 2, the supply of of the entry side starts White smoke seen in Unit 2, until the morning of 22.03 it disappears White smoke at unit 3, disappears Continue water cooling units 2, 3 and 4, at unit 4 a concrete pumping device is used to fill the spent fuel storage pool Iodine and cesium is detected in the air at the site sampling points

Event description 23.03.

Begins the injection of sea water in unit 2 using the normal cooling system Continue injecting sea water into unit 1 and 3 The power supply of units 1-6 is restored, the main control rooms are connected to the AC supply It began work on restoring power supply of the systems of all units Continue injecting seawater in the spent fuel storage pool of units 3 and 4 At 16.20, 23.03 a gray smoke is observed at unit 3, for security workers from the control room and around Unit 3 are evacuated Smoke changes in white and disappears slowly Subsequently found that radioactivity is increasing and decrease more slowly to the initial values End of water feed of the spent fuel storage pool of Unit 4

Green smoke at Unit 3 (23.03.)

Dose rates on the NPP site

NUCLEAR SAFETY
WHAT IS IT? -- It covers the actions taken to prevent nuclear and radiation accidents or to limit their consequences. This covers nuclear power plants as well as all other nuclear facilities, the transportation of nuclear materials, and the use and storage of nuclear materials for medical, power, industry, and military uses.

SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

WHAT IS THE HURDLE DESIGNING THE SAFETY FEATURES? COMPLEX SYSTEMS Failure modes of nuclear power plants Vulnerability of nuclear plants to attack Plant location Hazards of nuclear material

OPTIMUM SAFETY
As Nuclear power plant is very complex in nature it may never be tagged as FULLY SAFE power. But we can achieve Optimum safety through DEFENCE IN DEPTH mechanism. Most of the power plant is running these mechanism

Key aspects of the approach are: 1 high-quality design & construction, 2 equipment which prevents operational disturbances or human failures and errors developing into problems,

OPTIMUM SAFETY
3 comprehensive monitoring and regular testing to detect equipment or operator failures, 4 redundant and diverse systems to control damage to the fuel and prevent significant radioactive releases, 5 provision to confine the effects of severe fuel damage (or any other problem) to the plant itself.

Nuclear reactor safety systems

The three primary objectives of nuclear reactor safety systems are 1. shut down the reactor, 2. maintain it in a shutdown condition, and 3. prevent the release of radioactive material during events and accidents Severel safety systems are incorporated in NUCLEAR POWER PLANT over these years. And these systems design are constantly replaced by newar one/better one. Some basic safety systems brifed next.

Nuclear reactor safety systems

1. Reactor protection system (RPS) 2. Essential service water system (ESWS) 3. Emergency core cooling system (ECCS)

Emergency core cooling system (ECCS)

1-High pressure coolant injection system (HPCI) 2-Depressurization system 3-Low pressure coolant injection system (LPCI) 4-Isolation cooling system 5-Emergency electrical systems 6- Containment systems

Conclusion
1.Optimum safety of the Nuclear Power Plant is achieved by using defence in depth mechanism. 2. Development of more advanced Defence in depth mechanism to improve the reliability and safety of future Nuclear Power Plant